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ABSTR AC T
This study is an attem pt to examine agrarian production in  eighteenth century 
eastern Rajasthan at tw o levels. F irs t, we attem pt to establish the chronology o f the 
trends in  m a jo r indices o f agricu ltu ra l production using the annual revenue records 
o f six representative qasbas or townships. The wealth o f varied data available in  the 
revenue and related records o f the eighteenth century Ja ipur state made it  possible to 
estimate trends in  the size o f the agricu ltu ra l product, the variations in  cropping 
patterns and the secular movements o f foodgrain prices. Second, a prim ary concern 
o f the thesis has been to locate the secular trends in  production w ith in  the context o f 
the interaction between the state and the agrarian production system.
A  discussion o f the environm ental context o f agriculture in  the region leads to an 
analysis o f the log ic o f the system o f taxation that these realities predicated. The 
complexities o f the function ing  o f the socio-economic system have been analysed by 
an examination o f the mechanism o f red is tribu tion  o f the surplus, the m arketing o f 
foodgrains and the provis ion o f rura l c red it that underpinned the agrarian production 
system. We argue that the policies o f the state in these spheres were interlocked 
elements o f a coherent agrarian po licy  that sought to actively promote private 
investment and raise p roduc tiv ity  in  agricu lture. The e ffec tive  im plem entation o f 
the po licy however was cruc ia lly  dependent upon the a b ility  o f the state to m aintain 
e ffective  contro l over each element. The analysis o f the changing interaction 
between the state and rura l society in  a phase o f agrarian expansion and a period o f 
recession provides a perspective on the nature o f the linkage between po litica l 
s tab ility  and agrarian production and the impetus towards ins titu tiona l changes in  
the mechanism o f revenue collection during  the eighteenth century.
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Chapter I
IN TR O D U C TIO N
The State and the Agrarian Economy in  Pre-Colonia l Ind ia
The publication o f Ir fa n  H ab ib ’s Agrarian System o f  the Mughal Empire in  
1963 added immensely to our understanding o f the pre-co lon ia l state and economy. 
The image o f the M ughal empire presented by Habib was o f a h igh ly  centralised 
state that extracted a large p roportion  o f the peasant surplus through an elaborate 
system o f revenue taxation which was increasingly paid in  cash. The red istribu tion  
o f these revenues came to be the p rinc ipa l mode o f securing the m ilita ry  m ight o f 
the empire and the loyalty o f its po litica l agents. The bu lk  o f the resources o f the 
empire were d istributed among the nobles or mansabdars through transferable 
assignments of the revenues o f designated areas, or jagirs, in  proportion  to the ir 
status and the ir m ilita ry  contingents. A  subordinate share o f the land revenue 
accrued to the hereditary holders o f local rura l power, co llective ly termed the 
zamindars, whose partic ipa tion  in  the system was essential to fac ilita te  the process 
o f revenue collection from  the peasantry. The system that evolved was riven by the 
con flic t o f interest between the state, the jagirdars, the rura l aristocracy and the 
peasantry over the appropria tion and red istribu tion  o f the agrarian surplus. These 
conflic ts could be contained as long as the adm inistrative machinery operated an 
elaborate system o f "checks and balances" but Mughal decline was inevitable due to 
the inherent contradictions w ith in  the system. The frequent transfer o f jagirs 
exacerbated the tendency towards the over-exp lo ita tion  o f the peasantry and, by the
-  1 -
2la tter ha lf o f the seventeenth century, the increasing rura l im poverishm ent resulted 
in  the ir f lig h t from  land, a fa ll in  cu ltiva tion  and recurrent famines, culm inating 
fin a lly  in armed resistance by the peasantry and the zamindars.^
This view o f the decline of the M ughal empire was challenged by a number o f 
historians who argued that the collapse o f the system was not inherent to its 
function ing but was causally linked  to the po litica l events in  the late seventeenth 
century. They argued that i t  was the expansion o f the empire southwards and its 
fa ilu re  to respond e ffective ly  to the challenge o f the Marathas w hich  sapped the 
resources o f the empire and in tens ified  factional con flic t in  court culm inating in  
the establishment o f independent p rinc ipa lities  by ambitious M ughal nobles. W hile 
these interpretations o f M ughal decline deepened our understanding o f the po litica l 
processes set in motion by the expansion o f the empire, they im p lic it ly  accepted the 
view o f the M ughal state and economy presented by Habib.
The distinct elements of H ab ib ’s characterisation o f the M ughal economy were 
the predominance o f peasant production and the appropriation o f the bu lk o f the 
peasants’ produce, over and above subsistence requirements, in  the form  o f land 
revenue by the ru ling  classes. The structure o f revenue taxation was regressive and 
enhanced peasant s tra tifica tion  but, in  the long-run , the pressure fo r increasing 
revenue demand accentuated the leve lling  tendency o f the revenue system by 
subverting "superior" cu ltiva tion .^ The need to pay a heavy land revenue in cash 
provided the prim ary impetus to market an increasing proportion o f the agricu ltura l 
produce but at the same time le ft the peasantry w ith  lit t le  incentive and meagre 
resources to invest in  increasing p roductiv ity . This fo rm  o f "forced 
commercialisation" accounted fo r the expansion in  com m odity production and the
3considerable accumulation o f merchant capital in  the seventeenth century.^ 
However, the entire commercial structure was essentially geared towards the 
provisioning o f m ilita ry  retinues, fostering specialised artisan production and 
towards meeting the cu ltu ra lly  specific needs o f the M ughal no b ility .^  The
expansion in  trade and urbanisation in  the Mughal period was therefore crucia lly 
linked to the economic fortunes o f a small ru ling  elite whose po litica l eclipse in  the 
eighteenth century signalled a period o f general economic decline and anarchy.
Subsequent studies draw ing on rich  regional archival sources o f the eighteenth
century states have come to question some o f H ab ib ’s form ulations. M uch o f this
work was based on extensive documentation at the village level fo r  eastern
Rajasthan and Maharashtra. Satish Chandra and D ilbagh Singh showed the
existence o f a h igh ly s tra tified  village society w ith  a s ign ifican t stratum o f "rich
peasants" whose economic prosperity derived from  concessionary taxation and
partic ipa tion  in  diverse economic spheres that included the production  o f valuable
cash crops fo r the market, grain trading, moneylending and the lease o f agricultura l
implements. The indices of general trends in  agricu ltura l production in Rajasthan
and Maharashtra also indicated that a fte r the general crisis at the tu rn  o f the
eighteenth century, the agrarian economy expanded in  the next ha lf century.^
Moreover, B .R .G rover’s investigation o f rura l commerce in  north Ind ia  also
indicated that rura l commercial transactions at the level o f the small towns or
10qasbas retained the ir v ita lity  between the seventeenth and eighteenth century. 
Increasingly, historians came to question the model o f the M ughal economy 
presented by Habib and to examine more closely the notion o f irreversib le decline 
and anarchy in  the eighteenth century.
4Recent research on the social and economic history o f late pre -co lon ia l Ind ia
has sought to analyse and integrate the broader processes o f economic change and
state form ation in  the eighteenth century. Frank Perlin  sees the extensive
monetisation o f the rura l economy o f the western Deccan as part o f a larger process
o f economic development located in  the growth o f extensive peasant agriculture,
population and monetisation from  the sixteenth century onwards. He argues that by
the m id-e ighteenth century all transactions and rights to resources began to be
expressed in  monetary values. The new states that emerged in  th is period used the
same "lib ra ry  o f categories, terras and techniques", which were fle x ib le  enough to
adapt to local conditions, to draw and redistribute the agrarian surplus among
pow erfu l fam ilies w ith  a dispersed rura l base. Such a localisation o f power and
wealth stimulated the growth of "rurban" economies w hich linked  the local
exchanges incorporating the bu lk o f ru ra l inhabitants w ith  w ider regional and 
11"world economies". The princ ipa l contribu tion  o f P erlin ’s w ritings  has been to 
systematically integrate the p re-co lon ia l rura l countryside w ith  the w ider society 
and to reject the b ipo lar compartmentalisation o f urban and rura l, o f market 
exchange confined to servicing a small urban elite and the supposedly "non- 
market" exchanges characterising a se lf-su ffic ie n t and se lf-reproducing autonomous 
peasantry. A lthough documentation on these linkages is available only fo r the 
eighteenth century regional states, the general thrust o f P e rlin ’s argument is that 
these features o f the economy were not unique to the eighteenth century but had 
historically evolved in  the preceding centuries during which the monetisation o f the 
economy was as widespread as in the eighteenth century but o f a d iffe re n t order. 
This view ties in  w ith  recent research w hich posits that the po litica l fragmentation 
o f the M ughal empire was the result o f the expanding sphere o f agrarian 
production and the grow ing prosperity o f local landed elites in  the late seventeenth
519century. However, like  studies o f the M ughal economy and probably fo r s im ila r 
reasons o f source lim ita tions, P erlin ’s analysis fa ils to penetrate below the 
adm inistrative tax structures and revenue rights to provide a sense o f the system o f 
agrarian production in  pre-co lon ia l western Deccan.
Over the past decade, the reinterpretations o f the eighteenth century in  Indian
history have proposed hypotheses that attempt to draw together the broad processes
lin k in g  the social and economic developments in  Ind ia  w ith  the w ider crisis o f the
13Islamic empires and the contemporary expansion o f European trade. The 
emerging consensus o f opin ion w ith  respect to the nature o f the eighteenth century 
regimes is that the po litica l fragm entation o f the M ughal empire led to the 
evolution o f successor states that exercised "a much deeper contro l over commerce 
and production than any o f the regimes they had d isp laced ".^  The consolidation 
of regional states in  the eighteenth century demanding regular cash revenue 
payments to meet the grow ing cost o f warfare and m aintain a "new, grandiose form  
o f kingship" led to the grow ing commercialisation o f state power and the form ation
1 so f intermediate social classes between the state and agrarian society. Merchants 
and traders who had earlier serviced the Mughal revenue system became po litica lly  
more pow erfu l and Bayly argues that the eighteenth century saw the development 
o f a un ifie d  merchant class across the sub-continent. State patronage encouraged 
the consolidation o f another interm ediate group, the "service gentry", who combined 
landownership and priv ileged rights w ith  m ilita ry  and adm in istra tive expertise in  
the fie ld  o f revenue management. I t  was these intermediate social groups between 
the state and agrarian society that bought rights to farm  the revenue in  the 
successor states o f Awadh, the Maratha kingdoms, Bengal and Hyderabad.
6The consolidation o f new social groups and increased social d iffe ren tia tion  and 
vertical m ob ility  can be said to have been the characteristic features o f the
1 f teighteenth century. Bayly attempts to relate the regional variations in  economic
grow th and decline and the form ation o f social classes by emphasising the linkages
between ecology, agricu ltura l prosperity, po litica l s tab ility  and social developments.
He argues that i t  was only in  the re la tive ly stable areas o f "natural" surplus, such as
Benaras and Awadh, marked by sustained agricultura l prosperity, the persistence of
long-distance trade and relative po litica l s tab ility  that the interm ediate groups were
able to consolidate the ir position w hile  in  the agricu ltu ra lly  unstable areas, the
vicissitudes o f state patronage and the fra g ility  o f agricu lture inh ib ited  the ir 
17emergence.
In  what way d id  the fragm entation o f state power and the changing nature of
po litica l incorporation and social fo rm ation located in the eighteenth century re flect
changes in  the deeper levels o f the economy and agrarian production? David
Washbrook and Burton Stein have argued that the imperatives o f "m ilita ry  fiscalism"
18sign ifican tly  altered the relationship between the state and the economy. In  the 
drive to extract a larger share of the social product, "com munity" institu tions were 
eroded w hile at the same tim e the new instruments o f bureaucracy and fiscal 
control placed the mercantile and scribal groups in  positions o f power. The 
centralisation o f state power was reversed by the m id-eighteenth century when the 
new regimes began to farm  out the ir revenues. Washbrook has argued that revenue 
farm ing led to the accumulation o f de facto private property rights by the new 
social groups. These property rights were h igh ly s ign ifican t fo r  the development o f 
capitalism as they provided "increased security to invest capital in  production, 
especially fo r commercial purposes, and increased command over producers and the
71 Qmethods o f production". Thus the erosion o f the "m utualities between surplus 
appropriation and surplus production and between priv ilege and responsibility" that 
had governed resource d is tribu tion  by erstwhile "com m unity" institu tions led 
increasingly to the subordination o f labour and production to the imperatives o f 
commerce.
The above hypothesis provides useful insights to the general processes o f change 
in  the eighteenth century, pa rticu la rly  in  the changing nature o f state power and its 
relationship w ith  the rura l economy. I t  is ch ie fly  in  respect o f the e ffic iency o f 
revenue extraction and in  the systematisation o f the institu tions geared to that 
purpose that the early eighteenth century regimes distinguish themselves from  the 
Mughal state. In  defin ing  the relationship between the state and the agrarian 
economy, Washbrook captures the essential dynamic o f agricu ltu ra l production in  
the pre-co lon ia l period by stressing the m utua lity  in  production and revenue 
appropriation. The m ob ility  o f labour and capital and the need to attract and retain 
producers enforced state patronage and served to check against the process o f 
progressive immiserisation proposed by Habib.
However, certain propositions in  Washbrook’s arguments re lating to the changes 
in  the eighteenth century that signalled the development o f capitalism  seem to rest 
on dubious premises. Can one really equate peasant m ob ility  w ith  the existence o f 
a "labour market" in  a land surplus economy where the prim ary producers were 
forced to migrate in  response to subsistence crises? Equally, peasant entrepreneurs 
who m igrated to take advantage o f favourable opportunities cannot be considered 
symptomatic o f the development o f a labour market. The frequency o f references 
in  our sources to non-resident or "pahi" cultivators emphasises the f lu id ity  o f labour
8and agricultura l production in  the re la tive ly under-populated economy o f pre­
colonial north India. The ubiquitous presence o f pahis could be treated as 
equivalent to a demand fo r labour and a sign that "agrarian managers" were w illin g  
to finance rura l development through the grant o f surplus land, w o rk ing  capital and 
perhaps more permanent overheads such as irriga tiona l fac ilities. These features 
could be interpreted as a sign o f capita listic development. However, we cannot 
determine whether the impetus behind cu ltiva tion  by pahis was a result o f push or 
o f pu ll factors. M igrants may be responding to adverse c lim atic  or po litica l 
situations in  ad jo in ing regions or, equally, to favourable conditions and the 
patronage o ffered by the Jaipur state.
I t  is on the question o f the spread o f revenue farm ing and its im plications fo r 
the relationship between revenue farmers, peasant producers and agricultura l 
production that Washbrook’s argument appears least convincing. There is lit t le  
em pirical basis fo r the proposition that there had been an in trin s ic  change in  the 
organisation and conditions o f agricu ltu ra l production by the m id-eighteenth 
century which attracted and empowered revenue farmers to subordinate labour and 
to take control over the production process in preparation fo r  the increased 
investment and expansion in  production envisaged by these new holders o f "private" 
property rights. W hile there is considerable debate about the deleterious 
consequences or otherwise o f the fa rm ing  o f revenue on the agrarian economy, the 
rationale fo r its widespread adoption around the m id-eighteenth century in  regions 
as diverse as Awadh, the Maratha domains and Rajasthan remain obscure. I t  is not 
an adequate explanation, as Washbrook suggests, to a ttribu te  the spread o f revenue 
farm ing to the "weakness" o f the state. I t  is clear that the imm ediate cause fo r the 
farm ing o f revenue was financ ia l pressure on the resources o f the emergent
9regimes. W hile various factors external to the agrarian economy may be said to 
have contributed to in tensified  fiscal pressure -  such as the stoppage in  bu llion  
imports by the East Ind ia  Company, the change in  m ilita ry  technology or the 
payment o f large war indemnities -  the process whereby fiscal pressure was 
translated in to  a fundamental change in  these states’ management o f the ir resources 
remains unclear. To do this we need to develop a clearer understanding o f the 
logic and function ing  o f the agrarian system p rio r to its subversion to the relative 
ad-hocism o f revenue farm ing. I t  is this understanding which would enable us to 
trace the processes whereby the fo rm er system o f taxation became inoperable and 
yielded to that time-tested alternative in Islam ic taxation -  the fa rm ing  o f revenue.
Organisation o f the Thesis
The larger questions concerning the nature o f po litica l contro l and social 
form ation in  eighteenth century regimes in fo rm  our study to the extent that the 
structure and organisation o f agrarian production was moulded by and responded to 
w ider socioeconomic changes. The aim o f our study is to relate the trends in  the 
quantitative indices o f agricu ltura l production in the suburbs o f six qasbas in  
eastern Rajasthan to changes in  the agrarian economy in  the region during the 
eighteenth century. The qasbas selected form ed part o f the emergent state o f 
Jaipur that consolidated itse lf in  the wake o f the Mughal decline in  the eighteenth 
century. Qasbas have generally been defined in  terms which seek to distinguish 
them from  readily iden tifiab le  and d is tinctive  units such as villages and cities and 
w hich also emphasise the ir interm ediate status between the w ho lly  rural and the 
uniquely urban. Thus terms such as "rurban", "nuclear" urban, township and town 
convey that the qasbas shared certain urban features w ith  the c ity  or "shahr" such as
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a fixed  market, a concentration o f non-agricu ltu ra l population, m ilita ry  garrisons
0 0and forts and adm inistrative functions. W ith in  the ru ra l-u rban  continuum , the 
basis fo r  the classification o f an urban centre as a qasba rather than a shahr derived 
p rim a rily  from  the extent o f its adm inistrative ju risd ic tion . The adm inistrative 
hierarchy as defined in  the A in -i-A kbari consisted o f the successive grouping o f 
te rrito ria l units from  the "mauza" (village) to the "tappa", "pargana", "sarkar" 
(d is tric t) and "suba" (province). The adm inistrative headquarters o f larger units 
such as the sarkar and suba were termed shahr while those o f low er adm inistrative 
units -  the parganas and tappas -  were termed qasbas. The size and prosperity o f 
urban centres in  the pre-co lon ia l period were to a large extent dependent upon 
external factors such as shifts in  po litica l power and trade routes. Hence the 
gradation in  the degree of ’urban-ness’ im plied  in the orig ina l classification o f 
shahr and qasba in  the A iii-i-A kbari became distorted in  la ter periods due to the 
uneven pace o f grow th o f urban centres. This is evident in  a comparison o f the 
relative po litica l and economic importance in  the eighteenth century o f Jodhpur, a 
sarkar headquarters and therefore a shahr and Jaipur, w hich continued to be 
labelled a qasba.
The selection o f six qasbas fo r the analysis o f agricu ltu ra l production was 
essentially based on considerations o f data consistency which sought to overcome 
the methodological problems o f earlier studies. The trends in  rates o f taxation, 
prices o f foodgrains and cropping patterns have been compiled from  the annual 
revenue returns maintained fo r the d irectly  administered or "khalisa" lands. Such 
revenue abstracts recorded details perta in ing to production and taxation at the level 
o f the prim ary fiscal units -  the village or qasba -  and aggregations o f these 
corresponding to the adm inistrative boundaries o f the pargana. The basic problem
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that earlier studies encountered in  using pargana level figures was that the number 
o f villages included in  the aggregate revenue statistics changed constantly from  
season to season due to changes in  pargana boundaries and the transfer o f village 
revenues outside o f khalisa adm inistration. Hence in  any analysis using aggregate 
annual revenue returns as an index o f long-term  trends in  production , i t  was 
d if f ic u lt  to isolate changes that were purely the result o f adm inistrative 
reorganisation from  those that were representative o f secular trends in  patterns o f 
production. The database fo r ind iv idua l villages was s im ila rly  v itia ted , and it  had 
the added disadvantage that the range o f crops grown was lim ited .
Crop production in  the h in terland of the established qasbas, on the other hand, 
provided conveniently large units fo r  analysis and, un like parganas, the ir boundaries 
remained constant. Further, the importance o f adm inistrative contro l over the 
m ajor qasbas in order to co-ordinate the e ffic ien t extraction o f revenue from  the 
pargana meant that they were almost invariab ly under d irect adm inistration or 
khalisa. Hence the con tinu ity  in  the annual revenue series o f the qasbas is broken 
only fo r years where the records have not survived. In  the in terpre ta tion  o f the 
trends derived from  revenue data o f the qasbas, however, i t  was necessary to 
examine the extent to which the locational advantages of the qasbas influenced the ir 
cropping pattern and therefore how representative our analysis was w ith  respect to 
trends fo r the region as a whole. On the other hand, the greater access enjoyed by 
the qasba agricu lturists to the local produce market and cred it sources meant that 
the agricu ltura l statistics o f the qasbas provided a sensitive ind ica to r o f economic 
change.
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The methodology adopted to assess the production trends in the qasbas selected 
was to separately examine the changes in  three component elements that together 
accounted fo r annual variations in  the revenue obtained. The coexistence o f two 
disparate modes o f revenue appropria tion meant that the relevant revenue 
in fo rm ation  recorded fo r cash assessed crops was not comparable to that recorded 
fo r foodgrain production. The data recorded fo r the crops assessed in  cash per un it 
o f land by the mode commonly known as the "zabti" method, included details o f 
annual crop acreage, the rate o f taxation per un it o f land and the total revenue 
obtained fo r each crop. The statistics associated w ith  the crop-sharing fo rm  o f 
assessment, the "batai" or "jins i" mode, were the quantity o f crop collected in  
revenue, its sale price and the total revenue obtained. Hence each mode of taxation 
required the recording o f three in te rlinked  elements: namely, a physical measure o f 
production (acreage cultivated or grain produced), a conversion code to assign the 
state’s share o f the produce a monetary value (a crop-specific  tax rate per un it o f 
land or crop price), and lastly the total revenue obtained. O ur m a jo r problem w ith  
this fo rm  o f record-keeping is that although we are p rim a rily  interested in the 
changes in  the physical measures which act as a proxy fo r trends in  production, 
these cannot be compared across the tw o disparate modes o f revenue taxation.
Recent studies o f the agrarian economy o f eastern Rajasthan using s im ila r 
revenue records have relied solely upon the revenue obtained from  each crop as the 
common basis fo r studying in tra -c rop , in ter-harvest and annual trends. However, 
the va lid ity  o f this method as a measure o f production trends is lim ited . This is 
because variations in  aggregate revenue returns could be caused by actual changes 
in production -  either in  terms o f a change in  the c rop -m ix  or an expansion in  
production or in  the p roduc tiv ity  o f land -  or could equally be caused by changes
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in  the codes through which production was translated in to  disposable income -  that 
is, in  the prevailing prices or rates o f taxation. Hence, as the revenue collected fo r 
each crop provides the only element common to all crops, this has been used in  the 
thesis as the basis fo r comparison a fte r isolating the possible d istortions caused by 
coterminous changes in  revenue rates and prices. We have therefore analysed in  
tu rn  the trends in  revenue rates (Chapter V I), foodgrain prices (Chapter V II)  and 
acreage cultivated and quantities produced (Chapter V II I)  to in fo rm  and deepen our 
understanding o f the overall trends in  agricu ltura l production in  the six qasbas.
We have attempted to set the investigation o f the trends in  agricu ltura l 
production against the background o f the changes in  the agrarian economy o f the 
region in  the eighteenth century in  order to better understand and id e n tify  the 
significance o f the shifts in  agricu ltu ra l production discernible in  the statistical 
series. We begin in Chapter I I  by id e n tify in g  the constraints on agricultura l 
production in  a dry farm ing region prone to frequent droughts, a variable ra in fa ll 
pattern and a re lative ly low  population density. In such an environm ent i t  was not 
ownership o f land but the possession o f draught animals that was an essential 
prerequisite to cu ltivation. Cattle were particu larly  vulnerable to the recurrence o f 
drought which severely restricted the ab ility  o f settled farmers to breed and 
maintain them. The precariousness o f the princ ipa l components o f the physical 
resource base, namely ra in fa ll and animal power, meant that agricu ltu ra l production 
in  the region was characterised by w ide fluctuations from  year to year. The crop" 
m ix was dominated by food crops capable o f w ithstanding water-stress such as 
m illets and barley. However, the low natural fe r t il ity  o f the soil could be offset by 
investment in  various types o f irr iga tion  methods ranging from  costly b rick -lin e d  
wells to simple w a te r- lif t in g  devices. In  the absence o f perennial rivers, the
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effective u tilisa tion  o f ground water was crucial fo r stabilising production and 
making possible the cu ltiva tion  o f a w ide array o f crops. In  particu lar, the rabi or 
w in te r harvest and the cu ltiva tion  o f high value crops such as sugarcane, indigo and 
cotton in  the kh a rif harvest were w holly  dependent on a r t if ic ia l irriga tion . The 
expansion or in tensifica tion  o f agricu ltu ra l production therefore required the 
investment o f resources in  the construction o f wells.
In  the long-run  however agricu ltura l production was not sim ply a function  of 
the ava ilab ility  o f water. In  a period characterised by the m o b ility  o f labour and 
capital, trends in  production were underpinned by a complex interaction between 
demography, the d is tribu tion  o f resources and access to markets. These factors in  
turn were influenced by po litica l conditions and the patronage and protection 
o ffered by states eager to expand the ir revenue base. The state played a v ita l role 
in the management and d is tribu tion  o f resources and agricu ltura l p roduc tiv ity  was 
closely linked  to policies which served to attract and retain labour, encourage 
investment and promote trade. Chapters I I I  to V  examine the role o f the state in  
the agrarian production system exercised through the regulation o f the social 
d is tribu tion  o f resources in rura l society, the regulation o f rura l cred it and through 
the mechanism of its control over the m arketing o f foodgrains. Changes in  the 
nature o f state control between the firs t and second ha lf o f the eighteenth century 
provide an insight in to  the nature and dynamics o f agrarian production and the 
impact o f po litica l and economic change on agricultura l p roduc tiv ity .
I t  is partly  due to the lim ita tio n  o f our sources and the ir ove rrid ing  concern 
w ith  revenue transactions that the relations between state and society figure  so 
prom inently in  our discussion o f the agrarian economy. M ore im portantly ,
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however, one o f the prim ary concerns o f the study is to seek to understand the 
relationship between state action and agrarian p roductiv ity . I t  is on this question 
that historians o ffe r diverse and contradictory opinions. H abib argues that a 
’strong’ state s tifled  normal commercialisation and productive  investment in  
agriculture; and the corollary to this hypothesis echoed in  recent re-interpretations 
o f the eighteenth century suggests that i t  was only in  the context o f a ’weak’ state 
that an inc ip ien t development o f capita list enterprise under the aegis o f private 
entrepreneurs became possible. A  resolution o f the contradictions between these 
approaches requires a dynamic view o f the nexus o f state and society. The lack o f 
correspondence between the em pirica l evidence and theorisation and the 
contradictions between these approaches indicates that the lit t le  understood linkages 
between broader economic developments, state forms and the dynamics of peasant 
production remain subjects fo r h istorical investigation.
Sources
The prim ary sources consulted are from  the D afta r D iw an H azuri collection o f 
the Jaipur Records, located in  the Rajasthan State A rch ives, B ikaner. The 
abundance o f documentation on land taxation fo r  a variety o f eighteenth century 
regimes is in  itse lf ind icative o f a fundamental dimension o f state fo rm ation in  this 
period. The records o f the Jaipur state are unique in  that we have fo r the f irs t 
time detailed in fo rm ation  on local conditions as well as num erical data that perm its 
analysis o f a k ind  that is not possible fo r earlier periods thus m arking a new stage 
in  the historiography o f rura l India. In  addition to the range o f quantita tive 
in form ation that the revenue records provide, the logic o f the ir organisation gives 
us an ind ication o f the operational factors o f the agrarian production system.
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However, the sheer volume o f documentation and the fact that i t  is so scattered 
necessitates some form  o f selection that aims to focus on certain aspects o f the rura l 
order w ith in  defined geographical lim its . W ith  regard to qua lity  and accessibility, 
the documents range from  the v irtu a lly  uncatalogued but extremely in form ative  
collections o f "chittis" or letters, to the systematically arranged series o f annual 
revenue records. The sources used in  this study can be broadly classified into fou r 
categories, namely, a) fiscal records, b) taxation schedules, c) censuses and surveys, 
and d) o ff ic ia l correspondence.
A : Fiscal Records:
The data fo r the statistical series analysed was obtained from  the annual account 
o f income and expenditure o f a pargana. The annual statement termed the arhsatta 
m u jm il was compiled from  a varie ty o f notations some o f w hich, such as the 
roznamchas or roznamas. were daily running accounts while  others, such as the 
dastur amals remained unchanged over many years. O f the broad spectrum o f 
documents that we have categorised under fiscal records, the arhsattas are the most 
in form ative  and well catalogued. A p a rt from  the arhsattas, few  o f the other 
records have survived and i t  is only by examining the ir func tion  and the ir 
relationship w ith  the fina l statement o f annual accounts that we can fu lly  appreciate 
the valuable corroborative and supplementary in form ation that they provide.
A n  estimate or taqmina o f the agricu ltura l revenue fo r the season was drawn up 
in the period between the sowing and harvesting o f the crop. The taqmina 
contained an estimate o f the area sown w ith  each crop in  each revenue un it in  the 
pargana. Depending upon the customary mode o f assessment prevailing, the 
revenue obtainable was calculated by applying cash rates per u n it o f land fo r crops
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assessed in  cash and in the case o f foodgrains assessed in  k ind , the revenue share 
and its market value were gauged by estimating the average y ie ld  and the price o f 
sale. The taqminas therefore provide the only source o f in fo rm ation  on foodgrain 
acreage and yields. I t  is uncertain, however, how reliable these estimates were and 
in particu lar i f  the average yields were based on sc ien tific  measurements. Few o f 
these documents have survived and a comparison o f the acreages recorded fo r cash 
assessed crops in  the taqmina o f pargana Lalsot fo r the kh a rif harvest o f VS 
1788/AD 1731 w ith  that o f the arhsatta o f the same year shows that the taqmina 
figures were underestimated by th ir ty  to fo rty  per cent. As the zabti acreage 
figures are found to be inaccurate in  the taqmina records, the acreage estimates fo r 
jin s i crops cannot be relied upon absolutely and can at best p rovide approximations 
o f relative acreage.
The com pilation o f the actual revenue demand began w ith  a detailed assessment 
o f the ind iv idua l lia b ility  o f each tax payer which was noted in  the khasra. O f the 
khasras examined, only one was considered suitable fo r analysis. The m a jo rity  o f 
the khasras had either a few pages missing or were specimens from  the early 
nineteenth century. Generally, the khasras do not record the name o f the pargana 
w ith in  which the village lay and hence i t  was not possible to locate the revenue 
records o f the village and compare the total revenue recorded in  the khasra w ith  
that recorded in  the arhsatta o f the same harvest and year.
Based upon the figures in  the khasras, the revenue demand was computed by 
applying the appropriate cash rates per un it o f land in  accordance w ith  the revenue 
schedules or dastur amals fo r crops assessed in  cash. In  the case o f crops assessed 
in -k in d , the khasra recorded the state’s share o f the revenue a fte r the d ivision o f
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the crop. Details o f the sale o f the grain were noted in  the daily accounts or 
roznamchas maintained by the pargana treasurer. The roznamcha records consist o f 
five  types o f notations: i)  daily receipts and expenditure incurred from  the pargana 
treasury and the cash balance (roznamcha ootadarb ii)  the rate o f discount on b ills  
o f exchange or hundis (roznamcha liundaw ani), i i i )  bazar prices o f foodgrains, 
articles o f mass consumption such as coarse cloth, "ghi" and "gur" and the exchange 
rate fo r  gold, silver and copper coins (roznamcha n irakh bazar1), iv ) an account o f 
the contracted sale o f the state’s revenue collected in  grain (roznamcha satti) on 
which was recorded the names o f the purchasers, the day o f the contract, the price 
agreed and the quantity o f grain sold to each buyer, v) fines imposed fo r thefts, 
misdemeanours, fraud and other offences (roznamcha fa ro h i). In  parganas where 
the Jaipur raja was also the local zam indar or bhomia, a separate roznamcha bhomi 
was also compiled. Separate daily accounts were also maintained fo r sources o f 
non-agricu ltu ra l income such as the roznamcha chabutra ko tw a li. These 
roznamchas were the daily records o f taxes realised on the transit, sale and purchase 
o f commodities at the chabutra ko tw a li or custom house and police station in  the 
qasba. The detailed income statement is fo llowed by an account o f adm inistrative 
expenses and charitable donations and the fin a l balance.
The fin e r detail contained in records such as the khasras and roznamchas is lost 
in  the summary statements compiled m onthly, the goshwaras. or seasonally and 
annually such as the iamabandhis and arhsattas. The la tte r two records appear to 
have been routine ly compiled on a s ix-m on th ly  basis, the months from  early 
September (Bhadon sudi 3) to early M arch (Phagun sudi 3) com prising the kh a rif 
harvest and the fo llow ing  six months the rabi harvest, and a com bined or m u jm il 
statement produced annually. Generally, the jamabandhis provide a greater level o f
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detail than the arhsattas on aspects like  the varying rates o f taxation, the gradation 
in  the state’s share o f the grain heap depending upon the social status o f the tax 
payer and on the manner in  which the variety o f additional levies imposed to 
defray the costs o f revenue collection and supervision were calculated. The 
jamabandhis are thought to be statements o f assessed land revenue p r io r to 
collection w hile  the arhsattas recorded the actual revenue collected. However, a 
comparison o f the two types o f records fo r the 1727 rabi harvest in  pargana Phagi 
shows that the total revenue figures and the ir disaggregation by crop-type  fo r each 
revenue un it are identical. Further, the jamabandhis also record the date and price 
o f sale o f revenue collected in  k ind  and cannot s tric tly , therefore, be statements o f 
anticipated or assessed revenue. The d ifference in  the two records appears to be 
that the arhsattas contain summations o f revenue obtained from  agricu ltu ra l as well 
as non-agricu ltu ra l sources, or sawai jamabandhi revenue, w h ile  the jamabandhi 
documents record only agricu ltura l revenue. We have therefore used the revenue 
in fo rm ation  in  the jamabandhi documents where available to supplement the 
arhsattas records, particu la rly  fo r  years where the arhsattas are not available.
The logic o f the tax system therefore necessitated a very precise form  o f data 
collection and m onitoring o f agricu ltu ra l production. A lthough the revenue records 
provide us w ith  a unique source o f quantita tive data on v ita l aspects o f the agrarian 
economy they contain lit t le  or no in fo rm ation  on related subjects such as 
population, crop yields, size o f holdings, peasant m arketing or local trade. The lack 
o f data on such im portant factors o f supply and demand preclude the possib ility o f 
a total investigation o f the conditions and trends in  agrarian production. Further, 
the source is discontinuous. The ava ilab ility  o f the most complete series o f records 
determined the choice o f the qasbas to be analysed and defined the lim its  o f the
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period o f study. For the six qasbas selected, reasonably complete series were 
available from  1710 to 1770. The arhsattas were generally organised around the 
fiscal year corresponding to a twelve month period beginning in  early September. 
The convention we have adopted in  the thesis fo r  the conversion o f the fiscal year 
to its equivalent in  the Christian era is to cite the year in  w h ich  the fiscal year 
began -  hence we refer to the year 1721 rather than the more accurate 1721/22 to 
denote the fiscal year VS 1778.
B: Taxation Schedules
The second category o f documents used are dastur-u l-am als. or o ff ic ia l 
schedules o f rates o f taxation on agricu ltu ra l production and trade and commercial 
activ ity . The dasturs perta in ing to agricu ltura l taxation c la rify  the principles o f 
agrarian taxation and serve to establish to what degree the o ff ic ia l rates were 
actually implemented by cross-checking w ith  the annual revenue records. The 
dasturs on the sale and purchase o f commodities at the aasba. the period ic village 
market (hat) and fa irs as well as the transit duties on goods transported w ith in  and 
outside the region are equally detailed. The la tte r a ffo rd  an insight in to  the types 
o f goods traded, the categories o f traders classified according to the ir scale o f 
operations and residential status, and the types o f carriages used to transport goods. 
However, t i l l  such tim e as source material on actual taxation o f trading and 
commercial ac tiv ity , such as the roznamcha chabutra kotwalis m entioned above, are 
found in  su ffic ien tly  long series the analytical value o f the related taxation 
schedules is lim ited.
C: Censuses and Surveys
In  this category are included the documents termed vaddashtis or haqiqatis
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which appear to have been a record o f specially commissioned surveys rather than 
data routinely collected. A lthough very few o f these documents have been located, 
they provide im portant in fo rm ation  on a variety o f subjects such as lists o f deserted 
villages in  a pargana, the amounts paid to the revenue s ta ff in  each village o f a 
pargana, a lis ting  o f revenue arrears and agricu ltura l loans outstanding against 
ind iv idua l taxpayers. The most fascinating o f such documents are the censuses o f 
cattle owned by each cu ltiva to r in  a pargana. Such cattle censuses were 
commissioned to aid in  the resettlement o f areas that had been depopulated or to 
assess the productive potentia l o f an area that had been recently transferred to the 
Jaipur raja. By p rov id ing  a measure o f the variation in  the ownership o f a v ita l 
asset, these records lend themselves to a quantitative examination o f questions such 
as peasant d iffe ren tia tion . The yaddashtis also record the reasons fo r  the increase 
or decrease in  the number o f cu ltiva ting  fam ilies in  each village surveyed over the 
past year and thereby enable us to fo rm  an estimate o f a v ita l feature o f pre­
colonial agricu ltura l production -  namely, the extent o f peasant m ob ility . Six such 
cattle censuses have been analysed and these constitute the entire data that could be 
located fo r our period and region.
D: O ffic ia l Reports and Correspondence:
The last category o f sources, which we have classified as o ff ic ia l reports and 
correspondence, include the arzdashts. amber records, parwanas. sanads and the 
collections of ch ittis . The arzdashts and amber records provide in fo rm ation  o f a 
more general nature relating to events o f importance at the d is tric t o r regional level 
brought to the attention o f the raja and his instructions in  response. The arzdashts 
are, in essence, minutes o f proceedings at the darbar. Parwanas on the other hand 
contained the ra ja ’s directives addressed to ind iv idua l state functionaries w hile  a
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"sanad" was issued by the diwan and listed the entitlements o f the addressee, 
generally a jag irdar.
By fa r the most numerous and in fo rm ative  source documents are the ch ittis  
which record the correspondence between the diwans, the ch ie f adm inistrative and 
revenue o ffic ia ls  o f the state, and the subordinate o ffic ia ls  at the pargana, 
particu larly  the amil. Each ch itti contains the substance o f the com plaint, request 
or report received by the diwan from  various o ffic ia ls  or ind iv idua ls which is 
fo llowed by his instructions on the matter. A lthough the m a jo rity  o f ch ittis  are 
concerned w ith  the m inutiae o f local adm inistration that are o f lim ite d  h istorical 
interest, amongst the thousands of such letters that have survived are also a select 
few that provide a rare insight in to  rura l life . Such ch ittis  fo rm  an invaluable
source as they enable us to grasp the structure o f rural relationships through the ir
emphasis on events or developments that deviated from  the norm, were exceptional 
or had led to con flic t. The o ff ic ia l response to such situations contained in  the
diwan’s reply are a commentary on the aims and policies o f the state and the
function ing o f the system on the ground. Im portant as these documents are, a 
comprehensive survey o f the ch ittis  by theme, period or geographical location is not 
possible as they have not been catalogued systematically. O rig ina lly , the ch ittis  
pertaining to a particu la r pargana appear to have been chronologically arranged and 
each years records form ed one loose-leaf bundle. Several hundred o f such bundles 
have survived, each containing on average two to three hundred documents, but the 
orig ina l sequence has been disturbed and most bundles contain a m ix  o f various 
types o f documents from  d iffe ren t years and parganas. We have therefore compiled 
a running index o f the ch ittis , sanads and parwanas, amber records and arzdashts 
that were selected and m icro film ed  from  various bundles and record collections.
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A  large number o f terms in  our documents are adapted form s o f Persian terms. 
In  the transliteration o f these and other Rajasthani words we have, in  general, 
fo llowed the spelling in  the orig ina l documents w ithou t fo rm al d iacritica l marks. 
On the firs t occurrence o f an indigenous word in  the thesis i t  has been enclosed 
w ith in  double quotation marks and subsequent references to i t  have not been 
highlighted in  this way. Indigenous words used frequently in  the thesis have been 
included in  the glossary.
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Chapter II
TH E  SETTING
A  regional study o f agricu ltura l production must begin by placing the region 
w ith in  the context o f its natural resource position. The natural endowments o f a 
region, in  association w ith  the level and type o f technology and patterns o f 
economic exchange, set the broad parameters fo r such an analysis. I t  is in  this 
context that a discussion o f the topography, soils, ava ilab ility  o f water, rivers, and 
climate o f the region under study becomes pertinent.
The region under examination, comprising the six qasbas o f Sawai Jaipur,
Sanganer, Phagi, Lalsot, Chatsu and Malarna, lies w ith in  the modern districts o f
Jaipur and Sawai M adhopur in  eastern Rajasthan. The region is bounded on the
northwest by a chain o f h ills w hich fo rm  a natural boundary between the sem i-arid
area o f the Shekhawati and the more fe rtile  tracts o f the core Jaipur territories. To
the northeast, the region is demarcated from  the Trans-Yam una plains by the
Uplands o f A lw a r, and to the east lies the Karau li Tableland, separated by a range
o f low  hills marking the border. Westwards from  Jaipur lie  the A ra va lli mountains
and the southern boundary o f the region is form ed by the Banas rive r a fter i t
1
emerges from  the h il l ranges at Rajmahal and flows southeast to jo in  the Chambal.
Eastern Rajasthan is characterised by a lluvia l soils. The a lluv ia l deposits are 
scanty towards the west where the p la in  is higher and more irregu la r due to 
scattered h ills  w hile  in  the south and east the a lluvium  increases. To the north
-  26 -
27
and west o f Jaipur, the soil is generally sandy but occasionally s t i f f  clayey soil 
m ixed w ith  gravel or "kankar" is also found. Eastwards, along the Banganga rive r 
basin, the soil is rich  f irm  loam becoming sandier but very productive in  the area 
fu rthe r east around H indaun. Southwards from  Jaipur the soil is rich and fe rtile
a
especially along the Banas river. The modern tehsils o f Dadu, Phagi, Chatsu, 
Sanganer, Lalsot and Dausa ly in g  to the south and east o f Jaipur have loamy soils.**
The general drainage o f the region fo llows the slope o f the land towards the 
east and south-east from  the A rava lli. The m ajor perennial rive r, the Banas, 
provides the m acro -iden tifica tion  o f the region as the Banas P lain.^ The Banas has 
several tributaries, the most im portant o f which is the M ore l w h ich  rises east o f
Jaipur and flows south. I t  is jo ined  by the A m an-i-S hah i and the Dhund,
orig inating in  the h ills  north o f Jaipur. A fte r  jo in ing  the K ha ri as i t  emerges from  
the Lalsot-Toda Bhim  range, the M ore l flows into the Banas. A no the r tribu ta ry  o f 
the Banas, the rive r Mashi, is jo ined  by the Bandi and flows southeast to the Banas. 
Besides the Banas, the other two im portant rivers both o rig inating  in  the h ills north 
o f Jaipur, are the Sabi, which runs in  the north-easterly d irection  towards Gurgaon 
(Haryana), and the Banganga which flows east to jo in  the Yamuna. The Gambhir, 
a tribu ta ry  o f the Banganga, drains the Toda Bhim  and H indaun area.^
The basins o f the m ajor rivers and the ir tributaries fo rm  the m icro-regions 
w ith in  the broader geographical zone of the Banas Plain. The M ore l basin
incorporates the ’core’ areas o f the erstwhile Jaipur state. Four of the six
representative qasbas under study fa ll w ith in  this sub-region. The M orel Basin is 
characterised by scattered h ills  and a high water table in  the fo o th ill zone. In  
contrast to the yellow  soils o f the more fe rtile  Gam bhir and Banganga basins, the
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8M orel basin has in fe r io r  brown soil w ith  a high proportion o f cu ltivab le waste. To 
the south o f the M ore l basin lies the Tonk peneplane subdivided in to  the Sarwar 
Tract, M alpura Tract and the Gangapur M ai Tract, This zone is characterised by 
dark brown or black soil w ith  a hard rocky substratum w hich makes digging o f 
wells expensive and d if f ic u lt ,  though tanks can be easily constructed. The 
agricultura l potentia l o f this peneplane, in  terms o f fe r t i l i ty  o f soils and ava ilab ility  
o f irriga tiona l water, increases considerably proceeding from  west to east.^ The 
qasbas o f Phagi and Malarna were located in  what are now the modern tehsils o f 
Phagi (Dist. Jaipur) and Bon li (D ist. Sawai M adhopur) in  the zones iden tified  as the 
M alpura Tract and Gangapur M ai T ract, respectively.
Water Resources.
The average annual ra in fa ll in  the region under study varies between 500mm. to 
7 0 0 m m .^  The general trend o f the isohyetal lines is in  the d irection  northeast to 
southwest w ith  annual ra in fa ll increasing from  west to east. The region lies on the 
lim its  o f two monsoon currents -  the southeast and the southwest. This, however, 
results in  an extreme va riab ility  in  annual ra in fa ll determ ined by whether the
M 11region receives rain from  both currents or only "the f i t f u l  remnants o f one".
Most o f the ra in fa ll is concentrated in  the monsoon months from  June to
1 9  #September, the w in te r ra in fa ll being ins ign ifican t. The precarious nature o f the 
ra in fa ll is the most s ign ificant constraint on agricultura l p roduction in  the region. 
In  particu lar, crops grown in  the rabi or w in te r harvest are w ho lly  dependent on 
a rtif ic ia l irr iga tion  w ith  the exception o f lim ited  stretches o f seasonally inundated 
land.
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In  order to offset the va riab ility  in  ra in fa ll, both l i f t  and flo w  methods o f 
irriga tion  were prevalent in  the eighteenth century. As there are no snowfed rivers 
in  the region, the significance o f the rivers mentioned as sources o f a rtif ic ia l
I  ' I
irriga tion  is very lim ited  and most rivers run dry soon a fter the monsoon. On the
other hand, the high water table, varying from  a few feet to 30 or 40 feet,
fac ilita ted the digging o f wells which were "numerous" at the end o f the nineteenth
c e n t u r y . T h e  M ore l basin, in  particu lar, was characterised by a fa ir ly  high water
15table which was conducive to the p ro life ra tion  o f wells in  this region.
Wells were both "kutcha" (tem porary) and "pukka" (masonry). The depth o f the
well determined the type o f device to be used fo r l i f t in g  water. The "charas"
system was used when the water table was at the level o f 30 feet or below. These
wells were worked by cattle draw ing a leather bucket or charas over a pulley
1 f\mounted at the top o f the well. A  masonry or permanent w e ll f itte d  w ith  a
charas was called "koth i kua". These wells were stone or b rick  lined and though
more expensive to construct, were least liable to fa ilu re  in  years o f low ra in fa ll as
17they tapped water at the spring level. Temporary wells using the same lif t in g
1 f t  *mechanism were known as "dhers. Water ly ing  closer to the surface, was lif te d
by the Persian wheel or "rehat". This device was especially useful fo r  raising water
from  tanks, channels and rivu lets or when the water table was higher than 30 
1 Qfeet. The "dhenkali" was a shallow p it-w e ll dug where water was near the
surface but permanent wells could not be constructed as, fo r  example, on the sandy
soil o f dried r ive r beds. Such temporary wells, rarely lasting more than a season or
90two, were worked manually using a lever princip le . This was the cheapest and 
simplest device fo r  l i f t in g  water.
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Some idea o f the number o f wells in  the eighteenth century can be gauged from
a report dated 1725 that stated that 1,100 masonry wells had been constructed in
21the past seven years in  the 874 villages o f pargana Sawai Jaipur. The total
number o f wells in  the pargana, inc lud ing the kutcha wells, must have been 
considerably h igher as the expense o f constructing pukka wells meant that the 
number o f such b r ic k - lin e d  wells was small compared to the re la tive ly cheaper 
dhers. In  an earlier count o f wells in  a group o f 18 villages, only 41 o f the 528 
wells were b rick -lined .
The rocky substratum o f the Tonk region to the south o f the M ore l basin made 
well construction d if f ic u lt .  In  this region, as is current now, tanks provided the 
m ajor source o f irriga tion . The an tiqu ity  o f tank irr iga tion  in  the erstwhile Jaipur 
State was attested to by the Report o f the Irr iga tion  Commission (1901-1903) which
recorded the ir large numbers and commented that "some o f the largest and best
2*2
tanks were made many hundreds o f years ago.1 As a rule, water collected in 
storage tanks was only used fo r the rabi crop. A t the end o f the season, tanks 
generally ran dry, the large tanks in  A p r il and smaller tanks a fte r the f irs t 
sow ings .^  The margins and moist beds o f the tanks were then cultivated.
The importance o f irr iga tion  in  a dry farm ing region w ith  "predictable 
va riab ility " in  the quality o f the agricu ltu ra l season was reflected in  the complex 
classification o f revenue rates in  the eighteenth century. In  add ition  to the basic 
categorisation between un irrigated or "barani" land and irriga ted  "chahi" lands, the 
tax schedules were fu rthe r d iffe ren tia ted  on the basis o f the source, quantum and 
method o f irriga tion .
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Rural Settlement Pattern
The pattern o f rura l settlement, being closely related to the cu ltiva tion  o f soil, 
can be said to be p rim a rily  determ ined by the physiography o f the region, the 
ava ilab ility  and location o f water resources and the fe r t i l i ty  o f the soil. G iven the 
lack o f any large-scale modern irr iga tion  works in  the region under study, i t  is 
perhaps reasonable to assume that the type o f rural settlement in  the eighteenth 
century was in  general terms, s im ilar to that at present.
Three types o f rura l settlements -  compact, cluster-ham let and cluster-
farmstead -  can be found in  the study region. The tendency towards dispersed
villages is most pronounced in  the M ore l basin due to a high water table and the
need to protect the crops from  w ild  animals. The relative ease w ith  which wells can
be dug and the large number o f such wells has reduced the need fo r compact
villages. A n  average village consists o f a main site and several farmsteads ("dhanis"
or "vas") scattered among the sites o f wells. However, the low  natural fe r t il ity  o f
the soil in  the M orel basin as compared to the Banganga and Gam bhir basins,
results in  lower rura l densities and a larger percentage o f cu ltivable  waste in  this 
27zone.
The physiography o f the Tonk peneplane, on the other hand, discourages the 
construction o f wells. Tanks form ed by blocking the flow  o f seasonal streams are 
the most im portant sources of irriga tion . As the sites where tanks can be 
constructed are lim ited , the villages in the Gangapur M ai tract are large, compact
and w idely spaced. The density o f rura l population varies, being higher in  the
28fe rtile  eastern tracts and low er in  the western Sarwar tract.
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The village, in  the eighteenth century revenue records, was both a prim ary 
te rrito ria l locus and a fiscal unit. In  the arhsatta records, a village was referred to 
as a "mauza" or "gaon". Villages were classified e ither as "asli" or established 
villages or as "dakhili" settlements which were offshoots o f older villages. The 
revenue returns o f dakh ili villages were included in the returns o f the asli village o f 
which i t  was a part. In  the course o f time, the dakh ili village would acquire an 
independent fiscal status and i f  it  retained the name o f the parent village, the two 
were iden tified  by the suffixes "buzurg" or "kala", denoting the parent village, and 
the su ffix  "khurd" which s ign ified  a recent offshoot o f the form er. Depopulated or 
abandoned villages were called "viran", "u jar" or "bechiragi". V illages had a de fin ite  
physical boundary expressed in  terms o f measured area in  "bighas". This was sub­
d ivided into: i)  habitational area or "abadi" and area not available fo r cu ltiva tion  
(ponds, jungles, reh or usar lands w hich were uncultivable) and, i i )  the cultivable 
land or ”la ik  zararati". C ultivable land was fu rthe r d iv ided in to  "bahat" or gross 
cropped area and "padat". In  the context o f the term inology o f modern agricultura l 
statistics, padat land could have two meanings depending on its usage. Records in  
which the village statistics fo r  a whole year are given -  as in  the yaddashtis- the 
bahat would denote the gross cropped land, that is the total area cropped in  each 
cropping season or the net cropped area in  kh a rif and rabi plus the area that was 
double cropped, and the padat w ould include the cultivable waste as well as the 
long-term  fallows. However, when figures fo r  a single harvest are mentioned, as in  
the taqsim records fo r  instance, the bahat was the area cropped in  that season while  
the padat land included the current fa llow , the cultivable waste and the long-term  
fallows. This form  o f record-keeping which in essence only recorded the land 
tilled  in  a season or a year is ind ica tive  o f the revenue oriented concerns o f the
7Q
eighteenth century adm inistration.
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The establishment o f a new village was invariab ly recorded as being constituted
from  the cultivable waste o f ad jo in ing  villages w ith  the precise area o f each
contribu tory village stated. The boundaries o f villages d id  not necessarily remain
fixed  -  more land could be added to them or, as in  the case o f dakh ili villages,
they could separate from  the parent village to attain the status o f a fu ll- fle d g e d
village in  due course. The village was viewed as a discrete en tity  not only in  terms
o f its physical space but also in  the sense o f a social collective represented by the
village com m unity w ith  the patel as its ch ie f spokesman. This is most clearly
brought out in  representations made to the diwan, who was the head o f revenue
adm inistration in  the Jaipur state, by the patel pleading on behalf o f the entire
village on a variety o f issues common to the whole cu ltiva ting  com munity.
Disputes w ith  ad jo in ing villages over boundaries, grazing rights, and harassment by
31the jagirdars are among the issues that emerge from  the documents examined.
U nfortunate ly , the records o f the eighteenth century provide lit t le  in fo rm ation
on the density o f rura l settlement and population. I t  is clear from  our evidence
however that rura l m igration and the en masse desertion o f villages form ed an
im portant part o f the peasants5 response to adversity. Famines, wars, oppression
32and excessive taxation are all cited as reasons fo r m igration. The census o f 78 
villages in  pargana Malarna provides some measure o f the the scale o f rural
IT
migration. In  1666, o f the 2631 asamis owning cattle in  pargana Malarna, 268 or 
10 per cent were migrants or "pahis" o f whom 185 were from  neighbouring 
parganas o f the region and almost a th ird  had recently arrived from  the Deccan and 
Malwa. In  the previous year, 79 pahis had settled in these villages but w ith in  the 
same period 81 asamis had also emigrated. Thus in the two years 1665 and 1666, o f 
the 2791 peasants fo r  whom we have in fo rm ation , 12.36 per cent were migrants and
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fo r every one bullock owning cu ltiva to r who had emigrated from  the pargana, three 
others were settled in  the pargana. The recognition by the state o f the ab ility  o f 
peasant to m igrate in  search o f better conditions and thereby p ro found ly  affect 
production and the state’s revenue constituted a v ita l element o f the agrarian policy 
o f pre-co lon ia l regimes. The mere threat o f m igration was o ften  su ffic ie n t fo r the 
state to respond sympathetically to peasant grievances.^ O ffic ia l directives 
repeatedly exhort adm inistrative s ta ff to rehabilitate deserted villages ("ujar" or 
"bechiragi") and induce m igrating peasants to return w ith  o ffe rs o f tax reliefs,
-ac
concessions and loans. State patronage and protection were therefore c ritica l in  
attracting and reta in ing labour in  a period characterised by peasant m ob ility  and 
labour shortage.
Changes in the number o f villages over the years could provide some indication 
o f the trends in  the density o f rura l settlement. As the village form ed the smallest 
revenue un it, the revenue accounts fa ith fu lly  record the number o f villages in  each 
pargana w ith in  the ra ja ’s adm inistration. The village counts however need to be 
treated w ith  caution due to the d if f ic u lty  in  isolating actual changes in  the number 
of villages from  shifts arising due to the reorganisation o f pargana boundaries and 
the piecemeal transfer o f some parganas in  ija ra  or ja g ir  from  the Mughals to the 
Jaipur raja in  the the early eighteenth century. In  pargana Chatsu, fo r  example, 
there appears to have been a spectacular increase in  the number o f villages from  
288 in 1712, the year when Jai Singh acquired it  in  ja g ir  from  Jahandar Shah, to 
400 in  1749. In  contrast, the increase in villages in  pargana Malarna was 
comparatively modest: from  148 in  1708 to 164 in  1 7 8 4 .^  The lack o f adequate 
data makes i t  d if f ic u lt  to in te rp re t these figures and raises doubts about the 
re liab ility  o f village counts as crude indices o f population change.
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Cropping System
The agricu ltu ra l system can be analysed in  terms o f the cropping pattern and 
the available farm  implements and technology. The specific patterns o f regional 
crop production in  the eighteenth century w ill be analysed in  a later chapter. A n  
understanding o f the the general features o f the cropping system in  the region in  
terms o f the sequence o f fie ld  operations, work rhythms and agricu ltu ra l practices 
help us to id e n tify  more clearly the constraints on production and the significance 
o f observed shifts in cropping patterns.
The outbreak o f the monsoon in  late June marks the beginning o f the 
agricu ltura l or harvest y e a r .^  Sowing o f the "sialu" (kh a rif) or autumn season 
commences w ith  the firs t heavy showers on land ploughed and prepared in  the 
preceding months from  A p r i l to May. The kh a rif season in  the eighteenth century 
was, and continues to be, the most im portant harvest cycle w ith in  the agricultura l 
year in  this region. This is because the regions staple foods -  a varie ty o f m illets -  
were grown in  this season. As i t  is rare in  this region fo r the seasonal pattern of 
ra in fa ll to coincide w ith  the crop water requirements, m ille ts and other crops 
capable o f w ithstanding water-stress dominate the kha rif harvest. These crops were
called "barani" or ra in -fe d  crops and required lit t le  or no supplementary irriga tion .
38The kh a rif crops were harvested from  October to November.
The w in te r crop, called rabi or "unhalu", was only possible w ith  a rtif ic ia l 
irriga tion  or on retentive black soils. The neglig ib le amount o f w in te r ra in fa ll in  
this region made this one o f the m a jo r factors lim itin g  extensive rabi production. 
The cu ltiva tion  o f rabi crops therefore needed considerable in it ia l investment in  the
36
construction o f wells, w ork ing  capital fo r  the ir maintenance as w ell as the provision 
o f additional draught animals to w ork them. They also required repeated 
ploughings preparatory to sowing, and frequent weeding and watering. Preparatory 
tillage fo r the rabi crops is done in it ia lly  p rio r to the monsoon, and then repeated 
between m id-September and October a fte r the etreat o f the monsoons. The crops 
are sown in  the period extending from  October t i l l  m id-Decem ber and harvested in 
M a rch -A p ril. The m ajor rabi crops in  our period were barley, wheat, gram and 
combinations o f these. In  irriga ted  lands, "zaid-rabi" crops like  vegetables and 
various types o f melons, cucumbers and gourds were grown in  the period between 
the harvesting o f the rabi crops and the kh a rif sowing o f the next harvest cycle.
Our analysis o f the cropping pattern in  the region in the eighteenth century
39shows that the rabi harvest was generally as extensive as the k h a rif harvest. The 
fact that in the eighteenth century two harvests in  the region were the norm can be 
contrasted w ith  the present-day classification o f the region as a kh a rif mono­
cropping region producing only low value foodgrains in  the k h a r if harvest.^® This 
evidence suggests that land p roduc tiv ity  and the level o f investment in  the region 
was substantially h igher in  the eighteenth century. However, investment in  the 
management o f water resources was crucia lly  affected by po litica l and economic 
change and depended upon the creation o f an environment that fostered agricultura l 
in tensification and expansion.
In  a landscape marked by low population density and uncertain production, it  
was not ownership o f land but the possession of cattle that was an essential pre­
requisite to cu ltiva tion . In  the records o f the eighteenth century, the basic 
d istinction between a cu ltiva to r and an agricultura l labourer was that the la tte r d id
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not possess cattle to cultivate land independently. The com plem entarity o f human 
and animal labour in  systems o f agricu ltu ra l production u tilis ing  the plough made 
bullocks an essential asset. The extent o f the arable was as closely related to the 
seasonal pattern o f ra in fa ll and the development o f irr iga tion  as the ava ilab ility  o f 
draught power. The period ic recurrence o f drought and famines in  the region, 
however, must have lim ited  the capacity o f agriculturists to breed and m aintain 
cattle. The precariousness of the p rinc ipa l components o f the physical resource 
base, namely ra in fa ll and animal power, meant that agricu ltu ra l production in  the 
region was characterised by w ide fluctuations from  year to year.
Our sources provide lit t le  evidence on eighteenth century agricu ltu ra l practices
or the implements used. Recent research by Harbans M ukh ia  on the agricu ltura l
technology o f medieval north Ind ia  has drawn on a variety o f contemporary sources
to h igh ligh t the range and su itab ility  o f implements used fo r agricu ltu ra l operations
such as ploughing, leve lling and preparing the soil-surface, sowing, weeding,
reaping and th re sh in g .^  Basing h im self on the classification o f productive or
"polaj" land in  the A in-i-Akbari  as land under continuous cu ltiva tion  and the
absence o f a term fo r  fa llow  in  the contemporary literature, M ukh ia  proposes that
42m the medieval period most Ind ian fie lds produced at least two crops a year. 
This feature o f medieval north Ind ian agriculture, he argues, accounts fo r the high 
fe r t il ity  o f Ind ian soil. W hile the production o f two crops a year was indeed the 
norm in  large parts o f north Ind ia, the proposition that both crops were as a rule 
produced on the same fie ld  or, in  other words, that double cropping o f land was a 
regular feature o f agricu ltura l production in  the p re-co lon ia l period appears 
untenable.
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In  our sources, polaj land is clearly d iffe rentia ted from  'dofasli" or double­
cropped land. In  the context o f eastern Rajasthan, the extent o f double-cropping 
was p rim arily  lim ited  by the ava ilab ility  o f water and the pattern o f labour 
requirements imposed by the harvest cycle.4^ The in terva l between the harvesting 
o f even the early ripening kh a rif crops, such as m illets, and the sowing o f the rabi 
crops was too short in  north Ind ia  to allow fo r extensive areas to be prepared and 
sown again w ith  w in te r cereals w hich require many more ploughings and carefu l 
soil preparation. One o f the current arguments fo r  the adoption o f tractorisation in  
Rajasthan is that despite the ava ilab ility  o f adequate irr iga tion  in  some areas, the 
extent o f rabi cu ltiva tion  is severely lim ited  due to the short in te rva l between the 
harvesting o f the kh a rif crops and rabi sowing. However, i f  ploughs worked by 
bullocks were replaced by tractors, the additional power and speed would render 
such an in tensifica tion  in  agricu ltu ra l production technically feasible.44 Double­
cropping is also not possible on land sown w ith  crops such as cotton, sugarcane, 
indigo or the kh a rif oil-seeds, fo r example, due to the extended duration these 
crops occupy the land and also because the ir harvesting periods overlap w ith  the 
season when the succeeding crop should optim ally be sown. In  view o f the 
technical lim ita tions to the double-cropping o f land in  dry fa rm ing  areas, the 
description o f polaj as land under continuous cu ltiva tion  in  the Ain-i-Akbari  
probably denoted land that produced one crop w ith in  the biannual harvest cycle.
T rad itiona l agricu ltura l practices combined crop-ro ta tion  and fie ld -ro ta tio n  
along w ith  manuring in order to m aintain the fe r t il ity  o f the soil. Soil that had 
been annually cultivated fo r a number o f years was allowed a period o f rest 
extending up u n til fou r years to allow fo r natural regeneration. Such land from  
which the plough had been tem porarily  w ithdraw n corresponds to the category o f
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"parauti" and "chachar” land in  the Ain-i-Akbari.  As Harbans M ukh ia  points out, 
these lands should technically be termed lea rather than long-te rm  fa llo w s .^  
Another im portant trad itiona l method o f m aintaining soil fe r t i l i ty  was the practice 
o f intercropping. This technique invo lved the sowing o f two or more crops, at least 
one o f which was a n itro g e n -fix in g  legume, in  the same fie ld  which were then 
harvested separately ow ing to the ir d iffe re n t m aturation times. The advantages o f 
in tercropping in  terms o f the e ffective  use o f land and labour and the m inim isation 
o f the risk o f total crop fa ilu re  in  an ecologically frag ile  environm ent are in  
themselves im portant. In  addition, recent experimental research has shown that in  
terms o f p roduc tiv ity  per un it area and u n it time, in tercropping is as productive as
A jT
sole cropping. Watabe suggests that the favourable agronomic effects o f 
in tercropping provide an explanation o f how trad itiona l agricu ltu ra l practices 
maintained the fe r t i l i ty  o f the soil over long periods w ithou t the benefit o f 
fa llow ing or crop ro ta tio n .^
Crops Grown
In the kh a rif harvest the most im portant food crops were m illets. O f these, 
bajra (Pearl or bulrush m ille t, Pennisitum typhoideum) predominated in the region. 
Grown on lig h t soils w ith  no manuring, i t  is trad itiona lly  grown intercropped w ith  
pulses such as moth {Phaseolus aconitifolius), mung (Phaseolus radiatus), and urad
A O
{Phaseolus mungo). I f  sown as a m ixed crop, the same land can be used year
after year w ithou t ro ta t io n .^  To the south and east o f Jaipur, w ith  better soil and
a greater annual ra in fa ll, juw a r {Sorghum vulgare) cu ltiva tion  expanded but never
Sfisupplanted bajra as the p rinc ipa l m ille t. Juwar was m ainly a kh a rif crop, only 
occasionally being recorded as a green fodder crop under "chari". The grain and
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the straw o f ju w a r is superior to that o f bajra in its nu tritiona l content, and can
52yie ld  a succession o f cuttings from  July to March when grown as a fodder crop. 
Juwar, however, completely exhausts the soil o f moisture and p lant food. In  
addition to the m ajor m illets, sm all-gra in  m illets such as kodon (Paspalum 
scorbiculatiim), ra lo/kagani (Panicwn italicum or Setaria italica), chino {Panicum 
miliaceum), mandwa (Eleusine coracana), ku r i {Panicum helopus) and barti 
{Panicum crusgalli(?)) were also cultivated. These small m ille ts were all low  value 
crops, eaten by the poorer sections o f the population, low  in  nu tritiona l content, but 
agricu ltu ra lly  best suited to the environment. O f these, ku ri was "reckoned to be 
one o f the best o f Ind ian fodder grasses fo r  both horses and c a tt le ."^
In  addition to the m illets, the kh a rif food crops included pulses, maize, sesame 
and a few condiments. Next in  importance to bajra as a food crop was the pulse 
moth. O f the pulses, moth is least demanding in its soil and water requirements. 
Given a well d istributed ra in fa ll, the pulses mature w ithou t watering -  w ith  urad 
requiring maximum moisture and heavier soil, fo llowed by mung and moth. Pulses
are generally intercropped w ith  the m illets, being sown at the same time but
- -
harvested separately due to the ir d iffe r in g  growing durations. When sown alone, 
the pulses are an im portant cash crop o f ra in fed agriculture in  Rajasthan and can
be fo llowed by sugarcane or another irriga ted rabi crop. They are also a source
57 * . . .o f valuable fodder. Maize was sown both as a kh a rif and a rabi crop. I t  requires
a fe rtile  soil, frequent irr iga tion  and careful culture in  the form  o f repeated
ro
weeding, th inn ing  and manuring. Maize cu ltiva tion , therefore, was probably 
lim ited  to irrigated and manured land ly ing  close to the habitational site. Small 
quantities o f t i l  (sesame, Sesamum indicum), a coarse rice called sali {Oryza saliva)
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and condiments like  a jw ain (lovage, Caryota copticum) and cum in were grown as 
kh a rif crops.
In  addition to the food crops, cash crops like  cotton, sugarcane, indigo and 
sunn-hemp were also c u lt iv a te d .^  Cotton cu ltiva tion  was the most widespread 
both in  terms o f its acreage and its d is tribu tion  w ith in  the region. Generally, 
however, cash crop cu ltiva tion  was more sign ificant at the level o f the qasba when 
compared to the pargana as a whole -  particu la rly  fo r specialised crops such as the 
natural dye plants, vegetables, and tobacco .^
The fie lds fo r  cotton are prepared in  A p r il fo r the sowing o f the early varieties 
on irriga ted land in  M ay, or a fte r the rains in  June. The la tte r was categorised as
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"sawani" or the monsoonal ra in fed crop. Cotton p ick ing  begins in  m id-O ctober 
and continues t i l l  early December. The stubble is grazed upon by cattle a fte r the 
p icking. In  Rajasthan, cotton is sometimes "grown as a m ixed crop, usually w ith  
t i l,  arhar, san, etc.
Sugarcane, was grown less extensively than cotton in  the region in  the
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eighteenth century. Sugarcane occupies the land fo r twelve months and is the 
most demanding crop in  terms o f its labour and water requirements. Ratooning, or 
taking a crop in the second year from  the stubble o f the firs t, was practised. 
A lthough this gives a poorer y ie ld , less labour and capital is required. The sucrose 
content o f sugarcane planted on fie lds that had been le ft fa llow  fo r a whole year 
p r io r to p lanting was the highest. These technicalities o f sugarcane production, 
invo lv ing  varying levels o f capital and labour inputs and yields, were reflected in 
the d iffe ren tia l rates o f revenue levied on cane grown on prim e land fa llowed in
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the preceding year, w e ll or dhenkali irriga ted land, water retentive o r "gundgari" 
soils, and ratooned or ,lpedi" sugarcane.
The natural dye plants, o f which ind igo was commercially the most s ign ificant,
were cultivated in  all the qasbas studied, though in  varying degrees o f importance.
The market fo r indigo, centred at Agra, must have stim ulated its cu ltiva tion  in  our
region. Ind igo was a trienn ia l p lant which was cut every year a fte r the rains in
August or September. The revenue rates levied on "nyoti" and " ja ri" or "tisala"
categories o f indigo confirm s the account presented by the trave lle r F inch in  1607,
that the "produce o f the firs t year is called N yoti; that o f the succeeding years Jari.
The crop o f the second year gives the best quality neel or ind igo d y e ." ^  A fte r  the
th ird  cutting, the plant was allowed to seed before being sown again at the
f\Hbeginning o f the rains. Besides ind igo, dye plants like  "kasumbho" (safflower, 
Carthamus tinctorius), "aa\"{Morinda tinctoria), and henna were also grown in  the 
qasbas.
A  wide variety o f vegetables, gourds and melons were grown extensively in  the 
immediate environs o f the qasbas.*^ The perishable nature o f these crops and 
problems o f transportation would have restricted the ir cu ltiva tion  as fie ld  crops to 
areas where a market fo r  them was easily accessible. I t  may perhaps be mentioned 
here that "sakarkandi" or sweet potato (Ipomoea batatas), w hich was grown more 
w idely as a kh a rif rather than a rabi crop, was cultivated in  the region p r io r to the 
eighteenth century and could not have been introduced in  Ind ia  during or later than 
the eighteenth century as claimed in  recent research.*^
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In  contrast to the kh a rif season, the range o f crops grown in  the rabi season was
lim ited  in  variety. W hile high value crops like  poppy, tobacco, sugarcane and
garden produce required fe rtile , manured land w ith  an assured supply o f water, the
staples -  wheat, barley and gram -  could be grown on retentive soils w ith  lit t le  or
no additional irriga tion . However, the yields o f these crops are substantially
affected i f  they were unirrigated. In  1713-14, the d iffe re n tia l in  the yields o f
irriga ted and non-irriga ted  rabi food grains was estimated to be 6.75 maunds per
70bigha and 3 maunds per bigha respectively -  a d iffe re n tia l o f 225 per cent.
Though the actual yie ld  figures approximated by the revenue authorities may not be
very accurate or pertinent due to the fluctuations in the size o f the bigha and the
maund in  our period and region, the ratio derived is im portant as i t  helps in our
71understanding o f d iffe re n tia l rent. A n  appreciation o f the d iffe re n tia l yields o f
the princ ipa l rabi foodgrains, wheat and barley, owing to varying soil fe r t i l i ty  and
access to irr iga tion  was reflected in  the revenue categories under which the cash
rent on them was realised. Barley and wheat lands were subdivided in to  three tax
categories corresponding to the best, poorest and intermediate quality o f land -
namely, w ell irrigated "kyari" or "seko" land, dry or "bor" land and "khatli" or
7 9manured land located on the dried banks o f rivers or tanks.
The food staples -  wheat, barley and gram -  and the ir m ixed crops constituted 
the p rinc ipa l w in te r crops o f our region in  the eighteenth century. In  comparison 
to the hardier barley and gram, wheat cu ltiva tion  was re la tive ly restricted due to 
the higher labour and capital inputs required fo r its cu ltiva tion  in  terms o f repeated 
preparatory tillage and regular watering and interculture. There were two varieties
70
o f wheat grown -  the hard or "kantha" and the soft or "vajya" wheats. The la tter 
variety is o f fin e r quality and value w hile  the hard wheats are glutinous and are
44
normally coarsely ground in to  "suji" (used fo r  a porridge). I t  was common in  the 
eighteenth century, as it  is today in  the wheat grow ing tracts o f northern Ind ia, to 
cultivate m ixed crops o f wheat, barley and gram. M ixed  cropping o f this type 
d iffe rs  from  intercropping o f kh a rif foodgrains and pulses fo r example, in  that the 
seeds o f the constituent crops are m ixed and sown together and, at the end o f the 
growing period, harvested at the same time. The combinations grown were called 
"gojara" or "gojai" (wheat and barley), "gochani" (wheat and gram), and "baijhari" 
(wheat, barley, and gram). Thus when conditions fo r the sole cropping o f wheat 
were unsuitable, m ixed cropping provided a beneficia l a lte rn a tiv e .^  The straw of 
wheat and barley was also valued as fodder, that o f wheat being more nutritious.
The rabi oilseeds -  "sarson" (rapeseed) and "alsi" (linseed) ~ were cultivated in
smaller quantities. W hile sarson was grown in  all the qasbas under study, alsi
production was confined to qasbas Phagi, Chatsu and Malarna, Oilseed production
is d if f ic u lt  and requires a most favourable season fo r a successful harvest. They are
often intercropped w ith  wheat and barley and sown earlier and harvested later than 
75the associated crop. Linseed o il is often blended w ith  other oils and used fo r
H fkcooking, w h ile  sarson o il is also used fo r ligh ting . The oilcake is used as feed fo r 
m ilch cows.
In  the rabi season, cash cropping was dominated by the production o f a variety 
o f vegetables, cucumbers, gourds and melons almost exclusively restricted to the 
environs o f the qasbas. They were probably also grown on small homestead plots in  
the villages, but were liable to taxation only when cultivated as fie ld  crops in 
response to the demand in  the qasbas. The w in te r vegetables commonly grown 
were onions, carrots, radish, brin ja ls , spinach, sweet potatoes, pot herbs, pumpkins
45
and cucumbers. These crops require intensive manuring, weeding and watering and
are gathered in te rm itten tly  as they ripen. The ir production was specialised and
norm ally carried on by a separate caste group, the Malis. The d iffe re n t kinds o f
melons grown -  the "tarbuz" and "kharbuza", as w e ll as a varie ty called "sarda",
which was native to Kabul and thought to be the finest qua lity  o f melon -  are
really the "za id -rab i” crops. These were grown on the banks o f dried rive r beds,
the seeds being dropped into heavily manured pits, and bore f ru it  from  A p r i l to 
77June. In  addition to the vegetables and melons, poppy and tobacco were also 
cultivated in  small, but s ign ificant, quantities in  the qasbas.
The range o f crops that were grown in  the region in the eighteenth century 
clearly attests to the ab ility  o f the rura l producers to adapt to and overcome the 
ecological constraints o f sem i-arid  agriculture. Whether cu ltivators could take 
advantage o f the productive potentia l o f the land depended upon a complex 
interplay o f several factors such as population density, the ava ilab ility  and 
d istribu tion  o f resources, the agrarian po licy o f the state and the development o f 
the exchange economy. I t  is to these aspects o f the agrarian economy o f eighteenth 
century eastern Rajasthan that we now turn.
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century had a corresponding categorisation between the cotton produced on 
irriga ted fie lds and the ’sawani’ or ra in -fed  cotton. Taxation on irriga ted 
cotton was fu rth e r scaled according to the quality o f land and source o f 
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64. Sugarcane cannot technically be classified as either a k h a rif or a rabi crop as
its culture spanned both harvest periods. However, as i t  was planted and cut
before the end o f the o ff ic ia l kh a rif period, i.e. the end o f February, the 
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Arhsatta H indaun VS 1821/AD  1764.
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reference 27, Chapter IV  on Revenue Policy.
72. K h a tli is so defined in  the Gazetteer o f A lw a r (1880) by P.W.Powlett, p .280 
and H.H.W ilson, A  Glossary o f Judicia l and Revenue Term s, p. 283.
Seko is probably the local term fo r seka defined as "w ell-w atered wheat fields 
or irriga ted fie lds in  general" [ W ilson’s Glossary!
73. G.Watt, Commercial Products, pp.1085-1093.
74. Jasbir Singh, A n  A g ricu ltu ra l Geography o f Harvana. p .274.
75. G.Watt, Commercial Products. pp,725, 728-729, 177-178.
76. ib id ., pp.725, 181.
77. ib id ., pp.437-438.
Chapter III
A G R A R IA N  R ELATIO NS
In  a predom inantly agrarian society, all social groups were linked  to the land
and its product. The state functioned in  the context o f a larger economy w hich
included a reciprocal relationship between rura l areas and urban centres and
between economic producers and consumers. I t  was essential fo r  the state to ensure
continu ity  in agricu ltura l production through regulated access to land and through
the red istribu tion  o f the agrarian surplus. This involved an interaction between
four constituent elements o f rura l society: the landed elites and the agents o f the
state; the commercial intermediaries who financed both the state and the agrarian
producers; the rura l elite who played a v ita l role in  organising village production;
and fin a lly , the agricu ltura l producers or peasants. We shall begin w ith  a b rie f
description o f the institu tionalised means o f access to rura l resources through the
system o f rights to the surplus produce and the changes in this mechanism o f
d istribu tion  in  the eighteenth century. The princ ipa l focus o f the discussion which
follows w ill be the nature of land tenures and peasant s tra tifica tion  and we shall
also examine the role o f cred it in  generating relationships that provided what has
1
been termed the ’alternative mode o f access’ to agrarian resources.
Nature o f Land C ontro l.
Access to land was regulated in  eighteenth century eastern Rajasthan through a 
system o f hierarchical and concurrent rights. The righ t to hereditary occupancy
-  53 -
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and cu ltiva tion  o f land, on the one hand, and the po litica l contro l over land, on the 
other, had become separated. Po litica l control was expressed as a righ t to a share 
in  the surplus produce o f the land and was held complementary to -  but not 
exclusive o f -  the subordinate righ t o f hereditary occupancy o f the cu ltivator. 
Thus, un like  Awadh, where Fox has argued that trad itiona l power derived from  the 
corporate ownership o f land by the dominant Rajput lineages, in  Rajasthan the 
basis o f po litica l organisation was the shared righ t to the product o f the land by the 
ru ling  clan and those linked  to i t  by service and allegiance. This righ t was, 
however, d iffe ren tia ted  both p o litica lly  and economically. The d iffe re n tia l access 
to resources is reflected in  the social hierarchy w ith in  the dom inant caste, the 
Rajputs, which consisted o f the ra ja as the prem ier R a jput in  the realm, fo llow ed 
by the "thikanedars" and various tribu te -pay ing  or "peshkashi zamindars", 
"jagirdars", "bhomias" and lastly, the cu ltiva ting  or "gharuhala" Rajputs. Politica l 
authority and the d is tribu tion  o f resources was based upon two in te rlock ing  and 
con flic ting  systems: one based on kinship and the other on m ilita ry  m erit. The 
con flic t between these two competing systems fo r the red is tribu tion  o f the agrarian 
surplus forms the h istorical background to an understanding o f the relationship 
between the Jaipur raja and various holders of landed rights in  the eighteenth 
century.
L itt le  is known o f the Kachhwahas p r io r to the ir incorporation in to  the 
Mughal n o b ility  in the sixteenth century. The expansion o f the Jaipur raj from  its 
status as an ins ign ifican t p rinc ipa lity  in  1562 to that o f the leading R ajput state in  
the eighteenth century was largely a consequence o f the priv ileged relationship 
between the house o f Am ber and the Mughals. The incorporation o f the 
Kachhwahas in to  the M ughal n o b ility  greatly enhanced the ir resources and power.
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The raja was assigned his ancestral lands as a hereditary watan ja g ir, outside o f 
Mughal adm inistration and tribu te  demands, in  addition to substantial areas in  
tankhawah or service ja g ir.^  The subsequent development o f the Ja ipur raj in  the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries invo lved two parallel processes, viz., the 
extension o f local au thority and contro l over a w ider te rr ito ry  and, concurrently, 
the increasing bureaucratisation and centralisation o f adm in istra tion w ith in  the 
expanding raj.
The extension o f local authority  in  the region by the A m ber raja appears to 
have progressed through two stages. U n til about the end o f the seventeenth 
century, the added resources and power o f the raja were directed towards the 
displacement o f the erstwhile zamindars o f the A jm er-R an tham bhor sarkars, such 
as the Haras, Chauhans and Bargujars, by the various Kachhwaha lineages. The 
large scale transfer o f zam indari or bhomia rights that took place during this period 
can perhaps be dated from  the early seventeenth century when M irza  Raja Jai 
Singh (1621-1667) in itia ted  the po licy o f acquiring areas contiguous to the watan in  
service jagirs. The claims o f the Naruka lineage o f the Kachhwahas in  the 
eighteenth century to the zamindari o f a cluster o f parganas in  Mewat, which later 
constituted the A lw a r state, can be traced to the assignment o f these parganas in  
ja g ir  to M irza Jai Singh in  the m id-seventeenth century w ith  an im peria l d irective 
to "root out the miscreants and colonise the tract w ith  his own men".^ Jai Singh 
sub-assigned the ja g ir  to his soldiers and retainers. Subsequently, when the ra ja ’s 
ja g ir was transferred, the sub-assignees stayed on as the ijaradars o f the new 
jagirdars and in  the late seventeenth century claimed to be the bhomias or 
zamindars o f the region. A  sim ilar process o f displacement o f older zamindaris in  
the A jm er-R antham bhor region by the Kachhwaha lineages appears to have taken
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place in the same period. This process was endorsed by the Mughals who, in  order 
to ensure the realisation o f revenue from  the region, delegated to the Jaipur rajas 
the overarching authority  to intervene in  and suppress local conflic ts  even when the 
raja d id  not fo rm a lly  hold any assignments or adm inistrative posts in  the region.
The expansion o f local authority  through the usurpation o f older zam indari 
rights o f the non-Kachhwaha clans appears to have been an on-going process well
O
into the eighteenth century. However, during the last quarter o f the seventeenth
century and the f irs t ha lf o f the eighteenth, the expansionary po licy o f the Jaipur
state underwent a change. I t  was in  this period that Raja Bishan Singh and Sawai
Jai Singh made a concerted e ffo r t to bring  the parganas contiguous to the
hereditary watan under the ir direct adm inistration. Whereas earlier the rajas had
connived at the displacement o f older zamindaris and encouraged the expansion o f
bhomia rights o f various lineages o f the Kachhwaha clan, they now began to
acquire the zamindaris o f these areas themselves.^ The resistance to such an
extension o f authority by the raja appears to have been pa rticu la rly  acute in  the
1 flperiod from  about 1680 to the second decade o f the eighteenth century. In  this
period, i t  is precisely in  those parganas over which the Ja ipur raja acquired
adm inistrative control through an Im peria l appointment as jag irda r, ija radar or
fau jdar that the m a jo rity  o f the "bhomia" or zamindar revolts can be located. As
R.P.Rana’s analysis o f these conflic ts shows, the zamindars invo lved in  the con flic t
appear to have been motivated equally by the need to defend the ir rights from
encroachment by the darbar as by a desire to extend, create or acquire new
11zamindari rights in  a period o f in tensified  local con flic t. Such resistance varied 
from  region to region and received d iffe re n t levels o f support from  the peasantry. 
The success o f the bhomias in  fo rg ing  alliances w ith in  and outside the region
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determined the extent to which they would succeed in  the ir struggle against the
raja. In  the A jm er-R antham bhor region, the rebellious Naruka and Chauhan
bhomias were subjugated and, as the evidence fo r the Chauhans suggests, later
1 ?assimilated in to  the state possibly on the rajas terms.
In  the region where the the raja was successful against the bhomias, the
zamindari rights were usurped by the raja and the areas incorporated in to  the
’ regulation’ or d irectly  administered parganas o f the state. The eighteenth century
evidence suggests that the share o f the bhomias in  the resources o f the state
severely declined and became even marginal. The overwhelm ing m a jo rity  o f them
held only one village or a part o f i t  in  bhom and the ir total perquisites d id not
13amount to more than an ins ign ifican t fraction  o f the revenue.
The acquisition o f control over these extended tracts was accompanied by the
breaking up o f local lineage territories and the ir increasing bureaucratisation. O lder
relationships based on kinship and shared access to resources were transformed into
those based on loya lty and s e rv ic e .^  M odelled on the M ughal ja g ir  system o f
prebendal tenures, the kinsmen were assigned revenues o f tracts that were 
* • 1 5conditional on service. A  system o f valuation ("tan") o f the revenue o f villages,
institu ted probably in  the early seventeenth century, was used to estimate the
income o f a jag irda r and accordingly the number o f troopers and horses that he was 
1required to maintain. Jagir assignments were made through annually renewable
"sanads" or w rits  leg itim is ing access to the revenue o f the assigned tract on specific 
conditions o f service thereby replacing any p rio r claim to land based on hereditary 
right. The assignments continued to be made to members o f the royal or 
Kachhwaha clan but the dominance o f a particu lar sub-clan in  a pargana was
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broken by the expedient o f assigning jagirs to numerous lineages in  the same
pargana. These jagirs tended to become hereditary, thereby leading to a more
dispersed land hold ing pattern in  these parganas in  the course o f the eighteenth 
1 7century.
The impetus towards the bureaucratisation o f tenures by the Jaipur darbar
went as fa r as to attempt to convert thikanedars, or semi-autonomous chieftains, 
1 8in to jagirdars. The relationship between the thikanedars and the raja had
trad itiona lly  been based on m ilita ry  service and po litica l allegiance by the
thikanedar in  return fo r  protection and te rrito ria l autonomy in  the a ffa irs  o f the 
19thikana. I t  would appear that e ffo rts  were made to restate this trad itiona l
relationship in  terms akin to the ja g irda ri tenure by f ix in g  a notional revenue
assessment to the thikana and demanding the maintenance o f a specified contingent
9 0in  proportion to the assessment. A lthough the actual obligations o f the
thikanedars may not have changed much as a result, the po litica l au thority  o f the
21raja was enhanced at the cost o f the ancestral rights o f the clan leaders. On the
other hand, new thikanedari rights were also created in  the eighteenth century
through grants made by the raja o f a new k ind  o f permanent tenure called " ija ra -
istam arari-wa-watan-zam indari". These were conferred on Kachhwaha nobles in
99areas newly acquired from  the Mughals. On the payment o f a fixe d  annual sum, 
the assignees were granted complete autonomy in  the adm inistration and control o f 
the ir areas. Some o f these grantees later claimed thikana status, such as the
9a
thikanedars o f Barwara and Dhoola. As much o f the later controversy regarding 
the status o f thikanedars in  the Jaipur State indicates, the long period o f po litica l 
development and transmutation in  the preceding centuries had made it  v irtua lly
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impossible to validate the claim to autonomy made by the thikanedars on the basis 
o f ancestral r igh t and o rig ina l conquest.^
Thus by the eighteenth century, the princ ipa l mechanism o f the red istribu tion  
o f the state’s share o f the agricu ltura l produce was through the ja g ir  assignments. 
The ja g ir  tenure in the eighteenth century Jaipur state was, however, s ign ifican tly  
d iffe ren t from  that o f the Mughals despite the apparent s im ila rity  im p lied  by the 
use o f identical term inology and the o ff ic ia l de fin ition  o f tenures. U n like  the 
Mughal ja g ir, the jagirs assigned by the Jaipur raj tended to become hereditary -
9c
especially those held by Kachhwaha jagirdars. Many jagirdars were also the local
• ■ 76bhomias or zamindars, or had acquired zam indari rights by e ither dispossessing
the older zamindars or fo rc ib ly  establishing the ir "ko tri" (fo rts) and demanding
onbhomia rights over villages that were previously ra iyati or peasant held. The de 
facto long term nature o f the ja g ir  assignment, therefore, allowed the jagirdars a 
greater control over resources and village management. This however d id  not mean 
that the jagirdars’ collections were completely unregulated by the state. Some 
degree o f supervision was expected o f the local adm inistrative o ffic ia ls  as is evident 
in  the number o f instances where they interceded in  disputes between the jagirdars
9 Q
and the cultivators over the assessment and collection o f revenue. The practice 
o f demanding an annual confirm ation  o f ja g ir  a fte r o ff ic ia l ve rifica tion  o f the 
quality and size o f the contingent maintained by the assignee indicates that the 
tenure continued to be seen as a conditional assignment in  lieu o f a salary.
In  the la tte r ha lf o f the eighteenth century, the economic position o f the 
smaller jagirdars appears to have become increasingly d if f ic u lt .  One ind ica tor o f 
this is the w ide discrepancy between the o ff ic ia lly  estimated proceeds o f the ja g ir
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2Qand the actual collections. Undoubtedly, an aggregate fa ll in  agricu ltura l
production during this period im p lied  a decline in  the income o f a ll surplus
appropriators. This was expressed in  an intensification o f co n flic t w ith in  the rura l
comm unity over the collection and d is tribu tion  o f revenue in  the la tte r ha lf o f the 
30century. This situation was fu rth e r exacerbated by additional demands imposed
by the state. As the financia l pressure on the state increased, i t  began to realise a
special levy, called "ganim barar", from  the jagirdars in  order to pay the Maratha 
31tribute. The financia l predicament o f the jagirdars made i t  impossible fo r them 
to maintain the required contingents. In  an unprecedented move, the darbar was 
forced to grant the jagirdars o f twenty seven parganas a years compulsory leave in  
1760 due to the ir in a b ility  to render service. On the basis o f the evidence 
available this appears to have been a temporary response to a crisis.
From the m iddle o f the eighteenth century there was also a s ign ificant
expansion in revenue farm ing or "ijaradari" in  the Jaipur state. The farm ing o f
revenue was an integral part o f the Islam ic system o f taxation and served a variety
o f functions ranging from  a mechanism o f po litica l incorporation to a fiscal
33arrangement to encourage the restoration and extension o f cu ltiva tion . The lja ra
contracts in the f irs t ha lf o f the century in our region were almost invariab ly short
term and subject to regular supervision by the state’s adm inistrative o ffic ia ls .
Closely supervised contracts such as these were aimed at rehab ilita tion  and agrarian
expansion or were purely adm inistrative arrangements to overcome the problem o f
m ultip le  collecting agencies in  villages whose revenue was shared between a number
of assignees."^ In  the second ha lf o f the eighteenth century, as the state was faced
w ith  increasing demands fo r tribu te  from  the Marathas as w ell as an agrarian crisis
35in  production, there was an increase in  the villages assigned in  ja g ir  and ijara.
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The general trend in  the d is tribu tion  o f the state’s revenues provides some measure 
of this change.
Table 1 below shows the average variations in  the khalisa, ija ra  and ja g ir
revenues fo r the eighteenth century based on a sample o f six parganas. The
proportion o f the revenues w ith in  the categories o f the ’ k ing ’s share’ or khalisa (and 
w ith in  that o f ija ra ) and non-khalisa fluctuated in size and d is tribu tion  from  year
to year. O f the latter, the largest p roportion  was assigned in  ja g ir  w hile  the
alienation o f specific lands through various forms o f charitable grants was m inor 
and probably re lative ly stable over the period ."^ In  the in it ia l period o f 
consolidation o f po litica l control and subjugation of the recalcitrant local zamindars 
from  about 1700 to 1730, the revenues assigned in  ja g ir  were s ign ifican tly  higher 
than those in  khalisa or ijara. Subsequently, u n til the m iddle o f the eighteenth 
century, the revenues in  khalisa were higher than the assigned revenues. D uring  
the same period, there was an increase in  the proportion o f khalisa revenues that
were farmed out from  under 15 per cent in  the previous period to about 30 per
38cent. In  the second ha lf o f the eighteenth century, however, more than ha lf the 
khalisa revenue was farmed out and there was a parallel expansion in the ja g ir 
assignments.
Table 1. Percentage D is tribu tion  o f State Revenue (c.1700-1785)
PERIOD K H A L IS A  JA G IR
G ovt.Adm in Ija ra
1700 -  1730 34 6 60
1730 -  1750 47 13 40
1750 -  1785 23 25 52
Source: See note 39.
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The increase in  the fa rm ing o f revenue in  the late eighteenth century was in  
itse lf s ign ificant but equally im portant was the particu lar fo rm  o f ija ra  that became 
prevalent. The "ija ra  istamarari", as these contracts were termed, were generally 
taken by local rura l elites through a system o f com petitive b idd ing  fo r periods 
ranging from  three to fifteen  ye a rs .^  Such ijaras were generally given fo r small 
units comprising one or two villages and the ija radar took over all the 
adm inistrative, revenue, and ju d ic ia l functions o f the state fo r  the period o f the 
contract in  exchange fo r  a previously agreed upon annual payment to the state. 
Local moneylenders and traders were involved in  revenue fa rm ing  mostly as 
guarantors and less frequently as ijaradars them selves.^
I t  has u n til recently been generally argued that the widespread adoption o f 
such long-term  ija ra  tenures adversely affected the prosperity o f the c u lt iv a to r .^  
However, the available evidence fo r  our region does not appear to support this 
hypothesis. W hile there are complaints by peasants o f reckless and excessive 
taxation by the ija ra d a rs .^  , the number o f such petitions are small compared to 
the extent o f area that was farmed out. Further, once the ija ra  contract ran out in 
three to five  years and the villages reverted to d irectly administered khalisa lands, 
there was no appreciable d ifference in  the revenue collected before and a fte r the 
ija ra  te n u re .^  Given the lack o f any d irect evidence on the actual collections 
made by the ijaradars, such a comparison o f revenue returns provides a reasonably 
accurate proxy fo r  the con tinu ity  in  agricu ltu ra l production in  a economy where the 
most e ffective  deterrent against over-exp lo ita tion  o f the peasantry was the ir f lig h t 
from  la n d .^  On the contrary, the ija ra  contracts were taken on terms suggesting a 
twelve to twenty five  per cent annual rate o f increase over the previous collections
A y r
made by the state. This seems to indicate that there was a considerable leakage
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o f resources inherent in  the system o f revenue management which more than 
adequately covered the additional risk and the costs o f collection and supervision 
incurred by the ijaradar. Perhaps i t  was in  the ligh t o f this knowledge that the 
zamindars, village headmen and local o ffic ia ls , and even the peasants are 
reported to have taken on ijaras in  the second ha lf o f the eighteenth c e n tu ry .^
The increased farm ing o f revenue by the Jaipur state in  the second ha lf o f 
the eighteenth century appears to have been in  response to a financia l crisis caused 
by the regular payment o f tribu te  to the Marathas and which u ltim ate ly 
undermined the state’s a b ility  to command its resources. The complex interaction 
between agrarian production, the provision o f credit, state finances and the 
adoption o f revenue farm ing forms the subject o f the later discussion on cred it 
relationships.
Peasant S tra tifica tion
I t  is necessary to b rie fly  explain the various terms used to describe the sections 
of village society in  our region. In  the documents examined, a p rim ary d istinction
is made between cultivators, collective ly termed "haljotas", and non-cu ltiva ting
aq
artisans and menials or "kamins". Cultivators may be fu rth e r d iv ided in to  village 
residents, referred to as "gavetis", and non-residents or "pahis". Gavetis were 
broadly categorised in to  priv ileged taxpayers or rural elites, the "gharuhalas", who 
were granted concessionary rates o f revenue payment and the "ra iyati" or "palti" 
who paid the standard tax.
The priv ileged taxpayers comprised agriculturists who belonged to the upper 
castes such as Brahmans, Rajputs, Kayasthas, and Mahajans, as well as the
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zamindars and hereditary village o ffic ia ls , the "chaudhuri", "qanungo", "patel" and
"patwari". The la tte r were generally not members o f the upper castes and the ir
priv ileged tenure was in  recognition o f the ir status as holders o f superior agrarian
r ig h ts .^  These sections o f the rura l elite were granted concessionary rates o f
revenue payment on the ir gharuhala cu ltiva tion  as w ell as a complete or partia l
exemption from  contribu ting  to the common fiscal pool o f the village from  which
the additional taxes o f the state and the expenses o f the village were m e t.^  I t  has
been argued by D ilbagh Singh that the defin ing  features o f the gharuhala tenure
were the use o f personal ploughs and fam ily  labour to t i l l  the land and the payment
S1of revenue at concessional rates. He sees this de fin ition  as being consistent w ith  
the state’s objective to lim it  the size o f gharuhala holdings because o f the reduction 
in  revenue that an expansion in  gharuhala holdings entailed. The stipulation 
regarding the use o f fam ily  labour to t i l l  the land was a m ajor constraint on the 
secular expansion o f acreage under gharuhala cu ltivation. Land cu ltivated by non­
fam ily  labour was not reckoned as "gharujot" and concessionary rates o f taxation 
could not be claimed on such cu ltiva tion . D ilbagh Singh has fu rth e r asserted that 
the gharuhalas d id  not d if fe r  from  the paltis in  the nature o f the ir land rights and
CT
that like  paltis, gharuhalas could be "maliks" or proprietors as w ell as tenants. In  
both situations they paid revenue at concessionary rates.
This characterisation o f gharuhala tenure needs to be qua lified  on several 
points. There is evidence to show that the righ t to concessional revenue terms on 
gharuhala land could be claimed even when the tenure holders employed "halis" or 
ploughmen to work the la n d .^  D ilbagh Singh him self cites evidence that "majurs" 
or agricultura l labourers were hired to cultivate gharuhala land in  pargana Phagi in  
1723 and that this d id  not a ffect the gharuhalas entitlem ent to concessionary
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taxation. He, however, adds that this was an exceptional situation as the paltis o f
the village were "not in  a position to t i l l  the ir entire h o l d i n g s " . T h e  hypothesis
regarding the exclusive use o f fam ily  labour on gharuhala holdings appears
untenable on another account. A  single fa m ily ’s gharuhala holdings were
occasionally dispersed over more than one village making i t  impossible to cultivate
these holdings solely w ith  fam ily  labour. For example, the qanungo fam ily  o f
qasba H indaun had its gharuhala holdings spread over seven villages in the 
57pargana. I t  appear reasonable therefore to in fe r that fa m ily  labour could not 
have been the only fo rm  o f labour on gharuhala holdings in  all cases and that the 
use o f fam ily  labour cannot be seen as an essential element o f gharuhala tenure. 
However, there is evidence to indicate that i f  gharuhala holdings were cultivated by 
tenants, then the lower tax rates applicable to gharuhala cu ltiva tion  were
CO
w ithdrawn.
In  view o f these qualifications, gharuhala tenure can best be described as the 
privileged tenure extended to the rura l elite on the cu ltiva tion  o f land fo r which 
they provided the necessary inputs o f ploughs, bullocks and seed and retained the 
option o f supplementing or replacing fam ily  labour w ith  wage labour. The 
lim ita tions to the increase in  the gharuhala holding w ould then rest on the 
ava ilab ility  o f labour and capital to sustain such an expansion and the institu tiona l 
lim its  imposed by the state. In  the la tte r ha lf o f the eighteenth century, the 
recurring con flic t between the gharuhalas and the ra iyati arising from  the transfer 
o f ra iyati land to the priv ileged taxpayers brings in to  sharp focus the ambiguities in  
the nature o f gharuhala tenure and the states’ in a b ility  to contain an expansion in  
gharuhala holdings at the expense o f ra iya ti c u lt iv a tio n .^
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Further, D ilbagh Singh’s contention that an agricu ltu rist who was entitled to
gharuhala status by v irtue  o f his caste or social position could claim  gharuhala
privileges even when he was a tenant also needs to be questioned. The evidence
cited by him  to show that gharuhalas could be tenants comes from  a document that
states that Todarmal qanungo cultivated ten bighas o f w e ll irriga ted  land as a
khudkasht or gharuhala cu ltiva to r in  the "patti" o f Harchand Dhakar (J a t) .^  I t  is
plausible to argue that the Jat was one o f the patels o f qasba H indaun in  which case
the pa tti referred to denoted his pateli ju risd ic tion  as was generally the case. For
example, in  qasba Sanganer there were nine pattis corresponding to nine pateli
ju risd ictions. O f the nine patels, two were A h irs  and one each a M a li, Jat,
« 1^Kum har, G ujar, M ewati, and Guwar. Interpreted in  this way, the qanungo was 
not a tenant o f the Jat but sim ply had his gharuhala holding w ith in  the la tte r’s 
pateli ju risd ic tion . I t  is feasible that members o f the upper castes could be tenants, 
but in  such cases the revenue category by which the ir land w ould be assessed would 
depend upon the status o f the taxpayer or p roprie to r o f the land.
The other category o f agriculturists, comprising the m a jo rity  o f the village 
residents, were the ra iya ti or paltis. The paltis or the unpriv ileged cultivators were 
taxed at h igher rates than the gharuhalas and all the additional cesses and communal 
expenses o f the village were met by them. A  fu lle r discussion o f the revenue and 
other fiscal obligations o f the paltis is contained in  Chapter IV  on Revenue Policy. 
The paltis consisted o f peasants belonging to the intermediate agricu ltu ra l castes 
such as the Jats, Gujars, Malis, K um har-M a lis , A h irs  and Meenas. The term pa lti 
was used to describe both proprietors w ith  the righ t to sell or mortgage the ir 
holding, as w ell as those peasants cu ltiva ting  the personal lands o f the revenue 
grantees and zamindars over which they had no more than hereditary occupancy
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rights. In  a land surplus economy that was subject to frequent droughts and the 
loss o f cattle, the feature that distinguished the paltis from  the agricultura l 
labourers was the possession o f oxen. In  the records enumerating the number o f 
asamis or taxpayers owning oxen or plough-teams, called vaddashti hal b a il, there 
are numerous references to erstwhile labourers, such as majurs, halis and "naukars", 
who had acquired bullocks during the current year and begun to cultivate 
independently.^2
It  is not entire ly clear whether the category o f pa lti also included cultivators 
belonging to the professional and service castes collective ly termed the kamins. 
Ir fa n  Habib is o f the opinion that the hereditary division o f labour imposed by the 
caste system proh ib ited  the kamins from  acquiring the status o f peasants, thereby 
creating a "fixed  labour reserve force fo r agricu ltura l production". D ilbagh Singh 
has pointed out, however, that in  eastern Rajasthan kamins could become fu ll- t im e  
agriculturists and cultivate land on the ir own in  exceptional circumstances such as 
in the process o f resettling depopulated v i l l a g e s . H e  goes on to suggest that as 
cultivators, the kamins were probably economically better o f f  than the m a jo rity  o f 
the paltis as they paid land revenue at lower rates than the p a lt is .^  I t  is our 
contention that the status o f kamins as agriculturists was more widespread than has 
hitherto been recognised and that D ilbagh Singh’s evidence o f the concessional rates 
o f tax applicable to kamins is based on a m isinterpretation. To am p lify  this point, 
it  is our view that the m isunderstanding arises from  a confusion o f the caste 
category o f kam in and the treatment o f this caste in  the tax and revenue records.
Kamins who perform ed labour services or begar fo r the village com m unity 
customarily claimed a share o f the grain heap before the d iv is ion between the state
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and the peasant.^ The tax schedules o f parganas Udehi and Chatsu specifica lly 
mention that the kamins were subject to taxation in the proportions specified on the
f k lgrain received by them from  the agriculturists. This in terpre ta tion  also accords 
w ith  our evidence from  the khasra o f village Naelo (see appendix 7). In  this 
khasra, there is a clear u n ifo rm ity  in  the taxable grain quantities recorded against 
those taxpayers denoted kamins. These quantities appear to be too low to have 
been the output from  the cu ltiva tion  o f land and the element o f regular gradation 
in the amounts suggests that the amounts o f grain taxed were those received by the 
kamins through the customary red is tribu tion  w ith in  the village. That i t  was not 
unusual fo r the state to tax the kamins on this source o f income is corroborated by 
a sim ilar practice noted by Sykes in  the Deccan where the perquisites o f the 
balutedars or village servants were taxed "on the ground that the ir fees were more 
than commensurate w ith  the value o f the labour perform ed." ^  I t  is possible 
therefore that the lower rates o f taxation mentioned under the category o f kamins 
in  the various tax schedules were specific to the tax rate levied on the income o f 
non-agricu ltu ris t kamins.
As distinct from  the kamins who were non-agricu lturists, those who were 
cultivators were referred to as paltis or haljotas and it  is reasonable to in fe r that 
they paid land revenue at the standard rates applicable to the paltis. The confusion 
between the caste category o f the kamins and the ir tax treatment is illustrated by 
the predicament o f the agricu ltu ris t kamins of qasba Sanganer. In  qasba Sanganer 
all kamins were required to pay a caste-based levy called kho lri. The lis t o f kho lri 
taxpayers in  the jamabandhi o f 1695 reveals that the M alis, K um har-M a lis  and 
Mewatis were included in the category o f kam in but were referred to as paltis and
n c \
haljotas as they were fu ll- t im e  agriculturists. A lthough the kh o lr i levy was
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re latively small, the average annual tax per house being eighteen takas (or one
rupee), the Malis, Mewatis and Kumhars o f the qasba subm itted a jo in t petition
asking fo r exemption. The petitioners stated that they objected to paying a caste-
based levy in  addition to the land revenue imposed on the ir agricu ltu ra l output and
promised to expand the ir cu ltiva tion  and hence the revenue o f the qasba
71substantially i f  the ir request was granted. The petitioners also resort to the veiled 
threat o f m igration i f  the ir request were to be refused by re fe rring  to the fact that 
large numbers o f the ir kinsmen had already m igrated to G u jra t and M ewar because 
o f the excessive taxes imposed on them.
There is evidence in  other documents that sim ilar arguments were advanced by 
fu ll- t im e  agricu ltu rist kamins to ju s t ify  the ir claim fo r  exemption from  other caste- 
linked obligations such as labour services or begar. For instance, the telis o f qasba 
Phagi state that they cultivate land as well as work oil-presses and complain that 
they were being harassed to perform  b e g a r.^  Harbans M ukh ia  also notes that the 
oil-pressers o f qasbas Chatsu and Phagi, besides carrying on the ir caste-profession,
7 *1
were also agriculturists and were exempt from  begar. There are numerous 
petitions from  kamins alleging that although they were exempt from  begar they 
were being harassed by various sections o f the rural e l i te .^  From the available 
evidence i t  is clear that an exemption from  begar was only granted to agricu ltu rist 
kamins in  recognition o f the ir status as cultivators. The fact that in  the revenue 
records the cu ltiva ting  kamins were iden tified  w ith  the paltis as w e ll as the ir own 
perception o f the ir rights as agriculturists leads us to suggest that the ir status and 
fiscal obligations were sim ilar to the unpriv ileged caste peasants.
70
In  records enumerating the numbers o f oxen owned by each taxpayer or asami 
we fin d  numerous references to low er castes such as carpenters (K h a ti), oilpressers 
(Te li), barbers (Nai), potters (Kum hars), d istillers (Kala l), and service castes such as
HfvChamars or Balahis. W hile members from  these castes are included in  v irtu a lly  
every village in  such censuses, there are fewer references to castes such as 
washermen (Dhobi), printers (Cheepa), goldsmiths (Sonar) and cotton carders 
(Pinyara). The yaddashtis do not, however, consistently record the caste names o f 
all taxpayers thus making i t  impossible to accurately quan tify  the relative 
importance o f each caste as taxpayers in  the pargana.
A n  analysis o f the caste structure o f a few villages in  pargana Chatsu in  1666
shows that the castes generally included in  the category o f kamins constituted as
many as one in  five  o f all taxpayers. For example in mauza Datvas, pargana
Chatsu, o f the 87 cultivators recorded in  1666, 9 were oil~pressers, 7 distillers, and
one a ca lico -p rin te r or cheepa. Exclud ing the Malis or market-gardeners, other
castes belonging to the kam in category form ed about seventeen per cent o f the
7 7recorded asamis in  qasba Chatsu in  the same year. A no ther ind ica tor o f the ir 
number is provided by the yaddadashti o f pargana Chala Kalyan. This gives details 
o f the increase in  the number o f ploughs over the previous year and a sample 
survey of tw enty-n ine  khalisa villages o f tappa Sanghvani reveals that over twenty
per cent o f the ’new ploughs’ added w ith in  this period were owned by the
7 8kamins. O f the 201.5 new ploughs added to the previous years total o f 380 
ploughs, imm igrants or pahis brought in  40 ploughs. O f the other 161.5 new 
ploughs that had been acquired by the resident village population, over twenty per 
cent (33 ploughs) were owned by castes such as Chamars (20.5), Khatis (3.5), 
Kumhars (4.5), Nais (3), Cheepa (1) and M aniyar (0.5). The considerable annual
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addition to assets that these censuses record, ranging from  10 to 20 per cent fo r  a
pargana, indicate that the vast m a jo rity  i f  not a ll o f the new ly-acquired bullocks
were purchased in  the cattle market. Occasional references in  the documents
confirm  this view. For example, in  mauzas Jhak, Dhaman, and Jaisinghpura in
pargana Mauzabad, all the bullocks added to the village stock w ith in  the past year,
7Qnumbering 27, 13 and 5 respectively, had been purchased. The evidence o f the 
few cattle censuses that are available indicate that the number o f cu ltiva ting  kamins 
was sign ifican t and widespread.
We have lit t le  evidence on the kamins’ rights to the land they cultivated. A  
’sanad’ o f 1766 records that Lalo K um har o f village Choru in  pargana Phagi le ft the
on
village during the drought o f 1755. D uring  his absence, the w ell and the land 
that he had cultivated were declared ’bewaris’ or w ithou t he ir and sold to a Purohit 
fo r Rs.84. On the return o f the K um har a fte r eleven years, the am il was instructed 
to ensure that the Kum har’s land and well were restored to him  and that the 
Purohit was given back the money that he had paid fo r it. The d iw an ’s instructions 
regarding the return o f the money to the Purohit state that i f  the money had been 
deposited in  the treasury, a government hundi (varat) fo r  the amount be issued to 
the Purohit. A lte rna tive ly , i f  the proceeds o f the sale had been given to the 
moneylender to clear the K um har’s outstanding debts and an examination o f the 
bohra’s accounts established that his claim to the money was va lid , then the 
Kum har must pay the e ig h ty -fo u r rupees to the Purohit. The fact that the Kum har 
regained possession o f his land despite his long absence and the in te rim  sale o f the 
land to another cu ltiva to r indicates that his tit le  to the land was essentially s im ilar 
to the permanent and hereditary occupancy righ t claimed by the peasant in  Mughal 
Ind ia .81
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I t  is apparent from  the discussion in  this chapter that village society consisted
o f a variety o f social groups. The question arises as to what extent the social strata
in  terms o f caste corresponded to the economic status o f each group. In  a region
where the extent o f cu ltiva tion  and land-ho ld ing were closely related to the
numbers o f bullocks or plough teams, data showing the d is tribu tion  o f bu llock-
ownership could be used as a proxy fo r  determ ining the nature o f economic
d iffe ren tia tion . In  an earlier study, Satish Chandra showed that the m a jo rity  o f
peasants belonged to the ’m iddle peasant’ category owning two to fo u r bullocks per 
82head. The number o f peasants owning just one bullock, classified as ’poor’ , 
constituted about twenty to th ir ty  per cent o f the population enumerated while the 
number o f asamis w ith  more than fo u r bullocks was variable, fluc tua ting  between 
less than one per cent to over nine per cent in  d iffe ren t parganas. I t  is possible 
to extend the im portant find ings o f this study by corre lating economic 
d iffe ren tia tion  w ith  social status in  terms o f caste and o ff ic ia l position in the 
village. The significance o f such an exercise lies in the attem pt to assess whether 
the favourable tax treatment o f the socially superior strata o f rura l society was 
reflected systematically in the d iffe re n tia l ownership o f a key production resource. 
The results o f a sample study o f the d is tribu tion  o f bullocks among the most 
numerous castes resident in  the qasba and fou r large villages o f pargana Chatsu are 
shown in Table 2.8^
The figures under oxen per head in  the table show that although the upper caste 
asamis owned more bullocks on average than the unpriv ileged castes, the disparity 
in  ownership was not acute. The only group which appears to have control over 
draught power that was s ign ifican tly  higher than average were the village
Table 2: D is tribu tion  o f Bullock Ownership by Caste Categories.
Asamis Oxen Oxen % D is tribu tion  o f oxen
nos. nos. per head 1 2-4 >4 Total
Oasba Chatsu 200 422 2.1 30.5 64.5 5.0 100.0
Brahman 51 115 2.3 23.5 72.6 3.9 100.0
Nagori 14 35 2.5 28.6 57.1 14.3 100.0
M ali 70 123 1.8 40.0 58.6 1.4 100.0
Te li 28 51 1.8 46.4 53.6 0.0 100.0
Mauza Chandlai 165 502 3.0 12.0 72.3 15.7 100.0
Patel 9 78 8.7 0.0 11.1 88.9 100.0
Brahman 84 235 2.8 9.5 79.8 10.7 100.0
Jat 33 93 2.8 15.2 66.7 18.2 100.0
M ali 10 22 2.2 10.0 90.0 0.0 100.0
Mauza Kotkhavda l54 376 2.4 18.2 74.0 7.8 100.0
Patel 12 41 3.4 0.0 75.0 25.0 100.0
Sah (baniya) 14 48 3.4 0.0 78.6 21.4 100.0
Pande Brahman 27 53 2.0 33.3 66.7 0.0 100.0
Jat 22 50 2.3 18.2 77.3 4.5 100.0
M a li 14 27 1,9 28.6 71.4 0.0 100,0
Mauza Datwas. 78 193 2.5 20.5 69.2 10.3 100.0
Patel/Patwari 6 30 5.0 0.0 33.3 66.7 100.0
M ali 17 30 1.8 29.4 70.6 0.0 100.0
G ujar 13 25 1.9 23.1 76.9 0.0 100.0
Teli 9 18 2.0 44.4 55.6 0.0 100.0
Mauza B ikarva 34 81 2.4 29.4 64.7 5.9 100.0
Buzurg
Meena 20 47 2.4 20.0 80.0 0.0 100.0
M a li 7 10 1.4 57.1 42.9 0.0 100.0
Source: Yaddashti Hal Bail Jubani Patel Patwari, pargana Chatsu.
VS 1723/AD  1666.
Note: The figures alongside the name o f each o f the five  units (v illage or qasba) 
show the aggregate numbers and the percentage d is tribu tion  o f the total 
population w ith in  the un it. The caste groups which comprised the m a jo rity  o f 
the residents in  each un it have then been selected fo r fu rthe r analysis.
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84o ffic ia ls , notably the patels. Conversely, the M alis have the lowest average 
ownership ratio in  each o f the five  units analysed. This may be due to the fact 
that they were specialist cultivators o f cash crops on small and intensively cultivated 
plots o f land. Therefore, an index o f  economic s tra tifica tion  based on bullock 
ownership alone is a misleading measure o f the ir relative economic position. The 
d istribu tion  o f oxen across various categories shown in  the table appears to bear a 
remarkable approxim ation to a normal d is tribu tion . The m a jo rity  o f the asamis o f 
every caste are clustered w ith in  the ’m iddle peasant’ category owning two to fou r 
bullocks each.
Clearly we would need a w ider range of in fo rm ation  on aspects such as 
agricultura l investment and output to perm it inferences to be drawn regarding the 
relative economic status o f various caste groups. But the absence o f a sharp 
d iffe ren tia tion  in  the ownership o f a v ita l production resource does bring  in to  
question form ulations that assume a systematic correspondence between caste 
hierarchies and economic strata. O ur evidence suggests that w h ile  the m a jo rity  o f 
the upper caste agriculturists appear to be no better o f f  than the ord inary peasants, 
o f the few prosperous cultivators besides the village headmen who owned more than 
five  bullocks each, most were from  the higher castes. Thus although caste 
membership cannot be seen as an automatic proxy fo r economic status, the fiscal 
and other concessions accorded to the upper castes and the village o ffic ia ls  meant 
that prosperous agriculturists were generally members o f this priv ileged section o f 
village society.
The analysis o f the varia tion in  bullock ownership between ind iv idua l 
cultivators indicates a s tra tified  village society. The absence o f extreme inequalities
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in  the d is tribu tion  o f resources reinforces the view that the basic u n it o f production 
in  medieval north Ind ia  was the peasant fam ily  farm . Harbans M ukh ia  has 
characterised the agrarian economy o f medieval north Ind ia  as a ’ free peasant 
economy’. He defines a ’free peasant’ as a producer who "neither rendered his nor 
his fa m ily ’s labour to any one in  any fo rm  fo r purposes o f production, nor 
employed outside labour; he cultivated his fam ily  farm  w ith  his own fa m ily ’s labour 
and resources" and was free o f any fo rm  o f extraneous contro l over his process o f
Of
production. This de fin ition  reiterates the notion o f a se lf-su ffic ie n t peasant by 
emphasising the economic ’ freedom ’ o f the ind iv idua l peasant in  his control over his 
choice o f cropping pattern, w ith in  the universal constraints o f the regional ecology 
and the specific allocation o f his fam ily  labour. M ukh ia ’s characterisation however, 
does not allow fo r the various ways in  w hich the economic freedom o f action o f the 
peasant was constrained. In  a recent w ork, Frank Perlin has argued that the 
concept o f a se lf-su ffic ien t, se lf-regulato ry and se lf-reproducing autonomous 
peasantry derives from  an uncritica l acceptance o f the tax-contracting  revenue 
categories and that these o ff ic ia l categories conceal the sub-tenuria l g rid  o f 
sharecropping, h ired labour and temporary leases. Evidence from  other regions
of north Ind ia  corroborates Perlin ’s argument and shows that the lack o f adequate
8 7resources resulted in  various forms o f agrarian dependence.
A g ricu ltu ra l labourers represented the most extreme fo rm  o f agrarian
dependence. The lit t le  that our sources te ll us o f them suggests that the halis,
majurs and naukars could begin cu ltiva ting  as independent cultivators or asamis
88once they had acquired the ir own oxen or a plough team. Cattle were
particu larly  vulnerable to the period ic recurrence o f drought in  this region. The 
distress caused by fam ine and the consequent lack o f resources provides one
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explanation o f the process whereby peasants were reduced to the status o f
OQ
agricultura l labourers. Bayly suggests that po litica l factors also need to be
considered as these may create conditions where the peasants trade the ir
independence fo r p ro te c tio n .^  W hile we have no direct evidence to support this
view, periods o f in tensified  local co n flic t d id  coincide w ith  the d isruption in
agricultura l production and trade, the w ithdraw al o f m oney-lend ing capital, an
increasing frequency o f devastating fam ine and the general im poverishm ent o f the 
91peasantry. Hence, the prevalence o f this form  o f agrarian dependence m a 
region should be seen as arising from  an interp lay o f factors such as demography 
and the supply o f land, c lim atic  imbalances and po litica l conditions.
W hile agricu ltura l labourers were to ta lly dependent upon the ir employers fo r  
the ir subsistence, poor peasants also supplemented the ir income through casual
no
labour fo r which they received wages or "m ajuri". This feature may perhaps
have been seasonal as suggested by P .M .B la ik ie  who argues that well ownership is a
source o f power in  the village exercised through prov id ing  w ork and food fo r those
cultivators who were unable to farm  the ir land in  the rabi season because they
lacked irr iga tion  fac ilities. Such paid seasonal labour to supplement income was
clearly d iffe re n t from  the labour services rendered by the kamins fo r which they
received a customary share o f the agricu ltu ra l p ro d u c t.^  Sharecropping or ’ sanjha"
contracts can also be seen as a form  o f securing labour where the landlord closely
supervised and controlled production by regulating the provis ion o f agricultura l 
95inputs.
W hile the lack o f physical resources such as adequate draught power or 
irriga tion  forced peasants in to  relations o f dependence, the widespread prevalence
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of peasant indebtedness must also have severely reduced the autonomy o f the 
peasant in  crucial spheres such as cropping decisions. In tervention  in  the peasant’s 
labour process on his own land may have been ind irec tly  exercised through the 
manipulation o f the terms o f debt repayment. In  one instance we fin d  that the 
moneylender demanded repayment o f grain advances made at the commencement o f 
the sowing season in  form  o f raw cotton after the h a rve s t.^  Hypothecation o f 
valuable cash-crops in  order to service debts appears to have been widespread in
07the ad jo in ing Agra-Bay ana region even in  the seventeenth century.
In  view o f the various forms o f inter-dependence that existed in  rura l society,
i t  would conceptually be more accurate to view the ind iv idua l cu ltiva ting  fam ily
98units as part o f a complex production system as emphasised by Baker. 
Christopher Baker stresses that few farms enjoyed any chance o f economic and 
po litica l independence and that the contro l over local capital in  the hands o f the 
commercial and landed elites meant that the princ ipa l un it o f organisation o f the
agrarian production system was an ’agrarian manager’. The la tte r provided the
necessary fac ilities fo r production in  exchange fo r labour. In tr in s ic  to the system 
o f production was moneylending and i t  is to the provision o f cred it that we now 
turn.
Credit Relationships
The agricu lturists ’ needs and demand fo r credit can be a ttribu ted to the ir 
revenue obligations, to the seasonal demand fo r consumption and seed loans, to
finance investment in  wells and cattle and the need to provide fo r social
ceremonies such as marriages or bereavements. In  his study o f agricu ltu ra l credit in
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medieval Ind ia , Habib cites evidence from  eighteenth century Bengal to suggest that
peasants took loans "mostly" because o f the need to pay land re venue .^  Our
evidence shows, however, that loans were generally "b ij khaj" or seed and
consumption loans and the explanation fo r  this d ifference can be found in  the fact
that the revenue demand in  our region was largely levied in  k ind. There are also
instances in  our documents o f loans taken to finance the d igging o f wells, the
purchase o f cattle and the rehab ilita tion  o f v i l l a g e s . A  clear ind ica tion  o f the
im portant role o f cred it in  agricu ltura l production is provided in  the response o f
the diwan to a jagirdars’ com plaint that the patel and paltis o f the village had
1 f)1stopped cu ltiva tion  w ithou t o ffe rin g  any explanation. The diwan in  his reply 
suggests three possible reasons and the appropriate actions to be taken; firs t, that 
the raiyatis refusal was deliberate and therefore i f  they d id  not cu ltivate village 
lands then the jag irda r should get the land tilled  by other paltis; second, that the 
village moneylender was not p rov id ing  them w ith  adequate cred it in  which case a 
sum proportionate to the average output o f the village be advanced to the raiyati; 
and, th ird , that the ra iya ti may not be cu ltiva ting  because the moneylender was 
harassing them to repay old debts and that this must not be perm itted.
The two p rinc ipa l sources o f cred it fo r needy peasants were the state and the 
moneylenders who are referred to in  our sources by the generic term  o f "bohras". 
These two agencies fo r agricu ltura l loans should not, however, be seen as competing 
alternatives but rather as being complementary to each other. Our evidence 
indicates that the normal seasonal demand fo r seed and consumption loans (b ij 
khaj) was generally provided by the rura l moneylenders. The "tagai" or agricultura l 
loans extended by the state on the other hand were generally fa ir ly  large amounts 
advanced to finance productive investment or to aid in  the agricu ltu ra l recovery o f
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an area when the bohras refused to extend cred it due to perceived risk. Tagai was
also the term used to denote loans made by revenue farmers, assignees and 
102grantees. W hile our documents clearly indicate that rura l moneylending was
widespread and that the bohra was an integral part o f village society, they o ffe r 
lit t le  in fo rm ation  fo r the historian on questions related to the operation o f the 
system and the terms o f credit. A  greater body o f in fo rm a tion  is available 
regarding the state’s tagai loans and the contro l exercised by the state on the rura l 
moneylenders and i t  is through the analysis o f this evidence that we can obtain a 
partia l insight in to  rura l moneylending.
The Jaipur state’s objectives in  financing agrarian development appears to
derive from  the M ughal conception o f development which consisted o f the
extension o f the area under cu ltiva tion  and an increase in  the production  o f cash- 
103crops. Thus tagai loans were advanced fo r investments such as the construction
o f a dam in  Sanganer and the in troduction  o f sugarcane cu ltiva tion  in  pargana
Bhusawar. In  1714 the ra iya ti o f qasba Sanganer subm itted a pe tition  to the state
requesting a loan o f Rs. 6,000 to finance the construction o f a dam and stated that
such a scheme would benefit the state in  the form  o f increased revenues o f
approximately Rs. 3,000 per year. The ra iya ti also undertook to repay the princ ipa l
w ith in  the next five  to seven y e a r s . I n  pargana Bhusawar, on the other hand,
the state provided substantial sums to encourage the expansion in  the cu ltiva tion  o f 
105sugarcane. The document states that the target set by the state to double the
production o f sugarcane in the tappa o f Pavta, pargana Bhusawar, had not been met 
as the ra iya ti o f some o f the villages were unable to obtain credit from  the bohras 
to purchase seed. The diwans response was to emphasise that the cu ltiva tion  o f 
sugarcane was essential fo r  the prosperity o f the village and, therefore, tagai loans
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were sanctioned to these villages at the rate o f six rupees per bigha o f cane grown
and the total amount lent was fixed  at Rs. 2,000-2,500.
Tagai loans were generally advanced through the village patel but records were
maintained o f the ir d is tribu tion  to ind iv idua l asamis w ith in  the village. I t  was on
the basis o f such records that ind iv idua l lia b ility  was calculated and attempts by the
patel to pass on his debt burden to the ra iya ti were met w ith  o ff ic ia l
1 06
reprimands. The state levied interest on tagai loans w hich was approximately 9
per cent in  the fiscal year 1 7 6 0 - 1 7 6 1 . This was also the standard rate charged
to traders who contracted to sell the state’s share o f grain and may have
108corresponded to the p reva iling  commercial rate o f interest. Tagai loans
advanced by the state fo r  seed and consumption were also d istribu ted in  grain and
the value o f the loan was calculated in  cash at the p reva iling  high pre-harvest 
109prices. Repayment w ith  interest on the loan generally demanded immediately
after the fo llow ing  harvest and occasionally in instalments spread over the fiscal 
110year. This convention o f debiting a grain loan as a cash loan involved a gain 
irrespective o f whether payment was demanded in  cash o r the grain-equ iva lent at 
the low prices after the harvest. The local revenue o ffic ia ls  were quick to spot the 
potentia l loss to the state during the fisca l year 1726-27 when there was an unusual 
rise in  post-harvest prices. The rise in post-harvest prices was perhaps due to the 
famine in  the territories around D e lh i and the export o f substantial amounts o f the
* 1 1 1 * 4 .w in te r grains to the affected areas by the state. In  this year i t  was estimated 
that the state would incu r a loss o f about Rs. 15,000 on the recovery o f tagai loans
that had been distributed when the prices were much lower than those at the tim e
112o f repayment. The local o ffic ia ls  were therefore instructed to revise the price at
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which the commutation in to  cash had been fixed  and recover gra in at this in fla ted  
rate which was then to be sold im m ediately in  order to make up the notional loss.
There is re lative ly meagre in fo rm ation  regarding the terms o f cred it on loans
advanced by the bohras. A  recent study suggests that the rates o f interest charged
by the moneylenders were usurious and ranged from  ten to tw e n ty -five  per cent 
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per annum. A n  analysis o f the fa m ily  papers o f a Brahman priest who invested 
in  moneylending and trade in  the ad jo in ing  state of M arw ar (Jodhpur) in  the same 
period, concludes that the range in  the rates o f interest, fluc tua ting  between ten to 
th ir ty -s ix  per cent in  this region, was a re flection o f the nature o f security o ffe red 
on loans. Thus the higher rate o f 36 per cent was charged on unsecured loans 
while only ha lf that rate was levied on loans secured on land, oxen or 
ornaments.11^ Part o f the capital o f the rura l moneylender appears to have been 
obtained through advances from  the substantial traders and sarrafs or money­
changers resident in  the qasbas. These men lent money to the v illage bohra as well
11^
as d irectly to jagirdars, patels and the raiyati. One such financ ie r, Mohanram
Mahajan, requested the assistance o f the state to recover Rs. 10,000 that he had
loaned to the "Rajputs, mahajans and ra iyati" o f pargana Amarsar. S im ilar pleas
from  other large financiers fo r help in  the recovery o f loans were generally acted
upon by the state on the condition that a quarter o f the sum recovered was
117deposited in  the state treasury. Some requests were rejected on the ground that 
the loans were more than ten years old or when it  was fe lt that the ir recovery 
would adversely a ffect peasant p roduction .11^
Rural moneylending was not restricted to the trad itiona l commercial castes such 
as the baniyas, sarrafs and mahajans but also included rich  agriculturists and the
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hereditary elite such as chaudhuris and qanungos. Some bohras and mahajans were
1 1 0  1 *also gharuhala cultivators. , and traders , while substantial agriculturists also
121derived part o f the ir income from  moneylending and trading. W hile i t  is clear 
that such ’rura l commercial magnates’ who combined agricu lture, trading, 
moneylending and, in  some cases, adm inistrative o ffice  existed in  the eighteenth
century in the region studied, the paucity o f data does not pe rm it an estimate o f
1 22the ir number or scale o f activities. In  the m a jo rity  o f documents relating to 
conflicts arising from  the mortgage o f land in  the la tte r ha lf o f the eighteenth 
century, i t  was this category o f rural magnate that was involved.
In  addition to lending money, the rural rich also h ired out assets such as wells, 
1 22ploughs and bullocks. The rent on wells was termed "nalvat" and some estimation
o f its incidence can be obtained from  the o ff ic ia l rates o f nalvat levied on the lease
o f state-owned wells. Such wells appear to have been acquired by the state through
sequestration o f the property o f defau lting asamis -  as in  the case o f the patel who
1 2 4 .absconded on being charged w ith  the the ft o f cattle -  and in  the process o f
forc ib le  eviction o f recalcitrant clans. When the Chauhan zamindars o f pargana
Lewali were ousted along w ith  the ir supporters in  1723-24, the ir property was
declared khalisa and nalvat demanded by the revenue authorities on the use o f the
1 2 Swells by the ra iyati in  a later year. Nalvat was a levy in  add ition  to the land 
revenue and could be realised in  cash at a fixed  rate per bigha or in  k ind as a 
proportion o f the produce. In  qasba Sawai Jaipur, the rate o f nalvat paid to the 
state was fixed  at e ither one rupee per bigha or, when paid in  k ind , a sixth o f the
1 2fitaxpayers share o f the produce a fte r the payment o f revenue and other dues. In  
qasba Chatsu the rate was only fo u r annas per bigha in  1763 w hile  in  qasba 
Sanganer, i t  was calculated at a sixth o f the estimated value o f the produce in
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127cash. There is no evidence o f the rate o f nalvat demanded by private owners 
although one document indicates that the amount demanded was substantially
increased by calculating the levy as a proportion  o f the gross output o f the peasant
128rather than on the peasants share afte r the payment o f revenue.
The state imposed several restrictions on the operations o f the rura l 
moneylenders. The measures taken were aimed at restricting the demands o f the 
bohras as well as to ensure un in terrup ted cu ltivation. In  a few  instances we fin d
that the ra iya ti desert the village due to the excessive demands made on them by
129the bohra. In  one such case, the A h ir  patel o f the village was instructed to
induce the paltis who had fled  to resettle in  the village by o ffe rin g  revenue
concessions and a guarantee that the ir debts to the bohra would be deferred fo r
three years and afterwards repaid in  instalments fixed  in  accordance w ith  the
180harvest output. I t  was precisely this sort o f peasant resistance to excessive
demands that the state attempted to prevent through a po licy con tro lling  the sphere
o f moneylending. The diwan’s instructions to the amils repeatedly emphasise that
the bohras must not harass the ra iya ti to meet repayments on loans that were older 
181than a year. The general p rinc ip le  in  regard to all loans -  tagai as well as loans
advanced by the bohras -  was that debts incurred in the current harvest period
182should be recovered im m ediately a fte r the harvest or w ith in  the fiscal year.
Arrears on older loans could only be demanded i f  the output o f the current harvest
188was considered adequate. In  one case the state recommended that the indebted
paltis repay the ir creditors, the Rajawats o f Sirsa, by selling the ir m ilch  c a ttle .^ ^ -
In  order to lim it  the compounding o f interest arising from  defaults on payments,
185the am il was to ensure that the total debt d id  not exceed tw ice the principal.
In  situations o f acute distress or poverty o f the ra iya ti, a m oratorium  on all
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repayments on loans was imposed t i l l  such tim e as they were able to clear the debt 
in  easy instalments.
The fact that the state actively discouraged the recovery o f old loans by the 
bohras suggests that such loans were generally unrecoverable and therefore w ritten  
o ff. The bohras often attempted to circum vent the stringent restrictions imposed 
by the state and connived w ith  the am il in  attempting to recover old debts. The 
diwan strongly reprimanded the am il o f pargana G azi-ka-Thana fo r  conniving w ith  
the moneylender, Harla i Mahajan, and despatching a task-force (talab) to B ij ay 
Singh Rajawat’s ja g ir  village in  order to collect debts outstanding fo r over ten years
1^7
owed by the village mahajan, ra iya ti, and the jag irda r’s retainers. In  another
1 ^8instance, Gordhan sarraf imprisoned a patel who owed him  Rs. 1,350. The am il 
negotiated the release o f the patel on condition that the patel repay the sarraf and 
appoint a guarantor. Follow ing this settlement, the diwan was in fo rm ed that the 
patel was harassing the ra iya ti to increase the ir contributions to the common 
financia l fund ("malba") o f the village in  order to clear his debt. Rather than 
reprimand the patel fo r  the misuse o f the common village funds, the diwan 
remonstrated w ith  the am il c ritic is ing  his role in  the settlement on the grounds that 
i t  was proh ib ited  to demand the repayment o f old debts and that the amils 
responsibility lay in  ensuring that the ra iya ti were not harassed on this account.
Our discussion o f the system o f agricu ltura l credit in  operation shows that 
severe institu tiona l constraints dictated by the state were applied to the terms o f 
repayment that could be imposed on borrowers. This must not, however, be taken 
to im p ly  an antagonistic relationship between the state and the bohra. In  an 
agricu ltura l economy in  which a large and dispersed number o f small borrowers was
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serviced by a corresponding m u ltip lic ity  o f petty moneylenders, the state clearly
recognised the im portant role played by the la tte r in  rura l production and in
1 29marketing thereby ensuring the flow  o f revenue to the state. The rationale fo r 
the lim its  imposed by the state on the moneylenders must lie  in  the objective o f the 
state to subordinate the claims o f the bohras to its own revenue demands. A n  
integral component o f the policy to regulate and lim it  the p ro fits  o f the bohras was 
the ab ility  o f the state to provide an alternative source o f cred it when the bohras 
refused to extend this fa c ility .
In  situations where the bohras were unw illing  to provide cred it, the state
advanced tagai loans to meet the subsistence requirements o f cultivators. In  a
number o f documents the amils report that the prevailing drought or the preceding
poor harvest had meant that the bohras were unw illing  to extend b ij khaj loans to
the agriculturists and therefore provis ion fo r tagai loans had to be made to ensure
cu ltiva tion .140 In  1743, the am il o f pargana Malpura complained that despite a
fo rtn igh t o f unin terrupted rains in  the month before the sowing o f the kh a rif crops,
the bohras were not coming fo rw ard  to provide seed-loans to the cultivators as the
1 41previous year had been one o f drought. The state therefore allocated Rs. 2,000
as tagai to the pargana. In  situations o f an acute subsistence crisis, such as the
famine o f 1731, the state not only provided tagai loans but also took additional
measures to induce the bohras to lend to the peasants. The reported widespread
refusal by the moneylenders to provide loans in  every pargana in  1731 led the
diwan to issue instructions com pelling the bohras to advance h a lf the grain that
they had recovered in  the previous rabi harvest as seed-corn to the peasants so that
1 42the rabi cu ltiva tion  in  the current year could commence. The bohras returns 
were to be assured by issuing them w ith  parwanas or state orders empowering them
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to collect the ir advances in  three instalments. Such o ff ic ia l assurances were crucial
in  allaying the private moneylenders’ fears o f default in  conditions o f uncertain
production e ither because o f in su ffic ien t yields or because o f desertion by the 
14^peasantry. In  the same year, the state advanced tagai loans in  five  parganas and 
specified that in  the d is tribu tion  o f these sums, p r io r ity  was to be given to those 
cultivators producing cash crops such as cotton and sugarcane and those whose 
fields were irr ig a te d ."*^  The state also had to intervene when the total volume o f 
debt had risen to a level at which the bohra could not continue operating in  the 
village.
In  the period a fter the death o f Sawai Jai Singh (d.1743), our evidence indicates 
that the cred it policy o f the state becomes inoperative due to the in a b ility  o f the 
state to provide an alternative source o f credit. In  this period, the increasing 
financia l demands placed on the state to meet the payment o f a w ar-indem n ity  to 
the Marathas led to a severe financia l crisis. This situation was fu rth e r exacerbated 
by the devastating annual raids by the Marathas and the years o f successive 
droughts in  the m id-1750s. The im pact o f these factors on agricu ltu ra l production 
was an in it ia l sharp contraction in  overall production and subsequently the inab ility  
o f production to revive t i l l  the end o f our p e r io d .^ ^  E arlie r famines, such as 
those in 1717 and 1731, had not had a sim ilar long-term  e ffec t on production. 
W hile several interconnected factors accounted fo r the recession in  the second ha lf 
o f the eighteenth century, the contraction in  the provision o f cred it by the state had 
im portant consequences fo r agricu ltura l production and the changed relationship 
between the state and the commercial and rura l elite.
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As we had seen earlier, the sources o f commercial cred it contracted during 
droughts or periods o f po litica l ins tab ility  when the provision o f tagai loans by the 
state was crucial to the recovery o f production in  the region. The in a b ility  o f the 
state to provide adequate resources fo r agricu ltura l recovery during  or a fte r the 
series o f drought years from  1754 to 1756 appears to have had tw o interrelated 
consequences. On the one hand there is evidence that rich  agriculturists began 
acquiring the land o f pa lti-p rop rie to rs  through the mechanism o f mortgage, and on 
the other, that in  order to make funds available to the impoverished peasantry the 
state was forced to give the bohras f irs t claim to the agricu ltu ra l product and 
fina lly , to resort to revenue farm ing.
Mortgage o f land was not a new feature o f the second ha lf o f the eighteenth
century as is apparent from  the instances o f land mortgage that are referred to in
1 ATIthe documents from  the earlier period. As mortgage and sale o f land were not
mediated through the state machinery, the state records provide lit t le  evidence o f
the nature and effects o f such transactions w ith in  the village. However, in  the
second ha lf o f the eighteenth century the increasing incidence o f conflic ts  between
the priv ileged gharuhala cultivators and the paltis consequent to mortgage and sale
transactions began to involve a rb itra tion  by the state as there was no adequate
1 4 8mechanism fo r the ir resolution in  the village. The distinguish ing feature o f the 
mortgage o f land in  the second ha lf o f the eighteenth century was that a substantial 
number o f paltis lost the ir status as independent cultivators. Collective 
representations made by the paltis o f qasbas Phagi, A jabgarh , Tonk, Chatsu and 
Pahari u n ifo rm ly  allege that the ir land had been acquired by the gharuhala 
cultivators through mortgage and that they (the paltis) were im poverished as a 
c o n s e q u e n c e . T h e  extent o f decline in  the number o f independent peasants was
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sign ificant -  in  qasba Phagi the number o f paltis had been reduced from  700 in
1753 to 28 in  1764, in  qasba Pahari from  300 to 50 in  1760, w h ile  in  qasba Chatsu,
150175 o f the 300 fie lds belonging to the paltis had been acquired by a mahajan. 
The decline in the ir number may in  part have been due to increased m orta lity  and 
m igration during the fam ine years, but as they themselves claim  in  the ir petitions to 
the diwan, a s ign ificant number had been forced to pledge the ir land as collateral 
fo r loans taken out during this period.
A n  analysis o f the documents relating to mortgage reveal that the land 
mortgaged was invariab ly located in  the qasba or else comprised w e ll- irr ig a te d  land
1C1
in  the villages. Such land was o f obvious value owing to capital improvements
made or to its favourable location w ith  respect to the local market. The terms o f
the mortgage varied. In  some cases, the mortgage was usufructory and the
mortgagee cultivated the land t i l l  such tim e as the loan was paid o f f  by the
mortgagor. Such an arrangement between Fateh Khan, the mortgagee, and Budhsa
A h ir , was referred to the diwan fo r  a rb itra tion  when the la tte r refused to allow
Fateh Khan to continue cu ltiva ting  the land although he had not yet repaid the 
152loan. The instructions o f the diwan were that Fateh Khan should be allowed to
cultivate the land according to the terms o f the mortgage deed or a lternatively,
Budhsa should repay the p rinc ipa l w ith  interest to Fateh Khan. In  another case,
K ira tram  held the mortgage on C hittarm al Kayastha’s land and the terms o f the
agreement were that each o f them would cultivate the land fo r a successive period
1o f fou r years in  rotation. When the kayastha continued to t i l l  the land fo r the 
f i f th  year running and also refused to clear his debt, the diwan recommended that 
K ira tram  be given possession o f the land w ith  the proviso that i f  the facts o f the 
matter were d iffe re n t then the village council or "panchayat" should arbitrate.
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Evidence from  the second ha lf o f the eighteenth century, on the other hand,
indicates that the mortgagor continued to t i l l  the land and paid "bhara" on
unirrigated land or nalvat on irriga ted  land. These terms appear to have been used
interchangeably to denote rent paid by the tenant, who in the m a jo rity  o f instances
was the orig ina l proprie tor, as well as interest payments to the mortgagee on loans
secured against the land o f the ow ner-cu ltiva to r. As we had seen earlier, a levy
termed nalvat was paid to the state in  addition to the revenue payments fo r  the use
o f state-owned wells. The term nalvat has been used in  a s im ila r sense o f rent on
irrigated land in  a document recording the dispute between a Brahman lessor and
Sah Ramdas mahajan o f mauza K ik ro d  in  pargana Antela P ra g p u r.^ ^  The use o f
the term nalvat in the sense o f interest payments is evident in  the com plaint made
1 ssby the paltis o f qasba Phagi. The dispute arose because the bohra-mortgagee
demanded that the paltis pay him  the agreed proportion o f the produce in  respect
1o f nalvat before the appropriation o f the revenue in  k ind  by the state. The
paltis complained that this mode o f levy le ft them w ith  a smaller fraction  o f the
produce and the diwan confirm ed that the bohra’s payment was to be deducted
from  the peasants’ share a fter the d iv is ion o f the grain between the state and the 
157paltis. The fact that the paltis were liable fo r  revenue payments to the state 
w ith  respect to the land mortgaged indicates that they continued to be regarded as 
the owners o f the land.
As discussed, our evidence on the la tte r ha lf o f the eighteenth century indicates
that the paltis were losing tit le  to land through the mechanism o f mortgage. This is
reflected in the ir frequent references to the reductions in  ra iya ti-he ld  land and
o ffic ia l concern at the simultaneous extension o f land held under priv ileged 
1 59gharuhala tenure. Such a trend im plied  a reduction in state revenue as the
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gharuhalas were entitled to concessionary rates o f taxation. The quantita tive indices 
o f the extent o f cotton acreage under p riv ileged and standard rates o f taxation in 
qasbas Phagi and Sanganer support the evidence o f the ch ittis  that there was a
i • irelative increase in  the proportion  o f land assessed at the concessionary rates. 
The Jaipur adm inistration however forbade the conversion o f ra iya ti land in to
1 / r  1
gharuhala land. However, this d id  not im p ly  that the state considered the 
acquisition o f pa lti land through the mechanism o f mortgage an illeg itim ate  ac tiv ity  
requiring the restitu tion o f proprie tary rights to the paltis through its in tervention. 
On the contrary, the ru ling  o f the am il in  the cases o f defau lt on interest 
repayments recommended foreclosure and the transfer o f land ownership to the
1 ^9
mortgagee. What the state insisted upon was that the tax code on such land 
remained unaltered so that its revenues were not affected. The problem  w ith  such 
a position was that i t  was d if f ic u lt  to implement. The im poverished tenants, 
probably dependent upon the gharuhala fo r  agricultura l implements or seed, would 
be indistinguishable from  wage labourers or majurs specially when the la tte r also 
received a share o f the produce fo r  the ir labour or cu ltivated small plots o f the ir 
own. The employment o f wage labourers to cultivate gharuhala land was an 
accepted practice which d id  not lead to the w ithdrawal o f rights to concessionary 
revenue payments. The am biguity in  the o ff ic ia l directives forced the state to 
accept the expansion in  gharuhala holdings provided such a transgression had the 
sanction o f time. The date fo r  such ra tifica tion  was, however, a rb itra rily  fixed  
varying from  2 to 10 years p r io r to the receipt o f the c o m p la in t."^
On the basis o f the partia l and fragm entary view that we obtain from  our 
evidence, it  is d if f ic u lt  to conclude that land was being concentrated to an 
appreciable degree in  the region as a whole especially in  a situation o f land
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abundance. On the other hand, the type o f land that was being mortgaged indicates 
that in  a period o f recession and poor harvests, the rura l elite added to the ir assets 
through the accumulation o f land w hich had been im proved by capital investment. 
Our evidence, however, does suggest that the depletion in  the resources o f the 
paltis fo llow ing  the m id-1750s fam ine resulted in  an increase in  the numbers o f 
dependent peasants.
In  a period o f a prolonged crisis in  production and fam ine, only those peasants 
who could secure loans against productive or advantageously located land were able 
to obtain credit. The contraction in  cred it in  such periods meant that the state had 
to provide fo r rura l re lie f and recovery through tagai loans and absorb the risks of 
default on these loans in  return fo r the longer-term  objective o f ensuring a stable 
flow  o f revenue to the state. The documents o f the m id-1750s and early 1760s 
which relate to the provision o f tagai loans reflect the in a b ility  o f the state to 
provide adequate resources in  this period. In  practically every instance, the state 
was compelled to guarantee the money lent by the bohras to the peasants by 
debiting these as tagai loans and empowering the bohras to recover them w ith  
interest at the time o f the harvest.1^  This reflects the in a b ility  o f the state to 
provide adequate resources which forced i t  to secure loans w ith  an o ff ic ia l parwana 
guaranteeing the recovery o f the loan w ith  interest. W hile evidently the need fo r 
state intervention in  the provision o f rura l cred it was most acute in  the decade 
from  1754 to 1764, there are indications that the state had in itia ted  the practice of 
borrow ing tagai loans soon after the death o f Sawai Jai Singh and the Maratha 
involvem ent in  the succession dispute between Ishwari Singh and Madho Singh.
As early as 1748 the diwan recommended that money be borrowed from  the bohra 
in  order to grant tagai loans fo r the rehabilita tion o f a village in  pargana Sawai
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1Jaipur that had been looted by the Maratha army and whose peasants had fled. 
W ith  the adoption o f the practice o f securing the moneylenders’ loans, the state was 
e ffective ly  placed in  the situation o f bearing all the risks o f production shortfalls 
while  guaranteeing the bohras return on capital. W hile more evidence would be 
required to assess the change in  the relationship between the state and the bohras it  
is clear that the ab ility  o f the state to exercise control over p riva te  moneylending 
was e ffective ly  constrained in this period.
In  the foregoing discussion, we have seen that the in a b ility  o f the state to 
intervene e ffec tive ly , and thereby control, an in trins ic  component o f the system o f 
agrarian production, namely, the supply o f credit led to an increase in  its 
dependence upon rura l moneylenders as well as an increase in  the contro l exercised 
by the rura l elites over production. These developments had the e ffec t o f reducing 
the state’s share o f the agricu ltura l output and thereby exacerbating the financia l 
crisis o rig inating  in  the substantial w ar-indem n ity  demanded by the Marathas. The 
state’s response to the changed context o f the latter ha lf o f the eighteenth century 
was to adopt revenue farm ing or the system o f ijaradari.
Revenue farm ing in  the form  that was prevalent in  the second ha lf o f the 
eighteenth century had the advantage o f p rov id ing  the state a stable income to buy 
protection from  the Marathas w hile  at the same time devolving upon the ija radar 
the risks o f production shortfalls. The change in  state po licy w ith  regard to the 
mechanism o f surplus extraction that the adoption o f ija radari im plied , reflects 
upon its ab ility  to command its resources in  a period o f prolonged financia l crisis. 
Our evidence o f fa llin g  foodgrain prices from  the m id-1760s in  a period o f 
agricultura l recession and a decline in population corroborates the suggestion that
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there was a shortage o f specie and a trade recession in  the north  during this
1 ^7
period. The adoption o f revenue fa rm ing  by the successor states in  this context 
can be seen as an institu tiona l means to tap the resources o f men w ith  capital and 
transfer the claims o f the state’s creditors to the revenue farmers.
In  eastern Rajasthan, the m a jo rity  o f the ijaradars were rura l elites, zamindars
and local o ffic ia ls , who had a clear knowledge o f the productive  capacity o f the
area and who, as agrarian managers, e ffective ly  controlled local agricu ltura l
production. The immediate advantage o f long-term  contracts fo r  such ijaradars lay
p rim a rily  in  the absence o f detailed state supervision and the consequent operational
freedom that such a lack o f contro l provided. The question that arises however is
why the rura l elites, and the bankers and traders who stood surety fo r  them, b id  fo r
ijaras in  a period o f agricu ltura l recession and price decline. D av id  Washbrook has
argued that the expansion in  revenue farm ing in late eighteenth century Ind ia
provided the emergent ’great households’ "increased security to invest capital in
production, especially fo r  commercial purposes, and increased command over
1 fiSproducers and methods o f production". This hypothesis appears untenable in  the
specific context o f eastern Rajasthan because i f ,  as Washbrook suggests, the aim o f
acquiring ijaradaris was to enhance the commercial p ro fita b ility  o f the enterprise, it
would appear paradoxical that the expansion in  revenue farm ing  coincided w ith  a
period o f general agrarian crisis and trade recession. In  the context o f eastern
Rajasthan, D ilbagh Singh has suggested that in  the late eighteenth century revenue
farm ing presented a viable alternative form  o f capital investment in  a period when
opportunities fo r  investment in  trade were shrinking due to the climate o f
1 60instab ility  generated by the Maratha raids. However, the available evidence fo r 
our region indicates that i t  was not urban traders and bankers who speculated on
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revenue farms but local landholders who had a long term  interest in  the
170maintenance o f the revenue paying capacity o f the land.
Our evidence indicates that both w ith in  and outside the system o f state taxation, 
a considerable proportion o f the peasants produce was appropriated at the local
1 71level through sanctioned and irregu lar levies o f various kinds. A n  awareness o f 
the magnitude o f the margin between the ’o ff ic ia l’ taxation and what was or could 
be actually collected from  the peasants, combined w ith  the local power to realise 
this marginal amount probably provided the immediate economic incentive fo r  the 
m a jo rity  o f the small ijaradars, such as the patels, chaudhuris and occasionally the 
raiyati o f the village, to b id  fo r ijaras. For them i t  was the possib ility  o f a 
substantial gain based upon a close personal knowledge o f the productive potentia l 
o f the area that made the fa rm ing o f revenue an acceptable risk. In  the long term, 
i t  was only those ijaradars who could outb id  competitors and retain control over 
the ir territories, such as some thikanedars, who consolidated the ir position and later 
claimed po litica l control on the basis o f long-established, hereditary rights.
In  this chapter we have attempted to go beyond the legal fo rm  o f land tenures 
and to examine the substance o f peasant social and economic stra tifica tion . Our 
sources allow us only fleeting glimpses o f peasant l ife  which are not in  themselves 
su ffic ien t to enable a m icro-analysis o f the peasant economy. But the o ff ic ia l 
documentation recording the m inutiae o f agrarian taxation makes i t  possible to 
examine the role o f the state in  regulating the activities o f its p rinc ipa l economic 
subjects and the impact o f such policies on the rura l economy. Our preceding 
discussion has dealt w ith  one aspect o f the regulatory role played by the state, 
namely in  the provision o f rura l credit. Equally v ita l to the annual cycle o f peasant
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production were state policies which governed the d is tribu tion  o f the agricu ltura l 
product and which constrained the economic decisions o f the p rim ary  producers in  
c ritica l matters such as the choice o f crop, the level o f capital investment, and the 
organisation o f labour. I t  is to these policies and the princip les, level and form  o f 
agricultura l taxation in  eighteenth century eastern Rajasthan that we now turn.
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Chapter IV
REVENUE P O LIC Y  AND TH E  SYSTEM OF A G R A R IA N  T A X A T IO N
Many o f the studies that have dealt w ith  the relations between the state and 
village society in  p re-co lon ia l Ind ia  have tended to focus on the magnitude o f 
agrarian taxation and the adm inistrative arrangements fo r  its assessment and 
collection. W hile an understanding o f the complexities surrounding revenue 
collection and the functiona l and geographical responsibilities o f various 
adm inistrative o ffic ia ls  provide useful in form ation, the ins titu tiona l emphasis in 
these studies has generally kept them from  examining the in teraction between the 
state, its taxation po licy and agricu ltu ra l p roductiv ity . In  this chapter, we shall 
attempt to relate the logic and princip les o f taxation adopted by the Jaipur state to 
its objectives and role in  agricu ltura l production.
The Nature o f Land Revenue.
The question, as posed by the B ritish  administrators, o f whether the land 
revenue in  the pre-co lon ia l period could be regarded as rent or a tax on land hinges 
on the iden tifica tion  o f the real owner o f the land. Modern research on the agrarian 
economy o f Mughal Ind ia  has, however, la id  emphasis on the po in t that the concept 
o f absolute private ownership d id  not exist in  the pre-co lon ia l era. The peasant in  
Mughal Ind ia  can be said to have been the p roprie to r o f land in  the sense that his 
land was inheritable, and could be sold or mortgaged. However, this righ t was 
conditional on the regular payment o f land revenue to the state. In  order to
- 1 0 9 -
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prevent the loss o f revenue due to it, the state asserted its r igh t to ensure
uninterrupted cu ltiva tion  o f land, or to demand that the revenue be paid even i f
the cu ltiva to r chose not to t i l l  the land, or else to have the land cultivated by
1
another in  case the owner had deserted. This meant that there was no exclusive 
righ t to property and, hence, the question o f the nature o f land revenue could not 
be viewed in  terms o f rent or tax on land. W alter Neale, on the other hand,
stressed that im p lic it in  the use o f concepts such as ’ren t' or ’tax ’ was the
* *2 t assumption that a market system was in operation. He argued that in  the context
o f the pre-co lon ia l Ind ia, the land revenue was part o f the red is tribu tive  system
whereby the state received a share in  the gross produce o f the peasant.^ I t  has,
therefore, been argued that pre-co lon ia l land revenue "was not properly speaking
rent or even a land tax. I t  was a tax on the crop."'*
In  princ ip le , revenue was calculated as a proportion o f the produce o f each 
crop, whether collected in  k ind  or commuted into cash. Irrespective o f the form  o f 
payment, revenue demand would vary annually fo r each p rim ary  fiscal un it -  a 
village or qasba -  on the basis o f diverse factors such as variations in  p roduc tiv ity , 
prices, the value o f the crops grown and the extent o f cu ltiva tion  in  each harvest 
period. The uncertainty in  estimating the revenue proceeds o f the state was to some 
degree sought to be m inim ised by the Mughals through the im position o f fixed  cash 
rates per bigha fo r  each crop a fte r making allowances fo r  regional d isparity in  
p roductiv ity  and prices. W hile this system elim inated variations arising from  
seasonal fluctuations in  the harvest and prices, the aggregate demand fo r each fiscal 
un it would nevertheless continue to vary in  accordance w ith  the types o f crop 
grown and the annual fluctuations in  the ir respective acreages. This feature o f 
Mughal revenue po licy necessitated a detailed survey o f each village fo r each
I l l
harvest as well as the form u la tion  o f a schedule o f locally applicable rates o f 
taxation. W hile there is evidence to show that this was done fo r  the territories 
under close M ughal adm inistration, un fortuna te ly these records have not survived. 
I t  is in  this context that the annual series o f records fo r the parganas under the 
adm inistration o f the Jaipur rajas in  the eighteenth century acquire great 
significance. The system o f taxation in  these parganas was derived from  and 
closely modelled on M ughal practices. Thus the detailed records and the variety o f 
sources o f data available fo r  this region from  the m id-seventeenth century onwards 
make it  possible to attempt a comprehensive analysis o f the state’s revenue policy 
and its application and consequences.
There were two modes o f revenue assessment prevalent in  the region from  at 
least the m id-seventeenth century. These were f irs tly , the crop-sharing method or 
"batai" based on a physical d ivis ion o f the crop in an agreed proportion  between the 
peasant and the state; and, secondly, a cash assessment per un it area o f land or the 
'’zabti" system. These two methods coexisted fo r each qasba and village and fo r 
each harvest. Before we discuss the w ork ing  o f these two d is tinc t forms o f revenue 
realisation, i t  is necessary to examine the rationale fo r  the ir adoption.
I t  was the type o f crop grown, rather than the qua lity  o f the soil or the nature 
o f land tenure, which determ ined whether the crop was assessed by the zabti or 
batai method or, sometimes interchangeably, by both. The crops invariab ly  assessed 
by the zabti system were the ’cash’ crops in  both k h a rif and rabi harvests. These 
included cotton, the dye plants, sugarcane, tobacco, spices, vegetables, poppy, maize 
and sunn-hemp. These constituted the "pukki" zabti crops or crops that were never 
assessed by the crop-sharing method.^ The crops generally assessed by the batai
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method included all the m ajor foodgrains -  m illets, pulses, oilseeds, barley, wheat 
and the rabi m ixed grains. In  accordance w ith  the po licy o f M ughal taxation, each 
of the la tte r foodcrops could be assessed by the crop-sharing method or by the
n
zabti method, the choice theoretically being le ft to the peasant. Such crops were 
classified as "kutchi" zabti perhaps to indicate the f le x ib il ity  in  the fo rm  o f 
assessment possible w ith  respect to these crops.
The choice o f the peasant to opt fo r  either o f these two types o f assessment 
w ith  respect to the food crops was closely regulated by the Jaipur state to ensure 
that it  d id  not involve a loss o f revenue. In  pargana G ijgarh , fo r  instance, the 
revenue obtained by applying the zabti rates per bigha fo r irriga ted  wheat and 
barley was estimated to be considerably lower than the revenue that would have 
been obtained by collecting the revenue in  k ind  and selling the grain in the market. 
The diwan therefore instructed the am il to consult w ith  the ra iya ti and revise the 
cash rate by levying an additional amount per bigha under "afzud” , or additional 
levy, so that the state d id  not su ffe r a loss. I f ,  however, the peasants found an 
upward revision in  revenue rates unacceptable then they w ould have to pay the 
revenue on these crops in  k ind  at the proportions customary fo r  the parganas that 
were trad itiona lly  part o f the Jaipur patrim ony or "panch mahals .
In  an area o f dry fa rm ing that was prone to in d iffe re n t harvests, crop-sharing 
was clearly o f advantage to the cu ltiva to r as the preferred mode o f discharging his 
revenue obligations. Crop-sharing ensured that w hile  the risk o f harvest shortfalls 
was shared between the state and the peasant in  proportion  to the ir respective 
shares in  the output, that o f local price variations was borne by the state alone. 
However, the ’ transaction’ or ’supervision’ costs invo lved in  tasks such as po lic ing to
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prevent p ilferage p r io r  to the harvest, the actual weighing and d iv is ion o f the crops 
and the arrangements to ensure the sale o f the produce were undoubtedly higher in  
the batai method. In  this respect, cash assessment had the clear advantage o f 
making the assessment and collection o f revenue adm in istra tive ly easier from  the 
po in t o f view o f the state. Why then d id  crop-sharing persist, or, why d id  the state 
accept the peasants5 r igh t to the choice o f the mode o f appropriation? The reasons 
perhaps lie  in  the relations between the state and the peasant and the agricultura l 
practices that prevailed in  the region.
A g ricu ltu ra l production in  p re-co lon ia l north Ind ia  was characterised by a high
land to man ratio coupled w ith  a high degree of peasant m o b ility .^  The ab ility  o f
the peasant to m igrate in  search o f better terms -  an option o ften resorted to -  and
the dependence o f the state on the continued production o f surplus by the peasants
placed the la tte r in  a better bargaining position v is -a -v is  the state. In  this context,
i t  has been argued that considerations o f 'supervision5 costs by the surplus
1 flappropriator are unim portant. The peasant would adopt the mode o f revenue 
payment that would allow him  to retain the maximum part o f his output w ith in  the 
lim its  prescribed by 'custom5. In  conditions o f uncertain production , the preference 
fo r crop-sharing, especially fo r ra in -fe d  crops, is consistent w ith  the risk averse 
strategy o f the peasant. On the other hand, fo r  crops requ iring  special skills or 
higher labour and capital inputs -  in  particu la r irr iga tion  w hich reduces the degree 
o f uncertainty associated w ith  agricu ltu ra l production -  the adoption o f fixed  cash 
rates which were m arkedly stable provided the peasant w ith  the opportun ity  to 
retain any additional gains through increased p roduc tiv ity  or favourable price 
movements.
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In  addition, there may be specific agronomic reasons why certain crops were
exclusively assessed by the zabti system and others predom inantly by the batai
system. A  crop specific cash rate per bigha presupposes that sole cropping was the
norm. However, in  the dry lands o f the sem i- arid  zones, in tercropp ing o f one or
1 1more types o f crops continues to be the dominant cropping pattern. U n like  the 
m ixed crops -  such as the barley, wheat and gram adm ixtures- w hich are sown, 
harvested and sold as such, intercropped plants, whether or not sown together are 
invariab ly harvested separately. Depending upon the types o f crops that were 
grown in  the same fie ld  it  may o r may not have been possible to arrive at a single, 
un ifo rm  cash rate o f assessment. We f in d  that combinations o f the types listed 
below were invariab ly assessed by the zabti method: 1) m inor m illets -  varti,
kagani and ralo -  in  combinations o f two, 2) guwar and chola, both pulse crops 
consumed as vegetables and fodder, and 3) makka combined w ith  ju w a r or
mandwa. A  comparison o f the rates o f taxation o f each crop separately and in  the
12.combined form  reveals that the rates were identical. Hence, in  instances where 
the zabti rate o f taxation on each crop w ith in  the com bination was identical, i t  was 
immaterial whether the crops were intercropped or grown separately from  the po in t 
o f view o f the rate per un it o f land at which the revenue was assessed. However, 
the most common examples o f in tercropping in  low ra in fa ll regions o f north Ind ia  
include the m illets, p rim a rily  bajra, and pulses. The disparity in  the p roductiv ity  
and in  the prices o f these crops made i t  d if f ic u lt ,  i f  not impossible, to form ulate a 
un ifo rm  cash rate o f levy fo r  fie lds intercropped w ith  legumes and cereals in 
varying proportions. In  the case o f such crop combinations, once each crop had 
been separately harvested, the physical d ivision o f the crops in  the proportions 
specified by the batai schedule was perhaps the more appropriate and simpler
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method o f revenue collection in  the context o f the princip les o f taxation in  the pre­
colonial period.
Crops exclusively assessed by the zabti method, on the other hand, were
prim arily  crops that were either harvested over a long period o f tim e like  cotton, or
were perishables like  vegetables, or required prim ary processing before they could
be marketed like  the dye plants and sugarcane. E ithe r one or a com bination o f all
these factors made the method o f crop-sharing, w ith  its concom itant aspect o f
marketing o f the produce by the state, an impracticable proposition w ith  regard to 
1 ^the ’cash5 crops.
I t  is perhaps a combination o f factors relating to the nature o f land revenue 
and the conditions and techniques o f agricu ltura l production that account fo r  the 
coexistence o f two disparate methods o f revenue assessment. The persistence o f 
crop-sharing as a mode o f revenue realisation in  eastern Rajasthan cannot therefore 
be seen to be ind ica tive  o f e ither a poorly monetised economy, or an im perfect 
adoption o f the more ’sophisticated5 M ughal system, or else explained away as a 
reversion to an antiquated and in e ffic ie n t system o f taxation as a result o f the 
po litica l f lu x  in  the eighteenth c e n tu ry .^  The continu ity  in  the modes o f taxation 
at the local level throughout a large part o f the seventeenth century and the whole 
o f the eighteenth is evident in  the comparative schedule o f taxation cited in  a 
document fo r  a period spanning roughly three-quarters o f a century during which 
the pargana had been successively under the adm inistration o f M irza  Raja Jai Singh 
(from  1637), fo llowed by the Mughals (c.1667-1710) and was then granted to Sawai 
Jai Singh in  1 7 1 0 .^
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The document records the diwans response to a representation made by the
peasants o f pargana Chatsu in  1710 requesting a reduction in  the current rates o f 
1 ^taxation. In  the ir appeal the ra iya ti claimed that fo r  the past th ir ty  years o f 
"Turk i" or M ughal adm inistration, they had been taxed at the rate o f twenty annas 
per bigha fo r  cotton and that the revenue in  k ind  levied on irriga ted  rabi cereals 
had been tw o -f if th s  o f the produce. These rates were considerably higher than 
those levied in the previous period o f M irza  Jai Singh’s adm inistration w hich had 
been sixteen annas per bigha and a th ird  o f the grain, respectively. In  order to re­
populate a pargana that was claimed to have been devastated by fam ine and 
excessive taxation during the in te rim  period o f M ughal adm inistration, the diwan 
agreed to a reversion to the lower rates on the condition that the ra iya ti undertake 
to increase the annual revenue collection o f the pargana to equal that in  M irza Jai 
Singh’s reign in  the fo llow ing  three years. The document clearly shows that despite 
variations in  the level o f taxation, the structure o f taxation remained unchanged 
over successive adm inistrative regimes notably in  the coexistence o f dual modes o f 
revenue appropriation.
The Structure of A g ricu ltu ra l Taxation.
A  detailed analysis o f the fo rm u la tion  o f the zabti rates and the proportions o f 
produce levied in  batai reveal the ir close relationship w ith  p roduc tiv ity . As stated 
in  the A in-i~A kbari, the cash rates per bigha fo r crops assessed by the zabti system 
were fixed  in  accordance w ith  the prices and average p roduc tiv ity  o f the crop in
1 7each dastur circle or mahal. However, the arhsattas and the dastur amals fo r our
region indicate that there was no un ifo rm  cash rate fo r  each crop in  the areas
1 Rw ith in  a single dastur circle as id en tified  in  the A in-i-A kbari. In  practice,
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differences in  the quality o f the soil, location o f the fie ld , duration o f fa llow ing  o f 
the fie ld  sown and the degree o f capital and labour investment were incorporated to 
form ulate a complex schedule o f graded tax rates fo r  each crop. Far from  there 
being a un ifo rm  crop rate fo r a whole pargana, the rates even varied as between 
fields w ith in  ind iv idua l villages.
The interp lay o f the diverse factors that affected the cash rate can best be 
shown by examples o f the varia tion in  the crop-specific  zabti rates on sugarcane 
and cotton cu ltiva tion  in  qasba Sanganer. In  examining the rationale behind the 
d iffe ren tia l in  tax codes, i t  is im portant to stress that these could only have been 
workable and acceptable to the prim ary producers i f  the level o f demand took in to  
account production costs and outturn  and rewarded investment w h ile  at the same 
tim e fu lf i l le d  the long-term  objectives o f the state to expand and stabilise its 
revenue base.
The area under sugarcane was f irs t subdivided in to  "gundgari", "machil" and
"pedi". Gundgari was d iffe ren tia ted  from  the other two categories by the a ttribute
that gundgari soil abounded in  moisture and therefore may have been naturally
19productive or required less irr iga tion  than ordinary soil. The rate per bigha fo r 
gundgari was the highest at Rs. 7.00. A lthough m achil and peri were both 
irrigated, peri sugarcane was the ratoon crop requiring less labour and capital but
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producing a poorer quality crop. As considerations o f outturn  o f the peri crop 
were counterbalanced by the re la tive ly cheaper production costs, pe ri sugarcane was 
taxed at a m arginally lower rate (Rs.4.50 per bigha) than the machil category. 
M achil land was d iffe re n tia lly  taxed on the basis o f f irs t, the source o f irriga tion ; 
and second, the duration o f the fa llow  preceding the sowing o f sugarcane. W ith
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respect to irriga tion , cane watered by rive r water was more heavily taxed per bigha 
(Rs.5) than that irrigated by wells (Rs.3). The d iffe ren tia l in  taxation was perhaps 
meant to compensate fo r  the larger capital outlay required fo r w e ll irriga tion  as
91
opposed to canal irriga tion . Another factor that has been noted in  the cu ltiva tion  
o f cane is the deterioration in  the output and the sucrose content w ith  the
9 9
shortening o f the length o f fa llow  p r io r to planting. Sugarcane grown on 
"bhadvadh" land -  that is, land allowed to lie  fa llow  fo r  the k h a r if season during 
which period i t  was repeatedly ploughed -  was taxed at Rs.5 per bigha when 
irrigated by rive r water. On the other hand, s im ilarly irriga ted land on which a 
kh a rif crop preceded the rabi sowing o f sugarcane, termed "dofasli" land, was taxed 
at Rs. 4.50. C learly, where production costs were estimated to be equivalent, the 
better quality o f harvest on bhadvadh land was taxed at an appropriately higher 
rate. From the v iew poin t o f the state, i t  was also good management to provide 
economic incentives to encourage agricu ltura l practices such as the double cropping 
o f land and the sinking o f wells by taxing such cu ltiva tion  at low er rates.
Cotton cu ltiva tion  in  Sanganer was also taxed according to a s lid ing scale o f 
revenue rates per bigha depending upon the quality o f the soil and irriga tion  
method. There were six basic categories in to  which cotton acreage was divided. 
The highest rates were levied on "piwal paheli" or good qua lity  soil that was 
irrigated by wells having an abundant supply o f water. These lands were manured
9a
and often lay adjacent to the inhabited sites. The next category was "piwal
pacheli" which comprised ord inary soils irriga ted by wells and located at a
9 4reasonable distance from  the inhabited area. In  descending order o f tax burden, 
the categories that fo llow ed were "sawanu", "dhandha", "lih" and "rama". Sawanu or 
sawani cotton was, as the name implies, the late variety o f cotton sown after the
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monsoons and largely rainfed. W hile we do not know what type o f land the 
category termed dhandha referred to, lih  was land that was annually flooded and
Of\rama denoted land irriga ted by rive r water. This pattern o f graded taxation was 
the norm in  all the parganas and each grade was either referenced by exp lic it 
categories, or, as in  some parganas, only a series o f graded rates were recorded 
w ithou t any ind ica tion  o f the ir specific app licab ility .
Rates o f taxation per bigha also varied across parganas. In  Tables 3 and 4 we
have attempted to compare the zabti rates in  d iffe re n t parganas. As a d irect
comparison is not possible given the d iffe re n t dates at which the revenue schedules
were compiled as w ell as differences in  the size o f the bigha in  each pargana, we
27have indexed the rates to that o f cotton in  every case. Table 3 shows that there 
was no d irect correspondence in the actual or the indexed zabti rates as between 
parganas. Only parganas Phagi and Jhak reveal a basic s im ila rity  in  the structuring
o f the rates which was perhaps due to the ir p rox im ity  and the ir inclusion in  the
28same pargana t i l l  the second ha lf o f the eighteenth century. D ifferences in  
agricultura l p roduc tiv ity , and variations in  the units o f area measurements and price 
levels meant that no standardised rate could be u n ifo rm ly  applied. In  general 
terms, the indexed values fo r all the parganas reveal a basic pattern o f h igh rates on 
cash crops and low er rates on foodcrops, relative to cotton. Comparison w ith  the 
indexed rates fo r the dastur circle o f Chatsu recorded in  the A in -i-A kbari (c.1595) 
and the rates given fo r pargana Chatsu fo r 1712 show that the rates fo r all crops 
except indigo, sunn-hemp, cum in and onions were higher in  the early eighteenth 
century taken relative to cotton. From the ranking o f the crops in  both schedules it  
is clear that sugarcane, poppy and ind igo continued to be taxed at a rate higher
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Table 3: Rates o f Taxation in Cash (ZabtD in  Selected Parganas (Rs./B igha)
Crop Sanganer Chatsu Sonkher Phagi Jhak Udehi
------- —
A B A B A B A B A B A B
Cotton 2.25 100 1.13 100 2.00 100 1.00 100 1.00 100 2.00 100
Indigo 4.50 200 1.75 155 - _ 1.25 125 1.00 100 2.60 133
Tobacco 4.50 200 2.00 177 2.81 141 3.50 350 3.50 350 4.00 200
Sunnhemp 1.50 67 0.50 44 2.00 100 1.00 100 0.75 75 2.38 119
Sugarcane 7.00 311 2.00 177 2.50 125 - - - - - -
Poppy - - 2.00 177 2.50 125 2.50 250 2.50 250 4.00 200
Kodon - - 0.75 66 - - 1.00 100 0,75 75 1.00 50
M akka/Juwar 1.75 78 1.00 89 1.00 50 1.50 150 1.50 150 - -
Chola - - 0.50 44 1.00 50 1.00 100 1.00 100 - -
Kaguni - - 0.75 66 - - 0.75 75 0.50 50 1.00 50
V a rti - - 0.50 44 1.00 50 0.75 75 0.50 50 0.75 38
Veg. kha rif 
Veg. rabi
Sources:
1.25 89 1.00
1.00
89
89
1.00
1.09
50
55
1.00
1.50
75
150
0.50
1.50
50
150
2.00
2.50
100
125
1* Dastur A m al Qasba Sanganer dt.14 Jamadi I I  1114 H ijra /A .D .1 7 0 7  as translated
by V.S.Bhatnagar, L ife  and Times o f Sawai Jai Singh 1688-1743. p .291.
2. Dastur A m al M a liih a t wa Sa iriiha t Pargana Chatsu, Sarkar Ranthambhor dt. Mah 
Sudi 9 V.S.1769/A.D.1712
3. Dastur A m al Pargana Sonkher Sonkhari dt.V.S. 1773/A .D .1716
4. Dastur Am al wa A m al Dastur Pargana Phagi dt. A .D .1691
5. Dastur A m al Pargana Jhak (compiled post-1712 A .D . from  in terna l evidence)
6* Dastur A m al Pargana Udehi (compiled post-1714 A .D . from  in terna l evidence)
Notes to Table 3:
Under subdivision A  are listed the standard rates mentioned fo r  each crop in 
Rupees per bigha. Subdivision B gives the index values o f the rates fo r each 
crop w ith  cotton=100 in  each pargana.
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Table 4: Comparison o f Z ab ti Rates in  pargana Chatsu in  1595 &  1712
Crop A in  (1595) Dastur (1712)
Index Rank Index Rank
Cotton 100.00 7 100.00 6
Ind igo 171.48 1 155.00 4
Sunnhemp 114.29 4 44.25 13
Henna 85.74 8 132.74 5
Sugarcane 171.48 1 176.99 1
Poppy 147.70 3 176.99 1
Safflower 74.45 9 176.99 1
Cum in 102.71 5 88.50 7
Onions 102.71 5 88.50 7
Veg. kha rif 71.03 10 88.50 7
Melons 16.96 14 88.50 7
Juwar 41.62 12 88.50 7
Kodon 42.65 11 66.37 12
Chino (Arzan) 22.44 13 44.25 14
Sources: A in - i-A k b a r i o f A b u l F a z l- i-A lla m i, vol. I I ,  trans. H  S Jarret,
pp. 110- 111.
Dastur A m al M a liiha t wa S a irjiha t, pargana Chatsu, Sarkar Ranthambhor, 
VS 1769/AD 1712.
than that applicable to cotton in  both tim e periods while  the foodcrops were taxed 
less heavily (see Table 4).
The batai system was less complex as a method o f appropria tion p rim a rily  
because i t  d id  not take in to  account variations in  the type o f soil, location o f fie ld , 
local price levels or type o f crop. The highest proportion o f the produce taken was 
a half share fo r both the kh a rif and fo r  the rabi crops. However, a few o f the crops 
in  the kh a rif harvest that were invariab ly  irrigated -  like  a coarse rice called sali 
and water-chestnut or singhara -  were taxed at two f ifth s  o f the gross produce. In  
the rabi harvest, on the other hand, all the batai crops were d iffe re n tia lly  assessed 
depending upon whether or not they were irrigated. The irriga ted  rabi crops were 
liable to a lower assessment in terms o f the proportion o f the produce. In  the 
m a jo rity  o f the parganas fo r  which we have data, the standard assessment on
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irriga ted crops was two f ifth s  o f the produce. In  Chatsu, however i t  was as lit t le  as 
a th ird . In  the parganas o f Chatsu and Phagi, wheat was taxed at a level that was 
lower than the other rabi crops in  both the irriga ted and un irriga ted categories.
Given that the p roduc tiv ity  o f irriga ted  rabi land was much higher and more 
stable, a concessionary demand on irriga ted  crops appears at f irs t sight to inve rt the 
logic o f taxation which would po in t to a higher rate as being more logical. W hile it  
was the po licy o f the state to encourage the extension o f irr ig a tio n , it  is improbable 
that the state would be w illin g  to pursue a policy that would be detrim ental to its 
revenue returns. This anomaly is fu rth e r re inforced when we compare the cash 
rates levied on irriga ted and un irriga ted wheat and barley. A  sample survey o f the 
zabti rates applicable in  a few villages o f pargana Toda Bhim  fo r the rabi harvest 
o f 1693 shows that among the eight categories in to  w hich the revenue rates fo r 
barley are graded, the highest rates are fo r  crops irrigated by permanent wells and 
the lowest fo r the unirrigated crop. W hile there was no un irriga ted  category fo r 
wheat, the gradation in  the rate fo llow s the same pattern as fo r barley (see Table 5).
The apparent discrepancy in  the form ula tion  o f cash and k ind  rates can be 
explained only by the y ie ld  factor. The higher gross produce from  irriga ted land 
meant that although the state claimed a smaller p roportion  o f the produce, it  
actually acquired a larger absolute amount o f crop than i t  would have had i f  the 
crop had been unirrigated and subject to a higher tax rate. The lower tax rate on 
the produce o f irriga ted  land would also have le ft the taxpayer a larger proportion 
and quantity o f crop thereby serving as an incentive fo r  increased labour and 
capital investment. I t  is like ly  that the estimated d iffe ren tia ls  in  the average y ie ld  
o f irrigated and un irrigated crop were taken in to  account to determ ine the
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Table 5: Revenue Rates fo r W in ter Cereals in  Toda Bhim  (Rs./BighaV
Category Status Barley Wheat V illage
1. Pukka well Gaveti 3.78 4.44 H a lilp u r &  Hasil
Pahi - 4.31 -d o -
2. Kutcha well Gaveti 3.66 4.31 -d o -
Pahi - 4.19 -d o -
3. O ld well Gaveti 3.25 3.75 R a jpur
Pahi 3.13 3.63 -d o -
4. New well Pahi 3.00 3.50 -d o -
5. Seko Gaveti 2.88 _ -d o -
Pahi 2.75 - -d o -
6. K ha tli Gaveti 1.81 1.88 -d o -  &  H abibpur Saet
Pahi 1.69 - -d o -
7. Bor Gaveti 1.25 _ -d o -
Source: Arhsatta, pargana Toda Bhim  fasl Rabi VS 1750/AD  1693.
Notes to Table 5:
Gaveti denotes resident cultivators w h ile  pahi’s were non-resident cultivators who 
were generally assessed at concessional rates. In  all cases above, irrespective o f 
category or crop, the d ifference between the gaveti and pahi rates fo r  the same 
category was two annas or Rs.0.13 per bigha.
The tim e period fo r categorising a w ell as ’o ld ’ has not been specified. W hile pukka 
wells last fo r a century, kutcha wells are stated to last from  2 to 20 years 
(Fortescue, Report on the Revenue System o f D elh i Territo ries 1820. p. 106). 
Therefore, depending upon the tim e period, i t  is possible that a kutcha or pukka well 
may be classified as an old or established well.
Evidence from  other parganas indicates that seko was equivalent to kyari o r irriga ted 
land and both terms were used interchangeably. However, w h ile  seko was used only fo r  
irriga ted barley and wheat, kya ri could also include other crops. A lthough our 
sources do not te ll us the basis on which seko is classified and taxed separately from  
the other irriga ted categories 1-4 above, i t  is possible that land irriga ted by 
devices other than wells, such as dhenkalis or r ive r channels, was put in  the seko 
category.
K ha tli was the dried up bed o f a seasonal rive r or the sandy bank o f a rive r which was 
manured p r io r to grow ing rabi crops.fRaioutana Gazetteer v o l.III : A lw a r, p.280).
Bor was invariab ly  used as a category contraposed to kyari. I t  probably denoted 
unirrigated land which had a degree o f natural water re ten tiv ity  to allow rabi crops 
to be grown. The p roduc tiv ity  o f such land compared to kya ri or irriga ted land was 
estimated at 100 : 225 CTaqmina. pargana Phagi, fasl unhalu, VS 1770/AD  1713).
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appropriate tax rates. The o ff ic ia l estimation o f the y ie ld  o f irriga ted and 
unirrigated barley and wheat land in  pargana Phagi was 6.75 maunds per bigha and
90
3.00 maunds per bigha respectively. These estimates im p ly  a y ie ld  ratio o f 
approximately 225 : 100 which is not inconsistent w ith  the ra tio  calculated fo r  the
irrigated and un irriga ted rabi staples in  an agro-c lim atica lly  s im ilar region o f
anPunjab, though fo r a later period. The doubling o f output that resulted from  
irr iga ting  the fie ld  im plied  that a tax fixed  at two fifth s  or a th ird  was higher in  
absolute terms than the customary maximum of a ha lf share taken in  tax from
ai *
unirrigated land. A lthough the state extracted a h igher absolute quantity o f grain 
from  irriga ted  land this s till meant that the cu ltiva to r retained a larger proportion 
o f the total produce o f such land. Hence the structuring o f the batai shares in  the 
case o f rabi crops was consistent w ith  the gradation in  zabti or cash rates and 
incorporated the state’s dual objectives o f enhancing revenue as well as p rovid ing 
an incentive to the peasant fo r the increased labour and capital investment required 
fo r irriga tion .
Batai proportions were also reduced to allow fo r b ring ing  fa llow  land in to  
cu ltiva tion , constructing new wells, and fo r double cropping. A l l  these activities 
required additional capital and labour and also augmented and stabilised the flow  o f 
revenue in  the long term. Thus in  pargana Antela, w h ile  the irriga ted  land sown
w ith  rabi crops that had been fa llowed in  the preceding k h a rif harvest was taxed at
32two fifth s  o f the gross produce, the dofasli land was taxed at the rate o f a th ird .
Further, land irrigated by a new w ell was taxed at the rate o f a quarter in  the firs t
33year, a th ird  in  the second and th ird  year and as normal fo r the succeeding years. 
However in  a le tte r to the am il o f Ante la , the D iwan instructed h im  to levy tax at
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the rate o f a quarter o f the produce on reclaimed banjar land irriga ted  by a pukka 
w ell fo r the f irs t five  to twelve years. I f ,  however, there were no wells in  the 
village or the water table was too deep making the construction o f the permanent 
well both d if f ic u lt  and expensive, the concessionary rate o f a quarter was to be 
levied in  p e rp e tu ity .^
T il l  this po in t we have basically been concerned w ith  the log ic o f the system o f 
revenue taxation and we have examined its correspondence to the conditions o f 
agricultura l production in  our region. A  v ita l element o f the taxation policy that 
derived from  social and po litica l considerations rather than the specific ities o f crop 
production was the preferentia l rates granted to certain p riv ileged sections o f the 
village inhabitants.
In  the form u la tion  o f the produce proportions, the dastur amals make an 
exp lic it d istinction between the "ra iyati" dasturs and the "riyayati" dasturs. W hile 
the form er constituted the highest proportion  o f the produce that could be levied on 
the resident cu ltiva to r in  the village, the riyayati schedule was lower and was 
fu rthe r d iffe rentia ted. Table 6 shows that the riyayati o r concessionary rates were 
applied on revenue paid in  k ind  by the hereditary village o ffic ia ls  -the  patels, 
patwaris, chaudhuris and qanungos -  as well as d istinct caste groups like  the 
Rajputs, Brahmans, Kayasthas and Mahajans. The granting o f advantageous terms 
o f revenue payment to the local adm inistrative functionaries was a method o f 
remuneration that has a parallel in  the allocation o f revenue-free or inam lands in
■3C
eighteenth century Maharashtra. The inclusion o f the pahis in  the riyayati 
schedule was sim ila rly  part o f the state policy o f o ffe rin g  fiscal inducements to 
m igratory cultivators who were generally given the waste land or the poorer quality
1 2 6
Table 6: S t a t e ’s  Share  o f  Crop (Batai) in S e lec ted  P arganas
Pargana
i 3"
4
7
4j
i  bt  
1
i '  j  X |  -
ii * j i i ^  Miscellaneous
Chatsu
Kharif 1/2 — 1/4 — 2/5 1/4 1/3
S a l i  ( r ice)  
Rabi u n i r r
2 /5
1/2 2/5 1/4 2/5 1/4 1/3
Wheat u n i r r  
Rabi i r r .
2/5
1/3 - 1/4 - - - -
Phagi
Kharif 1/2 2/5 — 1/3 9/20 1/4 1/3
Jhak
Kharif 1/2 2 /5 1/4 1/3 2/5 1/4 1/4
S a l i 2 /5 1/3 1/4 - — — —
Rabi u n i r r . 1/2 1/3 1/4 1/3 1/3 1/4 1/4
Rabi i r r . 1/3 - 1/4 - - - -
Qasba brahmans :9/20 
Qasba r a i y a t i  :9/20 
Qasba patelsC6]:2/5 
Pa tw ari  :3/4
P a tw ari  ; i / 4
S a l i  & S inghara :2 /5
2 /5
Amarsar
U n ir r ig a ted 1/2 2/5 1/4 2/5 2/5 1/4 1/3 - -
I r r ig a t e d 2/5 1/3 1/4 1/3 1/3 1/4 1/3 — 1/3
Udehi
Kharif 1/2 2/5 1/4 2/5 1/4 1/3 1/3 2 /5 Banjar land : 2/5 
Brahman/qasba: 1/2 
4 P a t e l s /q a s b a : l /3  
Miscl .brahmans :2 /5
Rabi u n i r r . 1/2 2 /5 1/4 2/5 2/5 1/4 1/3 1/3 2/5 -d o  above-
Rabi i r r , 2 /5 — - - — — — — — Dof a s  l i /b a n  j a r  :2 /5
Antela
Kharif 1/2 2/5 1/4 — 1/3 1/4 1/3 2/5 1/3 S inghara  : 2/5
Rabi u n i r r . 1/2 2/5 1/4 - 2/5 1/4 1/3 - - Polach : 2 /5
Rabi i r r , 2 /5  . 1/3 1/4 - 1/3 _ - - - D ofas li  : l /3
S o u rces ;
1. D astur Amal M aHihat wa S a i r l ih a t  Pargana Chatsu  S a rk ar  Ranthambhor 1712
2. Dastur Amal wa Amal Dastur Pargana Phagi 1691
3. D astur Amal Pargana Jhak Suba Ajmer (n.d.- p o s t  1712 from i n t e r n a l  evidence)
4. D astur Amal Pargana Amarsar dt.Chait Vadi 3 V.S.1783/A,D.1726
5. D astur Amal Pargana Udehi (n.d -  post  1714 from i n t e r n a l  evidence)
6. D astur Amal Pargana Antela Sarkar Alwar Suba Akbarabad, n.d.
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land o f the village to cultivate. The pahis therefore, irrespective o f the ir caste, 
were assessed at concessional rates and thus the rationale fo r  the ir inclusion in  the 
riyayati schedule was quite d iffe re n t from  that o f the other groups. The grant o f 
preferentia l rates o f taxation to the members o f the upper castes not trad itiona lly  
associated w ith  agricu lture has usually been explained on the grounds o f the 
additional expenses incurred by them on the wages o f hired labour to perform  tasks 
deemed socially po llu ting  and the ir low er p roductiv ity  in comparison w ith  castes
11J
specialising in  agriculture.
The preferentia l rates accorded to the village o ffic ia ls  and the higher castes 
varied between parganas. However, in  each pargana the chaudhuris, qanungos and 
the zam indar-bhomias paid the lowest rate o f a quarter and the patels the highest at 
two fifth s . These form ed the upper and lower lim its  o f the range o f preferentia l 
rates. There is no systematic pattern in  the ordering or level o f the rates fo r the 
other categories which lay w ith in  the range mentioned above. However, there was 
a basic u n ifo rm ity  in  that the same p rinc ip le  o f p referentia l rates fo r  the revenue 
functionaries as well as the upper castes applied in  all parganas.
U n like  the batai schedule o f taxation in  which concessionary rates were 
invariab ly recorded, the schedules o f cash rates generally do not specify whether 
preferentia l rates were accorded to each o f the priv ileged groups mentioned in  the 
batai rates. In  the dastur amals, concessionary rates fo r  cash assessed crops are 
occasionally mentioned, though lim ite d  to selected crops or a specific ind iv idua l or 
social group. Thus in  parganas Chatsu, Jhak, and U deh i the chaudhuri and 
qanungo were granted concessionary cash rates fo r  crops like  cotton, sugarcane, 
m illets and makka. W hile concessionary rates in  respect o f chaudhuris and
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qanungos were generally mentioned fo r a few crops grown in the pargana, i t  is 
unusual to f in d  references to the patels or the higher castes being assessed at the 
concessional rate. In  fact, o f the dastur amals examined, a caste based d istinction 
in  the rates fo r  ord inary cultivators and the cu ltiva ting  Rajputs is only specified in
-IQ
the case o f pargana Antela. The rate d iffe ren tia l varied fo r d iffe re n t crops being 
Rs.1.00 per bigha fo r cotton, Rs.0.75 fo r  poppy, Rs. 0,50 fo r  makka, kaguni and 
varti, and as lit t le  as 10 copper takas fo r  vegetables. U n like  the tax schedules, the 
arhsattas record a variety o f rates per bigha fo r each crop. The arhsattas do not 
un ifo rm ly  record whether these variations are in response to varying p roduc tiv ity  or 
i f  they are an expression o f pre ferentia l taxation o f certain categories o f cultivators. 
I t  is clear that both these crite ria  fo r  gradation in  tax rates were operative fo r a ll 
the qasbas under examination w ith  the exception o f qasba Malarna.
The best example o f the inverse gradation in  zabti rates w ith  the status o f the 
tax payer is provided by a comparison o f the dastur amal o f Phagi fo r  1691, lis ting
IQ
the standard rates o f revenue realisation, w ith  the arhsatta o f the same year. 
A lthough the dastur amal only d iffe ren tia ted  between soils o f varying p roductiv ity  
in its lis t o f the cash rates applicable on each crop, in  the arhsattas the soil 
categories so d iffe ren tia ted  included a fu rthe r range o f gradation (see Table 7). 
Thus fo r  each crop, in  each o f the sub-categories based on vary ing p roduc tiv ity  the 
highest rate equalled that given in  the dastur amal and w hich was paid by the 
ra iyati. The concessionary rates w h ich  fo llow ed were levied on land cu ltivated by 
named ind iv idua ls who were invariab ly  members o f the higher castes. I t  is this 
level o f gradation in  the tax codes which that has not been specified in the dastur 
amals although it  appears to have been operative at the ground-level. U n like  the 
arhsattas o f the other qasbas, those o f qasba Malarna record a single zabti rate
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allow ing no varia tion fo r p roduc tiv ity  or the status o f the cu ltiva to r although the 
revenue obtained in  k ind  was levied at two d iffe re n t rates.^® I t  is possible that 
these two rates were applied to irriga ted  and un irriga ted crops and d id  not 
represent preferentia l ta x a tio n .^
Table 7. Gradation in Z ab ti Rates per Bigha; Qasba Phagi. 1691 A .D .
Cotton: Area.Sown Tax. Rate
(Bighas) (Rs./b igha)
A : Goriwa land.
(i) Raiyati 215.90 1.00*
( ii)  Bhavsa Kasliwal &
Sukhdev G ujara ti 19.40 0.75
( i i i)  Sheoramdas Naruka 8.35 0.50
B: Mangro land.
(i) Raiyati 1964.45 0.75'
( ii)  Bhavsa Kasliwal, Ram
Singh Banbirpota &  Gujaratis 94.00 0.50
( i i i)  Sheoramdas &  Chatrabhuj
Naruka 10.80 0.38
Kodon:
A : Mangro land.
(i) Raiyati 157.15 0.75
(ii) Bhavsa Kasliwal &
miscl. Gujaratis 11.40 0.50
( ii i) Sheoramdas &  Chatrabhuj
Naruka 6.25 0.38
Sources: Jamabandhi. pargana Phagi VS 1748/AD  1691 and
Dastur A m al wa Am al Dastur. pargana Phagi VS 1748/AD  1691.
*Note: These are the standard rates fo r each category that have been specified in
the o ff ic ia l tax schedule or dastur amal.
P referential taxation on the basis o f caste or o ff ic ia l status o f the cu ltiva to r does 
not appear to have form ed a part o f the Mughal system o f revenue ta x a tio n .^  
However its prevalence in  parts o f northern Ind ia has been variously attested t o . ^
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U n til comparable data fo r our period fo r other regions is located i t  is not possible 
to say whether preferentia l taxation was a localised phenomenon re flecting the 
customary privileges accorded to the socially dominant castes or that the level o f 
detail in  our sources accurately reflects the actual d is tribu tion  o f the ’average’ rate 
form ulated by the M ughal state.
The questions that arise next are whether a ll the members o f the non- 
agricultura l castes were accorded concessionary rates, and i f  so, whether there were 
any restrictions imposed on the extent o f the ir priv ileged holdings and the degree to 
which these were effective. I t  has been argued by D ilbagh Singh that a ll members 
o f the priv ileged sections or castes were granted concessionary rates o f revenue on 
the ir entire h o ld in g .^  This inference is supported by the manner in  which the 
dastur amals specify caste as the condition fo r  the award o f p referentia l rates as 
seen in  Table 6. Further, in  a num ber o f documents the iden tifica tio n  o f the rura l 
elite granted concessionary rates has been made in  general caste terms, fo r example, 
"vata tisara ra iya ti wa chautha aur kom ka" i.e., the ra iya ti pay at the standard rate 
o f a th ird  o f the produce while the other castes pay at the concessional rate o f a 
quarter. Here the term ra iya ti has been used in  its restrictive sense to apply to the 
cultivators o f peasant castes also called the p a lt is .^ . In  other documents all 
members o f the rura l e lite elig ib le fo r  preferentia l revenue taxation are collective ly 
termed "him ayati log" (lite ra lly , patrons). In  one such document the h im ayati log 
have been iden tified  as the Purohit, Vyas, Sanghi, Sah, and K ayas tha .^  The use 
o f general caste categories suggests that the concessionary rates were caste-linked 
and were therefore extended to all members.
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However, the record o f revenue paid by each cu ltiva to r entered in  the khasras 
does not conform  w ith  the view o f general app licab ility  o f favourable revenue rates 
fo r  all members o f the non-agricu ltu ra l castes. The evidence o f the khasra o f 
village Naelo indicates that the m a jo rity  o f the higher caste cultivators were 
assessed pre fe ren tia lly  on only a part o f the ir total grain production and that a 
s ign ificant number o f them were not en titled to concessional assessment at a l l . ^
Only thirteen o f the th ir ty  three Brahmans and one o f the seven Kayasthas in
village Naelo were accorded concessionary tax rates. The Rajputs on the other 
hand, were assessed at favourable rates either fo r the ir entire gra in output or at
least the m ajor portion o f it. That the find ings o f this khasra are not exceptional is
corroborated by the khasra o f village Madsudanpura, pargana Chatsu, examined by
S.P.Gupta. He concludes that no favourable rates were granted to the patel o r to 
the larger producers. U n fortuna te ly , the castes o f all the cu ltivators have not been 
recorded against the ir names in  the Madsudanpura khasra. However, among those 
paying concessionary rates who have been iden tified  were a R a jput, a patel and a
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pahi or non-resident cu ltiva tor. The evidence o f the khasras indicates that there 
may have been other conditions in addition to caste membership that determined 
the app licab ility  or otherwise o f the favourable schedule o f revenue rates.
I t  has been suggested that only those Rajputs who were armed and o ffered 
m ilita ry  service to the state or Brahmans who recited the "Sandhya Gayatri Mantra" 
were entitled to revenue concessions.^ W hile there are documents that state 
precisely these reasons to lend support to the claimants r igh t to preferentia l 
taxation, the vast m a jo rity  o f s im ila r claimants do not ju s t ify  the ir claim in  these 
terms.*^ The general nature o f the above conditions is perhaps ind ica tive  o f the 
ideological ju s tifica tio n  fo r  preferentia l taxation o f the rural elites rather than a set
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o f rigorously applied crite ria  fo r exclusion o f some members. Generally, whenever 
a claim to preferentia l tax was made it  was advanced on the ground that the 
cultivated land was the claimants gharuhala or personal land. The state 
recognised the economic im plications o f priv ileged tenure and attempted to lim it  
the extent o f gharuhala cu ltiva tion . The mechanism fo r conta in ing a secular 
increase in  the size o f the gharuhala ho ld ing was that the state insisted that revenue 
be paid on all land declared as personal land whether i t  had been cu ltivated or not 
and secondly, that a ll land cu ltivated in  excess o f the gharuhala land was to be 
taxed at standard rates.
There are a number o f documents which re fer to the village headman or the 
patel being accused o f in tentiona lly  leaving land uncultivated in  the village, 
whereupon the state instructed the revenue authority that the revenue on such land 
was nevertheless to be assessed. A lthough the magnitude o f the levy is not 
mentioned the tax was to be realised at a fixed  rate per bigha o r "b ig h o r i. The 
obligation to render tax on all proprie tary land served as a fo rm  o f check on the 
un lim ited  expansion o f the p riv ileged tenure, as the a b ility  to provide and control 
labour -  both human and animal -  had to be assured over a reasonably long 
duration to validate the claim on the basis o f customary usage. This obligation o f 
the taxpayer was an o ft repeated condition fo r the retention o f the peasant’s
occupancy righ t in  the adm inistrative literature o f the seventeenth and eighteenth
53centuries. The extension o f cu ltiva tion  by the holders o f p riv ileged tenure to
what was designated as the khalisa or ra iyati land meant that they had to pay
54revenue on the additional cu ltiva tion  at the normal rates. This would perhaps 
explain the simultaneous levy o f concessional as well as standard rates on d iffe ren t
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portions o f the grain produced by the rura l elites in the khasra o f village Naelo 
cited a b o ve .^
The con flic ting  evidence regarding the basis fo r concessionary taxation -  that is, 
whether i t  was caste-based or lim ited  to indiv idua ls pe rfo rm ing  specific ’services’ 
fo r the state -  arises due to the diverse methods by which the state redistributed 
resources to the rura l elites. For example, in  qasba Sanganer, about three percent 
o f the land revenue in  1731 has been recorded as being obtained from  the 
revocation o f inam lands. These inam grants had been to mahajans, Rajputs, 
Kayasthas, various traders, Cheepas, Jogis and faqirs, and others. In  another 
document, the amils were instructed to remunerate the patels and other hereditary 
elites e ither through a commission computed on the entire revenue proceeds o f the 
village or, a lternatively, through concessionary rates o f taxation on the ir gharuhala
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land and exemption from  contributions to the malba fund. In  general we can say 
that caste was an im portant, i f  not the only, determ inant o f p referentia l taxation. 
However, although the level o f concessionary taxation and the fo rm  i t  took may 
have been defined by custom and state po licy, i t  was inva riab ly  restricted to a 
certain type o f property righ t encapsulated in the term gharuhala. The form ula tion  
of the basic revenue demand was, therefore, extremely complex and varied, 
incorporating w ith in  its structure d iffe ren tia ls  in  the p ro d u c tiv ity  o f land, labour, 
and capital as well as recognising the superior rights o f the socially and po litica lly  
dominant sections o f rura l society.
The payment o f the basic revenue demand was undoubtedly the ch ie f financia l 
burden on the peasantry. However, the revenue records do not reveal the entire 
range o f additional payments made by the peasants under numerous heads which
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can broadly be categorised as protection and transaction charges. A l l  o f these 
charges w hich accrued to the state were generally recorded under the category o f 
"sair jih a t" taxes and, where the Jaipur raja also held zam indari or bhom i rights,
CQ
under the specific account o f bhom i dues. Those levies that form ed part o f the 
perquisites o f the local revenue o ffic ia ls  while  discharging the ir revenue functions -  
such as measuring fie lds, d iv is ion o f the crop, watching over the ripe grain and 
preparation o f records and statements -  were paid to them in  proportion  to the ir 
duration o f stay in  the village in  the form  o f money and provisions. As we shall 
discuss below, these payments could be made d irectly  at the level o f the village or 
through the state. A lthough both were recognised methods o f remunerating the 
o ffic ia ls  involved, in  the case o f payments made by the villagers d irectly such 
expenses were not accounted fo r as income by the state and were therefore not 
included in  the annual revenue statement. Both the above types o f additional 
levies, that is, those recorded in  the arhsattas and those that were not recorded, 
appear to have been paid out o f a common financia l pool or the "malba" fund  o f 
the village. Expenses from  this pool, termed "malba kharch", also included money 
spent communally on entertainment, charity and religious ceremonies.
Detailed accounts o f these expenses fo r qasba Lalsot in  1737 are available, thus 
p rov id ing  im portant in fo rm ation  regarding the fiscal organisation o f the village and 
its relationship w ith  the revenue authorities. P rio r to a discussion o f the malba 
fund i t  is necessary to examine the context w ith in  which the account came to be 
recorded as part o f the state revenue documentation. In  1723, a parwana was issued
CQ
by the Jaipur darbar to the amils o f all parganas. I t  began w ith  the statement 
that the expenses from  the common fund had become so high that cu ltiva tion  was 
fa lling  o f f  to the detrim ent o f the state’s revenue. The amils were therefore
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instructed to make a concerted e ffo r t to encourage the patels and ra iya ti o f the 
parganas to extend cu ltiva tion  by o ffe rin g  them a reduction o f a fou rth  o f the 
stipulated revenue on new land brought under the plough along w ith  an o ffe r  o f 
state loans, or tagai, to enable them to do so. Further as a mark o f royal favour, 
the patels o f large villages were to be honoured w ith  presents o f good quality cloth 
(th irm a), w hile  the others were to receive turbans. In  order to control the 
expenditure o f the village, and specifica lly to control payments to the "sehna" or 
village watchman and to the subordinate o f the am il, the "tappadar", i t  was decided 
that all the expenses norm ally met out o f the fund  were to be paid out by the 
pargana treasurer ("tehvil potadar"). A t  the time o f the harvest, an additional 
amount was to be levied from  each village and entered in  the revenue accounts 
under the heads o f "malba", "sehnagi" and "tappadari" to make up the de fic it. I t  was 
impressed upon the amils that on no account should they allow any fu rthe r 
impositions, fines, or presents to be taken from  the village. Further, i f  the villagers 
had previously taken a loan from  the moneylender, e ither collective ly or 
ind iv idua lly , in  order to meet the ir malba obligations, they were not to be coerced 
into repaying the outstanding amounts u n til perm itted by the state.
I t  was perhaps a s im ilar d irective that resulted in  amounts being entered under 
hasil malba in  the additional revenues or "sawai jamabandhi" accounts o f pargana 
Lalsot. This amount varied every year, as i t  consisted o f the d iffe rence between 
the annual collections and the sanctioned expenditure from  the fund , the remainder 
being deposited in  the state treasury.^® The complete malba account g iv ing  details 
o f both collection and expenditure has been recorded only fo r  1737.
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In  parallel to the basic revenue demand in  qasba Lalsot w hich comprised taxes 
on crop production, on service and artisanal production via a hearth tax, and lastly, 
a levy on sheep and goats as a pastoral cess, contributions to the malba fund  were 
also calculated under these three categories. The totals o f the basic revenue demand 
are given in  column 1 o f Table 8. C ontribu tion  to the malba fund  in  respect o f 
crop production was calculated on the cash amounts o f zabti assessed crops as well 
as on the sale value o f the grain revenue paid. The m a jo rity  o f the peasants 
contributed 7 annas or Rs.0.44 fo r each rupee o f the tax on crop production paid 
by them. The patel, patwari and certain Brahmans contribu ted at lower rates 
ranging from  3 to 6 annas per rupee o f the ir revenue obligation to the state. The 
average rate o f malba levy per rupee o f land revenue has been calculated in  col.5 o f 
Table 8. Certain priv ileged farmers, such as the six chaudhuris, three Kayasthas, a 
Purohit and five  others were tota lly exempt from  payment to the fund. The land 
revenue paid by these priv ileged sections on which malba taxation was exempted is 
given in  col.2 o f Table 8. The exemption amounted to the ir paying only the basic 
revenue on the ir holdings w ith  all additional taxes, cesses and common expenses 
being borne by the rest o f the contributors to the common fund. Such exemptions, 
as well as the preferentia l rates at which some cultivators contributed to the 
common fund, were a source o f continual tension between the p riv ileged and non­
priv ileged cultivators. In  addition to the levy on crop production , smaller amounts 
were realised per household from  the artisanal and menial population and on each 
sheep or goat. These contributions were in  addition to s im ila r levies which were 
included in  the basic revenue demand. Lastly, the ud ik , or recip ient o f a charitable 
grant by the state, also contributed to the fund in  p roportion  to the assessed 
revenues o f the land grant.
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The expenses incurred from  the malba fund  were as fo llow s :
i)  various cesses and taxes paid in to  the state treasury (category II. 1, 
Table 8). The m ajor items in  these were the discount on the payment o f revenue in 
old coin ("kasur batta" or "sarf-i-s icca"), o fferings o f respect ("sadar"), payment to 
the "waqai-nawis" or new s-w rite r, and the cesses included in the sair jih a t category 
in  the arhsatta accounts w ith  the exception o f the hearth and livestock taxes.
i i)  Payments to the o ffic ia ls  appointed by the state to assess and collect 
the revenues (category II.2 , Table 8). The la tte r included the village watchmen or 
sehnas, who guarded against p ilferage and the ft from  the tim e the crop ripened t i l l  
the d ivision o f the threshed grain; the tappadar, and his team o f land measurers 
("doriya" and "teniya"); and the "bhakho" or grain measurer. In  the malba account 
being analysed, i t  is d if f ic u lt  to w ork out the rates at which the appointed o ffic ia ls  
were paid as only the total cash emoluments fo r each sort o f functionary and the 
number o f days spent in  the qasba were entered in the account. We are not to ld 
how many o f each category o f o ffic ia ls  were involved, except the six sehnas 
mentioned.
I t  is like ly  that the revenue o ffic ia ls  also received provisions during the ir stay in 
the qasba although such payments would not be entered in  the cash-book o f the 
malba accounts. Another document sets out in detail the payments to each o f the 
revenue functionaries in  pargana M alpura lis ting daily rates o f cash emoluments as 
well as provisions o f grain, pulses, flo u r, gur and ghi to w h ich each o ff ic ia l was 
entitled. The highest rates were paid to the tappadar w hich amounted to a 
"bhent" or present o f Rs.2.00, a daily cash income o f Rs.0.38 fo r  each day spent in  
the village o f revenue, and "khurak" or daily rations o f grain (3 seers), f lo u r ( l i  
seers) and a quarter seer each o f pulses, gur and ghi. The other functionaries got
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Table 8: Summary o f the Collection and E xpend itu re  from  the M alba Fund o f 
Qasba Lalsot in  1737. fA ll Figures in  Rupees!.
I  : C o llection Basic Rev. Exem pted R a iya ti Malba Rate/Rs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4 /3 )
1. Crop production
i)  K h a r if  4259.81 373.75 3886.06 1629.97 0.42
ii)  Rabi 4957.06 215.04 4742.02 1082.00 0.23a
2. Sheep/Goats 34.60 34.60 12.22 0.35
3. M enia ls/A rtisans 260.92 260.92 22.28 0.09
4. I ja ra  (singhara) 91.00 91.00
5. U d ik  grant I-
i)  C u ltiva tion (36.28)° 15.88 0.44
i i)  Arrears(1735-6) 8.75
Totals 9603.39 679.79 8959.88 2771.10 0.31
I I  i Outcomes K h a r if Rabi Total
1. A d d itio n a l Cesses to State
i)  S a ir- jih a t 49.50 40.75 90.25
i i )  Sadar Vakanawis 89.50 57.50 147.00
i i i )  Bhents/Presents 4.12 4.12
iv ) Batta fo r  o ld  coin 258.00 195.00 453.00
v) Money bags &  Stamp 1.12 1.00 2.12
Total: 402.24 294.25 696.49
2. Charges fo r  superv is ion /co llection
i)  Watchman (sehna) 96.50 85.00 138.00
ii)  A dm in istra tor(tappadar) '61.38 27.75 89.13
i i i )  Coin exam iner 8.00 8.00 16.00
Total: 165.88 120.75 286.63
3. B hom i/zam inda ri dues to Raja 238.88 187.06 425.94
4. Dasturs to hereditary o ffic ia ls
i)  Chaudhuri 85.00 53.00 138.00
i i )  Patwari 131.00 80.00 211.00
i i i )  Patel 39.00 39.00
Total: 255.00 133.00 388.00
5. Communal Expenses
i)  Rituals, donations,etc. 25.75 8.13 33.88
i i)  Paper/Ink 5.00 5.00 10.00
i i i )  E n terta inm en t/M isc. 25.50 16.25 41.75
Total: 56.25 29.38 85.63
I I I  : Remainder o f fu n d  pa id  in fn
treasury under hasil malba. 570.84 317.56 888.41
Totals ( I I  + I I I ) 1689.10 1082.00 2771.10
Source: A rhsatta Pareana Lalsot V.S.1794/A.D.1737.
Notes to Table 8: a: The low er average rate per rupee o f basic revenue demand fo r  the rabi harvest is 
due to the exem ption from  malba taxation on the add itiona l revenue collected under a fzud on w in te r 
cereals. : The revenues assigned in  u d ik  or charitable grant appear to be liab le  to malba payment at 
the same rate as the o rd inary  ra iyati.
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smaller sums o f cash and provisions per day, although the total emoluments 
recorded as paid to the sehna were considerable due to the longer time spent by 
him in  the village. I t  is also like ly  that more than one sehna was generally 
appointed in  each revenue un it, as fo r  instance in  qasba La lso t.*^ Smaller amounts, 
calculated in  copper coins or "takas", were paid to the chaudhuri fo r prov id ing  the 
wooden rod against which the hempen rope or dori was measured and the qazi fo r 
ce rtify ing  that the dori was o f the correct length.
i i i )  O f the dasturs or perquisites paid to the hereditary rura l e lite in  the 
qasba (categories I I .3 &  II.4 , Table 8), the bhomi or zam indari cess was the largest. 
This was paid in to  the state treasury as the Jaipur maharaja claimed zam indari 
rights in  the qasba. We f in d  that in  areas where the raja was the zamindar, the 
d istinction between bhomi income and government revenues was not always 
maintained.**** Dasturs were also paid to the three chaudhuris and the patwari while  
the two patels, a M a li and a Brahman, received "nankar" or an allowance fo r  the ir 
services in  rem itting  the revenue to the treasury. The allowances paid to the 
hereditary rura l elites were in addition to the ir p riv ileged entitlem ent to 
concessionary rates o f taxation and exemptions from  certain payments.
iv ) Lastly, there were the re lative ly t r if l in g  amounts spent on celebrating 
festivals like  H o li and Dewali, on o ffe rings to temples and Brahmans and communal 
prayers and recitations (poojas and kathas), paying the wages o f servants called 
upon to serve v is iting  dignitaries in  the area, expenditure on in k , paper, and the 
hemp rope or dori fo r  measuring fie lds, and condolence o ffe rin g  at funerals. These 
have been broadly classified as the common expenses o f the qasba (category II.5 , 
Table 8).
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For reasons discussed earlier, the remainder o f the cash a fte r expenses was 
deposited in  the treasury under the head o f hasil malba (category I I .6, Table 8). 
The amount thus entered in  the arhsatta records o f pargana Lalsot was not, s tric tly  
speaking, the proceeds o f a regular levy but rather the rem ainder or baqi o f a 
separate account. G iven the nature o f this account i t  is not surprising that the 
amounts deposited under hasil malba fluctuated every season -  in  1733 i t  was noted 
that there was no remainder, the collection being equal to the expenses in  that year, 
while in  1737 the considerable sum o f Rs.888.47 was deposited in  the treasury.
I t  is clear from  the malba account that although the land revenue was collected 
both in cash and in k ind, additional payments fo r adm in istra tive and collection 
charges were made through a common fund to w hich the taxpayers contributed in 
cash. The combination o f a cash and k ind  system o f revenue assessment meant that 
parity  between the two could only be approximated by assuming that the proceeds 
from  the sale o f the revenue in  k ind  represented the same proportion  o f the output 
as the revenue in  cash obtained from  zabti crops. The con tribu tion  to the common 
fund therefore was calculated at a specific rate fo r each rupee o f the total revenue 
demand paid by each cu ltivator. G iven the array o f miscellaneous expenses that 
were met from  the fund, some o f which were levied on the revenue un it as a whole 
and were impossible to apportion to ind iv idua ls w ith  any degree o f ’equ ity ’ , the 
malba fund was obviously a matter o f financ ia l expediency.
A lthough the revenue records o f parganas other than Lalsot do not o ffe r  s im ilar 
in fo rm ation  on malba payments, the numerous complaints and disputes arising from  
the operation o f the fund attest to its widespread prevalence. C ontributions to the 
fund  would have varied fo r each revenue un it both tem porally in  accordance w ith
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the estimates o f the total additional expenses, as well as spatia lly, w ith  the 
differences in  the number and the rates at which various customary exactions were 
made. As a rule the state had no d irect role to play in  determ ining the total 
amount to be paid in to  the fund  or its allocation among the taxpayers. Ind irec tly , 
however, the m in im um  amount to be collected was predeterm ined by o ff ic ia l 
regulation that prescribed the rates at which the cesses, revenue functionaries and 
hereditary elites were to be paid. We shall return to the question o f fiscal control 
over the malba fund and its im plications fo r the d is tribu tion  o f power in  the village 
later in  this chapter.
By com bining the in fo rm ation  o f the land revenue collection in  qasba Lalsot 
w ith  that o f the malba account fo r  the same year, i t  becomes possible to comment 
on the total collection and expenditure in  the qasba. Summarising the available 
in fo rm ation  fo r  the year 1737 we obtain the fo llow ing  breakdown:
Total collection from  qasba
i) Basic revenue demand
ii)  Malba Payments 
Total:
Outgoings
i) Land Revenue (m aljiha t)
i i)  A dd itiona l Taxation to State
i i i )  Supervision/Collection charges
iv ) Bhom i/zam indari dues
v) Dasturs to rura l elite in  qasba
v i) Common expenses o f qasba 
Total:
Rupees.
9603.39
2771.10
12374.49
9307,87
1880.42
286.63
425.94
388.00
85.63
12374,49
77.61%
22.39%
100.00%
75.22%
15.19%
2.32%
3.44%
3.14%
0.69%
100.00%
Taking the figures fo r collection and expenditure fo r the qasba as a whole, we 
fin d  that the taxation on crop production (m aljiha t) amounted to 75 per cent o f the 
total amount collected in  the qasba, the additional cesses accruing to the treasury to 
approximately 15 per cent. Payments to the rural e lite and collection agents o f the 
state claimed a fu rthe r 9 per cent and the communal expenses o f the qasba
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comprised less than 1 per cent o f the total outgoings. On average then, the qasba 
taxpayers parted w ith  an additional 33 per cent o f the land revenue to fu l f i l  all 
the ir financia l ob lig a tio n s .^
A lthough the ratios o f the various types o f fiscal exactions to the total collection
can be worked out precisely, i t  is more d if f ic u lt  to deduce what proportion o f the
gross produce they represented. We had earlier shown that the maximum proportion
specified as the state’s share o f the grain in  respect o f land revenue was 50 per cent
7 0fo r the ra iya ti in  the qasba. . I t  has generally been assumed that this meant that
ha lf o f the gross produce o f the peasant was appropriated in  the form  o f land 
71revenue. However, as we have seen above, in  addition to the land revenue, the
m ajority , or the non-priv ileged ra iya ti, contributed at the rate o f 44 per cent o f the 
land revenue to the financia l pool from  which the cesses and taxes were met. I f  
the assumption that the land revenue was 50 per cent o f the gross produce is 
maintained, i t  would im p ly  that the peasants in  qasba Lalsot had to part w ith  72 per 
cent o f the ir gross grain produce in  1737 -  a rate o f surplus appropria tion that 
appears unsustainable fo r  a sem i-arid  region of low agricu ltura l p roductiv ity .
The complexities o f the d ivis ion o f the grain heap described by W alter Neale
fo r a village in  north Ind ia  and by D avid  Ludden fo r one in  the south, show that
the sharing between the state and the cu ltiva to r took place a fte r various deductions
in specified proportions had been made to the village menials and artisans,
79agricultura l labourers, watchman, and the cu ltiva to r him self. In  the dry farm ing 
region o f Punjab, i t  has been argued that in  the late eighteenth century, the 
division o f the grain heap between the government and the cu ltiva to r in  the 
specified proportion was done a fte r a certain proportion o f the gross produce had
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been deducted in  respect o f the additional cesses ("abwabs"). A lthough  we do not 
have s im ilar evidence fo r our region, i t  appears like ly  that the state’s share o f the 
produce revenue was net o f the deductions.
In  view o f the discussion above, i t  would be hazardous to estimate an
approxim ation o f the proportional relationship between the land revenue, communal
expenses, cu ltiva to r’s share and the gross produce as a ll these elements were
constantly changing. Assuming however, that the nom inal cash rates actually
equalled a th ird  o f the gross produce w hich in  princ ip le  they were supposed to, an
additional charge o f Rs. 0.44 on each rupee would mean that the non-priv ileged
cu ltiva to r was le ft w ith  about 52 per cent o f the gross p ro d u c e .^  In  the case o f
produce revenue, i f  we were to assume that the customary deductions made p r io r to
the sharing between the state and the cu ltiva to r equalled the con tribu tion  to the
malba fund  we would obtain the fo llow ing  ratios : the non-p riv ileged  cu ltiva tor,
con tribu ting  to the common fund  at Rs.0.44 fo r every rupee w orth o f produce
revenue and assessed at ha lf o f the net produce a fte r deductions, would have to
75part w ith  about 59 per cent o f his gross produce in  all. O f the estimated 
outgoings o f 59 per cent, 90 per cent would have been deposited in  the state 
treasury and the remaining 10 per cent spent on meeting the collection charges, 
levies paid to the rura l elites and common expenses. In  other words, the basic land 
revenue fo r the m a jo rity  o f the tax payers in  the qasba would have amounted to a 
maximum o f about 44 per cent o f the gross produce and the tota l amount deposited 
in the state treasury a lit t le  over ha lf the total grain production.
The proportions worked out above on the basis o f a single account cannot be 
taken to be fixed  or u n ifo rm ly  applicable. They are at best tentative approximations
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o f the level o f total demand based on evidence which remains incomplete. For one,
we have no ind ication o f the amounts paid in  grain to the service castes and
artisans. Such customary payments appear to be unconnected to the malba fund
and were probably deducted from  the gross produce p r io r to the other fiscal 
7 f\demands. Secondly, our assumption that the con tribu tion  to the common fund 
equalled the customary deductions is pure ly hypothetical. W hile the deductions from  
the gross produce may have been fixed  in  accordance w ith  local custom, we cannot 
postulate that the contribu tion  to the malba fund  bore a d irect proportional 
relationship to the customary deductions from  the gross produce.
Given the d if f ic u lty  in  ascertaining the magnitude o f revenue demand and the
lack o f data on related aspects such as average yields, size o f holdings and
population size and structure, an index o f the ab ility  o f the peasants to meet the ir
revenue obligations tells us more about the relationship between taxation and
agricultura l production. A n  ind irec t though sensitive measure o f the peasants’
ab ility  to meet the revenue demand can be formed by an examination o f revenue
arrears. Revenue arrears were recorded annually fo r  each pargana under the head
of "baqaya" in  the arhsatta records. However, the baqaya sum comprised arrears
due from  a variety o f defaulters such as ijaradars who had contracted fo r  the taxes
on trade and transit ("mapa rahdari"), traders owing money on the contracted sale of
state grain, outstanding rents on state owned shops in  the qasba as well as actual
arrears o f land revenue. As a rule the baqaya figures are not su ffic ien tly
disaggregated in  the arhsattas to enable us to assess the p roportion  o f the land
revenue that remained unpaid over the years. A n  older, m id-seventeenth century
yaddashti o f qasba Mauzabad however, records the amounts outstanding against 
77each taxpayer. The arrears o f land revenue fo r  73 o f the qasbas taxpayers
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totalled Rs. 153.44, The m a jo rity  o f defaulters owed small amounts ranging from  a 
few annas to five  rupees w ith  the largest single sum due from  a lea ther-w orker who 
had m igrated from  the qasba owing the treasury Rs. 20.00 on an ija ra  taken by 
him. The total arrears were jus t over 3 per cent o f the land revenue o f the qasba 
in  the same year which was Rs. 4,817.65. The low ratio o f arrears to revenue 
collected appears reasonable i f  we consider that over 80 per cent o f the revenue in 
that year was collected in  k ind  where the notion o f arrears d id  not arise. I t  is clear 
from  the document that the lis t o f taxpayers in default included both agricu lturists 
and non-agricu ltu ris t kamins resident in  the qasba. A lthough we have no data on 
the total number o f taxpayers in  the qasba, a census carried out in  the fo llow ing  
year put the number o f bu llock-ow n ing  peasants resident in  the qasba at 270 
persons. The available evidence thus suggests that, at the outside lim it ,  one in  fou r 
agriculturists were unable to meet the ir revenue obligation in  fu l l  although the 
amounts owed in d iv id u a lly  were small in  relation to the aggregate revenue demand.
The Payment o f Revenue: Fiscal Control and V illage C on flic t
I t  has generally been argued that the un it o f assessment in  the M ughal period
70
was in  fact the village as a whole and not the ind iv idua l peasant. The system o f 
"asamiwar" or ind iv idua l assessment was the preferred and ideal type specified in  
the M ughal revenue manuals but in  practice a lump sum assessment was made on 
the basis o f overall production in  the village. The revenue demand was then 
apportioned among the cultivators by the headman or by a small group o f 
’dom inant elements’. "This dom inant group then collected the tax at rates fixed  by 
themselves from  every peasant, pu tting  the collection in  a pool...(from  which)..the 
land revenue would be paid, so also the fees and perquisites o f certain o ffic ia ls  and
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79certain common expenses o f the village. Thus, the argument goes, the
practicalities o f revenue collection meant that in  north  Ind ia  the socially ’dom inant’ 
caste-group in  the village also held economic power through the ir control over 
revenue management and the o ff ic ia l recognition o f the ir role as revenue 
intermediaries. E thnographically, such ’dominant elements’ are d if f ic u lt  to id e n tify  
except in  regions such as Aw adh where there appears to be a clear correspondence 
between the regional dominance o f a s tra tified  Rajput lineage and the management
on
o f resources and land control at the village level. Generalising from  the evidence 
that the high-caste cultivators were accorded preferentia l tax treatment, it  has been 
suggested that in  eastern Rajasthan the gharuhala cu ltivators comprised the 
’dom inant’ elements who also w ielded power at the level o f the village and 
controlled the village fund.
The argument above contains two fundamental propositions regarding power in  
the countryside that need to be qua lified  in the context o f eighteenth century 
eastern Rajasthan. F irst it  questions the ab ility  or w illingness o f the pre-co lon ia l 
state to penetrate below the level o f the village and second, attributes o f social 
status such as caste are seen to be sym m etrically related to village dominance and 
resource control. The evidence fo r  our region suggests that at least in  the 
eighteenth century, the land revenue was assessed on ind iv idua l taxpayers and that 
power in  the village, measured through the control o f village finances and revenue 
management, rested w ith  the village patel who was almost invariab ly  a member o f 
the num erically predom inant agricu ltu ra l caste resident in  the village. The 
d is junction between the economic and po litica l dominance o f the Rajput clans at 
the regional level and the power o f the patel at the level o f the village resulted in  
frequent village conflic ts over issues central to its fiscal organisation and control.
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Such conflic ts  between the socio-economically priv ileged high caste cultivators or 
gharuhalas and the paltis represented by the patel were re ferred to the higher 
adm inistrative o ffic ia ls  fo r  ad jud ica tion as there was no mechanism fo r  the ir 
resolution w ith in  the social organisation o f the village. Thus our sources provide us 
an abundance o f documentation on village con flic t which, as we shall examine in  
greater depth later in  the chapter, can clearly be located w ith in  the context o f the 
w ider changes in  the agrarian economy.
The argument that the land revenue was collectively assessed on the village is 
largely based on the evidence o f specimen village accounts reproduced in  the 
accountancy manuals o f the seventeenth century that both the land revenue and 
other communal expenses were met from  the village fund. However, the khasra 
records strongly indicate that the assessment o f the basic revenue demand (or 
m aljiha t) was ind iv idua l rather than collective. Against the name o f each cu ltiva to r 
the khasras record the dimensions and area o f the fie lds sown w ith  each crop 
assessed by the zabti method, or the quantity o f grain produced and its d ivis ion in  a 
specified proportion  between the state and the peasant where crop-sharing was the
Q-j
mode o f tax collection. I t  has been argued by Habib that w h ile  crop-sharing 
involved direct collection from  the grain heaps o f ind iv idua l peasants it  is possible 
that the asamiwar entries on o ff ic ia l assessment papers fo r  cash revenues were 
"..either completely fic titious  or sim ply copied or adapted from  the papers o f the
09
village accountants or headmen." However, the level o f detail in  the annual 
statement o f revenue accounts (arhsatta records) would have been impossible 
w ithou t the aid o f a detailed annual survey and assessment as they record diverse 
variables that were taken in to  account in  the form ula tion  o f the total revenue 
demand on the village or qasba. That the khasra papers played a regular part in  the
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system o f revenue assessment is attested to by the number o f these records that 
have survived fo r d iffe ren t villages o f our region. The khasras form ed the basis 
fo r the com pilation o f the aggregate revenue returns fo r  each crop grown in  the 
revenue un it as presented in  the arhsattas. Occasionally, the arhsattas duplicated 
the form at o f the khasras in  recording by name each tax payer who paid revenue at 
lower than standard rates fo r each cash assessed crop cultivated. There appears to
have been no reason to undertake such a detailed exercise o f recording ind iv idua l
  0-2
tax lia b ility  i f  in  fact the village form ed the basic un it o f assessment.
The view that the assessment and tax lia b ility  was ind iv idua l rather than
collective is re inforced by the manner in  which the revenue arrears were meant to
be discharged. As we have seen arrears were recorded in the patwaris accounts
against the ind iv idua l defaulter and that this was the accepted practice can be
deduced from  complaints regarding deviations from  the norm. When a com plaint
was lodged by the patel and ra iya ti o f qasba Phagi that some cultivators had
connived w ith  the patwari to transfer the ir arrears o f the previous harvest onto the
account o f the ra iyati, the am il was instructed by the diwan to ensure that the
84arrears o f each cu ltiva to r were correctly recorded against the ir names. S im ilarly, 
when the state had directed that outstanding arrears were to be paid in  annual 
instalments o f 6 per cent o f the assessed revenue t i l l  the debt was discharged, the 
ra iyati protested that the levy was being ind iscrim inate ly imposed on all cultivators. 
The response o f the diwan was that the levy should be realised only from  those who 
were in  arrears im p ly ing  the existence o f, and the recognition by the state o f the 
ind iv idua l tax liab ilities  o f each c u lt iv a to r .^
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The basic un it o f assessment was therefore the ind iv idua l cu ltiva to r discharging 
his revenue obligations not at a rb itra ry  rates determined by the headman or the 
dominant members o f the 'v illage com m unity ' but at rates specified by the local 
revenue authorities and conform ing to the general princip les o f the state’s taxation 
policy and local customary practices.
The cash revenue thus assessed was collected and deposited w ith  the treasury o f
the pargana by the patel. Revenue paid in  cash appears to have been paid in
three instalments or "qists’1 fo r  the k h a r if harvest and in  two instalments fo r the 
87rabi harvest. The dates fo r the k h a rif qists were m id-N ovem ber, m id-Decem ber
and early February. The last instalment fe ll due a month before the o ff ic ia l
term ination o f the six month kh a rif period in  early March. The rabi instalments
were to be paid by m id-June and early July. The dates o f these instalments are
88broadly s im ila r to those recorded in  late eighteenth century Punjab. The tim ing  
o f the qists indicates that allowances were made fo r the harvesting and sale o f
produce and there is no evidence to show that revenue payments were demanded
80before the crops could be harvested. Revenue collected in  k ind , on the other 
hand, was sold by the state to the grain traders at agreed prices soon a fter the 
physical d iv is ion o f the crop on the threshing flo o r and the revenues recovered 
d irectly from  the traders according to the terms o f the contract between them and 
the state. We shall examine the mechanism fo r the disposal o f the revenue in  k ind  
in the next chapter.
As we have shown in the analysis o f the malba kharch, the cesses and taxes in  
addition to the basic revenue demand were collective ly paid from  the common 
fund. The questions that arise next are : i)  how was this fund  controlled, that is,
150
who determined the rate at which the taxpayers contributed to it, and ii)  which 
sections o f the rural com m unity contributed to the fund  and w hich were exempt 
and on what conditions? These questions can best be elaborated upon by analysing 
the nature o f conflic ts arising from  the operation o f the malba fund.
Disputes over the payments to the common fund were o f three types:
i)  where the patel was accused o f demanding an excessive levy on this 
account, or m isappropriating the proceeds, or using the fund  fo r  im proper and 
extravagant expenses. Such complaints were generally made by the revenue 
assignees, that is, by the jagirdars o f the Jaipur Maharaja.
i i)  the priv ileged cultivators accused the patel o f imposing the levy on 
them despite the customary exemption granted to them in  recognition o f the ir status 
as gharuhala tenure-holders.
i i i )  where the patel and ra iya ti submitted a jo in t  pe tition  stating the ir 
in a b ility  to meet the common expenses paid from  the malba fund  due to the non­
payment by the priv ileged sections. Such complaints were linked  to the declin ing 
resources o f the ra iya ti owing to the acquisition o f the ir land by the members o f 
the priv ileged section o f the rural community.
The patel occupied a central role in all disputes re lating to the malba fund. 
Complaints by the jagirdars against a patel accused o f demanding an excessive 
amount in  respect o f malba kharch from  the paltis were generally fo llow ed by the 
lamentation that due to these exactions the village was unable to prosper.^® In  each 
case the am il was instructed to ensure that the patel d id  not impose a demand in 
excess o f the customary amount, and that the levy as well as a ll legitim ate expenses 
be collected w ith  the consent o f and in  the presence o f the revenue assignee. The
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fact that these complaints were in itia ted  by the p rinc ipa l appropriators o f revenue
on behalf o f the paltis, shows that the magnitude o f the malba exactions was such
that i t  a ffected the overall production o f the village and, consequently, the income
o f the jag irdar. The recognition by the state o f the patels contro l over the malba
fund is evident in  the ru ling  made by the diwan on the com plaint made by the
01A h ir  patel o f village Chandpura, pargana Khohri. In  this case the jag irdar, Raj 
Singh Naruka, was accused o f abrogating the patel’s zam indari righ t and fo rc ib ly  
appropriating the malba dues from  the village. The d iwan’s ins truction  to the am il 
and the amin o f the pargana clearly state that the prim ary righ t to the management 
o f the malba fund was the patels, and i f ,  on investigation, the patel’s zam indari 
righ t too was found to be long-standing, they were to ensure that the jag irda r d id  
not harass the patel.
That the patel, and on occasion, the patel and patw ari, were regarded as the
persons in  contro l o f the malba fund  emerges unmistakably from  the documents. I t
may however be argued that in  view o f the ir o ff ic ia l position as the representatives
o f the village, the documents ascribe to them a degree o f contro l that was in  fact
inconsistent w ith  the actual pattern o f dominance and control w ith in  the village. I t
has been suggested that the control o f the common pool was in  the hands o f the
’dominant elements’ in  the village who " usually evaded paying the ir due share o f
revenue. Lower rates were also levied upon some favoured elements, the khwud-
kasht peasants in  northern Ind ia , gharuhalas in  Rajasthan and m irasdars in  
92Maharashtra." As we shall attempt to show in  the fo llow ing  discussion on the 
con flic t between the gharuhala cultivators on the one hand, and the patel and 
ra iyati on the other, the control over the malba fund  could not have been exercised
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by the form er notw ithstanding the ir p riv ileged position w ith  regard to the ir fiscal 
obligations to the state or the malba fund.
The section o f the rura l com m unity generally exempt from  payment to the 
malba fund, or contribu ting  at concessional rates, were the cultivators c la im ing 
gharuhala tenure on the ir land holding. In  complaints made by these priv ileged 
sections to the diwan, they invariab ly  assert the customary gharuhala status to 
ju s tify  the ir claim to a complete or partia l exemption from  the payment o f malba 
dues. In  a number o f documents, the ind iv idua l gharuhala cu ltivators claimed that 
although they had never paid these dues previously, the patel was now demanding
O'!
that they should. In  certain instances where the gharuhalas were required to 
contribute to the malba fund  at ha lf the rate applicable on the. paltis o r 
unprivileged cultivators, they complained that the patel had a rb itra rily  increased the 
d e m and .^  Three kayastha taxpayers o f qasba Tonk cited the p riv ileged terms on 
which they paid land revenue to assert the ir r igh t to exemption from  malba 
payments that had been illega lly  imposed upon them by the patel during the 
occupation by the M a ra thas .^  In  a few cases even the hereditary rura l elite -  the 
chaudhuris and qanungos -  registered the ir protest against the patel fo r  demanding 
that they pay the malba dues despite the ir gharuhala s ta tu s .^  The fact that the 
righ t to the payment o f land revenue at concessionary rates was quoted to ju s tify  
the claim to exemption from  malba contributions indicates that the two were 
recognised as inseparable characteristics o f gharuhala status.
The complaints lodged jo in tly  by the patel and ra iya ti against the high caste 
cultivators, referred to in  specific caste terms such as Rajputs, Brahmans, Banias or 
simply as the p riv ileged sections ("him ayati log”), do not ask fo r  the customary
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concessions extended to the p riv ileged sections to be revoked, but rather that these 
rights be lim ited  to the holdings designated as gharuhala lands. As we have 
discussed in  chapter I I I ,  the transfer o f irrigated land, pa rticu la rly  in  the qasbas, 
from  the ra iya ti to the gharuhala agriculturists coincided w ith  the decade o f 
agricultura l decline fo llow ing  the fam ine o f 1755. The petitioners therefore 
emphasise that the refusal by the gharuhalas to contribute to the village fund 
despite the ir having acquired the more productive ra iya ti land meant that the few  
remaining pa lti holdings had to meet the entire village expenses thereby 
im poverishing them fu rther. The co n flic t that emerged therefore arose from  the 
attempted extension o f priv ileged rights, in  the form  o f exemption from  malba 
contributions, by the gharuhalas to the ra iya ti land acquired by them. The paltis 
strongly resisted this on the grounds that they were unable to shoulder the increased 
fiscal burden on the ir own.
A  typ ica l example o f such con flic t can be seen in  the com plaint lodged by the
07patel and ra iyati o f qasba A jabgarh. They claimed that the qasba had largely 
been under ra iya ti cu ltiva tion  but that recently the superior sections had acquired 
ra iyati land through mortgage. Despite the considerable expansion in  the ir 
holdings, the superior sections refused to contribute to the common fund  and 
expected the few remaining ra iyati to bear all the malba expenses. The d iw an’s 
response was that the Purohits, Vyas’ , Sanghis, Sahs, and Kayasthas were 
customarily exempt from  payment o f malba dues on the ir long-standing gharuhala 
land and ought not to be harassed to contribute to the malba fund. However, on 
the ra iya ti land acquired by them through mortgage or purchase, they were 
expected to pay the ir share o f the village expenses at the same rate as the raiyati. 
The am il was instructed to despatch a task force i f  the gharuhala cu ltivators refused
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or delayed payment. Complaints o f this nature were not isolated and there are
numerous documents where s im ilar grievances are expressed by the patel and 
• 98raiyati. In  each case i t  was stressed that the malba payments were to be realised 
from  all those who cultivated ra iyati land.
I t  is apparent from  the o ff ic ia l response to the complaints received that the state 
was fu lly  aware o f the tendency towards the extension o f gharuhala privileges to 
ra iyati land. Generally, the diwan instructed the am il that the land cultivated by 
the priv ileged tenure-holders in  excess o f the ir established gharuhala land would be 
liable to the same fiscal obligations as applicable to the ra iy a t i .^  In  certain cases, 
the diwan specified a year -  usually 7 to 10 years p r io r  to the receipt o f the 
complaint -  and directed that i f  the ra iya ti land had been acquired a fte r the 
specified date then the accused would have to pay the dues but w ou ld  be exempt i f  
the land had been acquired earlier.1^  The specified year was taken to indicate the 
duration o f continuous land usage that was necessary to claim  priv ileged tenure on 
the basis o f customary rights on long-standing holdings. The date was, however, 
a rb itra rily  fixed  as we f in d  that when the ra iyati o f qasba Phagi made the ir 
complaint in  1752, the deciding year stipulated was 1743; but when the ra iya ti o f 
the same qasba repeated the ir com plaint in  1764, the year 1753 was deemed the
I  A i
deciding year. Another measure recommended by the state to resolve these
conflicts was to suggest that separate accounts be maintained fo r  the cesses paid by
1 n?the priv ileged sections (R ajput, Brahman and Baniya taxpayers) and the ra iyati.
In  pargana Lalsot, where the state was d irectly  involved in  the levy o f the malba
fund, the amils were instructed in  1742 to ensure that the pahis or non-resident
cultivators, Brahmans and Kayasthas contributed to the common fund  at the same 
1 0^rate as the ra iyati.
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The ineffectua l attempts made by the state at the resolution o f these disputes is
reflected in  the large number o f repeated counter-representations made by
protagonists from  the same village. Tw o successive representations by the patel and
raiyati o f qasba Tonk in  1741 were fo llowed by a coun ter-pe tition  by the
gharuhalas o f the qasba in  1756 alleging that the patel had illega lly  imposed malba
payments on them due to the chaos resulting from  the Maratha occupation.
However, in  1761 the patel and ra iya ti again repeated the ir com plaint o f tax
105evasion by the superior sections despite an extension in  the ir holdings.
S im ilarly, there are a series o f documents on village Chakvada, pargana Phagi,
dating from  1754 to 1761 invo lv ing  the Naruka Rajputs o f the village alleging
victim isation by the patel, and the patel and ra iya ti accusing the Narukas o f
1 0 6evading the payment o f the ir due share to the common fund. S im ilar sets o f
107documents were found fo r  qasba Phagi, pargana Phagi, v illage Jhak, pargana
P h a g i;^ ^  village Choru, pargana P h a g i;^ ^  and qasba A jabgarh , pargana G az i-ka - 
110Thana. In  the la tte r two instances, although the gap between the two petitions 
is relatively longer than the others, i t  goes to show that tension between the parties 
persisted on this issue.
What emerges from  the above analysis is that the obligation to contribute to the 
malba fund  was based on two principles. F irst, customary law entitled the 
gharuhala taxpayers to a complete or partia l exemption from  malba contributions, 
and second, state regulation p roh ib ited  the conversion o f ra iya ti land to the 
gharuhala category. Raiyati land in  the village included that cu ltivated by the 
ra iyati as well as the arable waste in  the village. The regulation p roh ib iting  the 
extension o f p riv ileged rights to ra iya ti land d id not im p ly  that the gharuhala 
cultivators could not enlarge the ir holdings but that they were expected to pay the
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standard revenue charges on such land. W hile the state, the patel and the ra iyati 
emphasised the la tte r p rinc ip le  to assert that the malba payments were linked to the 
category o f land rather than the status o f the cu ltiva to r, the gharuhala p la in tiffs  
claimed customary exemption on the basis o f the firs t p rinc ip le . Compounding the 
problem was the d if f ic u lty  in  enforcing the d istinction  between the assessable and 
non-assessable land due to the fact that the ’long -te rm ’ occupancy o f land -  
established by the regular payment o f revenue on i t  -  was the sole c rite rion  fo r  
judg ing whether the priv ileged cu ltiva to r could claim established gharuhala rights 
on the land. Thus w hile  the state was aware o f the adverse long term  effects to the 
prosperity o f the ra iya ti that the extension o f gharuhala privileges entailed, i t  was 
unable to provide an alternative mechanism fo r its containment. Further, once the 
ra iyati land had been transferred to the gharuhala peasants, through means other 
than by force, the state d id  not attempt to restore i t  to the o rig ina l cu ltiva to r, but 
merely sought to implement its revenue po licy w ith  regard to land thus acquired.
The priv ileged position o f the gharuhala cultivators regarding the ir fiscal 
obligations was guaranteed and defined by state regulation. Regarding the control 
o f the malba fund and village finances, it  is clear that i f  it  were managed by the 
gharuhalas by v irtue  o f the ir ’dom inant’ position w ith  respect to priv ileged terms o f 
fiscal payments, then the am il w ould not have to be called upon to intercede on 
the ir behalf in  disputes w ith  the patel. The patel, although accorded gharuhala
status and privileges, iden tified  w ith  and acted as the spokesman fo r  the ra iyati o f
111the village. W hile the outlays on cesses, collection charges and perquisites were 
largely predeterm ined, some form  o f collective decision making may have operated 
in  respect o f common expenditure related to social and relig ious a ffa irs  o f the 
community. This was perhaps done by the village panchayat. The references in
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our sources to village panchayats clearly indicate that they had a decisive role in
119regulating the social l i fe  in  the village.
Methods o f R e lie f and A g ricu ltu ra l Development
In trins ic  to the taxation po licy o f the eighteenth century Ja ipur state were 
measures to promote agricu ltura l expansion and investment. As we have seen, 
taxation schedules were structured to distinguish between the natural fe r t i l i ty  o f soil 
and the h igher yields brought about by ind iv idua l e ffo r t and investment so that 
cultivators who im proved the ir fie lds retained a larger share o f the output. In  
order to expand production, taxes were scaled down to fac ilita te  the cu ltiva tion  o f 
"banjar" or cu ltivab le waste and tax rebates were granted fo r  the restoration o f
11C
depopulated lands and the construction o f wells. Peasants were persuaded to 
cultivate high value crops through loans to finance the purchase o f seed and
1 1 f \through tax incentives. O ffic ia l po licy w ith  regard to agricu ltu ra l development 
was p rim a rily  composed o f fiscal measures such as these which aimed to encourage 
productive investment by the rura l elite. The peasants response to these measures 
and the spread o f rural specialisation however was dependent to a large degree on 
the ab ility  o f the state to sustain an environm ent that boosted in terna l demand and 
fostered trade
W hile a rise in  rura l p roduc tiv ity  was an im portant consideration o f state po licy, 
its overrid ing concern was w ith  m ainta in ing con tinu ity  in  production. The 
incorporation of the batai mode o f taxation fo r  foodgrain production shows how 
deeply this concern was b u ilt in to  the system o f taxation. In  addition , the system 
had to be flex ib le  in  order to respond to local as well as general fa ilures in
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production. W hile in  the batai mode o f taxation the revenue demand adjusted
automatically to the quality o f the harvest, specific allowances had to be made to
adjust output to tax demand in  the case o f the cash assessed crops. Allowances
were made fo r a partia l fa ilu re  o f the harvest or the destruction caused by a
marching army ("paimali") through a deduction in the revenue demand in
117proportion to the extent o f damage ("nabud"). In  years o f exceptionally poor
harvests there was a general reduction in  the cash revenue rates and much o f the
118assessed revenues were w r it te n -o ff,  i f  only because they were irrecoverable. In
a region where revenue in  k ind  comprised a large part o f tota l tax revenue, land
revenue arrears were small. The attitude o f the state to revenue arrears was s im ilar
to that adopted in  the case o f tagai loans. The amils were repeatedly instructed to
collect the revenue demand in  fu ll w ith in  the current year, but i f  arrears were
carried fo rw ard  to the next year they were to be collected in  annual instalments not
121exceeding five  or six per cent o f the current revenue demand.
The provision o f state loans or tagai loans went some way in  prov id ing  rural 
entrepreneurs badly needed capital to rehabilitate villages, to construct dams, dig 
wells and purchase seed and cattle. However, as we had seen in an earlier chapter, 
tagai loans were generally d istributed in  response to a production crisis rather than 
as a part o f a long-term  po licy that sought to stabilise or expand production 
through e ffective  state in tervention and control. Considering the importance o f 
tagai loans during periods o f crises, they should be seen p rim a rily  as part o f the 
states re lie f measures to enable the rura l population to tide over situations o f 
exceptional distress. The restricted supply o f credit in  conditions o f drought or 
po litica l con flic t meant that the state had to provide a fo rm  o f social subsidy in  
order to prevent large-scale m igration from  the region.
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A n  evaluation of the impact o f the system o f revenue taxation on agricu ltura l
p roductiv ity  in  the pre-co lon ia l period by modern historians has yielded con flic ting
viewpoints. The historians o f the colonial period emphasise the f le x ib ility  and the
responsiveness o f the pre-co lon ia l tax structures to the welfare o f agriculturists and
1 1 ^contrast this to the r ig id ity  o f the tax system imposed by the B ritish . The
leading historian o f the M ughal economy, on the other hand, has emphasised the
inherently regressive nature o f M ughal taxation and its tendency to "subvert
114superior cu ltiva tion" through excessive exploitation. These assessments appear 
contradictory only because they draw attention to a single aspect o f state po licy 
rather than see them as inextricab ly  linked  to each other and re flecting  the 
conditions o f rura l production.
On the one hand, the fact that taxes were levied at a standard rate and were not 
linked to ind iv idua l resources certa in ly highlights the regressive nature o f the 
structure o f taxation. In  eastern Rajasthan this feature was fu rth e r accentuated by 
the granting o f tax rebates and concessions to the priv ileged sections o f rura l 
society. Furtherm ore, to the extent that taxation drew out scarce capital from  the 
countryside, the system o f taxation inh ib ited  the d iffus ion  o f superior cu ltiva ting  
practices to all levels o f rural society. The objective o f the state to maximise its 
revenues, on the other hand, could not be achieved through a system o f taxation 
that d id  not allow the producers su ffic ie n t resources to meet the ir needs fo r 
continued production. The state’s need to attract and retain labour imposed fu rthe r 
lim its  to any po licy aimed at short term  revenue maxim isation. In  a dry farm ing 
area where production conditions were unstable and variable, the system o f taxation 
had to incorporate measures to promote productive investment in  order to stabilise
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and expand production in  the long-term  as well as to provide re lie f to overcome 
seasonal shortfalls in  production.
In  conclusion i t  needs to be emphasised that the system o f revenue taxation in  
the eighteenth century Jaipur state was modelled on the M ughal system and 
retained its p rinc ipa l aims and objectives. Yet it  is clear from  the evidence cited 
that the system o f taxation in  the eighteenth century state o f Jaipur was more 
systematised and adapted to local production conditions; more e ffic ie n t in  drawing 
revenue through taxing ind iv idua l producers and by defin ing , and thereby setting 
lim its  to, the privileges o f social dominance; more vigorous in the pursu it o f a 
policy o f agrarian expansion through fiscal incentives to aid investment and through 
its role in  the provision and regulation o f rura l credit. I t  was symptomatic o f a 
taxation system geared towards the e ffic ie n t extraction o f surplus that the state also 
sought to control the conditions under which grain received as tax in  k ind  was 
marketed. I t  is to this aspect o f the agrarian policy that we now turn.
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95. C h itti dt.Phalgun vadi 5 VS 1813/AD  1757, pargana Tonk [No.60].
96. C h itti dt.Phalgun sudi 5 VS 1818/AD  1762, pargana Tonk [No.59]; C h itti 
dt.Bhadon vadi 7 VS 1801/AD  1744, pargana G azi-ka Thana [No.61]; C h itti 
dt.Phalgun vadi 4 VS 1813/AD  1757, pargana Phagi [No.287].
97. C h itti dt.Chaitra Vadi 7 VS 1826/AD  1769, pargana Gazi-ka-Thana.
98. C h itti dt.Jesht sudi 2 VS 1821/AD  1764, pargana Phagi [No.53]; C h itti 
d t.K a rtik  sudi 14 VS 1808/AD  1751, pargana Tonk [No.57]; C h itti dt.Chait 
vadi 11 VS 1817/AD  1760, pargana Phagi [No.67]; C h itt i dt.Asad sudi 14 VS 
1819/AD  1752, pargana H indaun [No.211]; C h itti dt.Asad vadi 11 VS 1808/AD  
1751, pargana Phagi [No.288]; C h itti dt.Chait sudi 2 VS 1817/AD  1760, 
pargana Phagi [No. 315]; C h itti dt.Chait sudi 12 VS 1822/A D  1765, pargana 
Lalsot [No. 374]; C h itt i dt.Sawan sudi 8 VS 1818/AD  1761, pargana M alpura 
[No. 482].
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99. C h itti dt.Phalgun vadi 11 VS 1818/AD  1762, pargana Tonk [No.55]; C h itti 
dt.Chait vadi 7 VS 1826/AD  1759, pargana G azi-ka-Thana [No.56J; C h itti 
d t.K a rtik  sudi 14 VS 1808/AD  1751, pargana Tonk [No.57]; C h itt i dt.Maghshri 
vadi 14 VS 1808/AD  1751, pargana Tonk [No.58]; C h itt i dt.Sawan vadi 7 VS 
1802/AD  1745, pargana Phagi [No.62].
100. In  the C h itt i dt.Asad vadi 11 V.S.1808/1751, pargana Phagi, the year stipulated 
was V.S. 1801/A .D .1744. On the other hand, in  the C h itt i dt.Phalgun Vadi 11 
V.S.1818/A.D.1761, pargana Tonk, the previous 2 -4  years were specified.
101. C h itti dt.Asad Sudi 4 VS 1809/AD  1752; C h itti dt.Jesht Sudi 2 VS 1821/AD  
1764 both perta in ing to qasba Phagi.
102. C h itti dt Sawan Sudi 9 VS 1779/AD  1722, pargana Phagi [No.194].
103. C h itti dt.Chait sudi 12 VS 1822/AD  1765, pargana Lalsot [No.374].
104. C h itti d t.K a rtik  Sudi 14 VS 1808/AD  1741; C h itti d t.M aghshri Vadi 14 VS 
1808/1741; C h itt i dt.Falgun Vadi 5 VS 1813/ 1756.
105. C h itti dt.Phalgun vadi 11 VS 1818/1761.
106. C h ittis  dt.Maghshri Sudi 6 VS 1811/AD  1754; dt.Posh Sudi 8 VS 1817/ A D  
1761; d t.K a rtik  Sudi 15 VS 1818/AD  1761 all perta in ing to village Chakvada, 
pargana Phagi.
107. C h ittis  dt.Asad Sudi 4 VS 1809/AD  1742; dt.Jesht Sudi 2 VS 1821/AD  1764; 
dt.Asad Vadi 12 VS 1827/ A D  1770 all pertaining to qasba Phagi.
108. C h ittis  dt.Asad Vadi 11 VS 1808/A d 1751 and dt.Phalgun Vadi 4 VS 1813/ A D  
1756 both perta in ing to village Jhak.
109. C h ittis  dt.Sawan Sudi 6 VS 1801/AD  1744 and dt.Chaitra Sudi 2 VS 1817/AD  
1760 both perta in ing to village Choru.
110. C h ittis  dt.Bhadon vadi 7 VS 1801/AD  1744 and dt.Chaitra V ad i 7 VS 1826/AD  
1769.
111. Harbans M ukhia, "Illegal Extortions", IESHR. 20, 2 [1977], p.240 has also 
noted that the patel always supported his village in  disputes o f illegal 
extortions.
112. M .Bajekal, "Rural Disputes", pp.151-157
113. Asiya S iddiq i, Agrarian Change in a N orth  Indian State: U tta r Pradesh 1819- 
1833. Elizabeth W hitcombe, A grarian Conditions in  N orth  India. Vol.One: The 
U n ited  Provinces under B ritish  Rule. 1860-1900.
114. Irfa n  Habib, "Agrarian Relations and Land Revenue: N orth  India", C E H IL  
p.240. But also see recent attempts at a reassessment o f this v iew poin t by 
Satish Chandra, "Some Institu tiona l Factors in p rov id ing  Capital Inputs fo r  the 
Im provem ent and Expansion o f C u ltiva tion  in M edieval India", Indian 
H istorica l Review . vo l.III, N o .l [1976], pp.83-98.
169
115. C h itti dt.Mah vadi 6 VS 1826/AD  1769, pargana Phagi [No.406]; C h itti 
dt.Maghshri sudi 11 VS 1785/AD  1728, to Sah Mansaram [No.417]; C h itt i 
dt.Pos vadi 8 VS 1782/AD  1725, to Sah Sahibram [No.418]; C h itt i d t.K a rtik  
vadi 4 VS 1784/AD  1727, pargana Pragpur Ante la  [No.456]; C h itt i dt.Baisakh 
sudi 1 VS 1791/AD  1734, pargana Malarna [No. 450b]; C h itt i dt.Bhadon sudi 2 
VS 1780/AD  1723, pargana H indaun [No.552]; C h itt i d t.Asoj vadi 12 VS 
1767/AD  1710, pargana Chatsu [No.358].
116. C h itti dt.Pos sudi 15 VS 1785/AD  1728, pargana Bhusawar [No.422J.
117. Khasra zabti mauza Mohanpura sakh svalu. VS 1795/AD  1738.
118. C h itti dt.Phalgun vadi 3 VS 1818/AD  1761, pargana H indaun [No.384].
119. C h itti dt.Sawan sudi 14 VS 1809/AD  1752, pargana Pindayan [No.206]; C h itti 
dt.Baisakh sudi 4 VS 1809/AD  1752, pargana H indaun [No.71]; C h itti 
dt.Phalgun vadi 3 VS 1818/AD  1766, pargana H indaun [No.384]. A lso see 
Habib, Agrarian System, pp. 249-250 fo r  s im ilar directives issued by the 
Mughals to the revenue adm initrators..
Chapter V
TH E  STATE AND TH E  R U R A L FOO DG RAIN  M A R K E T
Studies o f the structure and organisation o f local markets have increasingly
come to attract scholarly attention since the seminal w ork o f B R Grover on rural
commercial l ife  in  seventeenth and eighteenth century north  Ind ia. The general
pattern o f local rura l trade that emerges from  these studies is the essentially vertica l
thrust o f commodities moving out o f the loca lity through a hierarchy o f markets
• 2linked by chains o f intermediaries and the flow  o f commodities and credit. 
A lthough detailed in fo rm ation  on the system o f rura l m arketing in  eastern 
Rajasthan in  the eighteenth century is fragmentary and incomplete, given the 
preoccupation o f the state -  and hence our sources -  w ith  taxation, the available 
evidence indicates that the structure and organisation o f local trade conformed to 
the general pattern. However, a s ign ifican t feature o f late pre-co lon ia l rura l 
commerce in  north India, that had been touched upon in  G rover’s study but has 
received lit t le  attention so fa r, was the extent and nature o f state in tervention in  
and control over the market. This aspect o f local trade forms the p rinc ipa l subject 
o f this chapter.
I t  has generally been understood that w ith  the fo rm u la tion  o f the schedule o f 
cash revenue rates or dastur amals in  the reign o f A kbar, the classical zabti or 
system o f cash assessment was the norm in  the core M ughal te rrito ries stretching 
from  the Indus to the Ghagara.^ I t  has been fu rthe r suggested that in regions such 
as Rajasthan where the late seventeenth and eighteenth century records reveal that
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crop-sharing persisted as the dom inant mode o f revenue assessment fo r foodgrains 
in particu lar, the peasant was obliged to rem it the revenue in  cash a fte r 
commutation o f the state’s share o f grain at current local prices.^ Thus whether the 
revenue was assessed in  cash or by the division o f the grain heap, its u ltim ate 
payment in  cash necessitated the m arketing o f agricu ltura l produce by the peasant.^ 
The role o f the Mughal state in  commerce is thus seen to be lim ited  to taxing 
traders through various sales and transit tolls or monopolising the sale o f certain
n
commodities. Instances o f the d irect in tervention by the state in  the regulation o f 
the grain trade have been noted in  situations o f scarcity and famine. Such
intervention was by its nature sporadic -  lim ited  to times o f crisis in  foodgrain
. . .  . 8 ava ilab ility  -  and in  keeping w ith  the popular expectations o f a paternalistic ruler.
The Jaipur records however, assign to the local government adm inistration a
more d irect and routine involvem ent in  local trade. This involvem ent was
articulated through the collection o f revenue in  k ind  which constituted more than
ha lf o f the total annual revenue proceeds.^ The revenue collected in  k ind  was
marketed by the local revenue o ffic ia ls  and not by the peasant as w ill be clear from
1 nthe evidence cited later in  the chapter. The collection o f revenue in  k ind
necessitated the conversion o f the m ajor portion, i f  not the whole o f the grain, in to
disposable income. The bu lk o f the grain was sold by the state to the grain
dealers. The price at w hich the state sold the grain, the amount sold and the total
value were recorded in  the annual abstract o f the state revenue, the arhsattas. The
systematic recording o f the prices o f the m ajor foodcrops has stimulated
1 1considerable statistical analysis and tabulation. However, im portant as these 
studies are in  the ir analysis o f price trends, certain crucial issues related to the 
processes o f storage, transport and m arketing o f grain by the state need to be
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emphasised fo r  a more complete understanding o f the nature o f the price data that 
the revenue documents provide. In  order to elaborate on this aspect o f the state’s 
interest in the grain market, i t  would be pertinent to trace the processes invo lved in  
the disposal o f the grain revenues appropriated by the state.
Storage o f the State’s Grain Share
A fte r  the d iv is ion o f the threshed grain heap, the share o f the state was
generally stored in  subterranean grain p its or "khasas" in  the village. Khasa seems
to be the term specific to the state’s grain pits in  the village w hile  other s im ilar pits
o f the patels and grain dealers in  the village, fo r instance, were termed "khatas" or 
12"khaees". Storage o f grain in  pits is regarded as the most im portant and e ffic ie n t
13method o f long term storage in  dry lands and continues to be in  use today. Tod’s 
description o f a grain p it in  the ad jo in ing state o f Kota in  eastern Rajasthan 
indicates that these were simple unlined structures in w hich grain was generally 
stored loose or unbagged. The pits or trenches were dug on elevated high ground, 
the ir sides were lined w ith  wheat or barley stubble before the grain was deposited. 
The grain was covered w ith  a layer o f straw and the mouth o f the p it  sealed by a 
terrace o f earth coated w ith  clay and cowdung which made it  im pervious even to 
the monsoonal torrents and which could be easily renewed i f  d a m a g e d . I n  these 
grain pits the carbon dioxide em itted from  the grain served to k i l l  any insects or 
larvae. Tod ’s suggestion that the patel norm ally used the ruse o f rats getting in to
the pits to cover up fo r embezzlement indicates that this was perhaps a plausible
15 •and common occurence. I t  appears that v irtu a lly  a ll villages had such grain
1stores, except those where the soil was unsuitable fo r  the ir construction. The soil 
o f villages unsuitable fo r  grain pits is referred to as "chothi" (clayey o r non-porous
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soils?) which caused the stored grain to rot. The recommended practice in  such
cases was fo r  the am il to arrange fo r  its transportation to the state granaries or
1 7"kotha ambar" in  the qasba.
In  view o f the fact that the e ffic ie n t storage o f grain pending its disposal was as 
im portant as the collection o f the revenue, the revenue o ffic ia ls  o f the state were 
required to inspect village pits regularly. Samples o f grain were taken to determine
1 O
the condition o f the stored grain. Generally, the bu lk  o f the grain revenue was
disposed o f f  w ith in  the fiscal year but sometimes unsold grain was stored fo r
longer periods. Two years appears to have been the maximum length o f tim e that
1 Qwas considered safe to store grain before it  deteriorated. In  1729, fo r instance,
o f the total grain collected in pargana Malarna, a l it t le  over ten per cent remained
unsold in  the fiscal year. These were all rabi cereals. In  the same year, grain
stored from  the previous two years was also sold. O f the total receipts from  the
sale o f grain in the year, the percentage value o f the grain o f 1727 and 1728 that
70was sold was 1.31 and 12 per cent, respectively. I f  there were signs o f
deterioration in  the stored grain, the am il was instructed to make immediate
arrangements fo r  its disposal, e ither through the grain dealers at prices lower than
91those current in  the bazar , or through d is tribu tion  to needy peasants as taccavi
99loans to be recovered in  k ind  at the tim e o f the next harvest.
The patel o f the village was responsible fo r safeguarding the grain in  the khasa 
and was debited fo r the amount o f grain stored. Thus when the mahajans o f 
qasba Malarna complained that they d id  not receive the entire amount o f grain 
from  the villages which they had contracted to sell and then to rem it the proceeds 
to the state treasury, the amils were instructed to ensure that the patels and
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patwaris d id  not embezzle the state’s g ra in .^  I f  there was a shortfa ll in  the 
amount o f grain taken in  revenue and the amount la ter handed over to the trader 
who had contracted fo r  its sale, the patel and ra iyati o f the village were obliged to 
make up the d ifference in  cash.^“*
Storage o f grain was, however, jus t an in terim  process to its u ltim ate disposal. 
The state’s need to convert its grain revenues in to  disposable income in  cash as 
well as the fact that long term storage o f grain was infeasible and inadvisable due 
to the risk o f deterioration, meant that the bulk o f the grain was sold to the local 
grain dealers during the current harvest. Some o f the grain, however, was 
transported by the state to forts fo r the provis ion ing o f garrisons.
In  order to place our subsequent discussion on the mechanism o f grain sale in  
perspective, i t  is necessary to estimate what proportion o f the gross grain produce 
of a pargana was marketed by the state. G iven the incom plete nature o f our data 
and the number o f variables to be considered we can at best fo rm  only a rough 
approxim ation o f this proportion.
W ith in  the ’regulation’ area, or the territo ries administered by the Jaipur darbar,
the quantity o f grain marketed by the state varied as between each pargana due to
various factors. F irst, the variation in  the extent o f revenues alienated or assigned
by the state in  revenue-free grants, in  jagirs, or in  ija ra  as the revenue collection in
these tracts was outside the direct adm inistration o f the state. O f these, grants o f
revenue-free land constituted below five  per cent o f the resources o f the state and
9 7probably remained fa ir ly  stable over the period. The proportion  o f revenues o f 
the state w ith in  the other three categories, viz. d irectly  adm inistered lands, ija ra
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and jag ir, fluctuated in  size and d is tribu tion  over space from  year to year in  
response to various po litica l and economic factors.
W ith in  the khalisa or the areas d irectly  administered by the ra ja ’s revenue 
o ffic ia ls , a second factor that affected the quantity o f grain acquired by the state in  
d iffe ren t parganas was variations in the cropping pattern and the mode o f 
assessment, in  particu lar fo r the irriga ted  rabi cereals. Thus in  parganas such as 
Phagi, Malarna, and Tonk, where revenue in  k ind  constituted more than three- 
quarters o f the revenue proceeds, the amount o f grain marketed by the state would 
be higher than fo r pargana Lalsot or Chatsu where irriga ted  wheat and barley were 
assessed in  ca sh .^
F ina lly , the state’s share o f the grain produce would depend upon the 
proportion o f the gross product appropriated in  revenue. The commonly held view 
is that the batai proportions stated in  revenue schedules or dastur amals specify the
If)
state’s share o f the gross produce. However,as we had argued in  an earlier 
chapter, our evidence relating to the collections and expenses from  the common 
village fund or malba made in  addition to the prim ary land tax suggest that the 
d ivision o f the grain heap between the state and the revenue payer was probably 
done after various customary deductions from  the gross produce had been made. 
W hile there appears to be no method o f accurately estimating the gross produce, the 
state’s share in  the grain heap net o f the deductions is well documented. This 
proportion varied according to the caste, o ff ic ia l and residential status o f the 
cu ltiva to r and the type o f concessions extended by the state in  its e ffo r t to extend 
cu ltiva tion  in to  previously un tilled  banjar land or increase and stabilise i t  through 
lower taxation on irriga ted lands. The available evidence so fa r suggests that the
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average share o f the taxable grain produce o f a village that was appropriated by the 
state in k ind  was about 45 per cent in  kh a rif and 35 per cent in  rabi. In  view o f 
this, and keeping in  m ind the deductions from  the grain heap p r io r  to the sharing 
between the state and the peasant, the percentage that the grain revenue form ed o f 
the gross produce o f a village could not have been fa r in  excess o f th ir ty  per cent 
on average.
Taking all the above factors in to  consideration, the upper and low er lim its  to 
the proportion o f the grain produce appropriated, and marketed, by the state in  any 
pargana would have been about three to twelve per cent o f the gross grain 
production w ith  the collections in  the period 1730-1750 fa llin g  w ith in  the upper 
end o f the range and that in  the second ha lf o f the eighteenth century being 
considerably lower. ^  Control over a sizable grain stock meant that the 
involvem ent o f the state in  the grain trade and the market was s ign ificant. The 
state partic ipation in  the grain market as the m ajor seller in  conjunction w ith  the 
po litica l power that i t  w ielded ensured its dom ination o f the local grain market.
The Regulation o f Foodgrain Prices
Records o f the sale contracts negotiated between the pargana adm inistration and 
the traders (svaha satti records) were maintained by the revenue authorities. These 
were organised chronologically w ith  the sales on each day being fu rthe r 
disaggregated by the village, the grain revenue o f which had been sold, the iden tity  
o f the purchaser, the quantity o f each crop sold and its sale price. Fragments o f 
such records which have survived show that the price o f each food grain sold on a 
particu lar day was the same fo r each transaction irrespective o f e ither the location
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o f the village w ith  respect to the main grain market or the value o f the ind iv idua l
-3 C
sale. Further, the sale price was d iffe re n t on successive days although the range 
o f variation w ith in  the short tim e span fo r which we have data was small. The 
contract price fo r the sale o f barley, fo r example, showed the fo llow ing  
variations:
Date o f Sale Seers per Rupee
10th.Shawwal (A p r il 5th.) 85.5
13th. _ d o _ 85.0
17th. _ d o _ 89.5
18th. do 91.0
3rd.Z ilqad (A p r il 28th.) 93.0
4th. _d o _ 93.0
11th. _do_ 94.0
13th. _do_ 93.0
17th. _ d o _ 93.0
18th. __do_ 93.0
19th. _ d o _ 90.5
21st. do 89.0
On the basis o f the in fo rm ation  provided by the syaha satti records pertaining 
to the sale o f the state’s grain i t  is clear that transactions invo lv ing  the sale o f the 
grain revenue o f several villages w ith in  the pargana on a single day were concluded 
at a un ifo rm  price and that this price was not an o ff ic ia l harvest price but varied 
over time. What was the price at w h ich the state’s grain was sold and how was it  
determined?
The state routine ly recorded the daily prices o f foodgrains at the qasba o f each 
pargana. The qasba, in  addition to being the adm inistrative headquarters o f the 
pargana, was also the main commercial centre of the pargana where the wholesale 
market o r "mandi" was located. The daily prices recorded at the qasba were termed 
the "nirakh bazar" or the lis t o f bazar prices. I t  should be pointed out that the 
recording o f daily prices at the p rinc ipa l market o f the pargana was not unique to 
eastern Rajasthan but form ed part o f the regular duties o f the M ughal revenue
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adm inistrator in  the seventeenth century and the practice survived t i l l  the early 
nineteenth century in  U tta r Pradesh.
In  his analysis o f pre-m odern markets and traders, K .N . Chaudhuri has 
iden tified  the determinants o f price form ation in  each o f the three analytically 
d istinct categories o f markets to be found in every spatially and functiona lly
no ■ • *
defined central place. The determ ination o f prices at each m arket varied; in  the 
bazar, the level o f prices was fixe d  by supply and demand factors; the prices in  the 
wholesale spot market adjusted according to the normal in teraction between supply 
and demand current at the tim e o f the transaction, the in fo rm a tion  available to the 
buyers and sellers and the merchants’ experience o f the past behaviour o f the 
market; and at the la tte r’s offshoot, the wholesale fo rw ard  market, fo rw ard  dealings 
were conducted through advance payments fo r  fu tu re  supplies at agreed prices, a 
form  o f trading that combined "expected" values and current transactions.
In  examining the process o f price form ation at the bazar level, B .R .G rover 
noted that the state exercised form al control over the rura l market through a policy 
o f ’ f ix in g ’ prices on a regional sca le .^  The state’s need to ’f i x ’ prices has broadly 
been ascribed to its desire to ensure cheap food. The fundam ental value im p lic it in  
this po licy was the "v irtue  claimed by and a ttribu ted to M ughal rulers during whose 
reigns low grain prices prevailed or who actively kept prices low  in  the ir central 
c it ie s ."^  Bayly, on the other hand, has argued that the ’ f ix in g ’ o f bazar prices by 
the state was more a process o f bargaining between the local merchants and the 
po litica l a u th o ritie s .^  In  his discussion o f the urban grain m arket he suggests that 
price form ation  took place at two levels, "firs t through the wholesalers and then by 
the retail sellers who established a fixed  daily rate in  consultation w ith  the po litica l
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authorities." 42 Hence, the in tervention o f the state in  negotiating retail prices w ith  
reference to the wholesale price has been seen by Bayly as a mechanism to ensure 
the smooth flow  o f grain into the c ity .4^ Such a process o f a negotiated price 
conforms w ith  the apparently contrad ictory statement that in  the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries the "Provincial or local adm inistration fixed  prices o f 
foodstuffs on a regional scale. The fixa tion  o f prices was governed by the p rinc ip le  
o f supply and demand." 44
We have no d irect evidence w hich puts into question the general process o f 
price fo rm ation as described above. The foregoing analysis o f the nature o f pre­
modern trade and markets shows that prices at local market were determined by 
factors o f supply and demand and that the ’ f ix in g ’ o f prices by the state consisted 
o f no more than the recording o f retail prices, using the in fo rm ation  and 
cooperation o f the grain traders, at the largest wholesale and reta il market o f the 
pargana, the qasba.4'* But the analysis does not adequately explain why the state 
so meticulously recorded the bazar prices at the adm inistrative centre o f every 
pargana. Our evidence suggests that state intervention in  price setting was closely 
related to its role as the m ajor seller o f grain in  the market w ith  its annual revenues 
being dependent upon the value o f the produce appropriated in grain. The bazar 
prices, recorded in the n irakh bazar documents fo r each qasba, provided a 
benchmark fo r the state to determine the price at which it  would sell its produce 
revenue to the grain dealers. The involvem ent o f the state in  the process o f price 
setting can thus be seen as a re flection o f o ff ic ia l social po licy as w ell as stemming 
from  its revenue considerations.
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Was the o ff ic ia l bazar price the same as the price at w h ich  the state sold its 
grain? Accord ing to S.P.Gupta, the prices recorded in  the arhsattas, are thought to 
be ’harvest prices’ and lower than the bazar p r ic e s .^  In  the table compiled by him  
to show the range o f variation between the arhsatta and n irakh  bazar prices, i t  is 
not made clear whether the figures given under the two heads are comparisons o f 
the prices in  the two records on the same day or a comparison o f the computed 
average price as derived from  the arhsatta and a ’harvest p rice ’ derived from  
averaging the n irakh bazar prices fo r  an unspecified period corresponding to the 
harvest m o n t h s . T h e  tabulated prices again show inconsistencies which are not 
explained -  fo r instance, while  a m a jo rity  o f the crop prices under the n irakh bazar 
column are higher than those in the arhsatta column, a few  are lower than the 
arhsatta price by 2 to 17 per cent.
However, our evidence from  the records o f Phagi indicates that the state’s grain
was sold at the prevailing n irakh bazar price on the day o f sale. Generally, the sale
details recorded in  the arhsattas only state that the grain was sold ’as per the rate’
{muafiq nirakh) on a specified date . Occasionally, however, the details are more
precise and specify that the ’ rate’ was the bazar rate in  the qasba {muafiq nirakh
bazar). Thus, the rabi foodgrains o f qasba Phagi were purchased by the mahajans,
miscellaneous asamis (futkar asami), and menials (paunis) on Chait Sudi 11
according to the n irakh bazar prices in  qasba Phagi {muafiq nirakh bazar qasba 
48Phagi). S im ilar references to sales on the basis o f the n irakh bazar prices at the 
qasba are e xp lic itly  mentioned in  arhsattas o f other ye a rs .^  A  comparison o f the 
sale prices as given in  the annual arhsatta w ith  the daily price lis t fo r the year 
{roznamcha nirakh bazar) confirm s that the two were i d e n t i c a l . T h e  contract 
price fo r the sale o f grain was therefore the same as the n irakh bazar price o f the
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day. The rationale fo r  meticulously recording the daily prices o f foodgrains at the 
adm inistrative headquarter or qasba o f each pargana now becomes clearer.
The daily variation in  the n irakh bazar and thereby the contract price o f grain 
made it  possible fo r the amil in  his capacity as the local revenue adm inistrator to 
collude w ith  the local grain dealers to the financia l detrim ent o f the state. I t  should 
be emphasised, however, that the am il was a local revenue o ff ic ia l o f the state 
adm inistration who was expected to implement state po licy and abide by the 
directives o f the diwan. In  order to fac ilita te  the function ing  o f the system, i t  was 
essential to allow the local adm inistrator discretionary authority  w ith in  the bounds 
o f the overall regulations concerning the disposal o f government grain. A lthough 
the form ula tion  o f the n irakh bazar prices appears to be outside the o ff ic ia l 
purview  o f the am il, his authority  extended to the d is tribu tion  o f the grain 
contracts and a degree o f f le x ib ility  in  price bargaining fo r the sale o f grain that 
was old or had deteriorated, either in  storage or by r a in .^  G iven the fact that the 
amil was invariab ly a member o f the commercial com m unity and was allowed a 
lim ited  discretionary authority the disposal o f the in k ind  revenue provided an
CO
inherent scope fo r  manipulation.
For instance, the am il o f pargana Chatsu was reprimanded by the diwan fo r 
issuing satta contracts at five  day old prices which were about 4 to 5 per cent lower
CO
than that preva iling  on the day o f the contract. In  another instance, i t  is im p lied  
that the am il, aware that there was going to be a substantial rise in  prices the next 
day, used his in fo rm ation  to issue satta contracts to two traders late at n ight at the 
lower p r ic e .^  In  the accusation, the diwan appears to have very precise details 
about the the day the fraudulent contract was made, the exact variation in  the
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actual and contractual price, and the iden tity  o f the purchaser. I t  is d if f ic u lt  to see 
how the state detected such fraud and maintained a check on the am il and the 
available evidence provides few clues as to how this was achieved. A  catalogue o f 
re latively m inor adm inistrative malpractices com m itted by the am il o f pargana 
H indaun was reported to the diwan by the "hakikat nawis", o r o ff ic ia l newswriter 
o f the pargana.55 The effectiveness o f such a method o f surveillance to prevent or 
detect fraud, however, remains questionable. This may perhaps account fo r  the 
observation that "the amils were frequently dismissed on the grounds o f ine ffic iency 
and dishonesty. A n  am il, i t  seems, d id  not hold o ffice  fo r  more than three 
years."56
Grain Purchasers and the Mechanism o f Sale
W hile all the arhsattas record the price at which each type o f foodgrain was sold 
as well as the variation in  the price i f  sales were made at d iffe re n t dates, they do 
not always provide details regarding the iden tity  o f the purchaser or the method o f 
sale. There is however one fortunate exception: the arhsattas o f pargana Phagi 
consistently record these details and our subsequent discussion w ill be based 
p rim a rily  upon the in fo rm ation  gleaned from  these records supplemented by the 
fragmentary references in  other records.
There appears to have been two methods o f grain sale. G rain was sold either
through contractual agreements ("sattas") or through what was termed "khush
kharid". Khush kharid  sales were clearly d iffe ren tia ted  from  satta sales in  the
58arhsattas o f pargana Phagi and appear to have become common from  about 1750. 
U n like  the satta sales however, there are no references to khush kharid  sales in  the
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letters o f the adm inistrative o ffic ia ls  thus making i t  d if f ic u lt  to in terpre t in  what 
way these sales d iffe re d  from  the satta sales on which we have more in form ation. 
No clear d istinction between the two forms o f sales w ith  respect to e ither the price 
or the type o f purchaser can be established from  the records. L ike  satta sales, 
khush kharid  grain sales were made at the price as specified in  the n irakh bazar 
fo r that d a y .^  S im ilarly the purchasers fo r  both types o f sale comprised 
commercial grain dealers, mahajans and vyaparis, as w ell as miscellaneous
indiv idua ls {asamis, raiyati, pauni).^® This leads us to in fe r  that khush kharid, as 
the term implies, d iffe red  from  satta or contract sales in  that they were spot 
purchases or where the money was paid at the tim e o f the transaction. I t  is 
possible that the increasing importance o f khush kharid  sales a fte r 1750, as our 
evidence from  qasba Phagi suggests, was linked to the crisis o f the state’s finances 
during this period and its dim inished involvement in  grain m arketing w ith  the 
marked increase in  revenue farm ing.
In  satta or contract sales, the purchaser paid the money due to the treasury in  
specified instalments spread over a number o f months as agreed in  the terms o f the 
contract. The period fo r fu l l  repayment o f the agreed sum was generally fou r 
months from  the date o f sale.61 I f  the entire sum due had not been deposited 
w ith in  this time, the outstanding balance was liable to interest at the rate o f th ree-
6 9quarter per cent per month. As the bu lk  o f the states revenue in  k ind  was sold 
in  the period immediately a fte r the harvest when prices were norm ally at the ir 
lowest, this mechanism o f deferred payment was an e ffec tive  method o f ensuring 
the sale o f grain by p rov id ing  the dealers w ith  the margin o f p ro f it  and cash flows 
accruing from  the seasonal variation in  prices and tim ed transactions.
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The question o f interest payments, however, appears to have provoked 
recurring con flic t between the revenue authorities and the grain dealers. These 
arose basically due to the incom pa tib ility  o f two contradictory fiscal policies o f the 
state. On the one hand, all revenue payments outstanding a fte r the commencement 
o f the new fiscal year in  Bhadon Sudi 2, or early September, were regarded as 
arrears and were liab le  to interest payments. The stated tim e l im it  fo r  recovery o f 
money from  satta contracts, on the other hand, was fo u r months from  the date o f 
sale. The sale o f the grains o f the rabi or w in te r harvest was spread over three 
months from  m id -M ay  to m id -A ugust w ith  the peak m arketing period being
i r o
June/July or the month o f Asad in  the Ind ian calendar. As an illus tra tive  
example, in  1729, the rabi batai revenues o f eight villages in  pargana Sanganer were
f T A
sold in  the fo llow ing  period:
Jesht (m id -M ay to m id-June) : 1638.28 maunds 24%
Asad (m id-June to m id -Ju ly ) : 4056.60 maunds 60%
Sawan (m id -Ju ly  to m id -A ug .) : 1053.50 maunds 16%
Total G rain (wheat+barley+gram-fbaijhari) : 6748.38 maunds 100%
Thus the t im e - lim it fo r payment on satta sales made from  early June onwards 
would have ended only at the end o f the fou r month contract period at the earliest 
in  October. As the October date was in  the next fiscal year, the pargana am il was 
instructed to levy interest on the satta sales that were, in  accounting terms, deemed 
to be arrears o f the previous fiscal year.
The confusion created by this contradiction resulted in  the amils o f parganas 
Tonk and Am ber pleading w ith  the diwan on behalf o f the grain dealers. Traders 
in Tonk were reluctant to purchase grain in  late May o f 1726 and in  A m ber in 
Ju ly-A ugust as these dates fe ll w ith in  the fiscal year 1 7 2 5 .^  The amils o f Tonk in  
particu lar appeared very concerned as the revenue was almost entire ly collected in
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k ind  in the ir ju risd ic tio n  and fu rth e r they had part o f the previous year’s stock to 
dispose o f f  as well. They had tried  the ir best to fin d  dealers w illin g  to purchase 
the grain but had failed. The reason given was that the traders feared that the 
regulation regarding interest payable on arrears would override the ir satta terms as 
was the situation in pargana Am ber. In  reply to a s im ila r le tte r by the am il o f 
Am ber, the diwan took the decision that despite the commencement o f the fiscal 
year 1726 in  a months time, interest on arrears would not be charged on contracted 
sales i f  the sum due was deposited w ith in  the fou r-m on th  period as was the 
norm .66
However, three days after the commencement o f the new fiscal year, the diwan
wrote back to the am il instructing him  to ignore the earlier ru ling  and to charge
interest as per the rule fo r  arrears on all outstanding satta payments as the prices
had increased greatly over the in tervening period. The ju s tif ica tio n  fo r  the
arb itrary reversal o f the earlier decision seems to im p ly  that the state thought that
the dealers could w ell a ffo rd  to pay the interest from  the higher p ro fits  made by
them as a result o f the above-average rise in  prices in  the month fo llow ing  the
signing o f the contracts.6^ The reversal o f the earlier assurance produced its own
consequences. When the tim e came fo r the sale o f grain in  the subsequent rabi
harvest, i.e. in  1727, the vyaparis refused to purchase 700,000 maunds o f state
grain. The diwan again assured them that no interest w ould be charged i f  the
terms o f the contract were met irrespective o f whether the tim e lim it  fo r repayment
lay a fter the new fiscal year began.6^ Yet in  the very next year we fin d  the same
7 0complaint repeated by the traders o f pargana Phagi.
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The recurrent fr ic tio n  between the state and the traders regarding the payment 
o f interest and the m anipulation o f the terms o f the contract to the advantage o f 
the state emphasises the element o f coercion, and therefore uncerta inty in  exchange, 
inherent in  the unequal relationship between them. However, there were lim its  to 
the extent to which the merchants could be coerced. The services provided by the 
merchant -  namely, the conversion o f commodities in to  disposable income -  were 
indispensable to the function ing  o f a centralised adm inistrative system. The most 
potent weapon o f the trading com m unity against a rapacious state was the collective 
refusal to trade. I t  seems un like ly  that the situation described above o f an annual 
con flic t between the revenue authorities and the traders was allowed to continue fo r  
any length o f time. Lack o f evidence, however, does not allow us to examine i f ,  
and in  what way, the policies o f the state were m odified.
In  the arhsattas, as well as in  the records o f sale contracts (syaha sattis), the
bulk o f the grain was recorded as being sold on a single day to the "panch
71mahajans" o f the p rinc ipa l qasba in  the pargana. In  add ition  to the panch 
mahajans, grain also was sold to ind iv idua l merchants who were e ither resident 
w ith in  the pargana (sahthani) or were from  outside the pargana (vichhayati). On 
the selling side o f the grain market i t  has already been argued that the market was 
concentrated w ith  the state as the largest single grain seller w ith  contro l over large 
stocks, upheld by po litica l power. A  lis t o f the buyers o f state grain in  pargana 
Malarna in  the fiscal year 1725 shows that the purchase o f state grain also appears 
to have been dominated by a few substantial dealers (Table 9). Four large buyers, 
includ ing the panch mahajan o f the qasba, together bought more than 70 per cent 
by value o f the total grain s o ld .^  O f these, a single trader, Pemraj Natani, 
purchased grain valued at over 35 per cent o f the total sales in  the year. On the
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Table 9: L is t o f Purchasers o f State Grain in  Pargana M alarna 1725. 
Name o f Purchaser Value o f sale in rupees
Total K h a r if Rabi
1. Pemraj Natani 25230.41 21891.47 3338.94
2. Panch Mahajan o f qasba Malarna 12680.97 7861.34 4819.63
3. Pragdas Ram rikh Sarraf 9357.13 6375.00 2982.13
4. Am arsingh Bhusavadi 3172.54 154.88 3017.66
5. Khewsi Sethi o f pargana Lewali 2730.72 1689.66 1041.06
6. Kheta Ram rikh M ahajan o f q. Malarna 2474.47 2474.47 -
7. Dalaram M ahajan o f qasba Malarna 2381.59 - 2381.59
8. Teko Mahajan o f qasba Malarna 1350.28 - 1350.28
9. Pohkar M od i 1227.94 1227.94 -
10. Id ra j &  Isar Mahajans o f Garh 1084.50 1084.50 -
11. Jodho Patel o f M a rijand i 1055.03 272.28 782.75
12. Kheto Chaudhuri o f qasba Malarna 1053.84 1053.84 -
13. Askaran M ahajan o f Serpur 796.44 796.44 -
14. Sah Nanig Mahajan o f qasba Malarna 503.81 - 503.81
15. Patel o f village Sahijihapur 481.00 457.50 23.50
16. Rikhabdas Mahajan o f Serpur 426.84 - 426.84
17. Sah K o ju  o f pargana Lalsot 401.00 401.00 -
18. Patel o f village Malarna Chhota 386.41 - 386.41
19. Bisna Thagaech 385.34 385.34 -
20. Takursi M ahajan o f pargana Dausa 332.34 332.34 -
21. Nathu Mahajan o f pargana Lewali 297.00 297.00 -
22. Te li o f qasba Malarna 254.81 254.81 -
23. Khushalchand Kasiram Mahajan 248.28 248.28 -
24. Govindas Srimal o f qasba Malarna 233.16 _ 233.16
25. Gangraj Mahajan 200.56 200.56 -
26. Bhayachand Devdas M odi o f p. Am ber 200.00 200.00 -
27. Nanduram Sethi o f pargana Lew ali 200.00 200.00 -
28. Patel o f village Karel 200.00 - 200.00
29. Rudha &  Suratram Qanungo o f q.Malarna 186.00 - 186.00
30. Jadu Qanungo 165.03 165.03 -
31. Dularam Qanungo o f qasba Malarna 160.16 - 160.16
32. H a tti Mahajan o f qasba Malarna 126.44 126.44 -
33. Raiyati o f village Khurahara 62.13 62.13 -
34. H irdeyram  Patel 59.81 - 59.81
35. Rupa Chaudhuri o f bazar Raisobdas 56.66 56.66 -
36. Raiyati o f v illge  Aabra 44.13 44.13 -
37. Raiyati o f village T ika ri Meena 38.97 38.97 -
38. Dalel Patel o f vilage Jeenaech 37.13 - 37.13
39. Sah Chudamani Mahajan 36.47 36.47 -
40. Patel o f village Gohad 33.66 33.66 -
41. Chhaju Bakhta Mahajan 25.88 25.88 -
42. Patel o f village Niwohada 20.59 - 20.59
43. Te li o f village Malarna Chhota 15.47 - 15.47
44. Shobha Mahajan o f qasba Malarna 4.78 4.78 -
Totals (in  Rupees): 70419.72 48452.80 21966.92
Source: Hasil K ifava t. Arhsatta Pargana Malarna, VS 1782/AD  1725.
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other hand, out o f the total o f 44 buyers, the ind iv idua l share o f 31 purchasers was 
less than one per cent. Between the substantial merchants and the very small 
purchasers who were generally village elites like  the patel and chaudhuris, were the 
small traders or mahajans. The ind iv idua l transactions o f these traders ranged from  
Rs. 200 to Rs. 3000. Most o f the dealers from  neighbouring parganas such as 
Lewali, Lalsot, Serpur, Dausa and Am ber, who also purchased state grain in  
Malarna belonged to this m idd le -rank ing  group.
The d istinction  drawn in the documents between the panch mahajan and 
ind iv idua l traders poses a number o f questions which however remain unanswered 
due to the lack o f relevant data. For example, was there a corporate organisation 
o f traders, resident in  the qasba, that was recognised by the state and which 
contracted as a group fo r the purchase o f the state grain revenues? O r was the 
term panch mahajan used as an adm inistrative shorthand fo r an unspecified number 
o f ind iv idua l transactions conducted w ith  resident traders from  the local qasba? 
Why then are some traders, also iden tified  as belonging to the local qasba, 
ind iv idua lly  named even when purchasing grain on s im ila r terms as the panch 
mahajans? On what crite ria  were traders included, or conversely excluded, from  
such a collective?
The references in  the ch ittis  to the panch mahajans in  the qasba are generally 
concerned w ith  the d is tribu tion  o f "parna". Parna has been defined by D ilbagh 
Singh as a coercive tax demanded from  grain traders who d id  not buy the state 
share o f grain realised in land re ve n u e .^  Documents re lating to parna, however, 
appear to indicate that i t  was not a cess, properly speaking, bu t a mechanism fo r 
the forced sale o f the state’s grain to the panchayat o f the qasba grain dealers.
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The mahajans o f qasba Malarna, fo r  example, in  a jo in t com plaint to the diwan 
allege that the am il was fo rc ing  them to purchase grain from  the villages in  the 
pargana through parna (gaon ka naj maha ne jorawari kari parna de )? ^  To this 
the response o f the state was that traders be given grain only i f  they are w illin g  to 
purchase i t  and not through parna ( apni rajabandi so naj le ta ne de jo  aur parna
7c
do mati) . The traders o f qasba M anoharpur had le ft  the qasba fo r an 
unspecified reason but were w illin g  to return on certain conditions. In  the lis t o f 
complaints that they presented to the diwan was included a demand to stop parna 
being imposed on them. A lthough the exact mechanism o f gra in sale through 
parna remains unclear, i t  is possible to in fe r that the grain traders in  the local qasba 
were obliged to purchase the state’s grain revenue and that this mechanism o f 
forced sale was operating through the local corporate organisation or the panchayat 
o f the resident grain dealers in  the qasba.
The ch ittis  documenting the disputes between the riva l panch mahajans o f the
Vaishnav (Maheshwari) and Jain (Saraogi) caste in qasbas Lalsot, Chatsu and Dausa
over parna shares to be allocated to each show that parna was imposed collectively
on the grain traders. Parna had been distributed to the Vaishnav and Jain panch
mahajans in  qasba Lalsot in  the ratio o f 5 : - l ,  respectively, t i l l  1722. In  1723, the
panch mahajan o f the Vaishnav traders petitioned the diwan who issued a order
77(sanad) altering the ratio in  favour o f the Vaishnavs to 3 : 4 respectively. The 
Jain panch mahajan then complained that the revision o f the ir respective liab ilities  
was u n fa ir as the Vaishnav traders had 118 shops in the qasba w hile  they (i.e. the 
Jains) only owned 30. The diwan appeared not to have been impressed w ith  this 
statistic and agreed to only a marginal revision to the parna shares in  the 
proportions o f 3.5 to the Vaishnav Maheshwari traders and 4 to the Jain Saraogi
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78traders. In  a sim ilar dispute between these two groups o f traders in  qasba Dausa, 
the diwans response to the Vaishnav mahajans5 com plaint that the am il was
7Q
favouring the Saraogi traders was that all traders were exempt from  parna. 
However, i t  is not clear whether the practice o f selling grain through parna had
on
ended or i f  this was a short term or local concession to the Dausa traders.
There are a number o f references to ind iv idua l grain traders being exempt
Q<|
from  parna, often as an incentive to induce traders to settle in  new markets.
Further, hereditary rura l elites like  the patel, patwari, chaudhuri and qanungo who 
♦ *traded in  grain were also exempt from  parna. Such exemptions were on occasion 
the cause o f disputes between the p riv ileged grain trader and the panch mahajans. 
The la tte r po in t is s ign ificant in  that i t  suggests that i t  was the responsib ility o f the 
panch mahajan to d is tribute the burden o f parna among the ind iv idua l members o f 
the com munity. Thus, a sweetmeat trader in qasba N iw a i argued that he d id  not 
and never had traded in  grain yet the panch mahajans were fo rc ing  him to take on 
parna grain. S im ila rly , the qanungo o f pargana G azi-ka-Thana, who was also a 
grain trader but had been granted exemption from  parna, was allegedly being
QA
harassed by the panch mahajan o f the qasba.
From the nature o f the complaints regarding parna, i t  seems clear that the 
practice o f fo rc ib le  sale o f grain was regarded as an onerous form  o f ind irect 
taxation by the grain traders through which they were obliged to purchase grain at 
prices and quantities decided by the state. On the other hand, i t  appears that the 
obligation to purchase the state grain on the part o f the panch mahajans entitled 
them to supply the state karkhanas w ith  provisions. Hence, the Saraogi panch 
mahajans o f qasba Dausa complained that although the ir share o f parna was larger
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than the Maheshwaris at 4 : 3 respectively, the am il was p rovis ion ing the karkhanas 
through equal purchases from  both. The diwans instructions in  response to this 
complaint was that the requirements o f the state be obtained from  the merchants in  
proportion to the ir commitment to buy state grain, a decision that satisfied the
OC
dictates o f equity and the Saraogi panch mahajans!
Besides the allocation o f grain through parna, state po licy to fac ilita te  the sale 
o f its produce revenue included additional coercive elements. In  1728, the amils o f 
parganas Dausa and Phagi reported that the traders were reluctant to purchase 
grain. To this the diwan responded that the grain should be transported to the 
vyaparis and sahukars at the qasba and big villages and satti contracts signed at the 
n irakh bazar prices. To these directives was added the ride r that unless the
government grain revenues were sold, there should be no p riva te  transaction o f
87grain between traders. In  order to enforce the la tte r condition , all movement o f 
grain outside the pargana was banned t i l l  such time as the state’s share o f revenue
OO
in grain from  the pargana was sold. The la tter policy is most clearly stated in  the 
diwan’s response to the complaint by the revenue farmers o f the sale and transit 
duties o f pargana Am ber that the ir collections had fa llen o f f  due to the restrictions
QQ
on inter-pargana trade in  grain imposed by the amil. The diwan replied that the 
state’s grain was to be sold before any other vyapari could sell his grain in  the 
pargana and that no grain could be transported outside the pargana t i l l  the state’s 
supplies had been exhausted. However, once it  had been disposed o f, the ban on 
the trading and movement o f grain was to be l i f t e d . ^  This is a clear illus tra tion  o f 
the essentially coercive core underly ing the apparently cooperative relationship 
between the state and the trading community.
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What emerges from  the above discussion on the sale o f grain by the Jaipur state 
in  normal years is that as the largest single owner o f grain stocks in  the area, i t  
used its po litica l au thority  to intervene in  the local market to maximise its revenue 
flows. This was affected through m onitoring and negotiating the price and the 
conditions fo r  the sale o f grain, coercing the merchants to purchase state grain 
either d irectly  through forced sales or ind irectly  by restricting commercial 
transactions and the in tra-reg iona l movement o f grain u n til its stocks were sold.
That this level o f state control over the local trade in  grain was not an unusual 
feature o f the pre-m odern state is attested to by s im ila r policies being pursued by 
the Ottomans in  the late fifteen th  century. To quote H a lil Ina lc ik  on the sale o f 
state owned rice in  the Ottoman empire, viz:
"According to the regulation, only state owned rice could be sold in  the 
markets or shops fo r a period o f eight months (in  a la ter period six 
months) a fte r the harvest. I f  ind iv idua ls attempted to contravene this 
order, the ir rice was confiscated and the ir persons subject to 
punishment. For example, in  the F ilibe  region rice stocks belonging to 
the...merchants were put under seal in  warehouses on a certain date t i l l  
such tim e as the state owned rice was completely sold...The reason 
given fo r the s tric t order was that by tendering the ir rice to the market 
at an early stage, and at prices lower than that set down by the 
government, ind iv idua l sellers caused the m arket price to drop, and 
brought substantial loss to the treasury."
The eighteenth century Nayaka state o f Madurai also collected part o f its
92revenues in  k ind  which the local revenue o ffic ia ls  sold in the paddy market. 
Despite the s im ila rity  in  the mechanism whereby grain collections were transformed 
in to cash revenues, the system in  operation d iffe red  s ign ifican tly  from  that in  
eastern Rajasthan in  the level o f state control. The Nayaka state does not appear to 
have had a defined po licy w ith  regard to the sale o f grain or played any role in  the 
regulation o f the grain market but le f t  the process o f grain disposal entire ly to the
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discretion o f local o ffic ia ls . Having secured the authority  to collect the revenue 
through payment in  advance, and hence becoming the sole agent fo r  the disposal o f 
state grain, the la tte r speculated in  the market to augment the ir own and 
government income. The am il in  our region on the other hand was a salaried 
functionary operating w ith in  the directives o f the state w ith  the local traders 
becoming, in  e ffect, the agents o f the state fo r the disposal o f its grain stocks.
In  years o f fam ine, a number o f measures were taken by the state to alleviate
grain shortage. These included actions to prevent speculative hoarding o f grain and
the adoption o f measures such as the remission o f transit duties to encourage grain
imports from  outside the region and an embargo on grain exports. Thus in  1731, a
year o f severe fam ine, when it  was reported that the traders in  the parganas o f the
ra ja ’s ju risd ic tio n  (13 in  all) were not selling grain despite having previously bought
the state grain revenue as well as grain im ported from  other regions, a series o f
measures were taken to regulate the grain trade and ensure that grain was sold by 
93the traders. The strategy adopted by the state to enforce the sale o f gram was 
firs t, to b ring  forw ard the date by w hich the money from  the sale o f state grain 
through satta was to be deposited w ith  the treasury by a month (i.e. to early August 
rather than early September); i f  the traders could not comply w ith  these terms, the 
grain given to them was to be handed back to the am il and the ir contracts 
cancelled; i f ,  at the appointed date, the traders had sold the grain and yet not 
deposited the money, they were to surrender the entire proceeds from  the sales 
made, presumably, at higher prices than the orig ina l contract p r ic e d  In  the period 
subsequent to the last date set fo r the grain contracts and the commencement o f the 
kha rif harvest o f the fo llow ing  year, that is between August and the D iw a li festival 
in  October-November, the local o ffic ia ls  were to estimate the size o f the trading
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stocks remaining in  the possession o f each local trader and then set a fixed  amount
to be sold daily by the trader. For each day that the trader d id  not sell the
stipulated amount despite there being purchasers w illin g  to buy, o r i f  he sold less, a
tax o f six copper dams per rupee (chhadami) o f the value o f the grain, presumably
calculated at the bazar price on the day, was to be levied. Further, speculative
hoarding was punishable by confiscation o f grain stores. In  addition to these
measures, a ban was imposed on the export o f grain from  the region w hile  im ports
were encouraged through the cancellation o f all transit and sales taxes fo r a ll grain
except wheat and sesame.^ There is, however, no evidence to indicate that a
0 7’ fa ir ’ price or an o ff ic ia l ceiling on prices was imposed.
In  its e ffo r t to provide re lie f to the urban poor too weak to earn a wage (majuri
kariwa ke takat nalti) owing to the severe drought and grain scarcity in  1738, food
98canteens (langars) were opened towards which Rs. 4 per day was sanctioned. 
However, the state does not appear to have had the resources to provide adequately 
fo r rura l fam ine re lie f resulting in  mass em igration and depopulation and there is 
evidence to suggest that in  scarcity conditions, the state’s gra in p its in  the villages 
were lo o te d .^
Transport o f grain
As we have discussed above, the price at which grain was sold remained 
un ifo rm  w ith in  the pargana fo r all transactions on the same day. There are no 
indications o f any form  o f variation in  the sale price to take account o f the varying 
distances o f the villages from  the po in t o f sale at the qasba or local wholesale 
mandi. This raises the question o f determ ining which o f the three agencies
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involved in  the transaction -  the peasant, the state or the grain dealer -  bore the 
cost o f moving grain and paid the various imposts and transit dues norm ally levied 
on the transport and sale o f grain.
The revenue authorities levied a cess called "bhara" under a variety o f d iffe re n t
accounting heads in  d iffe re n t parganas that was collected in  cash or k ind  equivalent
from  the peasants as part o f the ir revenue payments. The revenue regulations o f
pargana Jhak clearly state that bhara payments were specifica lly fo r  the transport o f
the revenue in  k ind  to the ganj in  the q a s b a . H o w e v e r ,  the document does not
mention the rate at which the cess was levied. A nother dastur amal, o f pargana
Amarsar, records that bhara payments were to be levied in  k ind  at the rate o f one
seer per maund o f revenue in  k ind  from  the ra iyati and at ha lf that amount from
1 mthe priv ileged sections. In  Sanganer the levy was calculated in  takas per maund
but was then reconverted in to an equivalent amount o f grain at varying conversion 
10*7rates. In  pargana Am ber, tax on fodder and bhara was a combined levy termed
103"n irn i bhara" in  kh a rif and "khaklo bhara" in  the rabi accounts. In  some 
parganas, fo r example in  Dausa, the batai revenue realised from  the qasba was 
exempt from  bhara, but from  the available evidence it  appears that the charge fo r 
the transport o f grain was a un ifo rm  levy on all villages varying only in  its rate and 
mode o f levy between parganas.
Taxation to recover the costs o f transport from  the prim ary producers, however, 
s till leaves the question o f the actual organisation o f grain transport unanswered. 
On this po in t our evidence is fragmentary and inconclusive. B.R. G rover states that 
the transport o f the o ff ic ia l grain to the mandi fo r  sale was arranged by the local
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revenue o ffic ia ls .1* ^  On occasion we do fin d  instances when the state did arrange 
fo r large quantities o f grain from  the region to be sold in  distant markets.
For instance, in  1726 the amils o f parganas Phagi, Bahatri, Chatsu and Am ber
were instructed by the diwan to arrange fo r professional haulage to transport the
rabi grains, wheat, barley and gram, fo r sale at Delhi. The prices in  D e lh i in
that year were about three times those prevailing in  the Jaipur region which
accounts fo r the diwans confidence that the state would p ro f it  from  the enterprise
1 0 7even after meeting the transport costs. However, there was cause fo r  some 
con flic t between the "gariwans" hired by the am il o f pargana Phagi in  response to 
the earlier d irective o f the diwan. The diwan then advised the am il that the 27
carts carrying gram had not yet reached Delh i and so fo r  the cartage o f the
* * 107remaining wheat and barley he should make a deal w ith  the banjaras. The
terms o f the deal were that fo r a ll grain except wheat, the banjaras would receive
ha lf the total amount o f grain transported but would have to pay a ll the transit
duties en route. W hile not stating the terms fo r the transport o f wheat, its
exclusion from  the above arrangement was due to its re la tive ly higher price which
would make the deal unpro fitab le  fo r  the state. This is a clear instance o f the state
taking on the role o f a grain trader, e ffec tive ly  u tilis ing  its command over an
enormous grain supply to enhance its revenues.
There is sim ilar evidence o f the state organising the transport o f salt worth two
hundred thousand rupees from  Sambhar Lake to the newly established salt
wholesale market or "katla" in  Sawai Jaipur to be d istribu ted to the salt dealers 
108there. Five thousand rupees were spent by the state fo r  the transport o f salt 
over the th ir ty -s ix  m ile journey between the lake and Ja ipur w hich was later
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recovered from  the salt dealers. Besides the estimated two m illio n  rupees w orth  o f
salt sales per annum, the salt trade also yielded considerable revenues in  sale and
transit d u tie s .^ ^  The establishment o f a m ajor wholesale salt market in  Jaipur was
perhaps an attempt to encourage the banjaras to make all the ir salt purchases at
Jaipur rather than go to Sambhar through alternative routes, frequently a cause fo r
110o ffic ia l concern and recurring con flic t w ith  the local zamindars.
The evidence cited above indicates that i t  was feasible fo r  the state to organise 
large scale movement o f bu lk commodities like  grain and salt. A lthough not 
exp lic itly  stated, there are a few documents on the forced sale o f grain to the local 
dealers or complaints by dealers that the am il had not given them the entire
amount o f grain entered in  the satta contract, in which the transport o f grain from
• 111 the village by the revenue o ffic ia ls  is im plied. Two other documents, however,
indicate that traders who had contracted to purchase grain from  the state also
transported the grain from  the villages to the qasba fo r which they were
compensated by the state. In  1727, the am il o f pargana A m ber reported that the
vyaparis were not purchasing grain as the bhara or transport costs paid to them
were fo r twelve kos (c. 27 miles) whereas due to the recent rede fin ition  o f pargana
112boundaries, the pargana included villages located outside this twelve kos radius.
A  complaint by Bhayachand Patni stated that traders buying the grain revenue o f 
village Newta had always received bhara fo r seven kos, as this was the distance 
between qasba Sawai Jaipur and Newta, but that the am il was g iv ing  him  bhara fo r
1 1 7
only five  kos. The con flic ting  evidence regarding the agency fo r grain
transportation may in  fact mean that the state resorted to both the practices -  i.e. 
organising carriage through h ired transporters as well as paying the grain traders 
the sanctioned charges when they transported the grain.
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Our study clearly shows that the state and adm inistration had a substantial stake 
in  the marketing o f foodgrains. A lthough  the state d id  not monopolise the sale o f 
grain, the appropria tion o f revenue in  k ind  fo r grain must have restricted the flow  
o f goods and services through private marketing channels in  an economy where 
grain production predominated. I t  is only w ith  respect to the local grain trade that 
we fin d  evidence o f the direct contro l exercised by the state in the market. 
However, rura l commerce as a whole was also subject to ind irec t controls and 
regulation through taxing markets, establishing tolls and con tro lling  the location and 
period ic ity  o f markets.
The question fo r the historian is why and how this came about. I f  there was 
already a well established rura l market in  foodgrains it  w ould have been possible 
fo r  the state to collect its revenue in  cash. As we have argued earlier, the adoption 
o f crop-sharing as the dominant mode o f revenue appropria tion derived from  a 
combination o f factors relating to the relationship between the state and the 
peasant, production techniques and the principles o f revenue taxation. A  batai 
system establishes a direct linkage between physical quantities in  production and 
revenue collection leaving the distortions caused by price or value changes to fo llow  
at a subsequent time. The commutation o f the grain in to  cash would not be 
possible w ithou t entering in to  elaborate discussion on the level o f the price changes 
from  year to year. Clearly it  was not feasible to enter in to  such negotiations w ith  
the peasant producers, w h ile  on the other hand, the alliance o f interest between the 
state and the trader was better understood.
By enforcing upon the local traders a collective responsib ility to purchase state 
grain at fixed  prices, the traders became in  e ffect the agents o f the state fo r the
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disposal o f its grain stocks. The restrictions on private trading and the movement o f 
grain t i l l  such time as the grain stocks were sold must have also restricted the stocks 
available fo r  trading in  the period o f state trading. In  so fa r as these measures 
succeeded in  raising post-harvest prices, then the purchase price paid by the trader 
included a large element o f taxation. Traders, on the other hand, would adjust the 
supplies that they were prepared to release to the market once state trading was 
over, in  order to p ro f it  from  the expected seasonal fluc tua tion  in  prices. The fo u r-  
month period allowed between the delivery o f the grain or the signing o f contracts 
and the deferred payment was in e ffect a fo rm  o f in terest-free loan incentive. The 
disposal o f the grain revenue by the state therefore invo lved three po licy variables, 
viz., contro lling  the price o f sale, fo rc ing  the merchants to purchase grain stocks 
and, lastly, a llow ing fo r a margin o f p ro fit  to the traders through the mechanism o f 
deferred payment.
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hat baniya. S im ilarly in  the Svaha Satti o f pargana Dausa cited above, more 
than 63% o f the sales during the 43 day period were made on a single day 
w ith  the panch mahajans o f qasba Dausa.
72. I t  is interesting to note that the d is tribu tion  by value o f the total annual 
transactions between the various purchasers o f grain and the state presented in 
Table I  is very s im ilar in  its p ro file  to that showing the percentage share o f 
each seller in  the coffee market o f Mocha in  K .N .C haudhuri, The Trading 
W orld o f Asia and the English East Ind ia  Company 1660-1760. p. 380. In  the 
la tte r case, the selling side o f the market exhib its two extreme contrasts 
between the few substantial oligopolists and the large number o f small 
suppliers.
73. D ilbagh Singh, "Nature and Incidence o f Taxes Levied on In land Trade", 
P IH C . Bhubuneshwar, 1977, p. 322.
74. C h itti dt.Bhadon sudi 9 VS 1793/AD  1736, pargana Malarna, (No.452).
75. ib id .
76. The orig ina l document reads " maha se parna dewa ke khechal kare chhe 
...(diwans rep ly! m uafik  n irakh khush kharid v icho ti kara ivo  parna kanhe ne 
dvo mati" in  C h itti d t.K a rtik  vadi 3 VS 1796/AD 1739, pargana, (No.486).
77. C h itti dt.Baisakh vadi amavas VS 1780/1723AD , pargana Lalsot, (No.361).
78. C h itti dt.Asoj vadi 2 VS 1780/AD  1723, pargana Lalsot, (No.360).
79. C h itti dt.Pos sudi 7 VS 1799/AD  1742, fau jda r and am il pargana Dausa,
(No.345).
80. The earliest reference in  our documents to a general exemption from  parna is 
fo r  1728. C h itti dt.Chaitra vadi 10 VS 1785/AD  1728, to Sahibram ji, (No.309) 
The lack o f adequate documentation on the question o f parna, however, makes 
it  impossible at present to indicate when or i f  the practice was discontinued.
81. Parwana d t.K a rtik  sudi 6 VS 1771/AD  1714, o f M aharaja Sawaii Jai Singh to
the Lalani traders o f Qasba Sanganer, (No.470) ; C h itt i dt.M ah sudi 10 VS
1766/AD  1710, pargana Dausa, (No.357); C h itti d t.K a rtik  vadi 3 VS 1792/AD  
1735, pargana G azi-ka-Thana, (No.437); C h itti dt.Pos vadi 14 VS 1798/AD  
1741, pargana Tonk, (No.465).
82. C h itti d t.K a rtik  vadi 3 VS 1792/AD  1735, pargana G azi-ka-Thana, (No.437).
83. "..panch mahaian maha so nai ka parna k i khechal kare chhe." C h itt i dt.Asoj 
sudi 6 VS 1797/AD  1737, pargana N iw a i, (No.442)
84. C h itti d t.K a rtik  vadi 3 VS 1792/AD  1735, pargana G azi-ka-Thana, (No.437).
85. C h itti d t.Chaitra vadi 4 VS 1813/AD  1757, pargana Chatsu, (No.401).
86. C h itt i dt.Jesht sudi 4 VS 1795/AD  1728, pargana Phagi, (No.412).
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87. "..sarkar ko nai v icho ti hua pachhe aur vvopari ko tu lo .” C h itt i dt.Baisakh vadi 
11 VS 1785/AD  1738, pargana Dausa, (No.301).
88. C h itti dt.Phalgun sudi 4 VS 1784/AD  1728, pargana G ijga rh , (No.440); C h itti 
dt.Pos vadi 14 VS 1783/AD  1726, to the amils o f a ll parganas, (No.369).
89. C h itti dt.Pos vadi 14 VS 1783/AD  1726, to the amils o f a ll parganas, (No.369).
90. ib id .
91. idem, "Rice C u ltiva tion  and the Celtukci-Reaya System in  the Ottoman 
Empire", in  H .Ina lc ik , Studies in  Ottoman Social and Economic H is to ry , 
pp.114-115.
92. D avid  Ludden, Peasant H istory in  South Ind ia , op.cit., pp .78-81.)
93. C h itti d t.K a rtik  sudi 4 VS 1788/AD  1731, amils o f a ll parganas, (No.382); 
Parwana d t.K a rtik  vadi 5 VS 1788/AD  1731, o f Maharaja Sawaii Jai Singh to 
the amils o f all parganas, (No.583).
94. Parwana d t.K a rtik  vadi 5 VS 1788/AD  1731, o f Maharaja Sawaii Jai Singh to 
the amils o f all parganas, (No.583).
95. C h itti dt.M aghshri sudi 9 VS 1784/AD  1727, to Narayandas K irparam , 
(No.419).
96. Parwana d t.K a rtik  vadi 5 VS 1788/AD  1731, o f M aharaja Sawaii Jai Singh to 
the amils o f all parganas, (No.583); C h itti d t.K a rtik  vadi 1 VS 1788/AD  1731, 
amils o f all parganas, (No.423); A m ber Records dt.Phagun sudi 1 VS 1769/AD  
1713, likh tang  from  Anup Chand Ram Singh to diwans Bhikaridas, Fatehchand 
and Sarvopama, (No.430). In  these documents, im port o f grain from  Kama, 
M athura and Agra  ly ing  to the east o f Jaipur, Kota and M ewar to the south 
and Shekawati to the north are specifica lly mentioned.
97. Evidence from  late eighteenth century Bengal and B ihar also suggests that 
while the local adm inistration made sim ilar e ffo rts  to fac ilita te  the ava ilab ility  
and d is tribu tion  o f grain in  conditions o f scarcity, a fa ir  price schedule was 
not specified or imposed, cf. D L  Curley, "Mughal Famine Policy", pp. 1-27.
98. C h itti dt.Pos sadi 7 VS 1799/AD  1742, pargana Phagi, (No.389).
99. C h itti dt.Jesht vadi 14 VS 1785/AD  1728, pargana Chatsu, (No.408).
100. Dastur A m a l. pargana Jhak. A n  undated document w h ich, from  internal 
evidence, was compiled later than 1712.
101. Dastur A m a l. pargana Amarsar, VS 1783/AD  1727.
102. Arhsatta qasba Sanganer, VS 1827/AD  1770 )
103. N irn i has been defined as animal fodder and khaklo as ch a ff o f wheat and 
barley used as feed in  Badrinath Sakaria and Bhupatiram  Sakaria, Raiasthani
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H in d i Sabad Kosh. pp. 2202, 607 resp. Also see Arhsatta pargana Am ber, 
qasba Am ber, VS 1783/AD  1726.
104. B .R .Grover, "Commercial L ife  in  Rural N orth India", pp. 124, 135.
105. C h itti dt.Baisakh sudi 6 VS 1783/AD  1726, pargana Phagi, (No.413); C h itti 
Baisakh sudi 6 VS 1783/AD  1726, pargana Bahatri, (No.414); C h itti dt.Jesht 
sudi 13 VS 1783/AD 1726, pargana Phagi, (No.416); C h itt i d t.K a rtik  sudi 7 VS 
1782/AD  1725, pargana Am ber, (No.302); C h itti dt.Bhadon sudi 9 VS 1783/AD  
1726, pargana Chatsu, (No.477); C h itti dt.Baisakh sudi 8 VS 1783/AD  1726,, 
pargana Am ber, (No.477).
106. In  September 1726 the price o f wheat in  D elh i was 12 seers to a rupee a fter 
conversion o f the d ifference in  the weights o f the D e lh i and Chatsu maund o f 
40 seers. A fte r  a s im ila r adjustment fo r the d ifference in  the Chatsu and Phagi 
maunds, the post-harvest price o f wheat in  Phagi in  the the fiscal year 1725, 
corresponding to M ay-June 1726, was 34.5 seers to a rupee, c f. C h itti 
dt.Bhadon Sudi 2 VS 1783/AD  1726 to the amils o f pargana Chatsu, (No.366); 
and Arhsatta pargana Phagi, qasba Phagi fasl unhalu, VS 1782/A D  1725.
107. C h itti dt.Jesht sudi 13 VS 1783/AD  1726, pargana Phagi, (No.416)
108. C h itti dt.Sawan sudi 6 VS 1785/AD  1728, from  V idyadhar to Narayandas, 
(No,303) Katla was probably a local term fo r katra. defined as a small square
bazar that was often a wholesale market where stocks are kept. S N uru l Hasan,
"The M orphology o f a Medieval Ind ian C ity  -  A  case study o f Shahjahanabad 
in  the 18th. and early 19th. centuries", P IH C . 1982.
109. The estimate fo r  the total salt sales is fo r  1728. See Parwana d t.K a rtik  sudi 7 
VS 1785/AD  1728, (No.305)
110. C h itti dt.Maghshri vadi 14 VS 1789/AD  1732, pargana N iw a i, (No.446); C h itti 
d t.K a rtik  vadi 8 VS 1814/AD  1837, pargana Chatsu, (No.328); C h itti
d t.K a rtik  sudi 3 VS 1789/AD  1732, pargana Malarna, (No.450(a)); C h itti 
dt.Phagun vadi 3 VS 1781/AD  1725, pargana N iw a i, (No.426); C h itti
dt.Maghshri sudi 11 VS 1785/AD  1728, to Sah Mansaram and Sanghi A ja b  
Singh, (No.417).
111. C h itti dt.Jesht sudi 4 VS 1785/AD  1728, pargana Phagi, (No.412); C h itti 
dt.Maghshri sudi 11 VS 1789/AD  1732, pargana Malarna, (No.449); C h itti 
dt.Pos vadi 5 VS 1785/AD  1728, pargana Dausa, (No.306).
112. C h itti dt.Jesht vadi 1 VS 1784/AD  1727, pargana Am ber, (No.300).
113. C h itti dt.Bhadon vadi 7 VS 1791/AD  1734, pargana Sawaii Jaipur, (No.304).
Chapter VI
TRENDS IN  REVENUE RATES.
In  this chapter, we w ill analyse the movements in  the cash rates o f revenue per 
un it o f land as well as the incidence o f additional taxes. The exclusion o f crops 
taxed as a proportion o f the produce is ju s tif ie d  on the grounds that the proportions 
were defined by custom and regulation and remained unaltered in response to 
variations in  yields or prices. The form u la tion  o f the cash rates, on the other hand, 
was in  princ ip le  responsive to both these factors. A n  examination o f trends in  the 
nominal revenue rates per u n it o f land, in  conjunction w ith  the later analysis o f 
price movements, would make it  possible to hypothesise about the change in  the 
real rates o f revenue demand during the course o f the eighteenth century fo r  our 
region.
Using aggregated data at the level o f the pargana, S.P.Gupta and D ilbagh Singh 
have analysed trends in  the revenue rates per bigha fo r the m a jo r crops fo r the 
periods 1665-1750 and 1750-1800 respectively."^ A lthough the ir methods d iffe r , 
both studies have analysed the movements o f the average crop -spec ific  revenue 
rates computed as a ratio o f the revenue received to the acreage cu ltivated fo r each 
zabti crop. As we have discussed earlier, the rate o f tax levied on a u n it o f land 
depended on its p roduc tiv ity  as w ell as on the tax status o f the ind iv idua l 
agriculturist. As an average crop-ra te  does not discrim inate between variations in  
these two components o f the tax, i t  becomes impossible to specify whether the 
fluctuations in  the annual average rate arise due to shifts in  the proportions o f
- 2 0 8 -
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h igh ly taxed to lower taxed land, in  terms o f either o f the factors specified above, 
or i f  there was an actual change in  the rate o f taxation.
Fortunately, the level o f disaggregation in  the revenue records o f some o f the 
qasbas under study makes i t  possible to analyse this question in  greater detail. In  
the fo llow ing  analysis therefore we w il l  trace the movements o f rates applicable to 
the ra iyati fo r  the m ajor crops o f the kh a rif and rabi harvests. The rates applicable 
to the ra iya ti were the highest in  terms o f the ir incidence per bigha and the m ajor 
proportion o f the zabti revenue was assessed at these rates. A  discussion o f the 
additional cesses and taxes has also been included fo r  each qasba to detect whether 
there were any additional taxes introduced or changes in  the rate o f levy. This was 
thought to be an im portant and essential complement to an analysis o f trends in  the 
incidence o f the prim ary tax as cesses could provide an avenue fo r  increased 
taxation w ithou t a change in  the basic revenue rate.
The cesses levied in  addition to the basic revenue demand are entered under the 
heads o f "m a l-o -jiha t" or "jiha t" and "sair jih a t '1 in  the arhsattas. A lthough the 
d istinction between the two is not always clearly m aintained in  the arhsattas, the 
jih a t taxes were levied to defray the charges o f assessment and collection o f land 
revenue w hile  sair jih a t taxes included a variety o f imposts. In  v iew  o f the lack o f 
u n ifo rm ity  in  the nature, rates and numbers o f such additional cesses, we have 
broadly classified them three types viz., i) those levied specifica lly on the cash 
assessed crops, i i)  those levied on the batai crops, and i i i )  miscellaneous cesses and 
imposts. We have categorised all the additional cesses fo r each qasba in to  these three 
groups irrespective o f whether the cesses had been orig ina lly  entered under jih a t or 
sair jih a t in  the respective arhsattas. W hile these cesses were regular levies
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collected annually at the level o f the prim ary fiscal un it, there were also imposts 
demanded on certain occasions such as marriages, on the sale o f trees, on reeds used 
fo r thatching, and various bhents or presents which fin d  m ention in  the sawai 
jamabandhi account. Such levies were not d irectly linked  to productive ac tiv ity  in  
rural society and have been excluded from  the analysis.
Qasba Phagi
The revenue records o f qasba Phagi are unique in the consistent level o f detail 
they provide fo r each year examined. A l l  the sub-categories linked  to varying 
p roductiv ity  were specified fo r  each crop and w ith in  each such category, the land 
area and the rate o f taxation on ra iya ti land was recorded separately from  land 
assessed at concessional rates. The pre fe ren tia lly  assessed ind iv idua ls  were named, 
w ith  particulars o f the area o f land they cultivated, the rate o f taxation and the 
revenue obtained. This form  o f precise referencing o f each category o f land and 
cu ltiva to r makes i t  possible to tabulate the revenue rates applicable to ra iya ti land 
fo r  the m ajor kh a rif crops -  cotton, kodon (m ille t), indigo and maize -  and the rabi 
crops -  poppy, tobacco and vegetables -  fo r  the period 1691 to 1778 as seen in  
Table 10
In  general, the cash rates per bigha were lower in  qasba Phagi than in  the other 
regions and especially so in  the case o f cotton (see Table 3, Chapter IV .). The 
o ff ic ia l schedule o f taxation or dastur amal fo r pargana Phagi recorded in  1691 
forms our benchmark fo r  an examination o f the trends in  zabti rates actually levied 
between 1691 and 1778 on the m ajor cash crops grown in  the qasba. Over this 
period o f eight decades, we see from  Table 10 that the cash rates were remarkably
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constant and fu rth e r that in  no year was the rate levied h igher than the prescribed 
rate o f taxation. On the other hand, there were a number o f years where there was 
a downward revision o f the rates o f levy. Such revisions were only occasional t i l l  
1742, after which we perceive a systematic decrease in  the zabti rates fo r all the 
m ajor crops. In  the years where a reduction in rates has been observed, i t  appears 
that the reductions were not un ifo rm  fo r all crops or fo r each harvest. The range 
of the downward revision varied from  one anna (Rs.0.06) to fo u r annas (Rs.0.25) 
and exceptionally, to eight annas (Rs.0.50) per bigha in  the case o f tobacco in  the 
year 1743. In  qasba Phagi therefore, i t  is reasonable to conclude that there was a 
slight decrease in  the nom inal rate o f taxation during the course o f the eighteenth 
century.
Using the data fo r cotton as a case study, we have also attempted to determine 
the d is tribu tion  o f cotton acreage between the h igh-tax category o f goriwa land and 
the less productive or mangro land. The quality o f the arhsatta records fo r  qasba 
Phagi also enable us to compare the p roportion  o f land w ith in  each o f these two 
categories that was assessed concessionally w ith  land subjected to the standard rate 
o f assessment or ra iya ti land. Table 11 shows that there was both an absolute and a 
relative fa ll in  the area o f cotton in  the qasba from  1715 to 1760. This was more 
marked in  terms o f the bighas cu ltivated than in  the relative proportion  o f cotton 
acreage in  the total cash assessed or zabti area o f the kh a rif harvest. W ith  reference 
to the quality o f land, there was a greater fa ll in  the less productive or mangro land 
than in  the h igh ly taxed goriwa land devoted to cotton. Therefore, w ith in  the
context o f an overall decline in  the production o f cotton in  the la tte r ha lf o f the 
eighteenth century, poorer quality land was being w ithd raw n from  cotton 
cu ltiva tion  in  qasba Phagi. I t  is interesting to note, however, that the fa ll in  e ither
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Table 10: Zabti Rates of Taxation on Selected Crops : Qasba Phagi. 1691-1778
Year Cotton Kodon Ind igo Makka Poppy Tbcco Veg.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1691 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.75 1.25 1.00 1.50 2.50 3.00 1.25
1697 0.81 0.56 0.81 0.56 1.06 - - - - 1.25
1715 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.75 1.25 1.00 1.50 N A N A N A
1716 1.00 0.75 - 0.75 1.25 1.00 1.50 2.50 3.50 1.50
1717 1.00 0.75 - 0.75 - 1.50 2.38 3.38 1.38
1718 0.94 0.69 0.94 0.69 1.13 0.94 1.38 N A N A N A
1721 N A N A N A N A  N A N A N A 2.38 3.38 1.38
1727 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.75 1.25 0.88 1.50 2.50 3.50 1.50
1728 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.75 1.25 0.88 1.50 N A N A N A
1729 1.00 0.75 0.94 0.75 1.25 1.00 1.50 - 3.50 1.50
1730 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.75 1.25 1.00 1.25 2.50 3.50 1.50
1731 1.00 0.75 - 0.75 1.25 1.00 1.50 2.50 3.50 1.50
1732 1.00 0.75 0.94 0.75 1.25 1.00 1.44 2.50 3.50 1.50
1733 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.75 1.25 0.94 1.50 2.50 3.50 1.50
1734 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.75 1.25 0.88 1.50 - 3.50 1.50
1741 1.00 0.75 - 0.75 1.25 0.88 1.50 - - 1.50
1742 1.00 0.75 - 0.75 1.25 0.88 1.50 - 3.50 1.50
1743 0.88 0.63 0.88 0.63 1.13 0.88 1.25 - 3.00 1.25
1744 0.94 0.69 - 0.69 1.19 0.94 1.44 - 3.50 1.50
1745 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.75 1.25 0.81 1.50 N A N A N A
1746 0.94 0.69 0,94 0.69 1.19 0.94 1.25 - - 1.25
1749 0.91 0.66 0.75 0.63 1.16 0.91 1.38 - 3.44 1.44
1751 0.91 0.66 - 0.66 1.16 0.91 1.25 2.00 3.47 1.50
1753 0.94 0.69 0.94 0.69 1.19 0.94 1.44 - 3.50 1.44
1754 0.94 0.69 - 0.69 1.19 0.94 1.44 1.25 3.00 1.50
1755 0.75 0.66 - - - 1.38 - - 1.41
1757 0.94 0.69 0.94 0.69 1.25 1.38 - - 1.38
1759 0.94 0,69 - 0.69 1.19 0.94 1,44 N A N A N A
1760 0.94 0.69 0.94 0.69 1.16 0.94 1.44 - 1.38 3.25
1778 0.88 0.69 0.88 0.69 1.16 0.88 1.25 - 3.25 1.13
Source: Arhsattas. pargana Phagi fo r the relevant years.
Notes to Table 10:
N A  indicates data not available due to gaps in  the series. -  (blank) indicates that the crop was not 
sown in  the qasba in  that particu la r year. The rates fo r better quality land sown w ith  cotton and 
kodon are given in  cols 1 and 3 w hile  the less productive mangro land rates are given in  cols.2 and 
4, respectively. Indigo crop o f the second year (or ja ri.co l.5 ) was taxed at a rate higher than the 
firs t cutting (or nyoti.co l,6)
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Table 11: Percentage Distribution of Cotton Land bv Tax Codes: Qasba Phagi
Period % Area A v. Area Year Area Goriwa Mangro
Cropped (Bighas) (Bighas) %A %R %P %A %R %P
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (V) (8) (9) (10)
1690 -  1714 — — 1691 2318.15 11 89 11 89 95 5
1715 -  1719 64.14 1344.69 1718 1375.70 24 66 34 76 71 29
1725 -  1729 64.54 1597.26 1728 2223.35 27 73 27 73 77 23
1730 -  1734 50.55 1608.03 1733 1504.75 21 75 25 79 78 22
1740 -  1744 43.77 773.70 1744 778.00 25 68 32 75 56 44
1745 -  1749 31.82 206.98 1745 195.85 42 63 37 58 73 27
1750 -  1754 51.62 519.89 1754 612.00 32 34 66 68 60 40
1755 -  1760 35.68 281.96 1760 309.45 42 44 56 58 47 53
1760 -  1780 - - 1778 174.45 47 43 57 53 53 47 .
Source : Arhsattas paruana Phaei fo r the relevant vears.
Notes to Table 11:
Cols.l and 2 are averages derived fo r the respective tim e periods. For each period an 
average was derived only where we had data fo r at least three years o f the five . This 
accounts fo r the exclusion o f the periods 1725-1729 and 1735-1739 from  the table due to 
gaps in  the series. C o l.l shows the average percentage o f the cash assessed area o f the 
kha rif harvest devoted to cotton. The average area under cotton fo r each period has been 
entered in  Col.2. C ols.l and 2 therefore indicate the relative and absolute shifts in  cotton 
cu ltiva tion  between the tim e periods.
The year chosen in Col.3 corresponds to that year w ith in  each period in  w hich the area 
under cotton was closest in  value to the average derived in Col.2. G iven the gaps in  the 
data, this was the only method o f avoiding extreme values and selecting a year that was 
re latively unexceptional. The years 1691 and 1778 have been included as they indicate 
the range o f the series.
Col.4 gives the cotton acreage fo r the years in  Col.3. In  the revenue records the total 
cotton area assessed, was subdivided in to  two sets o f rates on the basis o f the p roduc tiv ity  
o f the land cultivated. Goriwa and Mangro re fe r to the more productive and the less 
productive land on w hich cotton was grown.Each category was fu rth e r d iffe ren tia ted  on 
the basis o f those cultivators entitled to concessional rates and the ra iya ti who paid the 
maximum rates applicable. Cols.5 and 8 show the percentage d is tribu tion  o f the cotton 
acreage in the categories o f goriwa and mangro (%A). Cols.6 and 9 indicate the 
percentage o f land assessed under the maximum or ra iya ti rates in  each category (%R). 
Cols.7 and 10 give the proportion cultivated by the priv ileged sections granted 
concessionary rates in  each category o f land (%P).
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category o f cotton land was not proportionately reflected in  the percentages o f land 
cultivated by those accorded revenue concessions and those who were taxed at the 
ra iyati or standard rates. U n til about 1750, the percentage o f land assessed at the 
standard rate was approximately 70 per cent o f the land in  each p roduc tiv ity  linked 
category. From 1750 onwards there was a disproportionate fa ll in  the percentage o f 
ra iyati land grow ing cotton amounting to a drop o f s lightly more than 50 per cent 
in  each category. Thus, despite the reduction in the standard rate o f levy a fte r 
1743, cotton production in qasba Phagi in the la tte r ha lf o f the eighteenth century 
appears to have been increasingly restricted to the most productive land held by 
those members o f the rura l elite entitled  to concessionary rates o f taxation.
The revenue assessed in  cash included the land revenue on zabti crops, which 
formed the largest component o f the cash revenues, as well as a tax on farm  
animals and a hearth tax on the artisanal and menial castes residing in  the qasba 
(see below). These cash revenues were subject to a surtax at the rate o f one taka 
per 100 rupees and this fee was paid to the chaudhuri and qanungo. The patel 
received a two per cent levy called "v iro tra ’1. A  le tte r from  the diwan to the amils 
o f all the- parganas administered by the Jaipur durbar, indicates that the patel was 
either paid the customary five  per cent levy termed "bisondh" or the lower v iro tra  
amount i f  he paid land revenue at a concessionary rate. U n til 1733, v iro tra  was 
calculated on the entire revenue obtained from  the village com prising the sale value 
o f the revenues collected in  k ind  plus all the cash assessed revenues listed above. 
From the next year onwards, however, the levy was revised to exclude the sum 
obtained from  the sale o f grain. I t  is possible that the patel’s share o f the grain 
produced in  the village began to be collected in  k ind  at the tim e o f d ivis ion.
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The cesses on revenue collections in  k ind  were levied as a proportion  o f the 
state’s share o f the produce. The collective term fo r the three cesses collected in  
the category o f jih a t tax was "farah" and this generally amounted to ju s t under 
twelve per cent o f the grain revenue or ten per cent o f the total land tax in  qasba 
Phagi. Farah included three types o f levy. Principal among these was "seri" which 
was levied at the rate o f three seers per maund o f the state’s share o f revenue. 
This cess was only applicable to the ra iya ti and the village o ffic ia ls , the zamindars, 
Rajputs, Brahmans, mahajans and kamins being exempted from  payment.^ The 
etymology o f the word seri is d if f ic u lt  to trace, the closest term  being "serina" 
which was an allowance paid in  acknowledgement o f the p roprie tary righ t. A  
second cess, dastur chaudhuri/qanungo, was fixed  at one seer per maund levied on 
the entire grain revenues w ith  no concessions or exemptions to priv ileged revenue 
assessees. This levy parallels the dastur payable to the chaudhuri and qanungo on 
the zabti revenues mentioned above. Lastly, a cess called "izafa ganj wa v ichoti" 
was levied on all batai crops in  kh a rif and rabi. In  the absence o f a levy under the 
head o f bhara in  qasba Phagi, i t  is like ly  that the collection under izafa ganj wa 
v icho ti was, as the name implies, a tax to cover the cost o f grain carriage to the 
market. U n like  in  pargana Dausa where a s im ilarly named levy was u n ifo rm ly  two 
or three per cent o f the quantity o f grain revenue,^ the amounts entered under 
izafa in  qasba Phagi were not a fixed  ratio o f the grain collected although the cess 
was o f a roughly s im ilar magnitude. This may possibly be because certain sections 
were exempt from  payment and hence the proportion o f cess to basic tax in  k ind 
varied from  year to year. In  addition to these three general levies, a special tax 
called "n irn i" was imposed at the rate o f one and a ha lf takas per maund on the
n
grain revenues o f the pulses moth, mung, urad and chola. The rura l elites were 
exempted from  the payment o f n irn i. In  colloquia l usage, the term n irn i is taken to
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denote fodder and the tax may have been levied on the valuable fodder o f the pulse
Q
crops retained by the peasant.
In  addition to the cesses linked  to crop production, there was an annual tax, 
termed "gau shumari1', on a ll farm  animals except those owned by the higher castes. 
The livestock equivalent o f a tax amount o f one rupee was expressed as : five  
buffaloes, or seven camels, o r ten cows, or fourteen bullocks, or twenty-seven 
sheep and goats.^ The levy o f a cess on farm  animals was a method o f taxing those 
who derived a part o f the ir income from  pastoralism. Further, a grazing tax on the 
draught animals were collected at two annas per animal. However, by 1715 the 
grazing tax was no longer levied w h ile  the gau shumari had become restricted to a 
cess on sheep and goats only and renamed "chaili ra s i" .^  A no the r annual levy, 
termed "habubati", included a number o f miscellaneous items some o f which were 
previously o f a non-monetary nature but had been commuted in to  a fixed  cash
amount. These were a hide or "aghori" tax ( lit., ha lf-h ide ) and a blanket or "kam li"
11 12  tax. The annual charge fo r qasba Phagi under this head was Rs.26.00.
F ina lly , certain sections o f the non-agricu ltu ra l population o f the qasba, 
includ ing workers in  leather, base and precious metals, glass, lac, various processes 
in  cotton cloth production and a varie ty o f occupational castes such as distillers, 
potters and parched grain sellers, were subject to a hearth tax termed "kholri". A  
s im ilar hearth tax, either called kho lri or jh u p r i, was levied in  all six qasbas studied 
although the rates o f taxation d iffe red . In  qasba Phagi, generally two rates 
prevailed fo r each caste group -  twelve annas constituted the fu ll rate w hile  ha lf o f 
that was levied on apprentices or servants fo r the firs t year. From the
jamabandhi accounts i t  appears that some indiv idua ls were taxed at s till lower rates
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although the reason fo r such concessions has not been m e n tio n e d .^  The exclusion 
o f some o f the key members o f the trad itiona l service castes o f the village such as 
the barber, washerman and blacksm ith from  the lis t o f taxpayers as well as the fact 
that the tax was only levied on the artisanal and professional castes resident in  the 
qasba, suggests that the cess was some sort o f income tax on those urban producers 
producing solely fo r  the market.
Our review o f the additional cesses levied in  qasba Phagi indicates that all those 
under the category o f sair jih a t remained unchanged in the ir rate o f levy during the 
period 1715 to 1778. Further, there were no increase in  the num ber o f additional 
cesses imposed on the qasba under the head o f sair jih a t in  the same period. 
U nfortunate ly , a s ign ifican t element o f additional taxation that was included w ith in  
farah or jih a t taxes was itemised only in  the jamabandhis and not in the more 
continuous arhsatta records. Hence the constancy or otherwise o f the rates o f 
taxation fo r cesses such as seri and izafa cannot be verified .
Qasba Sanganer
The records o f qasba Sanganer are as detailed as those o f qasba Phagi. A  
sim ilar level o f disaggregation o f revenue rates on account o f d iffe ren tia ls  in  
p roductiv ity  and preferentia l status o f named cultivators enables us to id e n tify  the 
trends in  the nominal rates o f the m ajor crops applicable to the ra iyati. U n like  the 
other qasbas, the fiscal records o f qasba Sanganer were separated o f f  from  the 
pargana records and entered in  a separate arhsatta Qasba Sanganer along w ith  eight 
surrounding villages that were considered w ith in  its adm inistrative ambit. For a 
short span between 1736 to 1746, the revenue records o f qasbas Sawai Jaipur,
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Am ber and Sanganer along w ith  64 surrounding villages were consolidated under 
arhsatta Qasba Sawai Jaipur. This adm inistrative reorganisation affected the 
manner in  which the revenue records were maintained and the level o f detail 
generally recorded in  the arhsatta Qasba Sanganer was lost during the in terim  
decade.
In  general, the revenue rates on the cash assessed crops were s ign ifican tly
higher in  Sanganer than fo r the other parganas (see Table 3, Chapter IV ,). The
movement in  the rates o f the m ajor kh a rif crops -  cotton, sugarcane and makka -
and the rabi crops -  vegetables irriga ted by wells and melons -  have been tabulated
in  Table 12. The sign ifican t po in t that emerges from  the table is that there was no
increase in revenue rates from  1688 to 1773 and that the standard rate o f levy on
each productiv ity-based category was identical to the o ff ic ia l revenue schedule o f 
1 5the qasba. In  a number o f years the cash rates fo r some crops were lowered by
1 fione to fou r annas per bigha. The only year when there was a general downward
revision in  rates was 1712 and was most probably in  response to the severe drought
17o f 1712-13 leading to widespread fam ine in  the region. A fte r  1773, there is a
large gap in  the documentation t i l l  the arhsatta o f the rabi harvest o f 1786. In
1786, as a result o f the depredations o f the Maratha armies the ou tly ing  land o f the
qasba remained uncultivated and the harvest o f three o f the seven other villages
18included w ith in  the boundaries o f the qasba was completely destroyed. Further, 
while the nominal rates per bigha in  1786 were the same as in  1772, the number o f 
bighas assessed under m ethi and sarson have been a rtif ic ia lly  in fla ted  by 1.5 and 
1.25 times respectively. This unique form  o f enhanced taxation has been recorded 
only fo r this particu lar year. The gaps in  the documentation a fte r 1773 makes it
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Table 12: Zabti Rates of Taxation on Selected Crops: Qasba Sanganer, 1688-1773
Year Cotton
1 2 3 4
1688 2.25 2.00 1.75 _
1690 2.25 2.00 1.75 -
1708 2.25 2.00 1.75 -
1712 2.19 1.94 1.69 1.44
1713 - - 1.69 1.44
1715 2.19 - 1.69 1.44
1716 2.25 2.00 1.75 -
1724 - - - -
1728 2.19 1.94 1.69 1.44
1730 2.19 - 1.69 1.44
1731 2.25 2.00 1.75 1.50
1732 2.25 2.00 1.75 1.50
1733 2.25 - 1.75 1.50
1747 2.25 2.00 1.75 1.50
1748 2.25 2.00 1.75 1.50
1755 2.25 2.00 1.75 1.50
1756 2.25 2.00 1.75 _
1760 - - 1.75 1.50
1761 2.19 1.94 1.69 1.44
1763 2.19 1.94 1.69 1.44
1766 2.25 - 1.75 1.50
1767 2.25 2.00 1.75 1.50
1768 2.25 2.00 1.75 1.50
1770 2.25 2.00 1.75 1.50
1771 2.25 2.00 1.75 1.50
1772 - - 1.75 1.50
1773 2.25 2.00 1.75 1.50
K h a r if
Sugarcane
5 6 7 8 9
1.25 1.00 _ 5.00 3.00
1.25 1.00 - 5.00 3.00
1.25 1.00 - 5.00 3.00
1.19 0.94 - 4.50 -
1.19 0.94 6.75 4.75 -
1.19 0.88 7.00 4.81 3.00
1.25 0.88 7.00 4.75 2.81
1.25 - 7.00 - 3.00
1.19 0.94 7.00 5.00 3.00
1.19 0.94 7.00 5.00 3.00
1.25 1.00 7.00 5.00 3.00
1.25 1.00 7.00 5.00 3.00
1.25 1.00 - 4.50 2.81
1.25 1.00 - _ -
1.25 1.00 - - -
1.25 - 7.00 5.00 3.00
- - - 5.00 3.00
1.25 1.00 7.00 4.25 2.25
1.19 0.94 6.94 4.94 -
1,19 0.94 6.94 4.94 -
1.25 1.00 7.00 5.00 3.00
1.25 - 7.00 4.25 2.63
1.25 - 7.00 5.00 3,00
1.25 ? 7.00 5.00 3.00
1.25 1.00 - 5.00 3.00
1.25 ? - 5.00 3.00
1.25 ? 5.63 5.00 3.00
Rabi
Makka Veg. Melon
10 11 12 13
4.50 1.75 1.50
4.50 1.75 - -
4.50 1.75 - -
4.00 1.69 1.00 1.50
4.25 1.69 0.94 1.25
4.25 1.69 0.81 1.50
- 1.75 1.00 1.50
- - N A N A
4.50 1.69 1.00 1.50
4.50 1.69 1.00 1.50
4.50 1.75 1.00 1.50
- 1.75 1.00 1.50
- 1.75 N A N A
- 1.75 1.00 1.50
- 1.75 1.00 1.50
- 1.75 1.00 1.50
4.50 1.75 N A N A
- 1.75 1.00 1.56
1.75 N A N A
- 1.69 0.94 1.44
4.50 1.75 N A N A
1.75 N A N A
4.00 1.75 N A N A
? 1.75 1.00 1.50
? 1.75 1.00 1.50
? 1.75 N A N A
4.50 1,75 1.00 1.50
Source; Arhsattas Qasba Sanganer o f the relevant years.
Notes to Table 12: -  (dash) indicates that there were no revenue returns fo r  that particu lar 
category or crop. N A  denotes data not available. ? indicates that the category can not be 
identified .
Cols. 1-6 denote the six tax categories under which cotton acreage was assessed, namely p iw a l 
paheli, p iw al pacheli, sawanu, dhandha, lih  and rama respectively. Cols. 7-10 give the tax rates 
on the fou r productive categories o f sugarcane land, viz. gundgari, river-w atered, w e ll- irr iga ted  
and the ratoon or peri crop respectively.
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impossible to say whether there was a general increase in  revenue demand or i f  
1786 had been an unusual year.
As in  the case o f qasba Phagi, the statistics o f cotton production  have been used 
in  Table 13 to observe the trends in  the d is tribu tion  o f acreage between the six 
revenue categories o f cotton as w ell as the d is tribu tion  w ith in  each such category o f 
land assessed at a concessionary rate and that assessed at the standard rate. As 
observed in  qasba Phagi, in Sanganer too there was a fa ll in  the absolute and 
relative area cultivated w ith  cotton between the period o f extensive cotton
Table 13 : Percentage D is tribu tion  o f Cotton Area Cropped bv Tax Codes: Qasba Sanganer
Year %Area Total Piwal I Piwal I I Sawanu L ih Dhandha Rama
Crop’d Bighas %A%R%P %A%R%P %A%R%P %A%R%P %A%R%P %A%R%P
1711 33.33 1050.55 5 100 0 2 100 0 33 84 16 30 97 3 25 97 3 2 52 48
1715 38.55 911.65 1 100 0 -  - _ 47 92 8 21 100 0 30 90 10 1 100 0
1728 51.72 1256,80 16 98 2 1 100 0 40 97 3 23 99 1 18 100 0 3 100 0
1733 22.56 461.95 1 100 0 - - 37 91 9 17 100 0 39 100 0 6 100 0
1748 29.02 538.00 7 97 3 1 100 0 55 88 12 19 88 12 16 95 5 2 26 74
1755 14.26 227.80 10 100 0 13 97 3 45 95 5 11 89 11 21 79 21 -  -  -
1760 22.98 236.05 65 73 27 13 56 44 21 80 20 1 100 0
1763 44.65 506.05 21 96 4 5 63 37 55 89 11 9 79 21 8 45 55 2 74 26
1766 17.90 266.70 3 100 0 -  - - 66 84 16 3 100 0 27 93 7 2 100 0
1773 23.78 307.80 5 100 0 29 79 21 34 89 11 30 79 21 2 100 0 -  -  -
Source: Arhsatta Qasba Sanganer fo r  the relevant years.
Notes to Table 13:
% Area Cropped gives the cotton acreage relative to the total cash assessed or zabti 
area o f the kh a rif harvest.
Total Bighas gives the annual area in  bighas cultivated w ith  cotton.
The six tax categories applicable to cotton were, f irs tly , the most productive piwals 
o f the firs t and second quality, the monsoonal cotton crop or sawanu, cotton grown 
on annually inundated land and the low er taxed dhandha and rive r irriga ted or 
rama land. Each o f these tax categories was fu rthe r subdivided in to  land assessed at 
the standard and that assessed at p riv ileged rates. Thus in  each o f the six cotton 
categories the firs t column sets out the percentage o f land under that category in  
the year (% A), fo llow ed by proportion  liable to standard or ra iya ti rate o f taxation 
(%R) and that under priv ileged cu ltiva tion  (%P). A l l  the figures in  % A, %R, and 
%P are expressed to the nearest whole number.
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cu ltiva tion  in  the 1720s and 1730s and the period a fte r 1755 during which cotton 
production remained consistently low  u n til the end o f our series in  1773. Most o f 
the cotton was grown on land taxed in  the range o f Rs.1,75 to Rs.1.25 per bigha 
corresponding to the categories o f sawani, dhandha and lih , and this d istribu tion  
was maintained throughout. The cu ltiva tion  o f the h igh ly  taxed productive lands 
(piwals) and the lowest taxable category o f rive r irriga ted (rama) land fluctuated 
but even together d id  not generally amount to more than ten per cent o f the total 
cotton acreage. W ith  regard to the percentage d is tribu tion  o f cotton acreage
between land assessed at the standard ra iya ti rate and land liab le  to revenue
concessions, the la tte r category appears to have increased although this trend is not 
as clearly discernible in  qasba Sanganer as in  qasba Phagi due to considerable 
annual varia tion in  the categories o f land devoted to cotton in Sanganer.
The additional taxes in  qasba Sanganer entered under sair jih a t included cesses
levied on agricu ltura l production as well as on the trading and commercial ac tiv ity
in the qasba t i l l  about 1733. In  the arhsattas o f the other parganas, a basic
distinction was maintained between, on the one hand, taxes to be levied on
agricultura l production and on the population o f a fiscal un it or the sair jih a t
cesses; and, on the other, taxes on the trading, commercial and m anufacturing
operations in  the pargana as a whole. The la tte r type o f taxes d id  not bear a strict
ratio to the land revenue o f the p rim ary fiscal units and were generally put under
the head o f sawai jamabandhi in  the arhsatta records. W ith  the amalgamation o f
the revenue records o f the qasbas Sanganer, Jaipur and A m ber in  1736, the la tter
type o f taxes were separated from  the sair jih a t lis t o f taxes. I t  is possible
therefore, to id e n tify  the imposts specifically on agricu ltura l production in  the
qasba, as d istinct from  general levies on the pargana as a whole, and compare the
19rates o f these in  the period p rio r to 1736 w ith  those from  1747 onwards.
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A n  examination o f the cesses in  the two periods appears to indicate an increase
in  taxation in  the post-1746 phase. For example, on all the cesses collected in
copper takas an additional charge o f one taka on every five  collected was made
under the head o f "vata" or "panchtaki", thereby increm enting the total levy by 20
per cent over the previous level. However, this was due to a change in  the system
o f m aintaining accounts rather than an actual enhancement in the rate. Previously
the same charge had been made but rather than being entered piecemeal fo r each
20cess, i t  was registered under a d is tinct head in  the sair jih a t taxes. The 20 per
cent increm ent was imposed to cover the discount on the conversion o f the old
’black’ copper coins current in  the c ity  to the new ’red’ coins acceptable to the 
21  •treasury. S im ila rly , the cesses levied in  lieu o f the bhom or zam indari r igh t o f 
the Jaipur maharaja had earlier been separately recorded but under identical sub- 
heads in  each account. From 1747 onwards, the bhom dues were included in the 
sair jih a t taxes and entered along w ith  the basic levy. A  s im ila r reorganisation in 
the record-keeping occurred in  the case o f the patw ari and qanungoi cess. 
Accord ing to the arhsatta account o f 1712, the cash amount on which patwaro was 
levied as a specific proportion included the basic revenue collection as well as the 
cash amounts o f miscellaneous dues like  on the sale o f trees, fines fo r  
misdemeanours ("faroh i") and irregu la r marriages ("dherecha"). A fte r  1746, the 
collection under patwaro was lim ite d  to a tax on the basic revenue amount, w hile  
the other cesses previously included in  the calculation now had new sub-entries
2*i
recording the amounts collected in  lieu  o f patwaro and qanungoi. A  series o f 
such changes aimed at s im p lify ing  and rationalising the recording o f tax receipts 
account fo r the apparent enhancement in  the rate o f levy o f some sair jih a t cesses 
between the period p r io r to 1736 and the years after 1747.
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The additional taxes levied specifica lly on the cash assessed or zabti revenue 
were "taki" and "incch tarkari" collected in  both the harvests. Hasil tak i was 
calculated at 1 taka per rupee o f the zabti revenue. The patel was granted an 
exemption on his share o f the zabti revenue, which varied w ith  every harvest, and 
he also received a fixed  amount o f Rs. 7.50 per month from  the tak i c o lle c tio n .^  
A fte r  deducting the pa tw ari’s remuneration, a twenty per cent increment fo r  the 
reasons discussed above was added to make up the fin a l levy. In  addition to tak i,
the cu ltiva tion  o f fie ld  crops in  the qasba attracted a fu rth e r substantial levy o f five
25annas per bigha under the head o f incch tarkari.
The cesses on the produce revenue under farah were: i)  seri levied at a rate o f 
lit t le  over one and a ha lf maunds per 100 maunds o f grain revenue in  kha rif and 
two and a ha lf maunds per 100 maunds in  rabi on all crops w ith  the exception o f 
bajra. Bajra production was taxed at the considerably higher rate o f six and a 
quarter maunds per 100 maunds. The high levy on bajra probably incorporates the 
fodder charge which was not separately assessed fo r  bajra un like  the other batai 
crops, i i)  Fodder cesses or n irn i on the kh a rif pulses at one and a quarter takas per
t y / r
maund and "khari khaklo" on the rabi grains at one taka per maund ; and, i i i )
bhara or transport charges at a ha lf taka per maund fo r all batai crops in both the
27harvests. P rivileged taxpayers who paid land revenue at the lowest proportion o f
a quarter o f the produce were granted an exemption from  the payment o f the more
onerous o f the farah taxes such as seri and fodder charges. The patel also paid only
7 Rha lf the standard rate on his share o f the revenue in  k ind. Bhara was levied even
when a part o f the state’s share o f the grain remained unsold thus ind ica ting  it  was
2Qa fixed  levy irrespective o f the actual transport or sale o f the grain. The fodder 
and transport levies which were calculated in  cash were then converted in to  k ind  
quantities at exchange rates which were graded according to the assumed value o f
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the crop but d id  not bear a d irect relationship w ith  the price d iffe ren tia ls  as 
reflected in  the current sale prices. For instance, in  1770 the conversion rate was 
fou r seers per taka fo r gram, kh a rif pulses and bajra although th e ir market prices 
varied from  Rs.1.00 to Rs.1.72 per maund. In  the case o f high valued crops such as 
lentils and wheat, the fixed  exchange ratio o f takas to seers meant that because the 
tax was ultim ate ly paid in  k ind , the producers had to part w ith  a larger share o f 
the ir produce than the nominal proportions specified fo r  fodder and transport 
charges. For example, in  1770 the average harvest price o f wheat was Rs.1.52 per
- j n
maund and the market rate o f exchange was 14.5 takas to a rupee. The fixed
ratio adopted by the revenue authorities fo r the conversion o f takas to seers in  the
case o f wheat was fixed  at 3 seers per taka. I f  the calculation had been based on
the market price and the current exchange rate, then one taka o f tax would have
been equivalent to just 1.8 seers o f wheat -  or fo rty  per cent low er than the amount
actually demanded. Scattered evidence in  the arhsattas indicates that this practice
o f converting a cash levy in to  grain was a post-1747 innovation because p rio r to the
adm inistrative reorganisation, the levy on fodder was collected in  cash rather than 
*11
grain. In  addition to the cesses under farah, a tax on w eighing the grain, 
calculated at a rate o f ten annas per 100 rupees o f sales revenue was paid by the 
trader purchasing the state’s revenue in  k ind.
Collections termed dasturs, or customary payments, were made to the patwari 
and the qanungo. The pa tw ari’s dastur was calculated at 31 takas per 100 rupees o f 
the zabti revenue, a fte r certain deductions, and 1.25 maunds per 100 maunds on the 
grain revenue. The dastur qanungo, on the other hand, was calculated at a ha lf 
taka per asami or cu ltiva to r fo r the preparation o f the "daul".^^ Daul was the 
general term fo r the document prepared by the qanungo w ith  the particulars o f the 
estimated revenue in  the coming harvest on the basis o f w hich the fin a l revenue
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settlement was made fo r each revenue payer. W hile these heads were specifically 
termed patwara and qanungo, collections on the ir account also form ed a component 
o f other cesses such as "kho lri", "s ilju ta", and "khali ghana" discussed below.
In  con fo rm ity  w ith  the general categories o f additional levies in  the other
parganas, the agriculturists were taxed on the ir sheep, goats, sale o f trees, reeds
used fo r construction o f huts and on each gumlac and ju ju b e  tree. Thus the system
o f rura l taxation was comprehensive in  the sense that all forms o f productive
activ ity  besides the purely ho rticu ltu ra l were liable to taxation. The non-
agricultura l artisanal and menial castes (kamins) residing in  the qasba paid kho lri.
A fte r  the reorganisation o f the form  o f entries in  the accounts, hasil kh o lri included
the basic tax as well as the dues o f the patwari, qanungo and the bhomi. The basic
levy was graded in to  fou r categories -  the fu ll rate was 12 takas per house and the
lesser amounts 9, 6 and 3 takas -  but the princ ip le  underly ing the scaled taxation
has not been specified. In  addition to this there were imposts o f one taka per
house fo r bhom i, a ha lf taka each fo r  patwara and qanungoi and, lastly, the 20 per
37cent increment on the takas thus calculated under panchtaki discussed above. I t  
is interesting to note that those id e n tifie d  as paltis and haljotas or agriculturists 
among the kamins were exempt from  the payment o f kh o lr i dues from  about 
1728. The castes mentioned as paltis or agriculturists in  the lis t o f kho lri 
taxpayers were the Malis, Mewatis and Kumhars each o f w h ich category included
O Q
the patel and paltis o f the caste group.
The leather workers in  the qasba had to pay additional cesses called aghori and 
silju ta. A g ho ri refers to hides and was probably imposed on the tanners. Norm ally 
the tax was given on ija ra  to one or more o f the leather workers or to the entire 
caste panchayat o f the Chamars.^® S ilju ta , on the other hand was a cess fixed  at
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nine takas per ’p a tti’ w ith  an additional amount o f one and a ha lf takas per patti 
fo r patwara and bhom from  1746 onwards. The pattis appear to be linked  to 
agricultura l caste groups -  the Chamars o f each pa tti are id e n tifie d  as associated or 
attached to the pattis o f the Kumhars, Malis, Mewatis, Gujars, Jats, Guwars and 
A h irs .41
The oil-pressers or telis were required to pay a cess termed kha li ghana on each 
press worked by them charged at the same rate as the kh o lri tax levied on the 
kamins.4^ There was a steady decline in  the number o f oil-presses in  the qasba 
from  around the 1730s partly  due to the m igration o f telis to the newly established 
qasba Jaipur and partly due to the high tax level in  qasba Sanganer. In  order to 
avoid paying the high taxes levied on them in  Sanganer, the telis o f the qasba had 
moved to the nearby village o f Vavla in  pargana Am ber where the levy was just 
five  per cent o f that in  Sanganer.4"^
These then form ed the m ajor heads under which taxes in add ition  to the basic 
revenue demand were levied. The com plexity o f the system o f taxation in  addition 
to the changes in  the method o f record-keeping in  this qasba makes i t  d if f ic u lt  to 
perceive changes in  the rates o f levy. On the whole, however, i t  appears that there 
was no substantial change in  the level o f tax demand in  the qasba.
Qasba Lalsot
The revenues in  qasba Lalsot were almost entire ly assessed in  cash, generally 
constituting more than three quarters o f the total annual collection. Judging from  
the revenue returns, the m ajor crops were cotton and sugarcane in  the kh a rif and 
wheat and barley in  the rabi harvest. U n like  the preceding two qasbas studied, the
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detailed referencing o f cash rates by the two crite ria  o f type o f soil o r p roduc tiv ity  
and the status o f the cu ltiva to r have only occasionally been recorded in  the 
arhsattas o f Lalsot.
The highest rate applicable on cotton land in the qasba was Rs.1.38 or 22 annas 
per bigha in  the period 1713 to 1777. However, most o f the land allocated to 
cotton was not assessed at this rate. There was a gradual gradation in  rates from  22 
annas to 5 annas, generally in  steps o f one anna, though not a ll the rates w ith in  this 
range were levied each y e a r .^  In  terms o f varying p ro d u c tiv ity , f ive  categories 
have been id e n t if ie d .^  In  descending order o f cash rates these were: i)  "asli" or 
lands irriga ted  by an established permanent well situated close to the village s ite ,^
A ^
i i )  "dangro" or land situated on the steep bank o f a rive r or h ills ide , i i i )  "kuee" 
and iv ) "kua". The terms used to describe categories ( i i i)  and ( iv ) suggest irriga tion  
by well but the d istinction  between them is not clear. I t  is possible that kuee, a 
d im inu tive  o f kua, indicated a shallow p it-w e ll or dhenkali and kua was the term 
applied to a regular well which was either a re lative ly new pukka well or else a 
kutcha well v) Lastly, the lowest rates o f assessment were levied on the rama land 
or that irriga ted by rive r water. The la tte r was the category under which most o f 
the land producing cotton was assessed each year. W ith in  each o f the five  
classifications, there were fu rth e r gradations. A lthough these sub-categories have 
not been referenced, we have assumed that the pattern was s im ila r to that described 
fo r qasbas Phagi and Sanganer -  that is, the highest rate w ith in  each group was the 
standard rate applicable on ra iya ti land w hile  the other rates low er than that were 
concessionary rates granted to specific ind iv idua ls belonging to the rura l elite. In  
Table 14 we have set out the standard rate fo r each category fo r  each o f the yearsin 
which the categories have been specifica lly iden tified  in the arhsattas.
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The iden tifica tion  o f the p ro d u c tiv ity - lin ke d  categories in  the records is lim ited
to a few years while in  the m a jo rity  o f the arhsattas the d iffe re n t rates o f taxation
are sim ply set out in  descending order w ithou t the accompanying code reference.
Except fo r the highest rate on asli land, i t  becomes impossible to ve rify  the
movements in  the rates on the other categories accurately. G iven this d if f ic u lty ,  we
have used the movements in  the computed average rates per bigha fo r  each year to
id e n tify  the trends. These were derived by d iv id ing  the totals under revenue
received by the acreage o f cotton in  each year (see Table 15). We note that u n til
1722 the average rate o f taxation was consistently below Rs.1.00 per bigha and
ranged from  Rs. 0.82 to Rs. 0.97. However, from  the next available year in  the
records, that is 1730, and u n til 1753 there was an increase in  the average tax rate to
between Rs.1.00 and Rs. 1.06 per bigha . This was because in  the period t i l l  1722 a
larger proportion o f the annually cropped cotton land was assessed at rates o f
48Rs.1.00 and below, specially s ign ifican t being Rs.1.00 and Rs.0.75 per bigha. 
Cotton land assessed at the la tte r rate in the post-1730 period was either m in im al or 
nonexistent while  that taxed at Rs.1.00 alone accounted fo r  more than 70 per cent
Table 14: Zab ti Rates o f Taxation on Selected Crops : Qasba Lalsot
Crop Year A s li Dangro Kuee Kua Rama
Cotton 1730 1.38 1.25 1.19 1.13 1.00
Cotton 1731 1.38 1.25 1.19 1.13 1.00
Cotton 1762 1.38 1.25 1.19 1.13 1.00
Wheat 1731 2.69 2.32 2.32 2.19 1.94
Wheat 1767 2.69 2.32 2.32 2.19 1.94
Barley 1731 2.56 2.19 2.19 2.06 1.81
Barley 1767 2.56 2.19 2.19 2.06 1.81
Source: Arhsattas pargana Lalsot fo r the relevant years.
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o f the total in  1 7 3 0 .^  I t  is probable that there had been an upward revision o f
rates on land earlier taxed at Rs.0.75 to Rs.1.00 per bigha between 1722 and 1729.
There are no sign ifican t shifts in  the level o f cotton acreage assessed under the
higher tax rate.^® The revised rates continued to be enforced u n til the last year o f
our series, 1777, w ith  the exception o f 1767 and 1770 when there was a decrease in
51the entire range o f cotton rates by 1 anna and 2 annas per bigha respectively. 
Between 1753 and 1756 the average rate declined s ligh tly  but this was due to the 
sh ift towards the p roportion  o f land taxed at Rs.1.00 and under, from  that taxed at 
the higher range o f Rs.1.13 -  1.38 per bigha. I t  is possible that concessionary rates
were granted to more cultivators due to the severe drought in  1755 and the locust
52attack in  the qasba in  1756.
A lthough the revenue rates remained stable from  1730 onwards, there was a 
steady increase in the proportion o f cotton land assessed at concessionary rates as 
can be seen from  Table 16. This is consistent w ith  the trends in  qasbas Phagi and 
Sanganer discussed earlier. Thus although there was no general revision in  the 
cotton cash rates per bigha a fter 1730, there was a disproportionate fa ll in  the total 
revenues from  1753 onwards owing to a larger p roportion  o f cotton being 
concessionally assessed. The revenues received in  1762, fo r  example, were 7 per 
cent lower per un it than those o f 1730 despite the fact that the total acreage and its 
d is tribu tion  w ith in  the five  productive categories were roughly comparable in  the 
two years (cf. figures under %A). However, in  1762 although 43.4 per cent o f the 
cotton cropped area was pre ferentia lly  assessed, the shortfa ll in  total revenue due to 
this was only 7.5 per cent, im p ly ing  that the concessionary rates were only 
m arginally lower than the standard rates and d id  not result in  a substantial loss to 
the s ta te d
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The other im portant cash crop grown in  the qasba was sugarcane. A lthough
grown on a fa r smaller scale than cotton, its revenue yie ld  was tw ice that o f cotton
per bigha. The cash rates fo r  sugarcane ranged between the highest applicable on
ra iya ti land equal to Rs.2.00 per bigha to the lowest rate o f Rs.1.50, the
intermediate rates being graded by two anna increments per b ig h a .^  There was no
upward revision in  the ra iya ti rate fo r  the entire period. The average rate also
remained fa ir ly  stable ind ica ting  that shifts in  the proportions o f concessionally
assessed to ra iya ti cropped area were ins ign ifican t, the proportion  being generally
30:70 respectively. The exceptional years were 1748 and 1753 when the percentage
o f land assessed at ra iya ti rates fe ll drastically to 43 per cent and 15 per cent,
respectively,which had the effect o f lowering the computed average rate w ithou t
55there having been a real reduction in  the actual rates o f taxation. However, in  
1770 there was a substantial reduction in  the sugarcane rates -  those on ra iyati land 
being reduced by a th ird  o f the ir standard level. In  fact, in  1770 there was a 
general reduction in  the rates fo r  all kh a rif and rabi crops by varying amounts,
c n
probably in  response to a local crisis in  that year. Thereafter the rates resumed
CO
the ir normal levels.
The only instance o f revenue rates being reform ulated has been recorded fo r  the 
production o f irriga ted wheat and barley in  qasba Lalsot. U n t il 1722, the areas 
cultivated w ith  wheat and barley were not d iffe ren tia ted  in to  the ir respective 
acreages in  the records. The ir combined acreage was, however, disaggregated into 
the irrigated or "seko" land and the un irrigated or "bor" la n d ,^  The standard zabti 
rate on irriga ted cereal land (seko) was Rs. 1.75 and dry cereal acreage (bor) was 
Rs. 1.50.^® There are two points that can be made w ith  respect to this structure o f 
taxation. F irst, the margin between the tax rates on irriga ted and un irrigated cereal 
production was unusually small considering the almost tw o -fo ld  d iffe rence in the
Table 15: Average Rates of Zabti Taxation on Selected
Crops: Qasba lalsot, 1712-1777 2 3 1
YEAR COTTON SUGAR CANE GARDEN PRODUCE, 
KHARIF
HAKKA POPPY GARDEN PRODUCE 
RABI
WHEAT 8ARLEY
1712 0.82 1.89 1.09 1.22 1.19 1.05 1.01 1.01
1713 0.93 1.94 1.06 1.26 1.38 1.06 1,04 1.04
1714 0.89 1.92 1.10 1.50 1.37 1.04 1.04 1.04
1715 0.87 1.85 1.05 , * B
1716 0.98 1.95 1.12 1.50 1.40 1.01 1.07 1.07
1717 0.96 1.89 1.06 1.50 1.13 1.06 1.06
1718 0.90 1.92 1.12 1.25 1.47 1.09 1.08 1.08
1719 0.89 1.93 l . U 1.50 1.41 1.08 1.09 1.09
1720 0.92 1.87 1.11 1.50 1.48 1.12 1.05 1.05
1721 0.95 1.90 1.13 1.44 1.13 1.01 1.01
1722 0.87 1.71 1.12 1.50 1.10 1.00 1.00
1730 1.07 1.88 1.07 1.19 m
1731 1.05 1.89 1.12 1.25 1.48 1.12 2.01 1.85
1733 1.04 1.94 1.12 1.37 1.31 1.11 2.08 1.74
1734 1.04 1,88 1.12 1.12 < 1.13 2.06 1.81
1737 1.03 1.96 1.13 1.27 1.38 1.16 2.19 1,83
1739 1.00 1.88 1.12 1.30 1.50 1.12 2.07 1.76
1740 1.05 1.93 1.13 1.45 1.39 1.13 2.06 1.82
1741 1.04 1.92 1.11 1.50 1.50 1.12 2.08 1.82
1742 1.04 1.97 1.12 1.25 a a
1745 1.04 1.95 1.10 1.43 1.49 1.12 2.04 1.79
1746 1.05 1.90 1.11
1747 1.01 1.85 1.09 1.13 1.25 1.13 1.93 1.73
1748 1.04 1.08 1,05 0.96 1.27 1.12 1.92 1.74
1753 0.95 1.66 1.10 1.02 1.32 1.07 1.93 1.67
1754 0.96 1.75 1.13 1.10 1.50 1.10 1.99 1.80
1756 0.98 1.92 1.10 1.33 1.37 1.13 1.99 1.83
1757 1.02 1.87 1.09 1.23 1.52 1.11 2.04 1.83
1758 1.00 1.81 1.10 1.23 1.32 1.12 2.02 1.84
1759 1.00 1.89 1.10 1.22 . ,
1761 1.00 1.90 1.11 1.25 1.51 1.12 1.99 1.74
1762 1.00 1.87 1.09 1.24 1.49 1.13 2.03 1.86
1763 1.03 1.87 1.11 1.21 9 • B
1764 1.00 1.88 1.10 1.43 ,
1765 1.01 1.91 1.09 1.13 1.37 1.11 2.01 1.79
1767 0.97 1.79 1.11 1.29 1.12 2.01 1.74
1768 1.03 1.89 1.11 1.13 1.31 1.12 2.00 1.73
1770 0.89 1.27 0.93 1.00 1.08 1.95 1.69
1775 , t 1.12 2.01 1.76
1777 0,96 1.70 1.09 1.18 1.25 1.11 2.17 1.77
Source: A rhsattas Qasba Lalsot fo r the relevan t years.
Note: From 1712 to  1730 the revenue ra te s  per bigha for wheat and barley  
are id e n tic a l as they were assessed together under the head of k y a ri.
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p roductiv ity  o f wet and dry farm ing. Second, that despite a d iffe re n tia l o f 100:135 
in  the price o f wheat and barley, respectively, the rate o f taxation per bigha was
the same fo r both crops w ith in  the two basic p ro d u c tiv ity - lin ke d  categories o f wet
/ * 1
and dry lands. These two features suggest that in  general, the rate o f taxation on 
irriga ted cereal land was re lative ly low  compared to un irriga ted  land and that this 
b u ilt - in  tax bias appears particu la rly  marked in  the case o f irriga ted  land producing 
the h igh-va lue wheat crop. We can only speculate that these tax codes were 
form ulated w ith  the aim o f encouraging an expansion in  wet fa rm ing and in  
particu lar the cu ltiva tion  o f wheat.
Between 1722 and 1730, the tax codes fo r cereal p roduction in  qasba Lalsot 
were revised and the new codes were aimed specifica lly at correcting the biases 
noted above. A  revision in the zabti rates levied on the rabi cereals appears to have 
been implemented in  other parganas as well at the same tim e and prom pted by the 
recognition o f the considerable loss in  revenue suffered by the state when the 
revenue on rabi cereals was collected in  cash as compared to the potentia l revenue 
i f  the crop obtained by the d iv is ion o f the grain-heap in  the customary proportions 
was sold in  the m a rk e t.^  Essentially, two basic changes in  the structure o f 
taxation were introduced sometime between 1722 and 1730 in  Lalsot. F ive 
productive categories linked  to the source o f irriga tion  were id e n tifie d  on a basis 
s im ilar to that adopted fo r cotton and the irrigated barley and wheat land was 
separately recorded in  each o f these categories. The stated rate o f taxation fo r the 
two crops was again identical in  each o f the five  categories o f irriga ted  cropped 
land. But un like previous practice, an additional levy o f 15 annas per bigha fo r  
wheat and 13 annas per bigha fo r  barley began to be imposed under "afzud" 
bigha. Thus, the e ffective  rates fo r the two crops now d iffe re d  by 2 annas per 
bigha on irriga ted land (see Table 14). More im portan tly , the im position o f an
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additional levy signalled a substantial upward revision in  rates on irriga ted cereal 
production.. The rate o f taxation per bigha on un irriga ted or bor land, however, 
remained unchanged and no attempt was made to distinguish between the 
constituent acreages o f wheat and barley.
The revision in  tax rates applicable to irriga ted cereal land could have been 
prompted by long-term  changes in  the price level or the p ro d u c tiv ity  o f land. I t  
would appear reasonable to argue that given that production technology remained 
unchanged, the level o f the increase suggests that the p rim ary  basis fo r the tax 
revision was an increase in  the price level rather than p ro d u c tiv ity . However, by 
incorporating a fin e r d iffe ren tia tio n  in  the tax schedules and a higher levy on 
wheat rather than barley, the revenue authorities were clearly seeking to correct the 
obvious biases in  the old tax structure w hile  at the same tim e s trik ing  a balance 
between enhanced revenue receipts, on the one hand, and rewarding the investment 
o f labour and capital on the other. The fact that these sudden and sign ifican t tax 
revisions d id  not lead to an immediate decline in the cu ltiva tion  o f wheat and 
barley in  the qasba testifies to the ir general acceptability by the p rim ary  producers.
A fte r  the restructuring o f the rates on the irriga ted rabi cereals noted above, 
they remained constant from  1730 to 1777 w ith  the exception o f 1770 when the 
state granted a general reduction s im ila r to that allowed in  the case o f cotton (see 
Table 1 4 ) .^  The fluctuations in  the average rate, more specifica lly  the decline in 
irrigated wheat rates in the years 1747, 1748 and 1753-1756, was due to the 
increase in  the proportion o f land assessed at the lower productive  categories taxed 
at Rs.1.94 and below (see Table 15). I t  is possible that a concession in  rates on 
some lands was granted in  response to the drought in  1747 and the fam ine and 
locust damage that were suffered in 1755 and 1 7 5 6 .^  Despite the upward revision
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in  the taxes on irriga ted cereals, there was a marked stab ility  in  the annual cropped 
area from  1712 to 1 7 5 7 .^  The d is tribu tion  o f wheat and barley acreage between 
the percentage o f land assessed at concessional and standard rates fo r each 
p ro d u c tiv ity - lin ke d  sub-category appears to indicate that there was an overall 
increase in  the area concessionally assessed in  1767 as compared w ith  1731 (see 
Table 16.)* U n fortuna te ly , the detailed break-up in to  sub-categories fo r cereal 
acreage has been recorded only fo r the two years, 1731 and 1767, and it  is not 
possible to v e rify  this observation using data from  other years in  the series.
The additional taxes in  qasba Lalsot under the head o f sair jih a t were made up 
o f i) fixed  annual charges o f Rs.41.50 distributed over the k h a rif and rabi harvests 
in  respect o f various types o f bhents or presents, i i )  a tax o f one and a quarter 
takas per sheep or goat in  the qasba, i i i )  jh u p r i, or a hearth tax equivalent to the 
kho lri in  other qasbas, levied on the service and artisanal castes o f the qasba, and 
lastly, iv ) "rozina tappadari", or the dues collected at the rate o f Rs.1.63 per day in  
respect o f the remuneration due to the tappadar fo r the measurement o f fields and 
the assessment o f revenue. There were two types o f tappadars or revenue 
administrators subordinate to the amil. Permanent or "m uqarari” tappadars assisted 
the am il in  the overall w ork o f revenue adm inistration and were paid a m onthly 
salary, w hile  rozina tappadars were appointed fo r a short duration at the tim e o f 
the harvest and paid a daily wage fo r  the number o f days in  each harvest spent on
zTQ
the assessment and collection o f the revenue. I t  seems like ly  then that the dues 
collected under rozina tappadari in  qasba Lalsot were fo r  the short term appointee. 
Between 1715 and 1737 the number o f days in  each harvest that the tappadar was 
paid by the agriculturists o f the qasba varied between eight and ten. From 1737 
onwards however, this number increased to be almost double that during the 
previous period especially fo r the rabi harvest. On the basis o f the estimate that
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Table 16
Percentage Distribution of Cotton.and Cereal Land by Tax Code :Qasba Lalsot
Year T o ta l Asli Oanaro Kuee Kua Rama
Bighas XA XR XP XA XR XP XA XR XP XA XR XP XA XR XP
1730 1434,80 14 100 0 4 100 0 2 100 0 4 100 0 76 34 6
1731 1780,70 13 86 14 3 88 12 1 90 10 4 65 35 78 83 17
1762 1163,95 15 65 35 4 17 83 2 14 86 3 59 41 77 54 43
Wheat
Bariev
1731 483,00 14 100 0 1 100 0 1 100 0 2 54 46 81 58 42
1767 710,85 20 61 39 4 5 35 1 100 0 2 100 0 74 65 35
1731
1767
1623,95
721,75
8 89 11 
8 47 53
3 81 IS 
1 54 46
3 93 7 
5 63 37
2 59 41 
6 65 35
84 66 34 
81 32 68
S o u rce : A rh s a tta s  pargana  L a lso t fo r  th e  r e le v a n t  y e a rs ,
N otes to  T a b le .16:
The column headed  T o ta l  b ig h as  g iv e s  th e  a re a  in  b ig h as  d ev o ted  to  the  crop in  
each  y ea r.
The f iv e  ta x  c a te g o r ie s  have been a rra n g e d  in  decend ing  o rd e r  o f p ro d u c tiv ity , 
th e  c a te g o ry  tax e d  a t  th e  h ig h e s t  r a t e  p e r  bigha be in g  a s l i .  An ex p lan a tio n  o f 
th e  f iv e  ta x  c a te g o r ie s  i s  g iven  in  th e  te x t .
The th re e  colum ns under each  tax  c a te g o ry  show f i r s t ,  th e  p e rc e n ta g e  o f land 
a s se s s e d  w ith in  the  c a te g o ry  <%A), and then the  p ro p o rtio n  o f th a t  which was 
l ia b le  to  th e  s ta n d a rd  o r  r a i y a t i  r a t e  <%R) and th a t  a s s e s s e d  a t  co n cess io n a l o r 
p r iv ile g e d  r a t e s  o f ta x a tio n  (%P). A ll p e rcen tag es  have been ex p ressed  to  the 
n e a re s t  whole num ber.
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the tappadar was required to measure about 200 bighas a d a y ,^  the collections 
made on account o f rozina tappadari appear to be fa ir ly  consistent w ith  the acreage 
cultivated u n til about 1753. Thereafter, despite the decline in  the gross cu ltivated 
area, the number o f days fo r which the ra iyati were charged tappadari rose to 
between twenty and tw e n ty -five  fo r each harvest. Thus, although there was no 
increase in  the daily emoluments o f the tappadar, there was a disproportionate 
increase in  the number o f days fo r w h ich the cess was levied. The tappadari cess, 
along w ith  the other cesses included under sair jih a t, was paid from  the malba fund  
o f the village and hence an increase in  the collections under tappadari meant an 
increased tax burden on the unpriv ileged ra iya ti o f the qasba.
Our examination o f the cash rates o f revenue demand on zabti crops and the
additional cesses and taxes in three o f the qasbas fo r which the data is su ffic ien tly
detailed has sign ifican t im plications fo r  an evaluation o f the trend in  the real level
o f taxation w ith  respect to crops assessed in  cash. The rate at which revenue in
k ind  was appropriated was expressed as a proportion o f the output and thus the real
level o f taxation w ith  respect to jin s i crops remained unchanged fo r  all the qasbas
over the period under study. G iven this, i t  is im portant to enquire as to what
proportion o f the total revenue in  each o f the three qasbas studied comprised
revenues in-cash in  order to assess the relevance o f the changes in  the nominal
zabti rates in  an analysis o f the changes in level o f taxation. O f the three qasbas
examined in this chapter, the d is tribu tion  o f annual revenues between assessment in
cash (or zabti) and in  k ind  (or jin s i)  was most evenly balanced in  the case o f qasba
Sanganer w ith  an average ratio o f 2 : 3 respectively. In  qasba Phagi the proportion
o f revenue collected in  k ind was fo u r times that in  cash w hile  in  qasba Lalsot land
revenue was almost entire ly assessed in  cash, the ratio being twelve to one, 
7 0respectively.
237
The analysis o f the cash rates o f revenue on the zabti crops in  the three qasbas 
shows that in  general the cash rates were exceptionally stable. In  qasbas Phagi and 
Sanganer, in  particu lar, there was no sign ifican t revisions in  the zabti rates over a 
period o f nearly n inety years fo r w hich data is available. In  all instances o f a 
change in  the nominal rates in  these two parganas, there was a decrease in the tax 
rate per bigha and these shifts were generally very small. W hile the variations in  
revenue rates in  qasba Sanganer appear to have no regular pattern, in  qasba Phagi 
there was a d istinct reduction in the zabti rates from  1743 onwards. The scale o f 
the decrease was marginal, amounting to about six to eight per cent fo r each crop, 
and appears to be uncorrelated to the price changes during the period (see Chapter 
V I I  on Trends in  Foodgrain Prices). Further, an analysis o f additional taxes in 
these qasbas also does not reveal any enhancement in  e ither the rate o f levy or the 
number o f such imposts. The evidence o f qasbas Sanganer and Phagi therefore 
suggests a long-te rm  stab ility  in  the rates o f taxation despite changes in  the secular 
trend o f prices during the period.
On the other hand, our examination o f the evidence o f qasba Lalsot shows that
the zabti rates on the cu ltiva tion  o f the w in te r cereals -  wheat and barley -  were
increased substantially in  the th ird  decade o f the eighteenth century. U n like  qasbas
Sanganer and Phagi, the w in te r cereals were almost entire ly assessed in  cash in
qasba Lalsot and contributed over ha lf the annual revenue o f the qasba. O f the six
qasbas under study, the qasba w ith  a d is tribu tion  o f revenue comparable w ith  qasba
Lalsot was qasba Chatsu. A n  examination o f the rates o f taxation on w in te r cereals
in  qasba Chatsu reveals that in  pargana Chatsu also there was an increase in  the
standard rate o f taxation on "chomli" or irriga ted cereals in 1726 to over tw ice the
71rates prevailing in  the previous period. The rationale fo r  the enhancement in  the 
rates o f taxation that were levied on w in te r cereals is specified in  the d iw an’s le tte r
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to the am il o f pargana G ijgarh  w hich  clearly indicates that the increase was in
72response to the rise in  prices. The evidence suggests that there was a general 
enhancement in  the cash rates o f taxation on rabi cereals fo r  a ll parganas in  the 
mid-1730s.
Thus, the increase in  the rates o f zabti assessment on wheat and barley shows 
that the state found it  possible to adjust revenue demand to the rise in  price levels 
in  the long-run . The question that remains is why the cash rates fo r  the other zabti 
crops were not s im ila rly  revised. One reason could be the importance o f the 
revenue obtained from  w in te r cereals which made i t  necessary fo r  the state to 
m onitor the zabti rates in  parganas where assessment in cash was the predom inant 
form  o f revenue realisation and adjust these to long-te rm  changes in prices. 
A nother explanation is that in  the case o f foodgrains, i t  was feasible fo r  the state to 
collect its revenues through crop-sharing, as was the practice in  other parganas o f 
the region, in  the proportions defined by custom. Hence, i t  was possible fo r  the 
state to enhance the cash rates on foodgrains and yet prevent widespread protest by 
o ffe ring  the taxpayers the choice o f e ither paying revenue in k ind  at customary 
rates or accepting the revised cash rates.
The discussion above indicates that there was a long-te rm  stab ility  in  the cash 
rates fo r  the m a jo rity  o f the zabti crops and that, in  instances when a revision in 
revenue demand was implemented, the duration o f the lag in  the adjustment o f the 
demand to price changes was s ign ificant. The fact that the revenue rates remained 
v irtu a lly  static from  the end o f the seventeenth century to the eighteenth century in 
a period that saw a doubling o f the general level o f prices, indicates that at least 
fo r those cultivators grow ing non-foodgra in  crops there had been a reduction in  the 
real burden o f taxation. The percentage o f the annual revenue derived from
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non-foodgra in zabti crop cu ltiva tion  provides an estimate o f the scale o f ’cash’
cropping and the relative significance o f a fa ll in  the level o f taxation w ith  respect
to these crops. Exclud ing wheat and barley, the cash assessed crops contributed
about a f i f th  o f the regions annual revenue although this proportion  varied
74considerably from  pargana to pargana and over time. W ith  the exception o f 
qasba Malarna, the proportion o f the cash crops -  p rinc ipa lly  cotton, sugarcane and 
vegetables -  grown in  the qasbas was considerably higher than the regional average 
and amounted to about tw o -f if th s  o f the annual revenue in  qasbas Sanganer and 
Jaipur and between a th ird  to a sixth in  the other qasbas i f  we exclude the revenue 
obtained from  the rabi cereals (see Section I I I ,  Table 23, Chapter V III) . As we 
shall see, the cropping choices o f the rich  peasants, such as the village patels and 
some gharuhala cultivators, and the specialist agriculturists like  the Malis, were 
geared towards the production o f high value zabti crops (see Chapter V III) . Thus 
in  addition to the d iffe ren tia l structure o f taxation that gave an advantage to the 
gharuhala cultivators, a reduction in  the real level o f taxation on crops assessed in  
cash must have fu rthe r accentuated peasant d iffe ren tia tion  over the long-term .
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Chapter VII
TRENDS IN  FOO DG RAIN  PRICES
For the economic historian, the analysis o f the movement in  foodgrain prices 
remains a particu la rly  im portant and complex problem. O w ing to the inelastic 
nature o f its demand, fluctuations in the price o f foodgrains provide a sensitive 
ind icator o f variations in  the supply o f and the demand fo r food in  the economy. 
In  the context o f a dry fa rm ing region such as eastern Rajasthan w ith  a 
comparatively low  y ie ld  ratio, even a partia l fa ilu re  o f the harvest had a 
particu la rly  damaging e ffect on available food supply which was translated in to  a 
disproportionate increase in  seasonal prices. The variations in  price trends in  the 
short term thus provide a fa ir ly  accurate proxy fo r  the qua lity  o f the harvest and 
enable us to id e n tify  years o f dearth and plenty. Trends in  prices over the longer 
term and critica l tu rn ing  points in  the series are also generally readily identifiab le . 
In  this chapter we shall id e n tify  the broad secular trends as w ell as the annual 
fluctuations in the prices o f m ajor foodgrains in the eighteenth century in  our 
region. The nature o f the price data and the problems associated w ith  its 
in terpretation, however, necessitate a detailed discussion o f the method used to 
reconstruct the agricu ltura l price series in  this study and a c ritica l assessment o f 
previous e ffo rts  at analysing s im ilar price data.
The price series have been derived from  the annual revenue records o f the six 
qasbas studied. The average price o f each crop was obtained from  the annual 
figures o f the quantity o f grain sold and the revenue obtained from  the sale o f each
- 2 4 5 -
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batai crop. The weight o f the un it o f measurement -  the "man" (m aund)- varied
w idely in  the region. A  maund u n ifo rm ly  comprised 40 "sers" (seers) but the
weight o f the seer in  terms o f "tolas" varied from  qasba to qasba. Thus w hile  in
Phagi and Lalsot the seer weighed 30 tolas, that in  qasba Chatsu was 40 tolas while
*1
the qasba Jaipur and qasba Malarna seer was only 28 tolas. . Assuming that the 
tola did not vary in  weight in  the region as a whole, the d iffe re n tia l in  the local 
maund weights can be easily standardised by recalculating the quantity o f grain in  
terms o f a standard maund o f 40 seers each weighing 40 tolas. Therefore to 
compare prices across the qasbas, all maunds were firs t converted in to  a standard 
un it and the prices quoted in the arhsattas adjusted accordingly. Prices thus 
obtained were expressed in  terms o f rupees per maund.
The m ajor problem in  determ ining price trends lies in  the numerous gaps in  the 
series. These arise e ither because o f missing arhsatta records, or due to shifts in  
cropping patterns whereby certain crops stop being cu ltivated or are only sown 
in te rm itten tly ; o r changes in  the mode o f revenue realisation from  collection in  
k ind  to assessment in  cash per un it o f land (zabti) w h ich meant that the price o f 
sale was no longer recorded. The gaps in  each price series are therefore irregu larly  
d istributed over the period 1710-80. The d iff icu ltie s  invo lved in  the use o f these 
series fo r statistical analysis can best be emphasised by the fact that there is not a 
single year in  the seventy year period where data are available fo r  all o f the six 
qasbas under study. This lim ita tio n  is fu rthe r compounded by the considerable 
annual fluc tua tion  in  prices which vary in  magnitude fo r  each foodgrain produced 
in  the qasba thereby making i t  impossible to rely on po in t comparisons o f prices to 
estimate the general trend. In  order to overcome this lim ita tio n  o f the data, the
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studies conducted so fa r on s im ila r data from  the region have used three m ajor 
statistical techniques.
F irst, in  two o f the early pioneering studies, the price o f each crop was 
annually indexed to that o f wheat. W hile this method was useful in  ind ica ting  the 
comparative changes in  the prices o f foodgrains relative to wheat, its drawback was 
that i t  to ld  us lit t le  about the general price trend as the in it ia l problems o f a 
discontinuous series remained. On the basis o f the annual price ratios, the general 
inferences drawn in  these studies were that the varia tion in  the price o f kh a rif 
crops was greater than that o f the rabi foodgrains, that the comparative value o f 
d iffe re n t foodgrains in  any one pargana d id  not fo llow  a un ifo rm  pattern over time, 
and that the ir re lative ratios d iffe re d  from  pargana to pargana. However, i t  was 
noted that there was a sim ilar trend in  price changes in  years o f abnormally high or 
low  prices.
In  order to assess the overall trend in  the price level fo r  the region between 
1650 to 1750, a later w ork used weighted indices.^ The method employed was a 
current-year weighted price index w hich used the revenues derived from  each crop 
assessed in  k ind  as weights. Thus fo r each year fo r  which the arhsatta records were 
available fo r  a particu lar pargana, an index number was derived. This was done by 
deflating the revenue derived from  each batai crop by the price  ratio  o f the current 
and base year (1715), summing the deflated values thus obtained fo r  all batai crops, 
and d iv id ing  this w ith  the total current revenue received by the batai mode o f 
assessment:
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Pia Qia (p ia /  Pi0)
Pia Qia
where P Q is equal to the revenue, P ja is the current price, 
and P-Q is the price in  the base year
Hence,the two factors id en tified  earlier as causing gaps in  the price  quotations o f 
any one crop, namely a sh ift in  the c ro p -m ix  or changes in  the mode o f assessment, 
were circumvented by calculating a composite price index fo r each year. A fte r  the 
com pilation o f the price index fo r each pargana in  this way, the th ird  factor fo r the 
discontinu ity in  the series, namely missing records in each pargana series, was 
elim inated by computing an arithm etic mean o f all the non-m issing indices fo r the
C
six parganas in  a particu la r year. The trends that emerged using this method 
confirm ed the general observations o f the earlier study by Hasan et.al. that there 
had been a substantial rise in prices between the second ha lf o f the seventeenth 
century and the second decade o f the eighteenth. Moosvi and Gupta estimated that 
over this period, the rise amounted to the doubling o f prices w hich was fo llowed in  
the second quarter o f the eighteenth century by a gradual increase in  the index o f 
about ten per cent. In  terms o f the overall trend in the period 1708-50, however, 
they concluded that there was no d istinct upward or downward trend in  general.^
W hile these conclusions are im portant fo r an understanding o f the trends in 
overall prices, the method used had its lim ita tions. In  particu lar, the weighted price 
index gave no ind ication o f the price trends o f ind iv idua l crops or possible 
variations in  the general price levels between the six parganas. Besides, the method 
was biased towards exaggerating the price trend o f the crop y ie ld ing the highest 
revenue in  any year which caused certain distortions in  the index. For example, 
the weighted index shows an enormous rise in  prices in  1712, the index value being
Z
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only slightly lower than that o f a m ajor fam ine year, 1731. A  comparison w ith  our 
price index w ill show that the increase in  prices in  1712 was much lower than in 
1731 (see Append ix 3: Table 3.1). This discrepancy arises from  the fact that i t  was 
only the rabi foodgrains, especially barley, whose prices rose dram atically in 1712 
w hile  those o f the kh a rif grains rose in  the succeeding harvest which fe ll w ith in  the 
next accounting year o f 1713. O f the total revenue received from  the sale o f batai
crops, the proportion  obtained from  the sale o f rabi foodgrains was generally higher
n
than that o f the kh a rif foodgrains. Thus in a fiscal year when only the prices o f 
rabi grains rose, such as in  1712, the annual weighted price index tended to 
overstate the general price rise and conversely, when only the k h a rif grain prices 
rose, such as in  the fo llow ing  kh a rif season o f 1713, the increase is understated in
the price index. The lack o f disaggregation o f the price trends o f ind iv idua l crops
or areas in  the study made it  d if f ic u lt  to determine the extent to which shifts in  
cropping patterns were related to the movements in  prices during the period.
The price data fo r the second ha lf o f the eighteenth century (1750-C.1780) was 
analysed by D ilbagh Singh using linear regression to estimate the line o f best f i t  fo r
Q
each foodcrop cultivated in  six selected parganas. The analysis indicated that 
there had been an overall decline in  prices during this period o f varying magnitude 
fo r each crop w ith in  and across parganas. This method o f estimation, however, 
provided results o f dubious value as generally more than ha lf the observations in  
any one series were missing and i t  also precluded the iden tifica tio n  o f tu rn ing  
points in  the short term. W hile each o f the above studies have been pioneering in  
the ir analysis o f a rich  and complex data source, our attempt in  the fo llow ing  pages 
w ill be to fu rth e r systematise the price data and integrate the analysis o f the p re - 
1750 period to that o f the fo llow ing  ha lf century.
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A n  in it ia l p lo tting  o f the prices o f all the m ajor foodcrops in  the six qasbas 
indicated that despite the d ifference in  the price o f any one crop between d iffe re n t 
qasbas, the short term trends appeared to be generally sim ilar. This supposition was 
tested by a gross correlation o f the prices o f the m ajor and commonly cultivated 
crops o f the kh a rif harvest -  bajra and moth -  and o f the rabi harvest -  barley, 
wheat and gram -  fo r  the six qasbas,(Table 17) The correlation coeffic ients showed 
a high positive relationship between the prices o f the selected crops. Thus although 
price levels varied between qasbas, the s im ila rity  in  the ir trends suggested that the 
price d iffe ren tia ls  were sym m etrically linked  in  the form  o f a hierarchy.
Table.17 Gross Correlation o f Prices.
Bajra M oth Barley Wheat Gram
1. Phagi -  Sanganer 0.80 0.85 0.91 0.95 -
2. Phagi -  Jaipur 0.91 0.63 0.93 0.76 -
3. Phagi -  Chatsu 0.90 0.94 0.93 - 0.85
4. Phagi -  Lalsot 0.90 0.93 - - 0.99
5. Phagi -  Malarna 0.77 0.90 0.87 0.89 0.79
6. Sanganer -  Jaipur 0.93 0.82 0.87 0.77 —
7. Sanganer -  Chatsu 0.88 0.85 0.79 - 0.88
8. Sanganer -  Lalsot 0.89 0.92 - - -
9. Sanganer -M alarna 0.85 0.83 0.78 0.72 -
lO .Jaipur -  Chatsu 0.87 0.72 0.97 _ _
11.Jaipur -  Lalsot 0.99 0.74 - - -
12.Jaipur -  Malarna 0.78 0.55 0.84 0.65 -
13.Chatsu -  Lalsot 0.92 0.95 _ _
14.Chatsu -  Malarna 0.91 0,91 0.90 - 0.85
15.Lalsot -  Malarna 0.97 0.93 _ _
The correlation coeffic ients have not been calculated in  instances where there were 
less than 10 paired observations.
Source: Arhsatta records fo r the six parganas, c.1700-80. See Append ix  2: Tables 2.1- 
2.4, Col.A.
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In  order to investigate the observed relationship fu rthe r, f iv e  m ajor crops were 
selected and a m atrix  o f relative prices in  the six qasbas drawn up fo r  each crop. 
Given the yearly fluc tua tion  in prices and the randomly dispersed d is tribu tion  o f 
the missing values in  each series, a simple average o f the non-m issing prices in  
each series was rejected as possessing lim ited  value and a more accurate method fo r  
constructing a relative price m atrix  was devised. This was done in  two stages.
F irst, from  the six parallel series o f prices fo r any one crop, the common years 
fo r which price figures where available fo r any two qasbas was extracted and the 
mean obtained fo r each set o f common observations. This was done fo r each qasba 
in tu rn  to give a total o f fifteen  pairs o f mean values fo r  each crop (Appendix 1). 
As the years and the number o f observations common to any one set o f mean values 
d iffe red  from  any other, each set was unique and specific to the relationship being 
compared. In  the second stage, therefore, a un ifo rm  index o f re lative price ratios 
was obtained. This was done by converting the mean ratios in to  relative ratios 
w ith  the mean values o f each qasba in  tu rn  being notiona lly set to 100. The 
matrices so obtained are given in A ppend ix  1. The mean o f the six values in the 
m atrix fo r each qasba was obtained to give the average price d iffe re n tia l fo r each 
crop in  the six qasbas fo r the period and these are given below indexed to the 
relative ratio fo r prices in  qasba Malarna. Table 18 shows that although the 
magnitude o f varia tion in  the relative prices fo r  each crop across the six qasbas was 
not identical, there was, in  general, a un ifo rm  ranking order. The prices o f qasbas 
Jaipur and Sanganer were the highest fo llow ed by Chatsu and Lalsot and those o f 
Malarna and Phagi the lowest fo r  each crop.^ Table 18 confirm s our in it ia l 
hypothesis that there was a systematic hierarchy in  the prices o f food crops between 
qasbas which was broadly o f a s im ila r magnitude.
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Table 18: Relative Prices of Foodgrains in Six Qasbas
Crop Malarna Chatsu Sanganer Jaipur Phagi Lalso
Bajra 100 110 125 141 101 123
M oth 100 108 1701 151 100 105
Barley 100 109 119 138 76 -
Wheat 100 - 119 136 98 -
Gram 100 112 - - 101 -
Source: See A ppend ix 1.
1
Notes to Table 17: The ratio fo r  Sanganer is unusually high as the proceeds
from  the sale o f moth in  this qasba included an additional 
tax element realised in  cash ("n irn i") w h ich is generally 
inseparable from  the actual sale value.
Ratios were not calculated where the paired observations 
were less than 10.
A  symmetrical hierarchy in  crop prices has a number o f im plications. F irst, i t  
indicates that the price d iffe ren tia ls  between d iffe ren t crops in  each qasba were 
broadly sim ilar. This observation appears inconsistent w ith  earlier studies which 
emphasised that the comparative value o f crops in each area was dissim ilar. As we 
have discussed earlier this inference was made on the basis o f an annual price ratio 
indexed to the yearly wheat price. The nature o f the demand fo r  a luxu ry  crop 
such as wheat, in  addition to the fact that wheat was invariab ly  irriga ted  and so its 
outturn was more stable than that o f other foodcrops meant that the va riab ility  in  
its price was o f a d iffe re n t magnitude and not as closely linked  to that o f the more 
w idely cultivated foodcrops o f mass consumption. This is most clearly seen in years 
o f scarcity when the prices o f the ’poorer' crops rose dram atically compared to 
wheat. G iven these factors, the choice o f a wheat-based index tends to mask the 
essential u n ifo rm ity  in the price trends o f the basic foodgrains and the resulting 
distortions accentuate the apparent randomness o f annual price variations. We have
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therefore chosen to index the annual price ratios to ba jra  prices rather than wheat 
fo r all qasbas except Lalsot. In  qasba Lalsot bajra was sown only in frequen tly  and 
hence we have had to use moth prices as our annual index variable. A lthough we 
cannot expect the ratios in  an annual index to be identical over tim e and space 
given the number o f factors a ffecting  seasonal prices d iffe re n tia lly  fo r  each crop, 
there does appear to have been an essentially sim ilar ranking order o f crop prices 
common to all areas (cf.A ppend ix 4 :Tables on Price Relatives).
Prices were highest fo r the oilseeds, sesame and rapeseed, fo llow ed by the 
pulses, mung and urad, and then wheat. Next in  order were the two most w ide ly 
cultivated kh a rif foodcrops bajra and moth. The average re lative prices o f these 
two crops was almost equal although the ir ranking was d iffe re n t in  each area owing 
to the marginal differences in  the ir prices. Next in  the ranking order were the 
three m ixed crops o f the rabi harvest (gochani, gojai and ba ijha ri) and ju w a r 
cultivated in  the autumn season. The price o f barley was the lowest in  all the six 
qasbas. Gram prices, however, do not exh ib it a un ifo rm  ranking order in  the 
qasbas, being higher than bajra in qasbas Chatsu and Malarna and lower than bajra 
in  Phagi, Lalsot and Sanganer.
The high correlation in  the price trends o f food crops in  d iffe re n t qasbas as
well as the ir systematic linkage also suggests that the factors in fluenc ing  prices in
the region as a whole were broadly s im ilar to the extent that in  the long run,
agricu ltura l prices tended to move in  the same direction. G iven that the maximum
distance between the two furthest qasbas selected in  our study was about 64 miles,
the overall c lim atic  conditions a ffecting  agricultura l production can be assumed to
10have been un ifo rm , notw ithstanding m icro level variations. Further, as discussed
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earlier, prices were arrived at through negotiation between the state, which was the
single largest seller o f grain in the market, and the caste association o f the m ajor
grain purchasers resident in  the qasbas. The la tte r had the ir agents trading in  other
qasbas as well. This could perhaps have served to integrate the regional market as
price in fo rm ation  was accessible to both parties. S.P. Gupta has recently shown
that the regional price in tegration extended beyond the po litica l boundary o f the
emerging Jaipur state to include the Trans-Yamuna tract com prising the ad jo in ing
11d is tric t (sarkar) o f Agra.
Having quantified  the observed varia tion in  the price levels o f the qasbas in the 
manner described above, it  became possible to estimate the missing prices in  each 
series by reference to those available in parallel series fo r  any one crop. This was 
done fo r fou r m ajor foodcrops fo r which we had adequate data fo r  at least fou r o f 
the six qasbas, namely bajra, moth, barley and wheat (see A ppend ix 2 fo r 
estimation method). In  order to assess the va lid ity  o f the estimation method, actual 
prices fo r each crop and qasba were p lotted alongside estimated prices derived from  
the available observations in  the price series o f the other qasbas (Appendix 2: 
Figures 2.M.1 to 2.L.4). The close f i t  o f the two curves indicated that the average 
price d iffe re n tia l between qasbas that we had calculated was fa ir ly  constant over 
the period 1710-80, or in  other words, there did not appear to be a marked trend 
towards convergence or divergence o f prices in  the period. Further, i t  showed that 
i t  was feasible to interpolate the estimated prices fo r the missing years to construct 
a complete price series fo r  each crop (Appendix 2: Tables 2.1 to 2.4) From these 
qasba price series, an average regional price series was derived fo r  each o f the fou r 
selected crops. The la tter were indexed to the base year 1716 and a geometric
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mean o f the indexed values computed to form  the regional price index (Appendix 
3, Table 3.1 and Fig.3.2).
Before m oving on to a closer examination o f the secular trends, i t  would be 
pertinent to examine the nature o f the cyclical and short term price movements. 
Seasonal price movements in  general present a d istinct pattern o f low  prices after 
harvest and high prices in  the in ter-harvest period. The cyclica l nature o f the
seasonal price rhythms was a func tion  o f the pe riod ic ity  in  production and the
1 2marketing o f produce. As we had discussed in  an earlier chapter, the needs o f
local revenue adm inistration made it  necessary fo r the state to record daily prices o f
foodgrains in  a ll qasbas. A n  examination o f two such price lists by S.P.Gupta to
13study seasonal price trends however produced some anomalous observations. In  
the study, the average m onthly prices o f a number o f foodgrains were presented in  
terms o f the ir relative value w ith  respect to the average wheat price in that month 
fo r qasba Mauzabad (1664) and Sawai Jaipur (1735). For both these sets o f figures, 
the prices o f all the crops relative to wheat remain exceptionally stable throughout 
the year. S.P.Gupta concludes by suggesting that market conditions were more 
stable in  the seventeenth-eighteenth centuries than one would have supposed.
’S tab ility ’ in  market conditions, however, cannot account fo r  the lack o f 
seasonality in  agricu ltura l prices. Contrary to the conclusions drawn by S.P.Gupta, 
i t  could be in fe rred  that his results con firm  the non-m arket character o f the 
economy where prices were o f lit t le  importance and that they were merely symbols 
o f a fixed  system o f values bearing no relationship to exchange values determined 
by the factors o f supply and demand. This view would also conform  w ith  
K .R .H a ll’s study o f prices in  early medieval south Ind ia  where the s tab ility  in
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prices was attribu ted to the persistence o f customary ratios in  the relative values o f 
various commodities measured in  terms o f baskets o f r ic e .^  This argument, 
therefore, reduces the n irakh bazar records to an annual price schedule fo r grain 
disposal which had lit t le  relation to market prices. A l l  the available evidence 
however indicates the converse, and the fact that both the da ily  price lists analysed 
by S.P.Gupta were incomplete in terms o f the ir coverage fo r  the year may have 
v itia ted the results.
In  order to fu rth e r ve rify  our contention that the prices recorded in the n irakh 
bazaar were negotiated reta il prices current in  the qasba we have set out in  Table.19 
the average m onthly prices o f selected k h a rif and rabi foodgrains obtained from  the 
daily price lis t o f qasba Phagi fo r  the fiscal year 1725/26. The m ajor lim ita tions o f 
the series is that the price records are based on the fiscal year w hich does not 
correspond w ith  the m arketing year thus making i t  d if f ic u lt  to isolate seasonality on
I  f
the basis o f a single series. A t  a general level, the m onth ly prices do exh ib it a 
pattern o f seasonal varia tion w ith  lower prices a fte r harvest and h igher prices in  the 
subsequent period. Prices are lowest during the peak m arketing period a fte r the 
harvest, in  December-January fo r  the kh a rif crops and June-Ju ly fo r  the rabi 
grains. Subsequent price movements, however, do not conform  entire ly to the 
seasonal rhythm . K h a r if prices attained the ir highest level in  Ju ly, a fte r which 
they fe ll s ligh tly  and s im ila rly  rabi prices were highest in  September a fte r which 
they appear to drop. These two months also correspond to the sowing period fo r 
the respective harvests and possibly the demand fo r  seed, in add ition to the normal 
consumer demand, contributed to a rise in  prices in  these months. Contrary to our 
expectations, the price level o f both ba jra  and moth in  the period im m ediately pre­
harvest, from  September to November, are u n ifo rm ly  low. In  add ition to factors o f
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Table 19: Index o f Average M onth ly  Prices o f Foodgrains: Qasba Phagi 1725/26. 
(K h a r if  crops: January 1726 = 100.00 Rabi crops: June 1726 = 100.00).
K H A R IF  R A B I
Bajra
(new)
Baj ra 
(old)
M oth
(new)
M oth
(old)
Urad Barley Wheat
(hard)
Wheat
(soft)
Sept - 100.89 - 90.93 92.86 117.91 112.4 111.53
Oct - 100.57 - 91.93 95.62 115.96 110.27 110.32
Nov _ 97.02 - 91.63 106.26 111.18 106.29 106.94
Dec 105.63 103.48 100.43 98.30 103.82 110.59 103.45 103.48
Jan 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 110.56 103.33 102.34
Feb 100.07 99.24 104.81 102.41 98.12 112.69 103.41 103.39
M ar 103.33 102.70 104.92 105.35 100.69 115.46 108.32 108.96
A p r 102.01 98.30 101.55 99.89 109.11 112.60 107.40 108.61
May 102.64 96.94 98.92 98.82 115.40 101.63 100.81 100.42
June 106.62 102.59 105.48 103.82 127.40 100.00 100.00 100.00
July 111.93 102.18 111.10 105.06 135.34 100.25 100.29 100.04
Aug 102.95 95.82 113.76 102.61 139.64 101.59 102.24 101.36
Mean,*
Price 41.09 43.73 35.41 39.97 23.12 47.04 33.31 34.11
Source: Roznama N irakh  Bazar, qasba Phagi, VS 1782/AD  1725-26
Notes to Table 19: For the kh a rif crops bajra and moth two prices are recorded from  
Maghshri sudi 6 corresponding to early December 1725. These relate to the price o f the 
crop o f the current harvest (new) and the price o f the old stock o f the previous harvest 
(old). Wheat hard and soft are two varieties o f wheat termed katha and bajva in  our 
sources.
* Mean price is the average price o f the crop fo r the twelve month period in  seers per 
rupee w ith  40 seers equal to one m an-i-Shahjahani or 73.76 kgs.
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supply and demand, prices in  this period were also conditioned by the size o f the 
unsold stock from  the previous harvest and prospects o f the coming harvest, the 
risk o f losses from  spoilage o f stored grain and the fa ll in  value o f old stock 
oncethe next crop was harvested. U rad, which is a re la tive ly higher value kh a rif 
crop, exhibits a w ider range in  seasonal price variation w hich also fo llow  the 
expected pattern o f an almost continuous rise in  prices a fte r the harvest.
Overarching the very short seasonal cycles were the annual variations in prices 
which were essentially a function  o f the pattern o f ra in fa ll and its e ffect on 
production and the size o f the harvest. A nnual prices closely reflected variations in  
the size o f the harvest and this relationship was particu la rly  sensitive in a region 
where the level o f in tegration to the in ter-reg iona l network fo r  bu lk commodities 
such as foodgrains was re lative ly low  given the costs o f overland transport. The 
inverse correlation between output and prices is the most obvious in years o f 
fam ine (see Append ix 3, Figs. 3.1 ,3.2). Each o f the ’peaks’ in  the price curves 
appended corresponds to a year o f acute scarcity (or "kahatsali") caused by the 
fa ilu re  o f the rains.
References to the fam ine conditions in  1712/3, 1717, 1731, 1755-60 are
1numerous in  the o ff ic ia l correspondence between local revenue administrators. 
The fam ine years were generally preceded by three to fou r successive poor harvests 
and were characterised by a massive increase in the prices o f the low -va lue 
foodgrains. U n like  the famines in  the firs t ha lf o f the century which were 
generally fo llowed by a fa ir ly  rapid recovery in  production, the m id-1750s fam ine 
marks the beginning o f a phase o f a long term decline in  production that was not
17
reversed fo r a decade. The graph o f regional price trends shows that prices were
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highest in  the years 1754-60, w ith  1755 prices being about three times higher than 
normal. The severity o f the drought in  the mid-1750s was aggravated fu rthe r by 
the incessant Maratha raids during this period. In  various complaints made by the 
peasants regarding taxation levels in  this period, the overall fa ll in  production has 
been specifica lly ascribed to the series o f droughts and Maratha depredations 
resulting in  extreme poverty and the em igration o f the peasantry in  large 
numbers."^ The sharp fa ll in  population and production that resulted from  the 
combined effects o f drought and war had a long term e ffect on the economy o f the 
region which, u n til the end o f our period, had not been able to recover to its p re - 
1750 level. The severity o f the fam ine over this period was inde lib ly  etched in  the 
memory o f the populace who, more than a hundred years later, remembered it  as 
the "daso tia ".^
Substantial price rises in 1726, 1737, 1742, 1763 and 1770 were also caused by
*20 • the lack o f adequate ra in fa ll. The fa ilu re  o f the monsoon generally led to a rise
in  the prices o f both kh a rif and rabi grains due to a poorer output in  both harvests
and the continued effects o f food shortage t i l l  the next successful season. The
effect o f drought on the rabi harvest in  particu lar can be gauged from  the record
o f cu ltiva tion  in  pargana Pahadi in  1723. Owing to the fa ilu re  o f the rains, the
seasonal stream had dried up and the cu ltiva tion  o f the rabi was possible in only 4
21o f the 32 villages mentioned in  the report, all fou r o f w hich had kutcha wells. 
The im m inent fa ilu re  o f the monsoons probably signalled a change in  the cropping 
pattern to hardier drought-resistant crops in  response to the lim ite d  ava ilab ility  o f 
water both in storage devices and subsoil levels. The e ffec t o f this sh ift in  the 
c rop -m ix  perhaps caused a particu la rly  marked rise in  the price o f wheat in  these
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years, as compared to the fam ine years, where the crisis in  subsistence caused the 
prices o f mass consumption foodgrains to rise more sharply.
In  years such as 1713 and 1760, however, the upswing in  the prices o f grain 
harvested in kh a rif was not fo llow ed by a concomitant rise in  the rabi prices (see 
Append ix 3, Fig.3.1). In  fact, in  qasbas Lalsot, Malarna and Sanganer, production 
in  the rabi harvest o f 1713 was considerably greater than in  a normal year such as 
1716. The non-synchronous trends in the kh a rif and rabi prices and production 
probably resulted from  the adverse tim ing  o f the monsoons rather than the volume 
o f precip itation . The late a rriva l o f the monsoon rains frequently  resulted in  the 
fa ilu re  o f the k h a rif harvest w h ile  prom oting an extension in  cropping in  the 
succeeding rabi season. This would have had the e ffect o f increasing the prices o f 
kh a rif grains w ith  lit t le , or a muted, impact on the price level o f the succeeding 
rabi crop. On the other hand, the sharp rise in  the rabi prices in 1748 and 
1758/59, which is not reflected in the preceding or the fo llow ing  kh a rif prices, can 
perhaps be a ttribu ted in  part to the Maratha depredations in  the w in te r o f these 
years by Peshwa Bala ji Rao and M alhar H o lkar, respectively.
In  so fa r as the revenue fo r the m ajor foodgrains in  the region was assessed in  
k ind at a fixed  proportion  o f the output, the annual varia tion in  prices had a direct 
and sign ifican t impact on the revenues realised by the state. U n like  systems o f 
fixed  cash assessments where the inverse relationship between gross 
output/m arketed output and prices meant that the impact o f price fluctuations on 
small peasant producers was more negative than positive, in  the batai system o f 
assessment, the producers paid a fixed  proportion o f the ir output irrespective both 
o f the size o f the harvest and the p reva iling  prices. As has been argued earlier, crop
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sharing was in  p rinc ip le  a mechanism fo r risk-sharing w hich was more
advantageous to the peasant in  regions o f insecure agricu ltura l p roduction subject to
repeated droughts and famines. The state, on the other hand, often stood to gain in
years of high prices despite the reduced amount o f in  k ind  revenue it  could collect.
The monetary value o f the revenue in  bad years may equal or even exceed that in
normal years. Thus in  1731, a year o f severe fam ine, the total revenue realised
from  qasba Sanganer was about six per cent higher than the previous year although
overall production had declined s ign ifican tly  in  terms o f the area cultivated (by 16
24per cent) and the quantity o f revenue in -k in d  collected (by 32 per cent). 
S im ilarly, the revenues o f qasba M alarna were more than eleven per cent higher in 
the fam ine year o f 1717 as compared to 1716. On the other hand, cash assessed 
revenues, such as in  the zabti system, remained the same or declined in  years o f
O fthigh prices in  proportion  to the nature and amount o f tax remissions sanctioned.
In  a m ixed system o f part cash and part k ind  revenue payment practised in  our 
region, contradictory movements in  the revenue returns dependent upon the mode 
o f revenue realisation provide one o f the reasons why i t  is not possible to use the 
total annual revenue figures as a simple index o f agricu ltura l production.
Turn ing  to the longer term movements in agricu ltura l prices, Table 20 traces the 
decennial price trends o f the fou r crops bajra, moth, barley and wheat based upon 
the mean price in  each decade. Prices were re latively low  p r io r  to the severe 
drought o f 1712/3. The sharp increase in  prices as a result o f the drought was 
fo llowed by a fa ir ly  unsettled period o f price oscillation to be succeeded by 
afamine in  1717/1718. A t  the close o f the second decade o f the eighteenth century, 
average prices o f all fou r foodcrops stood at a s ign ifican tly  higher level than at the 
turn  o f the century. The magnitude o f the price increase was much greater fo r the
2 6 2
T a b le  20
Average P r i c e s  of  Major  F o o d g r a in s  i n  E a s t e r n  R a j a s t h a n  c, 1710-1780.
B a j r a  Moth B a r l e y  Wheat
A: <1) (2) (1) (2) <1) (2) (1) (2)
1691-1711 0 . 8 8 53 0 .81 53 0 . 8 4 79 1.30 78
1712-1719 1. 65 100 1. 54 100 1.07 100 1. 67 100
1720-1729 1,31 79 1. 17 76 1.09 102 1. 64 98
1730-1739 1. 77 107 1.61 105 1,34 125 2.02 121
1740-1744 1. 37 83 1. 36 88 1. 13 106 1.67 100
1745-1754 1. 28 78 1. 19 77 1. 16 108 1. 64 98
1755-1764 1.89 115 1.88 122 1.35 126 2.02 121
1765-1774 1,01 61 0 .8 7 56 0 .8 5 79 1.35 81
1775-1779 1. 28 78 1,46 95 1. 31 122 1,72 103
B: Mean P r i c e (Rs./Mnd) 1.59 1. 53 1. 28 1. 85
C: %  C o e f f , V a r i a t i o n  44,61 52 .35 36. 61 31. 51
D: Modal P r i c e Range 1.25 - 1 . 4 5 1. 15-■1. 35 1 .00 -■1. 20 1. 50-■1.8C
S o u r c e : See Appendix 3, T a b le  3. 1
Notes  to  Ta b le  20:
S e c t i o n  A:
Col ,  (1) r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  mean of  t h e  r e g i o n a l  p r i c e  w i t h i n  t h e  y e a r s  
i n d i c a t e d ,  In  c a l c u l a t i n g  t h e  mean, y e a r s  o f  a b n o rm a l l y  h i g h  p r i c e s  or  
famine y e a r s  <1717, 1731, 1737, 1754, 1755, 1756) ha v e  been e xc luded
from t h e  c o m p u ta t io n  f o r  a l l  c r o p s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  r a b i  g r a i n  p r i c e s  r o s e  
t o  famine  l e v e l s  i n  1712 and 1758 and k h a r i f  p r i c e s  i n  1713 and 1760. 
The r e s p e c t i v e  y e a r s  have  t h e r e f o r e  been e x c lu d e d  f o r  t h e  r a b i  c rops ,  
wheat and b a r l e y ,  and t h e  k h a r i f  c r o p s ,  b a j r a  and moth, In  a l l ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  e i g h t  o b s e r v a t i o n s  have  been  e xc luded  from e ach  c rop  s e r i e s .
Col .  (2) The mean p r i c e  i n  t h e  p e r i o d  1712-1719 c a l c u l a t e d  i n  c o l . l  has  
been t ak e n  a s  b a s e  i n  o r d e r  t o  compare r e l a t i v e  p r i c e  changes  i n  each 
t im e  p e r i o d  f o r  t h e  f o u r  c r o p s .
S e c t i o n  B:
The mean r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  a r i t h e m e t i c  mean f o r  a l l  o b s e r v a t i o n s  i n  each 
r e g i o n a l  p r i c e  s e r i e s  w i t h i n  t h e  y e a r s  1691-1779,
S e c t i o n  C:
The p e r c e n t a g e  c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  v a r i a t i o n  f o r  a l l  o b s e r v a t i o n s  i n  each 
s e r i e s  = S t d , B e v i a t i o n x  100 
Mean
S e c t i o n  D;
The modal p r i c e  r a n g e  i n c l u d e s  t h e  most f r e q u e n t l y  o c c u r r i n g  p r i c e .  
Each of  the  r a n g e s  i n c o r p o r a t e s  17 o b s e r v a t i o n s  f o r  e ach  c ro p  (approx.  a 
q u a r t e r  of  t h e  t o t a l  number of  a l l  o b s e r v a t i o n s  i n  each  s e r i e s ) ,
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two kh a rif crops (approximately 100 per cent) and only about 28 per cent fo r wheat 
and barley. The 1720s were a period o f relative stab ility  in  prices marked by a 
decline in  the kh a rif crop prices w hich nevertheless continued to be higher than in  
the pre-1710 period. Rabi grain prices remained high t i l l  1723 and fe ll thereafter 
making the ir average in the 1720s equal that o f the preceding decade. A fte r  the 
devastating fam ine o f 1731 there fo llow ed another hike in  prices o f approximately 
25 per cent fo r  all fou r crops. Between 1740-53 prices fe ll again to the 1720s level 
to be fo llow ed by a decade long series o f unrem itting  crises. In  eight o f the ten 
years between 1754-63, the price index stood at over one and a ha lf times the base 
year, 1716 (See Append ix 3 Table 3.1). Prices o f the two kh a rif crops in  particu lar 
rose by nearly f i f t y  per cent atta in ing the ir highest levels in  the decade 1755-64. 
The rise in  wheat and barley prices was more modest in  comparison and was on 
average the same as that in  the 1730s. In  the next decade, from  1765 to 1774, there 
was a sudden collapse in  prices to approxim ately the level in the pre-1710 period. 
This is the only period in the series when the price o f moth fa lls below that o f 
bajra. This dramatic fa ll in  the price level was only pa rtia lly  reversed in the 
fo llow ing  five  years in  varying degrees fo r each o f the crops studied. The recovery 
in  the price o f barley was most notable fo llowed to a lesser extent by wheat, moth 
and bajra. A t  the end o f our period, therefore, prices continue to be higher than 
in  the pre-1710 phase but the relative ranking of ind iv idua l crop prices does not 
appear to fo llow  as un ifo rm  a pattern as in  the preceding decades.
What emerges from  the above description o f price trends is that there was a 
marked parallel evolution in  the prices o f the fou r m ajor foodgrains in  the six 
qasbas studied. U nfortuna te ly , the arhsatta records are not available beyond c.1780 
fo r any o f the six qasbas. However, prices o f wheat, barley and bajra  prevalent in
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the c ity  o f Jaipur between 1761 and 1897 have been recorded by D r.T .H olbe in
27Hendley in  A  M edico-Topographical Account o f  Jeypore published in  1895. 
D r.Hendley’s tables are reported to have been compiled from  the n irakh bazar 
records o f the c ity  under the orders o f the then 'Prime M in is te r' o f Jaipur State and 
represent the average prices in  the k h a rif and rabi seasons o f the three foodgrains 
mentioned. I t  is unclear, however, i f  the prices quoted are in  terms o f the B ritish  
Indian rupees and seers or the local Ja ipuri (Jharshahi) rupee and seer weight. As 
we are p rim a rily  concerned w ith  assessing the trends in  prices rather than the 
absolute value o f commodities we have linked  the two series by indexing both to a 
common base year, 1762 (Append ix 3:Table 3.2).
A  comparison o f the indexed values in  the two series shows that fo r  the few 
years where they overlap, the annual price changes are not always o f the same 
magnitude. This anomaly is pa rticu la rly  marked in the case o f bajra prices between 
1777-79 which are considerably higher in  Hendley's tables than ba jra  or even wheat 
prices recorded in  the arhsattas fo r  the same years. As we have observed from  our 
examination o f the annual arhsatta prices, the general relationship o f low er bajra 
prices relative to wheat was only reversed in  years o f exceptional scarcity, such as 
in 1717, 1731, 1755-56. But there is no evidence that fam ine conditions prevailed 
in the region in  the years 1777-79 as the prices quoted in  H endley’s tables appear 
to suggest. S im ilarly, the exceptionally high price o f barley in  the rabi season of 
1772, which stood at more than tw ice that o f wheat fo r  the same season, remains 
inexplicable. These discrepancies raise doubts about the accuracy o f the prices 
recorded in  D r. Hendley's tables. However, barring the few  discrepancies noted, 
the quinquennial trends in  the arhsatta and Hendley’s series are broadly consistent 
over the period 1760-75.
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Table 3.2 in  A ppend ix 3 combines the price data available fo r  qasba Sawai 
Jaipur fo r the period 1730-79 w ith  that in  Hendley’s tables fo r  the period 1760- 
1800. In  order to make the two series comparable, the annual prices in  each series 
were firs t indexed to a year that was common to both series and the data complete 
in  respect o f values fo r all three crops, bajra, barley and wheat. The year 1762 was 
chosen as the base year as i t  satisfied these conditions and appears to have been a 
’normal’ year. W ith the exception o f the fam ine years, such as the severe "chalisa" 
o f 1783/4 and the widespread fam ine in  the early 1790s, prices tended to be lower 
after the m id-1760s than in  the previous decades. Price movements in  the last 
th ir ty  years o f the century tended to be unstable and gradually d rifte d  lower, 
ebbing to the ir lowest po in t in  the century in  the last five  years. In  fact the 
troubled decade 1755-64 which saw the highest prices in  the century, marks a 
clearly discernable ’ tu rn ing  p o in t’ between the secular rise in  prices in  the f irs t ha lf 
o f the century and the reversal o f this trend in  the later years.
To fac ilita te  comparison, the annual indexed prices in  both series have been 
averaged over each quinquennium and the average price fo r  the period 1760 to 
1764 set to 100 in  Table 21. Section C o f Table 21 shows that there was an overall 
fa ll o f over 20 per cent in  the average price of all fou r foodcrops between the 
periods 1730-64 and 1765-1800 in  the c ity  o f Jaipur.
In  this chapter we have charted the long term movements in  prices. I t  is the 
interpretation o f these trends and the way in which they relate to the w ider 
economy, however, that proves more challenging. A re  price trends sim ply the 
consequence o f variations in  the supply o f money or are they causally linked to 
more fundamental changes in  the relationship between population and food supply?
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Table 21: Average Prices of Foodgrains in Oasba Jaipur c.1730-1800.
A:
Bajra 
(A ) (H)
Barley 
(A ) (H)
Wheat 
(A ) (H)
1730-
1735-
1740-
1745-
1750-
1755-
1760-
1765-
1770-
1775-
1780-
1785-
1790-
1795-
•34
■39
•44
49
■54
-59
■64
69
74
■79
84
89
94
1800
B: Mean Price (Rs./maund)
C: Average index value
1730-1764 (A ) 
1765-1800 (H)
91
96
70
63
75
123
100
48
60
67
100
43
73
110
83
51
90
39
1.95 1.41
101
132
87
95
110
136
100
64
77
108
100
58
115
94
85
68
119
54
1.64 1.36
104
136
87
91
104
130
100
70
76
95
100
81
92
93 
88 
67
110
60
2.27 1.72
88 109 107
70 85 82
Source: See A ppend ix 3, Table 3.2.
Notes to Table 21:
Section A : For each o f the three crops, the average index values have been derived 
from  the prices calculated from  the arhsattas (Col.A ) or from  D r.H endley’s tables 
(Col.H). Cols. A  and H  represent the mean o f the regional price w ith in  the years 
indicated indexed to the average price in  the period 1760-64. In  calculating the 
mean, years o f abnormally high prices or fam ine years (1731, 1755, 1756,1784) have 
been excluded from  the computation fo r  all crops. In  all, therefore, fou r 
observations have been excluded from  each crop series.
Section B: The mean price represents the arithm etic mean fo r  all observations in
each price series in  terms o f rupees per standard maund o f fo rty  seers.
Section C: The average index value o f the prices o f bajra, barley and wheat w ith in  
the stated periods o f th ir ty  five  years each.
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The inadequacy o f our knowledge regarding trends in  population and p roductiv ity  
in  the p re-co lon ia l period make i t  d if f ic u lt  to relate secular price trends to changes 
in the internal economy. As a result there has been a marked emphasis on
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monetary factors in  p rov id ing  explanations fo r long run price changes. A lthough 
the question o f money supply is im portant in  an economy w hich was dependent 
upon imports fo r the standard un it o f its currency, the s ilve r rupee, the exact 
mechanism through which money supply affected prices remains unclear. On the 
other hand, the lack o f firm  evidence on trends in  population, and in particu la r the 
sections who were dependent upon the market, makes hypotheses based on changes 
in  demand h igh ly tenuous.
A  fu rthe r problem in the analysis o f a regional price series is that the paucity
o f comparable series fo r  other areas makes i t  d if f ic u lt  to isolate general price trends
from  those specific to the locality. For instance, rice prices in  Bengal constitute the
only other comparable continuous series that is available fo r  the eighteenth century.
A  comparison o f the price trends in  Bengal and eastern Rajasthan shows that prices
in both regions exh ib it an almost synchronous rise in the firs t ha lf o f the century.
However, there was a tremendous spurt in  prices in  Bengal in  the th ird  quarter o f
the century w h ich later levelled out and d rifte d  lower in to  the early nineteenth 
29century. Thus, the period w hich saw a deflationary movement in  prices in  
eastern Rajasthan coincided w ith  a marked hike in  prices in Bengal despite the 
stoppage in  the im port o f bu llion  by the East Ind ia  Company. Should we then 
consider the fa ll in  prices in  our region after the m id-1760s as an anomaly caused 
by uniquely local factors which combined to create the downward pressure? 
A lthough prices are certainly susceptible to local conditions, the lack o f 
correspondence in  the price trends noted above could equally be a ttribu ted to the
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separateness o f Bengal and eastern Rajasthan as constituents o f d istinct regional 
economic units which were subject to divergent economic s tim u li, pa rticu la rly  a fte r 
1757. Let us f irs t examine the local context.
The rise in  prices in  eastern Rajasthan from  about 1720 to 1745 coincided w ith  
developments in  the po litica l economy o f the region that were conducive to 
economic growth. The reign o f Sawai Jai Singh saw the quelling o f destructive 
internal co n flic t and the form ation o f a centralised state-apparatus modelled on the 
Mughal system. Jaipur became the centre o f an expanded raj contro lling  larger 
resources. In  this period o f intensive state form ation, a sustained e ffo r t was made 
at expanding the spheres o f production and exchange. Merchants and traders were
l f l
encouraged to settle and many m igrated from  neighbouring A gra and Delh i. A n
expansion in  commercial ac tiv ity  was also fac ilita ted by the closer in tegration o f the
region w ith  the trade nexus between A gra  and Gujarat. The m a jor trade routes
lin k in g  north Ind ia  to the west coast passed through M alwa. W ith  the collapse o f
Im peria l au thority  in  the province o f M alwa due to the constant fear o f attacks by
the Marathas, trade began to flow  via A jm e r or western Rajasthan passing through 
31Jaipur. There is evidence that G u ja ra ti cotton traders now began to make 
purchases in  the cotton market at qasba Sanganer. As we shall see in  the next 
chapter, the expansion and in tensifica tion  o f agricultura l p roduction that took place 
in  this period must also have stimulated economic ac tiv ity  and pushed up internal 
demand. The buoyancy o f prices in  the region was certa in ly a re flection  o f the 
favourable economic and po litica l conjuncture in  the f irs t ha lf o f the eighteenth 
century.
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Politica l factors in  the h istory o f the Jaipur state have generally been advanced 
to explain the fa ll in  prices in  the la tte r ha lf o f the eighteenth century. The annual 
Maratha raids between 1748 and 1761 are said to have created a climate o f
instab ility  causing a serious d isruption in  trade between Ja ipur and the surrounding
33areas. As a consequence, the supply o f foodgrains outstripped demand resulting 
in  a "glut" in  the market. W hile i t  is like ly  that the in tensified  po litica l co n flic t in
the region in  this period must have adversely affected the volum e o f in tra -reg iona l
trade, there is l it t le  evidence to sustain the argument that the region was a g ra in - 
surplus area w ith  a s ign ificant "exportable" margin. On the other hand, there is no 
doubt that the severe fam ine in  1755 and the fo llow ing  five  years o f scarcity led to 
considerable depopulation o f the region. A  more plausible demand-based 
explanation would be that the depopulation was d isproportionately greater in  the 
urban areas and w ith in  the ranks o f the sections dependent on the market fo r food, 
although this hypothesis cannot be ve rified .
The deflationary trend in prices also coincided w ith  a period that saw a
succession o f ine ffectua l m ino rity  regimes, unbrid led factionalism  in  court and the
successful breaking-away o f the pow erfu l lineage-head, Pratap Singh Naruka, to
found the M achheri s ta te d  In  the last th ir ty  years o f the century, the raj was
constantly under threat o f in ternal fragmentation w ith  the more ambitious
contenders invok ing  the support o f the Marathas or the Mughals. I t  is like ly  that
the eruption o f endemic con flic t underm ined commercial confidence leading to the
flig h t o f capital. The available evidence suggests that the exodus o f traders and
merchants (the "Marwaris") from  Rajasthan to the po litica lly  stable regimes to the
35west and successor states o f Awadh and Benaras to the east began in  the 1780s.
I t  is probable that the em igration o f the most prom inent mercantile group in  Jaipur,
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the Jains, began as early as the 1760s fo llow ing  a succession o f an ti-Ja in  riots in
-j/*
Jaipur.
In  relation to the ir resident population, the Jains commanded disproportionate 
prominence in  terms o f the ir business and adm inistrative importance. Members o f 
the Jain com m unity held the o ffice  o f diwan, the highest adm inistrative post in  the 
state bureaucracy, throughout the f irs t ha lf o f the eighteenth century, and Jains 
were reputed to have commanded ha lf the total commercial wealth between 
Rajasthan and Bengal. The Buddhi V ilasa , w ritten  in  1770 when sporadic attacks 
against the Jains were s till continu ing, records the vio lent death o f a leading Jain 
preceptor, one Todarmal Terapanthi, by H indu  mobs led by one o f the sp iritua l
gurus o f Raja Sawai Madho Singh. A lthough the causes fo r the series o f a n ti-
Jain riots spanning a decade between 1761-70 are not clear, they appear to be 
associated w ith  the grow ing po litica l and commercial im portance o f the m ilitan t
Vaishnav "bairagi" sec ts .^  Madho Singh was the only Jaipur raja to have
appointed a member o f this sect as personal guru and the k ing ’s tacit acquiescence 
and condoning o f the riots is im p lied  in  the account presented in  the Buddhi 
Vilasa.41
W hile these local factors no doubt had a s ign ificant impact on the magnitude 
and the tim ing  o f price shifts in  the short term, at a more general level price trends 
were responsive to the overall regional economic forces which shaped the long-term  
trends. Price in fo rm ation  fo r other areas o f north Ind ia  during the eighteenth 
century is fragm entary and generally anecdotal. The available data fo r the f irs t
ha lf o f the century appears to fo llow  a general upward trend s im ila r to the
4 9observed trend in eastern Rajasthan. There is remarkably lit t le  in fo rm ation  on
271
prices in north Ind ia  during the la tte r ha lf o f the century. Wheat prices in  Delh i 
from  1763-1835 compiled by Jevons indicate that u n til 1800 prices were in  general 
lower than in  the firs t quarter o f the nineteenth century. The crests and troughs in  
Jevons’ price lis t are broadly s im ila r to those in  Hendley’s series fo r  Jaipur over the 
same p e r io d .^  From the evidence available, therefore, i t  appears reasonable to 
in fe r that the secular movements in  foodgrain prices in  eastern Rajasthan accurately 
reflected the general price trends in north Ind ia  during the eighteenth century.
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Notes to Chapter VII: Trends in Foodgrain Prices
1. In  the arhsattas, the standard form at fo r recording the tota l amount o f grain 
collected in  a particu la r harvest fo r each revenue un it includes a quote o f the 
tola weight o f the local maund. In  the case o f the six qasbas under 
examination, see fo r example, Arhsatta Qasba Sanganer, VS 1817/AD  1760; 
Arhsatta qasba Sawai Jaipur, VS 1795/AD  1748; A rhsatta pargana Lalsot, VS 
1774/AD  1717; Arhsatta pargana Malarna, VS 1776/AD  1719; Arhsatta pargana 
Chatsu, VS 1766/AD  1709.
2. U n fo rtuna te ly , we do not know the weight o f the tola used in  the region 
during the period in  terms o f modern units o f weight. S.Hodivala, H istorica l 
Studies o f M ughal Num ism atics, pp.224-34 estimates a tola to be equivalent to 
185.5 grains. A  contemporary document indicates that the Chatsu maund, o f 
40 tolas, was fractiona lly  ligh te r than the "pukka" or standard maund in  D elh i 
in  1726, the ratio between the two being 104.4 : 100, respectively. See C h itti 
dt. Bhadon sudi 9 VS 1783/AD  1726. The pukka maund was probably the 
o ff ic ia l M ughal u n it o f bu lk weight, the "m an-i-Shahjahani", calculated as 
weighing 73.76 lbs. avoirdupois. (Irfa n  Habib, Agrarian  System, p.369) I t  is 
perhaps reasonable to assume therefore that the maund in  use in  Chatsu, which 
is also the standard un it used in  the study, was almost equivalent to the 
o ff ic ia l M ughal m an-i-Shahjahani.
3. S.N.Hasan and S.P.Gupta, "Price o f foodgrains in the te rr ito ry  o f Am ber
(c.1650-1750)", P IHC, 1967, pp.350-371. D ilbagh Singh, "Revenue
Adm in is tra tion", p .152.
4. S.P.Gupta &  Shireen Moosvi,"W eighted Price and Revenue-Rate Indices 
(c.1650-1750)", IESHR 1975, pp.183-93.
5. ib id . However, the method o f deriv ing the mean has not been clearly 
explained in  the article. As fo u r o f the six parganas chosen by the authors 
overlap w ith  the ones we have selected, our reconstruction o f the ir 
methodology is based on the knowledge that there were a number o f missing 
years in  the annual records o f each o f these parganas. Therefore the 
ambiguous statement that "mean fo r the six parganas has been evolved fo r each 
year" (p .186) cannot be taken to im p ly  that the price index was un ifo rm ly  
calculated on the basis o f values fo r  each o f the six parganas.
6. ib id .
7. See Chapter V I I I  on C ropping Patterns.
8. D ilbagh Singh, "Revenue A dm in is tra tion ", pp.152-54.
9. S.N.Hasan and S.P.Gupta conclude that the prices at pargana Am ber, which in  
1728 was reconstituted as pargana Sawai Jaipur, were consistently lower than 
those at pargana Chatsu in  the years 1650-1750.(idem, op.cit., p.355.) For the 
post-1750 period, D ilbagh Singh’s price series fo r  parganas Ja ipur and Chatsu 
again show that in  general prices were higher in  Chatsu. O ur calculations, 
however, indicate the reverse. This discrepancy may possibly be due to the 
differences in  the calculations invo lved in  the conversion o f the local maund in
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qasba Jaipur to the standard maund o f 40 tola weight. D ilbagh Singh 
specifica lly mentions that the maund in  use in  pargana Ja ipur was o f 40 tola 
weight and therefore o f the same weight as that in  pargana Chatsu as w ell as 
the standard maund (idem, "Revenue A dm in is tra tion", p .151) In  the 
subsequent calculation o f average prices, therefore, adjustments fo r a non­
standard maund would not have been thought necessary. A lthough Hasan and 
Gupta do not mention the tola weight o f the maund in  use in  pargana Am ber 
or Jaipur, the ir figures showing low er prices in  pargana A m ber/Ja ipu r than in  
Chatsu indicate that no correction factor was applied to calculate the average 
prices in  A m ber/Ja ipu r presumably because they reckoned that the maund in 
use in  A m ber/Ja ipu r was o f standard weight. Our evidence drawn from  the 
records o f qasba Jaipur indicates that the local maund was o f 28 tola weight 
and thus considerably ligh te r than the standard maund. In  our calculation 
therefore, appropriate adjustments to standardise the m aund-w eight were made 
and hence the average prices we have derived fo r qasba Ja ipur are higher than 
than those in  the above studies.
10. The six qasbas fa ll w ith in  a rough isosceles triangle w ith  qasbas Jaipur, Phagi 
and Malarna fo rm ing  the three outer points and enclosing an area o f 
approxim ately three thousand square kilometres. Malarna, ly ing  to the 
southwest o f both Jaipur and Phagi, was equidistant to both (approx.64 miles) 
w hile  Phagi, on the southeast o f Jaipur, was a lit t le  over ha lf that distance 
from  Jaipur (approx. 37 miles), cf. Ir fa n  Habib, A tlas o f the M ughal Em pire . 
Sheet 6A .
11. idem./'Prices in the Trans-Yamuna tract from  the close o f the 17th to the 
la tte r ha lf o f the 18th century", P IHC 1983, pp.263-79.
12. For an excellent discussion on the annual marketing and price cycle see 
C.J.Baker, A n  Ind ian Rural Econom y, pp.239-41.
13. S.P.Gupta, "Prices and Rural Commerce in  17th.Century Eastern 
Rajasthan".P IH C . 1982, pp.270-82.
14. K .R .H a ll, "Price M aking and M arket H ierarchy in  M edieval South India", 
IESH R . 14, 2 (1977),pp.207-30.
15. As the n irakh bazar records have not yet been catalogued and are in most cases 
incomplete, we were not able to obtain consecutive series longer than one 
fiscal year. The series analysed above was incomplete w ith  respect to price 
quotations fo r only 15 days in  the fiscal year.
16. References to famines in the fo llow ing  years are as follows:
1712: C h itti dt.Chait vadi 4 VS 1768/AD  1711, qasba Sanganer [No.468]; 
Am ber Records dt.Phagun sudi 1 VS 1769/AD 1712 [No.430]
1731: Am ber Records dt.Sawan vadi 13 VS 1788/AD  1731 [No.156]; C h itti 
d t.K a rtik  vadi 1 VS 1788/AD  1731, amils o f all parganas , [No.394]; C h itti dt. 
Maghshri vadi 2 VS 1788/AD  1731, to diwans V idyadhar and Sahibram 
[No.395]; C h itti d t.K a rik  vadi 1 VS 1788/AD  1731, pargana A m ber [No.423]; 
C h itti d t.K a rtik  sudi 14 VS 1788/AD  1731, pargana Am ber [No.393].
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1755-1760: Sanad dt.Sawan sudi 7 VS 1823/AD  1766, pargana Phagi [376]; 
C h itti dt.Sawan vadi 10 VS 1819/AD  1762, pargana Phagi [No.404]; C h itti 
dt.Jesht sudi 2 VS 1821/AD  1764, pargana Phagi [No.53]; C h itt i dt.Phagun sudi 
7 VS 1820/AD  1763, pargana Tonk [No.54]; C h itti dt.Phagun vadi 11 VS 
1818/AD  1762, pargana Tonk [No.55].
17. See Chapter V I I I  on Cropping Patterns.
18. Sanad dt.Sawan sudi 7 VS 1823/AD  1766, pargana Phagi [376]; C h itti dt.Sawan 
vadi 10 VS 1819/AD  1762, pargana Phagi [No.404]; C h itt i dt.Phagun sudi 7 VS 
1820/AD  1763, pargana Tonk [No.54]; C h itti dt.Chait vadi amavasya VS 
1820/AD  1763, pargana Sawai Jaipur [No.201]; C h itti d t.Chait vadi 7 VS 
1822/AD  1765, pargana N iw a i [No.410]; C h itti dt.Phagun vadi 3 VS 1818/AD  
1761, pargana H indaun [No.384].
19. See the lis t o f fam ine years in  the gazetteer o f the ad jo in ing d is tric t o f A lw a r 
complied by M a j. P.W.Powlett. Gazetteer o f U lw a r (1878), p.239.
20. C h itti dt.Asarh sudi 2 VS 1784/AD  1727, to Sah Dodraj [No.372]; C h itti 
dt.Jesht vadi 14 VS 1784/AD  1728, to Sah Mansaram and Sah A jabsingh 
[No.408]; L ikh tang  dt.Bhadon vadi 3 VS 1783/AD  1726, from  V idyadhar to 
D iwan Narayandas and K irparam  [No.427]; C h itti dt.Sawan sudi 2 VS 1795/AD  
1738, pargana Chatsu [No.398]; C h itti dt.Sawan sudi 2 VS 1799/AD  1742, 
pargana Phagi [No.276]; C h itt i dt.Jesht sudi 2 VS 1821/A D  1764, pargana 
Phagi [No.53];ChUti dt.Phagun sudi 7 VS 1820/AD  1763, pargana Tonk 
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Chapter VIII
CROPPING PATTERNS
In  studying the cropping pattern and the trends therein o f the six qasbas 
selected, what we are essentially analysing is the aggregate e ffec t o f the cropping 
choices o f ind iv idua l agriculturists w ith in  each unit. The potentia l cropping 
possibilities o f a region can be said to be broadly determ ined by its agro-clim atic 
conditions, the level and type o f technology and the exchange economy. The extent 
to which this potentia l is realised depends upon the in teraction between peasant 
fam ily  needs and resources and the ir response to a given situation. As we have 
discussed earlier, the lim ita tions to agricu ltu ra l production in  eastern Rajasthan in  
the eighteenth century were p rim a rily  those associated w ith  dryland agriculture in  a 
sparsely populated fro n tie r region. The extent o f the arable and the range o f crops 
grown were closely related to the ava ilab ility  o f water, draught cattle and labour. 
The physical constraints on the expansion and in tensifica tion  o f production could, 
however, be offset by increasing investment in  irriga tion . Irr ig a tio n  was crucial fo r  
stabilising production through m in im is ing the effects o f variable ra in fa ll and 
making possible the cu ltiva tion  o f higher value crops and thereby enhancing the 
p roductiv ity  o f land in  terms o f increased yie ld  as well as a greater in tensity o f 
land use. The development o f irr iga tion  not only signalled an im provem ent in the 
"level o f practice" by raising agrarian p roduc tiv ity  w ith in  the confines o f trad itiona l 
technology, i t  also represented an increase in  labour and capital input. The 
geographical f lu id ity  o f labour and capital that characterised the pre-co lon ia l period 
meant that the interaction o f state in itia tives and peasant responses to changing
- 2 7 7 -
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patterns o f supply and demand greatly in fluenced the development o f the rural 
economy. The a b ility  o f the state to channel the d irection  o f agricultura l
production through measures that promoted capital investment, fac ilita ted  the 
cu ltiva tion  o f certain crops, attracted labour to colonise abandoned lands and 
protected and encouraged trade were all im portant stimulants to the local economy. 
Equally, in times o f natural disasters or po litica l disorder, state intervention 
remained critica l to agricu ltura l recovery. Changes in  the cropping pattern over 
tim e therefore provide an im portant index o f peasant response to causally 
in terlock ing changes in  production conditions and state action.
In  this chapter we shall begin by exam ining the cropping patterns o f the qasbas 
and the surrounding village. In  doing this we shall address ourselves to two general 
problems: firs t, to what degree and in  what way d id  the p ro x im ity  o f an urban 
centre influence the cropping pattern in  the hinterland: and second, to what extent 
can the analysis o f long term trends in  agricu ltura l production in  the qasba be 
extrapolated to the region as a whole. We shall then analyse the cropping pattern in 
each qasba using the records o f revenue collections. This w il l  enta il a discussion on 
the range o f crops cultivated, the ir relative importance and the trends in the ir 
production over the period 1710 to 1770. Lastly, we shall also address the question 
o f the extent to which the d iffe re n tia l resource position o f a s tra tified  peasantry 
was reflected in  the ir cropping choices. A lthough evidence on this aspect is 
ind irect and scanty, i t  would enable us to iden tify  the social im plications o f long 
term fluctuations in  agrarian production.
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Specific Aspects of Crop Production in the Qasba.
In  order to place our analysis o f the trends in  the cropping pattern o f the six
qasbas under study in  perspective, a few general observations are necessary.
F irs tly , i t  would be pertinent to consider the question o f how the cropping pattern
in the qasba d iffe red  from  or coincided w ith  that o f the villages. This question
assumes importance, in  the context o f a monetised economy in  which a high
proportion o f the agricu ltura l product was meant fo r  exchange. The locational
advantages enjoyed by the agriculturists cu ltiva ting  in  the qasba were considerable.
These included access to a fixed  market, both wholesale and retail; access to the
network o f trade w ith in  and outside the region; as well as the a b ility  to respond to
local demand generated by the qasba population comprising both the elite and the
artisans, service groups and other non-agricu ltu ris t residents. Thus, the qasba could
be viewed as a dependable market fo r  a range o f agricu ltu ra l products that
provided an incentive to agricu ltu ra l producers to d ivers ify  w h ile  protecting them
1at the same tim e from  the risks o f excessive specialisation.
That these factors influenced the cropping pattern o f the qasba is unmistakeable 
in  each o f our six examples. D ive rs ity  in  crop production was especially marked in  
the agricu ltura l suburb o f the qasba. In  the six qasbas, s ix ty  crops were grown in  
all and on average as many as fo rty  d iffe re n t fie ld  crops were cu ltivated in each 
qasba over the period. We f in d  that the production o f crops such as poppy, 
tobacco, herbs and a range of vegetables and melons was m ainly concentrated in  the 
environs o f the qasba almost to the exclusion o f the villages in  the pargana. These 
high value crops do not figure  in  the selection o f the m ajor k h a r if and rabi crops 
cultivated in  fou r parganas which together accounted fo r approxim ately 90 per cent
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o f the aggregate revenues o f each pargana. The pargana aggregates included the 
revenues from  the qasba o f the pargana and a varying number o f villages. The 
insignificance o f the revenues from  the production o f high value specialist crops in  
the pargana aggregates can be contrasted to the ir p roportion in  the qasba revenue 
which norm ally was about a f i f th  o f the annual revenue (See Tables 6.[X ].5 and
6.[X ].6 in  A ppend ix 6).
In  order to examine this question in  greater detail, we have compared the 
cropping pattern o f qasba Sanganer w ith  that o f eight villages adjacent to it. As 
our sources do not provide figures o f the gross cropped area or y ie ld , we have used 
the figures fo r the revenue derived from  each crop as a measure o f relative output. 
As the mode o f revenue appropria tion (in  cash or in k ind) was common fo r the 
same crop cultivated in  the qasba or the village, the princip les in  the form ula tion  o f 
the revenue demand, i t  is assumed, were also common fo r each crop pair, making it  
possible to use the revenue figures as e ffective  indicators o f the relative output o f
a
each crop in  the village and qasba respectively. In  the tabulated figures fo r the 
years 1728, 1747, and 1760, we have compared the revenue returns fo r  each crop 
grown in  the qasba w ith  the mean o f the aggregated revenues o f the selected eight 
villages (see Table 22, Section II ,  C o l.l and 2).
However, com piling the ratio o f the relative production o f crops proved more 
d if f ic u lt .  This was because the aggregate revenue figures fo r the qasba and the 
villages d iffe red  in  two im portant ways. F irst, the cropped area o f the qasba was 
considerably larger than that o f an average village. This made a comparison o f the 
absolute revenue returns fo r  crops common to both units, like  cotton, sugarcane and 
the foodgrains, meaningless. Second, the crop -m ix  o f the qasba and the villages
2 8 1
Table 22 iCompanson of Agricultural Production in Qasba Sanqaner and Adjacent Villages.
I . D e f l a t e d  R e l a t i v e  Revenues of the  qasba and th e  average  of 8 v i l l a g e s ( i n  
Rupees c o r r e c t  to  the  second decimal  p l a c e ) .
1728 ’ ’ 1747 1760
Qasba Av .V i l l . Qasba Av .V i l l . Qasba Av.Vil l
l . K h a r i f  Z ab t i 254.80 23. 77 354,90 28. 46 202.11 14. 62
2 . Rabi Z a b t i 63. 76 0. 18 137.38 0.73 135.63 0 .20
To ta l  Zab t i 318.56 23. 95 492.28 29. 19 337.74 14.82
3 .K h a r i f  J i n s i 31. 41 13.82 36.81 12. 28 86.03 21.39
4 . Rabi J i n s i 374.32 62.23 326.23 58.53 387.27 63. 79
T o t a l  J i n s i 405.73 76.05 363.04 70.81 373.30 85. 18
Khar if  Rev. <1+3) 286.21 37.59 391.71 40. 74 288. 14 36.01
Rabi Rev, <2+4) 438.08 62.41 463.61 59.26 522.90 63. 99
T o ta l  Revenue (A)724.29 100.00 <B)855.32 100.00 < 0811 .04 100.00
I I .C o m p a ra t iv e  Croppinq P a t t e r n ,
__________J_728_____________   J747__........................................................... J 7 6 0
Qasba Av,Vill Ratios Qasba Av,Vil l Rat ios Qasba Av, Vil l Rat ios
Crop Revenue Revenue Qasba:Vi 11, Revenue Revenue Qasba;Vi 11, Revenue Revenue Qasba:Vi 11
Kh anf .  Harvest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Cotton 2023,84 137,71 203 100 1782,13 82,50 253 100 338,50 15,61 267 100
Sugarcane 256,28 27,41 129 100 124,53 21,46 68 100 124,88 0,0 - -
Maize e t c . * 839,56 65,92 176 100 1449,72 118,02 144 100 448,82 54,41 102 100
Garden Produce 301,50 0,0 - - 611.03 0,0 - - 356,06 0.0 - -
Sweet Potato 318,03 0,0 - - 279,34 0,0 - - 29.13 0,0 - -
Moth 134,47 78,03 24 100 263,88 76,20 60 100 308,00 62,60 61 100
Mung 20,31 1.74 161 100 - 1.27 - - 32,19 7,41 54 100
Urad 40.91 0,39 1449 100 29,91 0,0 - - 65,13 11,28 71 100
Bajra
RaDl.,H!HY£5t
5.78 31.98 2 100 28,66 18,94 82 100 46.81 21,15 27 100
Melons,Veg. 623,53 1,77 4864 100 1138,69 5,77 2308 100 668,56 0,98 8412 100
Poppy 171,31 0,0 - - 98,09 0,0 - - 0.0 0.0 - -
Tobacco 23,38 0,0 - - 175,34 0.0 - - 5,41 0,0 - -
Maize 29,09 0,0 - - 118,56 0,0 - - 34,16 0,0 - -
Condiments 0,0 0,0 - - 39,91 0,0 - - 9,63 0,0 - -
Barley 2089,72 90,02 321 100 1699,38 235.54 84 100 1391,13 115,98 148 100
Wheat 237,34 180,76 18 100 837,56 216,17 45 100 553,50 100,04 68 100
Gram 469,13 108,88 60 100 0,0 0,0 - - 0,0 36,38 - -
Mixed Grain 671,03 0,0 - - 0 ,0 8,76 - - 1021,37 53,15 237 100
Source : A rhsa t ta .  r e c o r d s ,  Qasba Sanqaner fo r  th e  r e l e v a n t  y e a r s ,
Notes to Section I and Section 11 of Table 22:
Section I ; Under the c o l . ' Average V illage ' ,  the mean values for the aggregate revenue of the 8 vil lages have been 
entered. Using the method for defla ting  the revenue discussed in Appendix 5, the re la t ive  size  of the Qasba v is -a -v is  
the average v il lage  is given by (A),(B) and (C) for 1728,1747,1760 respectively ,
Section II : Col.l and c o l .2 give the actual revenues obtained for the qasba and average of 8 vil lages respectively, 
Col,3 and 4 show the re la t iv e  ra t io  of the revenue front each crop a f te r  the qasba figures have been scaled down to
allow for the difference m the cropped area of the qasba and the average v i l lage ,  Thus c o l ,3 5 (col,1/A i  c o l ,2 h l0 0
for 1728, while the divisor for 1747 and 1760 is 8 and C respectively , as derived in Section I above.
*Naize e tc ,  shows the combined revenue figures for aaize, madva, chola and guvar,
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varied s ign ifican tly . The qasba produced very many more types o f crop in  each 
harvest and specialised crops like  poppy, tobacco and various kinds o f vegetables 
were cultivated almost exclusively in  the qasba. The cropping pattern o f the qasba 
and village d iffe re d  in  both the crops grown and the ir p roportiona l d is tribu tion . 
Thus i t  was also not possible to compare the percentage d is tribu tion  o f the 
aggregate revenue between crops w ith in  each un it due to the d istortion  caused by 
the d ifference in  the crop m ix  o f the qasba and the villages.
The method that we used to fo rm  a relative index o f cropping pattern in  the 
qasba and the average village consisted firs t, o f determ ining a relative notional 
revenue index that could provide a proxy fo r the relative output o f the qasba v is -a - 
vis the average village. In  order to establish a single index o f re lative production, 
the aggregate revenue figures o f the qasba fo r each season and mode o f assessment 
were deflated to elim inate the variations in revenue returns between the two units 
arising from  differences in  the crop composition, rates o f taxation or the price at 
which the revenue in  k ind  was sold. For both the qasba and the villages we had 
two sets o f figures. For the zabti or cash assessed crops the agricu ltu ra l area was 
stated w hile  fo r  the crops assessed in  k ind  the quantity o f grain in  maunds was 
specified along w ith  the total revenue derived from  each form  o f levy. Thus i t  was 
possible to calculate the m ultip lie rs  or average rate o f taxation per un it o f land fo r 
zabti crops and the average price at w h ich grain was sold fo r  the jin s i crops fo r 
each o f the units fo r  each season. The m u ltip lie rs fo r the average village were then 
used to deflate the qasba revenues. The calculations involved in the deflation have 
been given in greater detail in  A ppend ix  5.
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The deflated qasba revenue thus corresponds to the notional revenue that would 
have been realised from  the qasba had the crop composition, average rate o f 
taxation and average price at which grain was sold been the same in  the qasba as in 
the 8 villages. Having elim inated the e ffect o f varia tion in  crop composition 
between the two units, i t  became possible to compare the notiona l revenue o f the 
qasba w ith  the revenue o f the average village in  order to provide a measure o f 
relative output. The ratios o f the relative output are given by A , B and C fo r the 
years 1728, 1747 and 1760 respectively in  Section I, Table 22. This ratio was then 
used to scale down the actual revenue returns o f crops grown in  the qasba in  order 
to take in to  account the d ifference in  the relative output o f the qasba and the 
average village. This set o f figures could be compared d irectly  and have been 
stated in  percentage ratios w ith  the value fo r the average village being set to 100 
fo r  those crops which were common to both units (Cols 3 and 4 o f Table 22).
I t  needs to be emphasised that the notional index o f re lative output that has 
been calculated by this method is not an accurate measure o f gross cropped area. 
This is because i t  is based on the assumption that the y ie ld  per bigha o r the quality 
o f land and irriga tiona l fac ilities  were identical in  both units being compared. 
However, the h igher average rates o f revenue demand per bigha in  the qasba fo r 
crops such as cotton suggests that the average y ie ld  was higher in  the qasba. The 
higher p roduc tiv ity  in  the qasba was p rim a rily  due to a larger p roportion  o f land 
being irrigated. Taking the example o f cotton production in  1728, the area 
cultivated in  the qasba was 1256.8 bighas w hile  the average area under cotton in  the 
8 villages was 147.9 bighas. A d jus ting  the cotton acreage in the qasba by applying 
our ratio o f relative output fo r the year (724.29 : 100), the comparable ratio o f area 
cultivated was just 118 : 100 and considerably lower than the ra tio  o f 203 : 100 that
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represented the ratio o f relative output. However, i f  we take the variation in  the 
rate o f taxation per bigha fo r cotton in  the two units (173 : 100) as ind ica tive  o f the 
d iffe ren tia l in  y ie ld , the 1256.8 bighas o f cotton producing land in  the qasba had an 
outturn  equivalent to about 2174 bighas o f cotton acreage in  the villages. A pp ly ing  
our ratio o f relative output to the qasba acreage so calculated, the relative area 
devoted to cotton in  the two units is thus 204 : 100 -  which is very close to our 
ratio o f relative cotton output in  the qasba and the villages. Hence our notional 
index o f relative production can be taken as ind icative o f the relative ’size’ o f the 
qasba and the average village w ith  the proviso that the ’size’ was not a simple 
measurement o f areal variation but a composite measure that took in to  account both 
area and yield.
The results obtained, presented in  Section I I  o f Table 22, show that not only d id  
the qasba specialise in the production o f certain crops but that in relation to the 
village i t  also produced more ’cash’ crops like  cotton and sugarcane. The 
production o f more lucrative crops in  the qasba was at the expense o f foodgrain 
production. This is also apparent i f  we compare figures fo r  the qasba and the 
average village under the heads Total Z ab ti and Total Jinsi showing aggregate 
percentage annual revenue derived in  cash and in  k ind  (Section I  o f Table 22). The 
proportion o f revenue levied in  cash, and hence the cu ltiva tion  o f high value crops 
was invariab ly greater in  the qasba than the villages. The exception to this pattern 
was the considerable cu ltiva tion  o f barley in  the rabi harvest in  the qasba while 
more wheat was grown in  the villages. Wheat was a luxu ry  foodgrain w hich was 
priced considerably higher than barley and w hich required better soil, a r t if ic ia l 
irr iga tion  and greater labour in  tillage. From the po in t o f v iew o f the peasant, i t  
could function  both as a ’cash’ crop in  normal years or as a foodcrop in  years o f
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scarcity. The s ign ifican tly  higher production o f barley in  the qasba may possibly 
have been because the more productive and irriga ted land was devoted to the 
cu ltiva tion  o f crops like  poppy, tobacco, maize, condiments, w in te r vegetables and 
sugarcane. Barley production may also have substituted fo r  the shortfa ll in  the 
cu ltiva tion  o f the staples -  bajra and moth -  in  the kh a rif harvest. Interestingly, in  
both the qasba and the village, the rab i harvest was more im portant in  terms o f the 
revenue realised. In  the villages this was due to the substantial cu ltiva tion  o f 
wheat, which indicates that irriga ted  land in  the villages was generally devoted to 
the production o f wheat w hile  in  the qasba the most productive land was reserved 
fo r the cu ltiva tion  o f sugarcane and w in te r vegetables. Lastly, we note that 
although in absolute terms agricu ltura l production varied in  the three years chosen 
fo r comparison, the cropping ratios fo r each crop broadly retain the ir relative 
proportionality.
The second general issue that we posed was the ranking o f the qasbas in  terms 
o f the ir relative revenues to fo rm  some idea o f the ir relative size. W hile the issue 
in  itse lf is not im portant, i t  does provide a fram ework fo r  the la ter discussion on 
the cropping pattern o f each qasba. For instance, the cotton acreage in  both qasbas 
Chatsu and Phagi was about ha lf the aggregate kh a rif cash assessed area. However, 
the cotton acreage in  absolute terms was five  times larger in  Phagi than in  Chatsu. 
The d ifference in  absolute acreage not only reflected differences in  crop 
composition and the d is tribu tion  between crops assessed in  cash, fo r  which we have 
the area figures, and those in  k ind , fo r  which comparable area figures are not 
available, but also the d ifference in  the agricultura l suburb included w ith in  the 
adm inistrative boundaries o f the qasbas.
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Table 23 : Index o f Relative A g ricu ltu ra l Production in  Six Qasbas 
[A ll figs. relative to the base value fo r qasba Chatsu 
and correct to the second decimal place.]
Jaipur Phaei Sanganer Malarna Lalsot Chatsu
I. Relative Area under Zab ti (bighas)
K h a r if Area 34.65 60.78 64.95 7.66 91.84 31.50
Rabi Area 23.05 3.44 28.91 1.83 87.66 68.50
Tot. Zab ti Area 57.70 64.21 93.86 9.49 179.50 100.00
I I .  Relative Q uantity o f Revenue in  k ind  (maunds)
K h a r if Qty. 73.10 213.89 16.03 246.43 42.34 73.35
Rabi Qty. 180.78 489.95 427.54 295.60 14.58 26.65
Tot. Jinsi Qty. 253.88 703.84 443.57 542.03 56.92 100.00
I I I .  Relative Revenues (Rupees)
1.K h a r if Zab ti 32.13 25.89 63.52 8.85 58.90 16.55
2.Rabi Zab ti 15.27 2.28 18.89 1.40 82.80 64.72
Total Z ab ti Rev. 47.40 28,15 82.41 10.25 141.70 81.27
3. K h a rif Jinsi 24.62 35.69 9.43 41.34 10.04 14.12
4. Rabi Jinsi 59.69 81.19 93.24 53.99 2.34 4.61
Total Jinsi Rev. 84.31 116.88 102.67 95.33 12.38 18.73
K h a rif Rev.(1+3) 56.75 61.56 72.95 50.19 68.94 30.67
Rabi Rev. (2+4) 74.96 83.47 112.13 55.39 85.14 69.33
Total Revenue 131.71 145.03 185.08 105.58 154.08 100.00
Ranking (4) (3) (1) (5) (2) (6)
IV . Relative Average Rate of Taxation (Zabti) /P rice  o f Sale (Jinsi) :
K h a rif Zab ti 174.73 84.07 183.16 217.74 121.64 100.00
Rabi Zabti 72.47 85.94 70.39 80.29 100.88 100.00
K h a rif Jinsi 126.30 92.92 234.45 96.35 106.20 100.00
Rabi Jinsi 139.50 93.11 108.68 99.27 110.89 100.00
V, Deflated Relative Revenues ; Base = Qasba Chatsu
1.K h a rif Zabti 18.39 30.77 34.68 4.06 48.42 16.55
2.Rabi Zab ti 21.07 2.65 26.84 1.74 82.08 64.72
Total Zab ti Rev. 39.46 33,43 61.52 5.80 130.50 81.27
3. K h a r if Jinsi 19.49 38.41 4.02 42.91 9.45 14.12
4. Rabi Jinsi 42,79 87.20 85.79 54.39 2.11 4.61
Total Jinsi Rev. 62.28 125.61 89.81 97.30 11.56 18.73
K h a rif Rev.(1+3) 37.88 69.18 38.70 46.97 57.87 30.67
Rabi Rev. (2+4) 63.86 89.85 112.63 56.13 84.19 69.33
Total Revenue 101.74 159.03 151.33 103.10 142.06 100.00
Ranking (5) (1) (2) (4) (3) (6)
Sources: Arhsatta records o f the six qasbas, 1710-80. A lso see Append ix  5 fo r  a 
discussion o f the methodology.
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The method used to compute comparable production indices in  Table 23 are, in 
p rinc ip le , s im ila r to that discussed fo r Table 22. However, due to the gaps in  the 
series o f arhsattas records, there was no single year in  the period fo r  which we had 
data fo r each o f the six qasbas in order to attempt a po in t comparison o f the 
relative output o f the agricu ltura l h in terland o f the qasbas. Further, the gaps in  the 
series are irregu la r and so the number o f observations fo r each qasba d iffe r . To 
circum vent these problems o f im perfect series, we computed the average statistic 
fo r the years fo r which we had data fo r  qasba Chatsu and each o f the five  other 
qasbas in  turn. Qasba Chatsu was used to calculate the base statistic as its series 
was the most complete, w ith  the largest number o f observations over the period 
1710-75. Thus although the years as well as the number o f observations in each 
pa ir o f comparable figures common to qasba Chatsu and the other five  qasbas were 
d iffe ren t, in  each case the average statistic was derived as a percentage o f the 
average values fo r the corresponding years in  qasba Chatsu. W hile this method o f 
averaging conceals d iffe ren tia l medium term movements in  the relative values, i t  
has the advantage o f p rov id ing  an overall average which minim ises the errors 
inherent in  a simple mean o f an im perfect series. The average thus derived also 
takes in to  account the short-term  or annual variations in production and revenue 
caused by factors common to the region as a whole such as droughts and wars.
However, we f in d  that the figures fo r  relative area fo r  cash assessed crops and 
relative quantity o f grain comprising revenue in k ind  cannot be used to determine 
the relative size o f the qasbas as the two are not comparable and were generally 
inversely related (compare Sections I  and II ,  Table 23 fo r each qasba). On the other 
hand w hile  the relative aggregate revenue provides us w ith  an ind ica tor o f the
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variation in  the average value o f the crops grown i t  cannot be used to approximate 
relative production (Section I I I ,  Table 23). This was because there was considerable 
inter-qasba varia tion in  the rate o f taxation per un it o f land fo r  the same cash 
assessed crop sown as well as a d is tinc t hierarchy in  the sale prices o f crops that 
were sold to convert grain revenue in to  cash.4 Using the method described above 
fo r  Table 22, a one to one relative statistic fo r each un it has been computed by 
defla ting the relative revenue figures o f the five  selected qasbas by the relative 
average rate o f taxation per bigha and the relative average price at which grain was 
sold in  qasba Chatsu, w hich has been taken as the base fo r  a ll the calculations. The 
deflators, calculated in  percentage relatives, are given in Section IV , Table 23 (see 
A ppend ix 5 ,fo r the calculations invo lved in  the deflation). The notional revenue 
values thus obtained provide a proxy fo r  the average relative output and hence 
cropped area o f the qasbas had the ir crop composition, rates o f taxation and prices 
been identical (Section V , Table 23).
Thus while the relative revenue provides us w ith  an ind ica to r o f the value o f 
relative output in  the qasbas, variations in  which could be due to higher 
p roduc tiv ity , levels o f taxation, prices or crop composition, the deflated revenues 
provide us w ith  an notional index o f the relative physical size o f the gross cropped 
area. The d ifference in  the two indicators is particu larly  s trik ing  in  the case o f 
qasba Phagi which was ranked th ird  in  terms of relative revenue but appears to 
have been the qasba w ith  the largest agricultura l suburb (compare ranking in  
Section I I I  and V , Table 23). The reason fo r the lower ranking o f Phagi in terms 
o f relative value o f agricu ltura l product was because cu ltiva tion  in  Phagi was 
largely devoted to the production o f foodgrains assessed in  k ind. In  addition to the 
fact that foodgrains were generally o f a lower monetary value than ’cash’ crops, the
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relative prices in  qasba Phagi were also the lowest among the six qasbas. Thus, 
even the component o f the total revenue derived from  the sale o f foodgrains was 
lower than would have been obtained from  an equivalent sale in  qasbas Jaipur and 
Sanganer where prices were re lative ly higher.
Cropping Trends.
Our examination o f cropping trends shall focus on the shifts in  crop 
composition over the short term in  each o f the six qasbas in  tu rn  and then turn  to 
the analysis o f long -run  trends in  agricu ltu ra l production fo r  the region as a whole. 
To do this we shall p rim a rily  use as indices the physical measurements o f acreage 
cultivated or quantity o f produce taken in  revenue. Recent studies o f the 
production pattern at the level o f the pargana have invariab ly re lied on using the 
figures fo r the revenue obtained from  the taxation o f each crop as a proxy fo r  
establishing in tra -crop , in ter-harvest and annual com parability. W hile such a 
method is ju s tif ie d  fo r  some levels o f comparison, we hope to show in  our 
discussion that the lim ita tions o f the data cannot be overcome by re ly ing exclusively 
on an index that is at best only an ind irect and approximate ind ica tor o f the 
relative value o f agricu ltu ra l output. A l l  the figures and tables related to 
agricultura l production have, fo r ease o f reference, been grouped together and can 
be found in  Append ix 6.
Qasba Chatsu:
In  qasba Chatsu, agricu ltu ra l production in  the w in te r o r rabi harvest was more 
im portant than the kh a rif harvest over the period 1710-70 (Table 6.C.1). This was
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prim arily  due to the extensive cu ltiva tion  o f irriga ted wheat and barley. The form  
o f revenue assessment in  the qasba was predom inantly by the zabti method o f a 
specified cash levy per un it o f cu ltivated land in  both harvests.
The m ajor crops grown in  the kh a rif harvest were cotton, vegetables, maize 
(makka), bajra, and moth along w ith  smaller quantities o f coarse m ille ts, pulses and 
indigo (Table 6.C.2). The aggregate acreage figures fo r the crops assessed by the 
zabti method show an expansion from  1730 -  1741, fo llow ed by a slight fa ll 
between 1742-56 and an absolute fa ll to a level below the pre-1723 period from  
1756-70 (F igure 6.C.1). These variations in the aggregate acreage resulted from  the 
differences in the trends in  the acreages o f the m ajor zabti crops. In  the period
from  1723-42 there was a s ign ifican t expansion in  the cu ltiva tion  o f cotton, maize,
and vegetables resulting in the peak in zabti acreage in  1737. Subsequently, cotton 
and kodon cu ltiva tion  began to decline from  1738 w hile  between 1742-53 indigo 
cu ltiva tion  in  the qasba ceased altogether. However, the zabti acreage between 
1742-56 tended to be higher than in the pre-1723 period as the decline in  the 
cu ltiva tion  o f these crops was o ffset by the continued expansion in acreage o f 
maize and vegetables. Further, cotton cu ltiva tion  continued at a level h igher than 
in  the pre-1723 period, although marked by a high degree o f annual fluctuation . 
From 1756 to the end o f our period there was an absolute decline in  the kh a rif
zabti area due to the fa ll in  the acreage o f the m ajor zabti crops, i.e. vegetables,
maize, kodon, ralo and chola. The exceptions to this general phase o f decline were 
indigo, which began to be cultivated again on a small scale, and cotton, the 
cu ltiva tion  o f which continued to fluctuate but d id  not decline from  its 1738 level.
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The trend in  the production o f the kh a rif foodgrains, which were assessed by 
the crop-sharing or jin s i mode o f revenue appropria tion, was somewhat d iffe re n t 
(Table 6.C.2). O f the foodgrains, the main crop was moth and smaller quantities o f 
bajra, juw ar, and pulses such as mung and urad were also produced. W hile the 
production o f moth shows no clear long-te rm  trends, the aggregate figures fo r the 
quantities o f revenue in  k ind  re flect phases in  the production trends o f bajra, ju w a r 
and the pulses. In  the period 1710-24, production o f both bajra and ju w a r was 
high. Subsequently, the output o f these crops gradually ta iled o f f  but the fa ll in  
the aggregate quantity o f produce revenue between 1726 and 1738 was to some 
extent offset by the increase in  the production o f the higher value pulses from  
about 1733 to 1750 (Figure 6.C.2). However, this dramatic decline in  production 
appears to have been temporary and in  the last few years o f our series fo r Chatsu, 
1766-71, the quantity o f revenue in k ind  was at a level s im ila r to that in 1730-55. 
Thus the trend in  the aggregate quantities taken in  produce revenue fa ll in to fou r 
phases -  i.e., an in it ia l period o f high production between 1710-26 fo llow ed by a 
decline to approxim ately ha lf o f the average annual production o f 1710-26 in the 
period between 1730-55, to be succeeded by a phase o f fu rth e r decline between 
1755-65; and, fin a lly , a partia l recovery in  production to the 1730-55 level in  the 
last phase between 1765-70.
The apparently inverse relationship between the production trends fo r the cash 
and k ind  assessed crops in  the in it ia l phases-i.e. the periods 1710-30 and 1730-40, 
was perhaps due to the substitution o f lower value crops like  ba jra  and ju w a r fo r 
the cu ltiva tion  o f cotton, vegetables and maize. A n  absolute increase in  the area 
cultivated in  the kh a rif harvest between 1730-40 cannot be ruled out, although this 
would be d if f ic u lt  to ve rify . From 1740 to 1755 there was a slight decline in
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cu ltiva tion , especially o f cotton and indigo, that preceded a phase o f a s ign ificant 
fa ll in  the production o f both zabti and jin s i crops from  1755/6. W hile the zabti 
acreage figures show no reversal in  the trend o f agricu ltura l decline fo llow ing  this 
date, the production o f jin s i foodcrops increased.
The m ajor crops grown in  the w in te r harvest were wheat, barley and
vegetables.(Table 6.C.3). Wheat and barley were assessed p r im a rily  by the zabti 
form  o f assessment, and assessment in  k ind  was largely confined to un irrigated 
w in ter cereals and contributed a seasonally variable and re la tive ly  ins ign ifican t 
proportion o f the annual revenue. Irriga ted  land sown w ith  wheat or barley 
attracted an identical rate o f cash assessment and the combined acreage o f both
crops was entered in  the revenue records under the head o f "chomli". The
production o f wheat and barley on irriga ted  land dominated agricu ltu ra l production 
in  the rabi harvest. The varia tion in  the area under chom li and consequently in  the 
revenue derived from  it  determ ined the overall trends in  the aggregate production 
indices fo r  the rabi harvest in  qasba Chatsu.
The annual aggregate figures fo r the area under zabti cu ltiva tion  in  the rabi 
harvest were consistently high during  the period 1710-55, averaging over two 
thousand bighas per year (Fig.6.C.3). The variation from  year to year was small. 
From 1756 however, there was a fa ll in  the zabti cu ltivated area by approxim ately a 
th ird , and this decline in  acreage was especially marked in  the years 1756-60. 
A lthough both the area under chom li and the land devoted to market gardening 
fe ll, the decline was proportionately greater in the latter. However, the varia tion in 
annual rabi zabti assessed area continued to be small despite the overall fa ll. The
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trends in the rabi acreage were however s ign ifican tly  d iffe re n t from  the trend in  
the revenue derived from  cereal cu ltiva tion  in  the qasba.
A lthough the area under chom li cu ltiva tion  was fa ir ly  stable t i l l  1755, there was 
a sudden increase in  the rabi revenues in  the 1730s (compare Figs.6.C.3 and 6.C.6). 
This was due to an increase in  the tax rate per bigha fo r chom li in  1726. The rates 
o f taxation on irriga ted  wheat and barley were graded in to  e ight categories, the 
highest rate in  the pre-1726 phase being Rs.1.13 and the lowest Rs. 0.50 w ith  one
Q
and two anna increments in  the interm ediate rates o f taxation. In  1726, all eight 
grades were more than doubled, the revised rates being Rs. 2.38 fo r the highest tax 
category and Rs. 1.75 fo r  the lowest.^ In  the 1740s there was a gradual decline in 
the average rate o f taxation on chom li from  Rs. 1.88 per bigha to Rs. 1.50 and this 
decline accounts fo r the fa ll in  rabi revenues in  this period w hich is not reflected 
in  a proportionate decline in  acreage. W hile the earlier increase in  rates appears to 
have been part o f a general revision in  the cash rates fo r  w in te r cereals observable 
in  other parganas as w ell, the decline in  the average rate o f tax in  the post-1740s 
d id  not result from  a restructuring o f the standard rates but a sh ift towards the 
more lig h tly  assessed tax grades under which chom li was taxed.
The trends in  the annual revenue from  both kh a rif and rabi harvests reflect 
changes in  the cropping pattern o f the qasba as well as price and revenue rate 
variations. In  the in it ia l phase between 1710 to 1723, the revenue derived from  the 
kh a rif and rabi harvests was roughly equivalent (Table.6.C .l). In  this period, the 
variations in the annual revenue were p rim a rily  the result o f yearly fluctuations in  
the prices o f the foodgrains that were m ainly assessed in  k ind  in  the kh a rif harvest. 
The rabi revenue was re lative ly stable as the acreage under its m a jor tax category,
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chom li, varied lit t le  from  year to year and was subject to a fixe d  cash levy. In  the 
subsequent years t i l l  the early 1740s, the annual revenue became s ign ifican tly  
higher and also more stable (Fig.6.C.7). This was due to two factors. F irst, in  the 
kh a rif harvest there was a sh ift from  the cu ltiva tion  o f foodgrains such as bajra, 
juw ar, kodon and ralo to cotton and vegetables. W hile this change in  the c rop -m ix  
in  the kh a rif harvest d id  not lead to a substantial increase in  the kh a rif revenue, 
the seasonal returns became more stable as a m ajor po rtion  o f the revenue was 
realised by the zabti method and so the fluctuations caused by the annual price 
variations were reduced (Fig.6.C.5). In  the same period, the rabi revenues v irtu a lly  
doubled due to the increase in  the zabti rates imposed on the irriga ted w in te r 
cereals (F ig .6.C.6). A f te r  the revision in  the tax rates fo r chom li, about tw o -th irds  
o f the annual revenue came to be derived from  the rabi harvest and henceforth the 
trends in  the annual revenue obtained from  the qasba essentially fo llow ed the trend 
in  rabi revenues. In  the period between 1740-55, there was a decline in  the annual 
returns due to the fa ll in  the average rate o f taxation on chom li and the gradual 
decline in  overall kh a rif production.
In  the foregoing discussion based on trends in  aggregate areas cropped and 
quantities produced, we noted an absolute decline during the period 1755-65 fo r 
each type o f assessment and each harvest. This general decline in  production is 
however not as acutely reflected in  the annual revenue returns (Fig.6.C.7). Thus, 
contrary to what we would have expected from  the analysis o f the area and 
quantity statistics, the overall decline from  1755-65 fo llow ed by a revival in  the 
production o f k h a rif and rabi jin s i assessed foodgrains from  1765-70, appears in 
the revenue figures as a phase o f un ifo rm  decline extending from  1755-70. This 
anomaly is attributable to the continuous scarcity and fam ine conditions leading to
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the rise in  the prices o f both the k h a r if and rabi foodgrains from  1756 to about 
1763 that resulted in  higher than average revenue returns during this period. The 
decade o f h igh prices and scarcity conditions was fo llowed by a sudden sharp fa ll 
in  prices in  the next decade as discussed in  the previous chapter. A  general decline 
in  price o f foodgrains meant that the annual revenue remained v ir tu a lly  the same in  
both these decades despite the small upswing in  foodgrain production  in  the late 
1760s.
Qasba Malarna
A  comparison o f the annual revenues derived in  the kh a rif and rabi harvests 
shows that there were alternating periods when either the kh a rif o r the rabi harvest 
was more im portant in  terms o f the annual revenue contributed. Between 1711-17 
and 1731-64 rabi production was more im portant while revenues obtained from  the 
kh a rif harvest predominated in the in tervening period from  1718-30 and a fte r 1765 
(Table 6.M.1). In  both harvests, the seasonal revenues were largely composed o f 
taxation on the cu ltiva tion  o f foodgrains. As these were collected in  k ind , the 
annual fluctuations in  the total revenue collections o f qasba Malarna were 
accentuated.
The aggregate area sown w ith  zabti crops in the k h a rif harvest was small 
ranging from  79 bighas to 471 bighas (Fig. 6.M .1). The m ajor k h a r if cash-assesed 
crops were, in  decreasing order o f importance in  terms o f re lative cu ltivated area, 
sugarcane, cotton, vegetables, maize, tobacco, and indigo (Table 6.M.2). In  the 
period from  1711-43, cropping was dominated by the production o f sugarcane 
whose acreage remained fa ir ly  stable. Cotton was o f secondary importance during
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this period but fluctuations in  its acreage gave rise to the troughs and crests in  the 
aggregate kh a rif area figures between 1711-43. In  terms o f the crop composition, 
the mid-1740s mark a turn ing  po in t in  the cropping pattern o f the kh a rif zabti 
crops. Sugarcane cu ltiva tion  began to decline in  absolute terms from  1738 and in  
relation to the other crops from  1744 onwards. Over the same period, there was an 
expansion in  the areas sown w ith  vegetables (from  1745), tobacco (from  1744) and 
indigo (from  1737). These shifts reversed the earlier trend o f fa llin g  aggregate 
zabti area from  1730-43 and a cycle o f expansion and contraction is evident 
between 1744-50. The average zabti assessed area in  this period however remained 
lower than in  the preceding phase between 1730-43. Subsequently, we note an 
expansion in maize cu ltiva tion , both in  absolute and relative terms from  1756, while  
indigo ceased to be grown between 1754-58. However, no clear trend emerges 
during this phase from  1751-69 due to w ide fluctuations in  the yearly figures. The 
period 1775-82 marks the lowest ebb in  the average kh a rif zabti acreage due to a 
general fa ll in  the cu ltiva tion  o f a ll k h a rif cash assessed crops.
The m ajor food crops grown in  the kh a rif harvest were bajra, juw a r, moth, and 
sesame or t i l  (Table 6.M.2). From 1711-30, the trends in  the aggregate quantity 
figures fo r kh a rif appear to be m irro r images o f the zabti area figures, each phase 
o f expansion and contraction being inversely related (compare Figures 6.M.1 and 
6.M.2). In  the period 1732-63, however, aggregate jin s i produce figures began to 
decline, despite occasional good years, in  roughly two stages -  from  1732-50 the 
decline was gradual and the good years frequent, w hile  the phase from  1750-63 
marks the period o f the lowest average quantities produced. This period o f gradual 
decline coincided w ith  the decline in  the quantity o f moth produced. However, 
there was a revival in  production from  1765-69 that was especially marked fo r
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bajra and juw a r (Table 6.M.2). O verall the relative output o f bajra, ju w a r and t i l  
remained fa ir ly  consistent s ign ify ing  no basic change in  the cropping pattern o f the 
jin s i food crops.
The princ ipa l crops o f the rabi harvest were the food crops, barley, wheat and
gram, w ith  a lim ite d  cu ltiva tion  o f h igher value crops like  poppy and vegetables
(Table 6.M.3). The la tte r were invariab ly  assessed by the zabti method. The cash
assessed area in  the rabi harvest was small, averaging about 75 bighas annually over
the period (Fig.6.M .3), m ainly devoted to vegetables, onions, poppy, tobacco and
10irrigated barley and wheat assessed under the category o f "khatli". In  qasba
Malarna kha tli land (manured fie lds irriga ted  by rive r water) was sown w ith  wheat
and barley as is apparent from  the subdivision of khatli in to  wheat and barley in
11the arhsattas w ith  separate revenue schedules fo r each crop. The separate
schedules im p ly  that kha tli was not another term fo r the m ixed crop o f wheat and
barley called "gojai" but a specific category linked  to the p roduc tiv ity  o f land. In
qasba Am ber, kha tli land was assessed at ha lf the rate per bigha o f w e ll-w atered
kyari or seko land im p ly ing  that land categorised as kha tli was less productive w ith
a more variable outtu rn  that was dependent upon the ava ilab ility  o f rive r water
12than the more stable and regulated irr iga tion  possible by wells. The area assessed 
under kha tli has been recorded only at varying intervals in  the tim e series, except 
fo r a short continuous period between 1726-37. Poppy was cu ltiva ted sporadically 
from  1718-46 a fter which both poppy and tobacco production ceased. The 
subsequent decline in  the cu ltiva tion  o f rabi vegetables and melons from  1750 
signalled a fa ll in  aggregate rabi zabti acreage to less than ha lf that o f the previous 
phase.
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Crop sharing was the predom inant mode o f assessment fo r  the m ajor w in te r 
crops, barley, wheat and gram, in  qasba Malarna. The chart o f aggregate quantities 
o f produce revenue in  the rabi harvest shows a cyclical pattern marked by alternate 
troughs and crests w ithou t, however, a clear long term trend (F ig.6.M .3). W hile 
barley accounted fo r  the largest proportion  o f the rabi foodgrains fo r  the entire 
period, there appears to have been an expansion in  the relative quantity  o f wheat 
produced from  about 1743 (Table 6.M .2). The expansion in  wheat production began 
in 1725 but becomes obvious at the level o f relative proportions only a fte r the 
decline in  the production o f the m ixed crop, ba ijhari, from  1743.
The short term movements in  the aggregate annual revenue returns can be 
broadly periodised in to  three phases. From 1711-30, there was a period o f a 
gradual and consistent increase in  revenue which peaked in  1725. The in it ia l 
increase in  annual revenue was due to the gradual expansion in  the production o f 
cotton, a cash assessed crop, in  the k h a rif harvest from  1711-18. Despite the 
subsequent temporary decline in  cotton production t i l l  1725, the phase o f expansion 
in  the annual revenue continued t i l l  1730 owing to the continued increase in  the 
cu ltiva tion  o f ju w a r in  the k h a rif harvest and barley in  rabi. In  the second phase, 
between 1732-57, the average revenue remains high but the fluctuations between 
years become larger. D uring  this period, there was a s light decline o f about nine 
per cent in  the aggregate annual quantity o f produce revenue. This decline is, 
however, not reflected in  the annual revenue totals. Probably the relative increase 
in  the cu ltiva tion  o f the higher value wheat crop from  1743 onwards accounted fo r 
higher revenue returns despite the slight decline in  foodgrain production. The th ird  
phase, from  1758-79, appears in  the aggregate revenue statistics as an 
und iffe ren tia ted  period o f decline. A lthough there was a general fa ll in production
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in  both harvests during this period, the recovery in  kh a rif foodgrain production 
noted fo r the years 1765-69 is not reflected in  the revenue returns. This is s im ila r 
to the discrepancy observed earlier in  the case o f qasba Chatsu and can be 
attributed to the sharp swing in  prices from  the m id-1750s to the early 1770s -  the 
in it ia l decade being marked by fam ine level prices leading on to a sudden price 
collapse. The fluc tua tion  in  prices had the effect o f smoothing out the revenue 
figures thereby masking the partia l recovery in  k h a rif foodgrain production. 
Looking at overall trends, there appears to have been a period o f expansion in  
production and revenue between 1722-54 which was not lim ite d  to e ither harvest or 
to a particu lar crop, fo llow ed by an absolute fa ll in  both production  and revenue.
Qasba Phagi.
A  comparison o f the percentage o f annual revenue derived from  the kh a rif and 
rabi harvests shows that on average, the rabi revenue was one and a ha lf times 
more than that derived in  the kh a rif season (Table 6.P.1). However, the 
d is tribu tion  o f the average annual revenue t i l l  1743 was more equitable, the 
percentage ratio between the two being 47 : 53 fo r  the kh a rif and rabi harvests, 
respectively. But from  1743 onwards the average rabi revenue became a lit t le  over 
tw ice that obtained in the autumn harvest, the ratio fa lling  to 31 : 69. The revenue 
derived through the cash or zabti mode o f revenue assessment was fractiona lly  
higher than that from  the sale o f the jin s i crops. In it ia lly , between 1715-23, the 
aggregate zabti revenue was about 10 per cent lower than that in  k ind  (Table 6.P.1). 
However, from  1725-42, due to the rapid expansion in  the cu ltiva tion  o f the m ajor 
zabti crops -  cotton and kodon -  the relationship was reversed w ith  zabti revenue 
reaching a level 10 per cent higher than the aggregate jin s i returns. Subsequently,
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no systematic pattern in  the d is tribu tion  o f the annual returns as between the two 
modes o f assessment can be seen although, on average, the percentage o f zabti 
revenue remains a lit t le  higher (c. 52%). Zab ti assessment was the p rinc ipa l method 
o f revenue realisation in  the kh a rif harvest, while crop-sharing dominated in the 
rabi harvest.
The m ajor crops grown in  the kh a rif harvest were cotton, kodon, maize, indigo 
and a m inor m ille t, kagani, that were assessed by the zabti method; and, juw ar, 
moth, bajra and sesame, assessed by crop-sharing or jin s i assessment (Table 6.P.2). 
O f these, cotton and ju w a r dominated the kh a rif cropping in  terms o f the ir relative 
acreage and output.
A n  examination o f F ig .6 .P .l shows that in  the years between 1715-27 there was 
a gradual decline in  the aggregate zabti assessed area in the k h a rif harvest, despite a 
sharp fa ll in  1717 and an unprecedented expansion in  1723. The average zabti area 
in  this period, however, remained 7 per cent higher than the mean aggregate area 
fo r the entire series. This was fo llow ed by a phase o f expansion that began in  1728 
and continued t i l l  1732, w ith  the exception o f the fam ine year o f 1731, From 
1733, the year a fte r the maximum zabti area was recorded in  the k h a rif harvest, 
there was a phase o f gradual decline that continued t i l l  1746. The culm ination o f 
this cycle o f expansion and contraction was, however, not repeated in  the fo llow ing  
phase. From 1746-60, the zabti area remained low, fa lling  to 40 per cent o f the 
overall mean fo r the entire series.
The trends in  the movement o f aggregate kha rif zabti area re flect the variations 
in the cropping pattern o f p rim a rily , cotton and kodon, w h ich together accounted
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fo r more than 80 per cent o f the area t i l l  1743 (Table 6.P.2). The expansion from  
1728 noted above was due to the expansion in  the acreage cropped o f both these 
crops. However, from  1736 the area sown w ith  kodon began to decline and 
thereafter from  1743, cotton acreage also declined. The decline in  the cu ltiva tion  
o f these two m ajor crops was partia lly  o ffset by an increase in the cu ltiva tion  o f 
kagani between 1743-45 and indigo between 1741-51. From 1746 onwards, 
however, there was a general decrease in  the area cultivated fo r all kh a rif zabti 
crops accompanied by a sh ift in  the relative cropping composition. In  relative 
terms, there was a sh ift away from  cotton and kodon to maize and kagani. In  other 
words, the decline in  the cu ltiva tion  o f cotton and kodon from  the m id-1740s was 
both relative and absolute although they continued to be the two m ajor zabti 
assessed crops.
Our examination o f the zabti rates o f taxation in  qasba Phagi in  an earlier 
chapter indicated that there had been a slight downward revision in  revenue rates 
from  the 1740s (see Table 10). The revision in rates was probably sanctioned in  
response to the fa lling  o f f  in  cash crop production and the fa ll in  prices in  the same 
period (see Table 19). A  continued downward trend in  the k h a rif cash crop 
production, however, suggests that the magnitude o f the deduction in  rates was 
insu ffic ien t to offset the price decline making the cu ltiva tion  o f cotton in particu lar 
uneconomic. I t  is like ly  that only those cultivators who enjoyed concessionary rates 
o f taxation and also controlled the best qua lity  irrigated land were able to continue 
cu ltiva ting  cotton.
The kh a rif foodgrain production, assessed by the jin s i mode, was dominated by 
the cu ltiva tion  o f juw ar, w ith  moth bajra and sesame being produced in  smaller
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amounts (Table 6.P.2). In  the firs t two phases between 1715-28 and 1730-45, the 
trend in  the quantities o f jin s i crop production appears to be inversely related to 
that o f the zabti acreage (compare Figs. 6.P.1 and 6.P.2). S tarting from  a period o f 
high production in  the f irs t phase, jin s i production begins to decline from  1730, 
roughly coincid ing w ith  the phase o f zabti expansion that commenced in  1728/9 
(Fig.6.P.2). From 1746 onwards, however, the s ign ifican t decline in  the zabti 
revenue noted above was repeated fo r  the jin s i revenues. This decline was most 
marked in  the production o f ju w a r resulting in  a relative sh ift from  ju w a r to moth 
and bajra cu ltivation.
The m ajor rabi crops were the foodgrains, barley, gram and wheat, w h ile  the
zabti assessed crops included a small area cultivated w ith  vegetables, poppy and
tobacco (Table 6.P.3). On average, the rabi cash assessed area amounted to just five
per cent o f that s im ila rly  assessed in  the kh a rif harvest. The bar chart showing the
temporal movements in  the aggregate rabi zabti area begins w ith  a phase o f decline
fo llow ing  the peak acreage in  1716 (Fig.6.P.3). This lasted t i l l  1733, to be
succeeded by an upswing from  1734-60, although the expansion during this period
was marked by a high level o f annual variation. The p ro file  o f the chart reflects
the behaviour o f the area entered under "kyari'’. K ya ri denoted care fu lly  prepared
13plots that were irrigated and, in  qasba Phagi, were sown w ith  wheat or barley. 
The peaks in  the rabi zabti acreage in  1716/1717 and a sustained upswing between 
1734-60 were due to the inclusion o f kyari in  the zabti assessed area. The 
discontinuation o f the zabti assessment o f irriga ted wheat and barley between 1721- 
33 may have been fo r a variety o f reasons related to e ither a change in state 
regulations, a preference fo r  the physical d ivision o f the crop instead o f a fixed  
cash sum, or a sh ift in  the cropping choices o f the cu ltiva to r on high value irriga ted
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land. Next in  importance to kya ri cu ltiva tion  were the w in te r vegetables and melons 
grown in  summer as can be seen from  the figures fo r  garden produce in  Table 
6.P.3, which represents the aggregated values o f the ind iv idua l entries in  the 
revenue records fo r each type o f vegetable or melon. The cu ltiva tion  o f market 
vegetables and melons began to fa ll in  relative terms from  1749 onwards.
U n like  the other qasbas, market gardening in  qasba Phagi was re lative ly 
ins ign ifican t in  both the autumn and w in te r harvests. This was perhaps ind icative 
o f low local demand due to a smaller non-agricu ltu ra l qasba population. I t  is 
reasonable to speculate that although qasba Phagi as a revenue un it included w ith in  
i t  the largest extent o f taxable agricu ltu ra l land, i t  had a smaller ’urban’ 
complement o f resident elites and adm inistrative, commercial, artisanal and other 
non-agricu ltu ra l personnel than, fo r  instance, qasbas Sanganer or Jaipur.
The m ajor jin s i assessed crops in  the rabi harvest were, in  order o f relative 
proportion o f annual output, barley, gram, wheat and a m ixed barley and wheat 
crop called gojai (Table 6.P.3), The magnitude o f the annual fluctuations in  the 
aggregate produce revenue makes i t  d if f ic u lt  to attempt a rough periodisation o f the 
production trends (Fig.6.P.4). A  d is tinct phase o f expansion, however, can be 
iden tified  interposed between two phases o f lower and approxim ately s im ila r levels 
o f production. The upswing from  1724-36 was due to the increase in  the 
cu ltiva tion  o f gram and barley in this period, specially the form er. The fo llow ing  
decline in  seasonal output was ow ing to the fa ll in  gram cu ltiva tion , in  both 
absolute and relative terms, that could not be compensated fo r  by the relatively 
small increase in  the cu ltiva tion  o f gojai. In  fact from  1734 onwards the rabi 
harvest was completely dominated by the cu ltiva tion  o f barley and wheat and the ir
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mixed crop, gojai, which form ed a substantial proportion o f the jin s i produce 
revenue as w ell as the zabti assessed area under kyari.
The graph o f the annual revenue returns accurately reflects the increment in 
revenues arising from  the expansion in  production in  both harvests during the 
period 1725-36/41 (cf.Figs.6.P.5, 6.P.6, and 6.P.7). For the k h a r if harvest, the 
expansion was p rim a rily  in  the cu ltiva tion  o f cotton and kodon w h ile  gram and 
barley production increased in  the rabi harvest. Thereafter, the chart shows a 
stepped decline through two cycles running from  1741-46 and from  1749-60 (Fig. 
6.P.7). This decline in  the revenues was caused both by a fa ll in  production, 
p rim arily  in  the kh a rif harvest, as well as by a sh ift in  the cropping pattern 
towards lower value crops in both harvests.
Qasba Sanganer
The cropping pattern o f qasba Sanganer d iffe red  from  that o f the other qasbas 
in  the variety o f specialist and non-food  crops that were grown there. These 
included a range o f dye plants besides indigo like  safflow er, henna and a root 
yie ld ing red dye called aal (M orinda tinctoria ); condiments and m edicinal plants like  
cum in, a jwain (lovage), and isabgol (Plantago ovata); as well as small amounts o f 
poppy, tobacco, betel leaves, and rice fo r the local market. N ot a ll these crops, 
however, were grown every year and the ir cu ltiva tion  was lim ite d  in  terms o f the 
total annual output. The cu ltiva tion  o f these special crops contributed to the variety 
in  the overall produce m ix  o f the qasba w ithou t however a ltering the local pattern 
o f cotton and maize cu ltiva tion  in  the k h a rif harvest and barley in  the rabi season 
common to the surrounding villages. Where the cropping pattern o f the qasba
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d iffe red  s ign ifican tly  from  that o f the villages was in the extensive cu ltiva tion  o f 
vegetables both in  the kh a rif and rabi harvest which together contributed to about 
20 to 25 per cent o f the annual revenue from  crop production in  the qasba. For 
example, in 1740, o f the annual revenue o f Rs.9380, the proceeds from  market 
gardening were Rs.2086 or a l it t le  over 22 per cent, and the area devoted to 
vegetables was 1547 b ig h a s .^
The revenue returns indicate that the rabi harvest was more im portant than the 
kh a rif in  terms o f average revenue returns fo r each harvest. As in  qasba Phagi, the 
mode o f revenue appropriation in  qasba Sanganer was also predom inantly in cash 
by the zabti system in  the kh a rif harvest, w hile  in  the rabi harvest crop sharing or 
jin s i batai prevailed (Table 6.S.1). This d ifference in  the mode o f assessment 
related to the nature o f the crops grown in  the two harvests. Crops like  cotton, 
sugarcane and vegetables, that could only be assessed by the zabti method, were the 
m ajor kh a rif crops w h ile  cereal production , generally assessed in  k ind , was more 
s ign ificant in  the rabi harvest. Overall, the jin s i assessed revenue was s ligh tly 
larger in percentage terms than zabti revenue, the ratio between the two being 52 : 
48 respectively.
The m a jor zabti crops in the k h a r if harvest, in  descending order o f relative 
acreage cultivated, were cotton, maize, vegetables, a coarse m ille t called madwa, 
sweet potato or sakarkandi, sugarcane and a fodder crop, guwar (Table 6.S.2). In  
the firs t ha lf o f the century, the aggregate area occupied by cash assessed crops was 
large and fa ir ly  stable (Fig. 6.S.1). The p ro file  o f the aggregate area graph in  the 
period 1708-56 closely reflects the changes in the acreage o f cotton and maize 
which together accounted fo r  more than 50 per cent o f the kh a rif zabti area. W hile
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the percentage acreage o f vegetables and madwa remained stable at 15 per cent 
each in  this phase, guwar began to be cultivated from  the m id-1730s and its 
production increased steadily. Sugarcane cu ltiva tion , on the other hand, was 
sign ificant in  terms o f relative acreage and revenue returns t i l l  1724, a fte r which i t  
declined sharply remaining stagnant u n til 1768. Between 1768-73, there was a 
partia l revival in  cane cu ltiva tion  but the area cropped was smaller than that in  the 
in it ia l period. The year 1756, marked by the smallest figure  fo r  the aggregate 
kh a rif zabti area, signalled the phase o f decline in  the cu ltiva tion  o f a ll the m ajor 
zabti crops and the average area cu ltivated fe ll to ha lf its previous level. The 
decline, however, was not un ifo rm  fo r  all crops resulting in  a relative sh ift in  the 
cropping proportions. The relative cropped area o f both the m a jo r crops, cotton 
and maize, declined by about 10 per cent. Despite this, cotton continued to be the 
most im portant crop in terms o f relative cropped area, but market gardening 
displaced maize as the crop next in  importance to cotton. S im ila rly , madwa was 
displaced by the relative expansion in  the cu ltiva tion  o f sweet potato, guwar and 
sugarcane.
The m ajor jin s i assessed crops in the kh a rif harvest were m oth, bajra and urad. 
A lthough the average aggregate quantity  o f the levy in  k ind  was small w ith  a mean 
o f 123 maunds, i t  fluctuated w ide ly from  year to year ranging from  less than a 
maund o f moth in 1764 to 913 maunds in  1708. Thus no clear periodisation o f the 
aggregate jin s i returns is possible. There was a relative expansion in  the production 
o f moth from  about 1733 a fter which year moth accounted fo r  more than 50 per 
cent o f the aggregate jin s i quantity in  successive years.
307
The insignificance of the jinsi assessed foodgrain production meant that the
pattern o f kh a rif revenue returns broadly coincided w ith  the cycles in  the aggregate
zabti area figures as can be seen from  Figures 6.S.5 and 6.S.I. However, the graphs
o f these two aggregate values vary s ligh tly  due to the disproportionate e ffect that
the cu ltiva tion  o f a bigha o f sugarcane had on the average revenue returns per un it 
1 so f land. Thus between 1708-16, the revenue curve shows a steady upward trend 
that reaches a peak in  1715, registering an increase o f 71 per cent over the period 
while the aggregate zabti area increased by jus t 49 per cent over the same period. 
This is m ainly a ttributab le  to the expansion in  sugarcane acreage during  this period. 
The percentage revenue from  sugarcane was generally 10 per cent higher than the 
percentage area cropped as can be seen from  Tables 6.S.2 and 6.S.3. Over the years 
1708-44, the revenue returns continued to remain high (on average, 25 per cent 
higher than the overall mean fo r the k h a rif harvest), but thereafter began to 
decline. From 1745-56 the drop in  revenues was gradual, averaging about 28 per 
cent as compared to the preceding phase, but from  1760 there was a fu rth e r 35 per 
cent fa ll in  the average revenue returns (Fig.6.S.5).
In  the rabi harvest, the revenue derived from  cash assessed crops averaged a 
lit t le  over 20 per cent o f the total rabi revenue (Table 6.S.1). The zabti assessed 
crops were m ainly melons and vegetables, w ith  re latively smaller cu ltiva tion  o f 
poppy fo r opium , tobacco, w in te r maize, and condiments (Table 6.S.2). There 
appears to have been no discernable sh ift in  the relative acreages o f these crops 
over the years. There was however a phase o f expansion in  aggregate rabi zabti 
area over the period 1740-45, ow ing m ainly to the s ign ifican t increase in  the 
cu ltiva tion  o f vegetables and, to a smaller extent, tobacco (Fig. 6.S.3 and Table
6.S.2).
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The m ajor rabi crops were, however, the cereals barley, wheat and gram and 
the ir admixtures. O f these, barley contributed over 60 per cent o f the aggregate 
quantity o f produce revenue (Table 6.S.2). Hence, the year to year fluctuations in  
barley production are the m ajor explanatory components o f the annual fluctuations 
in  the aggregate produce revenues (F igure 6.S.4). Relative to barley, wheat 
cu ltiva tion  was small (average 15 per cent ) but more im portant than gram (Table
6.S.2). Wheat cu ltiva tion  went through a period o f relative decline in the decade 
between 1728-38, being substituted by gram in it ia lly  t i l l  1732 and later by the 
wheat and barley adm ixture, gojai. In  the la tte r ha lf o f the eighteenth century, 
there appears to have been a sh ift from  the sole cropping o f barley to a m ixed 
cropping system composed o f barley, wheat and gram, e ither in  combinations o f 
two or three (gojai, gochani and ba ijha ri), as well as an increase in  the cu ltiva tion  
o f the hardier rabi crop, gram (Table 6.S.2). This sh ift in  cropping pattern occurs 
in a period which sees an overall fa ll in  production, population and resources due 
to repeated droughts and po litica l ins tab ility  caused by M aratha raids. In  this 
context, i t  is plausible to argue that there was a retreat from  the cu ltiva tion  o f 
marginal land, on which lower value crops such as barley were grown, to the better 
quality land capable o f producing crops like  wheat or wheat combinations and 
which yielded better returns w hile  not requiring the scale o f investment needed fo r 
specialist cash crops such as indigo, poppy or tobacco.
The d iscontinu ity in  the revenue series o f Sanganer makes i t  d if f ic u lt  to 
periodise the phases in  the production o f rabi cereals. Broadly, from  1710-46, the 
aggregate produce quantity was on average 12 per cent higher than in  the phase 
from  1747-72 (Figure 6.S.4). This broad periodisation also appears to coincide w ith  
that o f aggregate rabi revenue (F igure 6.S.6). In  the in it ia l phase between 1708-44,
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there was a gradual increase in  the rabi revenue marked by short cyclical
fluctuations w ith  the troughs o f each cycle successively h igher than the last.
Subsequently, there was a 24 per cent decline in  revenue, re flecting  the decline 
noted above in  the rabi cereal production as well as the sharp contraction in  the 
acreages o f the zabti assessed crops.
The annual receipts o f revenue in  each fiscal year, show that there was an 
overall decline o f approximately 30 per cent between the period 1708-44 and 1745- 
72 (Figure 6.S.7). The analysis o f overall production trends in  the kh a rif and rabi 
harvests indicates that the decline began in  the mid-1740s. However, fo r the kh a rif 
harvest we note that the decline was gradual t i l l  1756 a fte r w h ich there was a 
fu rthe r fa ll between 1760-72. A lthough it  is not possible to accurately locate the 
stages in the decline in  rabi production i t  is apparent that there was an overall fa ll 
in  production in  both harvests w ith  the m id-1740s as the tu rn ing  point. U n like  the 
other qasbas, there was no phase o f expansion in  production in  the early decades o f 
the century in  Sanganer.
In  so fa r as the revenue returns are not accurate reflections o f actual changes in  
overall production, we can surmise that the magnitude o f the overall decline in  
revenues was more or less consistent w ith  the fa ll in  production. The d ifference in  
these two could be due to changes in  the prices o f the m ajor jin s i assessed crops,
change in  the revenue rates o f the zabti crops in  either harvest, or a sh ift in  crop
composition from  higher to low er value crops or vice-versa. W hile we have 
examined the firs t two factors in  other chapters, we are concerned here w ith  
changes in the cropping pattern. In  the case of qasba Sanganer, the absolute and 
relative decline in  the cu ltiva tion  o f h igher value crops like  cotton, indigo, and
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maize in  the kh a rif harvest from  the mid-1740s indicates that the fa ll in  the 
revenue was perhaps greater than the actual fa ll in  cultivated acreage,
Qasba Lalsot
The records o f qasba Lalsot are unique in  that the assessment o f revenue was 
p rinc ipa lly  made in  cash fo r all the m a jo r crops, w ith  only a small fraction  o f the 
revenue derived from  crop-sharing. This makes i t  possible to d irec tly  compare the 
trends in  the cropping pattern between harvests and crops using acreage figures as a 
un ifo rm  un it o f comparison. The distortions inherent in  using the revenue values 
as a proxy fo r  determ ining spatial and temporal changes in  crop d is tribu tion  and 
overall agricultura l production are thereby minim ised.
A n  attempt to compare the relative extent o f production in  the two harvests 
illustrates the problem o f re ly ing exclusively on the revenue figures as a proxy fo r 
the level o f production. On comparing the d is tribu tion  o f the annual revenues we 
see that in it ia lly , from  1712-30, the ratio o f the aggregate k h a r if revenue to rabi 
was, on average, 56 : 44 (Table 6.L.1). A f te r  1730, however, the revenues from  the 
rabi harvest increased and the average d is tribu tion  became 41 : 59, The reversal in 
the percentage d is tribu tion  o f the revenues, however, cannot be taken to im p ly  that 
there was a relative expansion o f production in  the rabi harvest from  1730. As we 
shall see in  more detail later, rabi production remained more or less stable from  
1712-57, both in  terms o f cropped area and the crop -m ix. Despite the stab ility  in  
production, the rabi revenue figures show a sudden increase from  1730 onwards. 
On the other hand, kh a rif production , both in  real and value terms, had begun to 
expand from  1730-42. The sudden increase in the rabi revenues, causing the
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reversal in  the ratios o f kh a rif and rabi revenue from  1730 onwards, was due to the 
enhancement in  the rates o f revenue per un it o f land fo r the m a jor rabi crops 
wheat and barley. The magnitude o f the increase in  the taxes on rabi cereals and 
the d istorting e ffect this had on the in ter-harvest d is tribu tion  o f revenue was such 
that i t  e ffec tive ly  masked the real expansion that took place in  k h a rif production 
from  1730-42. Overall, therefore, the extent o f cu ltiva tion  in  the k h a r if harvest 
remained higher than that in  the rabi, although as we have seen, in  value terms the 
rabi harvest yielded higher returns.
In  the f irs t ha lf o f the eighteenth century, the cropping composition o f the 
kh a rif harvest in  qasba Lalsot was dominated by the cu ltiva tion  o f cotton and 
sugarcane (Table 6.L.2). The other crops grown were vegetables, guwar, maize, 
m illets, moth, a jw ain, and chola. Except moth and up u n til 1737, bajra, a ll the 
other crops were assessed in  cash. Analysis o f figure  6.L.1 shows that there was an 
increase o f approximately 37 per cent in  the average zabti assessed area from  1730- 
42 as compared w ith  the pre-1730 phase. The expansion in the k h a r if revenue over 
the same period, on the other hand, averaged just 12 per cent (F igure 6.L.5). The 
disproportionate increase in  the area statistics was partly due to the change in  the 
manner o f assessment o f bajra. A fte r  an in it ia l period o f assessment in  k ind, bajra 
began to be taxed in  cash per un it o f land sown. Thus the scale o f expansion in  
the kh a rif harvest between 1730-42 was perhaps closer to 12 per cent than the 37 
per cent indicated by the area figures.
The expansion in  kh a rif production from  1730-42, was accompanied by a 
relative sh ift in  the crop composition. The increase in  aggregate acreage was, in  
relative terms, most marked fo r  cotton although there was an expansion in  the
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absolute acreage o f both cotton and sugarcane (Table 6.L.2). On the other hand,
O
over the same period there was a fa ll in  bajra production. T i l l  1737, bajra was 
assessed in  k ind  a fte r w hich i t  was assessed in  cash. The re lative revenue derived 
from  the cu ltiva tion  o f bajra, irrespective o f the mode o f its assessment, has been 
used as the basis fo r comparison in  order to indicate the magnitude o f the decline 
in  bajra production from  1731-47 (Table 6.L 4). There appears to have been a 
sh ift from  the cu ltiva tion  o f bajra to cotton and sugarcane from  1730-42, along 
w ith  a s ign ifican t overall increase in  gross cropped acreage in  the k h a rif harvest.
This period o f a boom in production was fo llowed by a gradual decline from  
1745-63 after which there was a fu rth e r fa ll (Fig. 6.L.1). There was also a change 
in  the crop composition that coincided w ith  the fa ll in  overall production . Cotton 
acreage began to fa ll in  relative terms from  1748 and sugarcane from  1756 w hile  
bajra, maize and guwar cu ltiva tion  expanded (Table 6.L.2). Overall the fa ll in  the 
aggregate area from  1742-70 was about 20 per cent w h ile  the drop in  revenue 
during the same period was more than 28 per cent. The greater magnitude o f 
decline in  revenue was owing to the relative sh ift in  the cropping pattern from  the 
production o f higher value crops, cotton and sugarcane, specially the latter, to the 
food crops, bajra, maize and guwar.
Barley and wheat were the m ajor crops grown in the rabi harvest, together 
accounting fo r  as much as 90 per cent o f the cropped area in  the harvest. The 
other crops such as poppy, w in te r vegetables and melons, gram and m ixed crops 
were o f m inor importance. T i l l  1722, the area cultivated w ith  wheat or barley was 
not separately specified, the ir combined acreage being taxed under two categories, 
"kya ri’1 and "bor", corresponding to irriga ted  and un irrigated land. A t  some point
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between 1723 and 1729, there was a revision in  the rates o f taxation that 
necessitated a separate record o f the wheat and barley acreages in  addition to the 
separate recording o f each in to  the revenue categories corresponding to irrigated 
and u n irr ig a te d .^  A n  upward revision in  the rates o f taxation on irriga ted cereal 
acreage, however, d id  not result in  a change in  the cropping pattern. There was a 
marked s tab ility  in  both the crop composition and the annual cropped area from  
1712-57 (Table 6.L.2 and Fig. 6.L.3). From 1758, along w ith  a w ider range in 
annual fluctuation , there was a overall decline o f about 20 per cent in  both the 
average area cropped and revenue. The decline in  acreage during this period was 
m arginally greater fo r barley than fo r  wheat.
From the above analysis o f the two harvests, i t  appears that there were three 
short term cycles in  the long term trend o f decline in  agricu ltura l production in  the 
suburb o f qasba Lalsot (Fig. 6.L.7). There was an increase in  revenue in  the in it ia l 
phase between 1730-45, averaging 37 per cent over the years 1712-22. This 
expansion was due both to the revision in  taxation rates fo r  cereal crops in  the rabi 
harvest as w ell as the expansion in the cu ltiva tion  o f h igher value crops, cotton and 
sugarcane, in  the kh a rif harvest. Subsequently, the sh ift in  the cropping pattern in 
the kh a rif harvest away from  ’cash’ crops to food crops from  1742 onwards as well 
as the decline in  rabi cereal production from  1758 resulted in  a slight fa ll in  the 
annual revenues by 10 per cent in  the phase that extended from  1747 to 1765. The 
last decade in  our series, 1767-77, was marked by a fu rthe r decline in  the revenue 
by 27 per cent over the preceding period. The overall fa ll in  revenue in  qasba 
Lalsot was not only due to the fa ll in  production in  both the harvests but also 
because o f the sh ift in  the crop composition towards low er value crops, especially 
in  the kh a rif harvest.
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Qasba Jaipur
The trends in  agricu ltura l production in  the suburbs o f qasba Jaipur, the 
residence o f the Jaipur Maharaja since its foundation in 1727, d if fe r  radically from  
that o f any o f the qasbas analysed so far. Here production was not on ly more stable 
but expanded consistently during the course o f the century. The cropping pattern 
in  qasba Jaipur also d iffe rs  from  the other qasbas in terms o f the importance o f the 
cu ltiva tion  o f high value food crops to meet urban demand such as vegetables and 
maize in  the kh a rif harvest and wheat in  the rabi harvest.
The d is tribu tion  o f annual revenue between the autumn and w in te r harvests was 
almost even ind icating that production in the w in te r harvest was as im portant as 
that in  the ra in -fed  kh a rif season and that the cu ltiva tion  o f two crops a year was a 
general practice (Table 6.J.1). As in  the other qasbas, the mode o f revenue 
appropriation in  qasba Jaipur was also predom inantly in  cash fo r  the k h a rif season 
and in k ind  fo r the rabi season.
The m ajor crops cultivated in  the k h a rif harvest were a varie ty o f vegetables 
and maize together accounting fo r  about 60 per cent o f the kh a rif zabti assessed 
area (Table 6.J.2). Smaller areas were devoted to sugarcane, sweet potato and a 
coarse grain, madwa. U n like  the other qasbas, and the region as a whole, cotton 
cu ltiva tion  in  Jaipur was irregular and o f m inor importance. The relative acreages 
o f the m ajor crops remain v irtu a lly  unchanged over the whole period w ith  a slight 
rise in  the proportion devoted to market gardening from  30 per cent o f the 
aggregate zabti area t i l l  1756, to 40 per cent in the subsequent period t i l l  1770. 
This expansion in  the relative area o f garden produce d id  not im p ly  a proportional
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fa ll in  the other m ajor crop, maize, but a displacement o f the m inor crops like  
sunnhemp, small m illets and cotton. The overall trend in  the aggregate zabti area 
was, as mentioned above, one o f consistent expansion which can be d iv ided into 
two phases (Fig. 6.J.1). From 1733-47, the average area on w hich zabti crops were 
grown was approxim ately 668 bighas. From 1750 onwards, however, there was an 
unprecedented expansion by over 50 per cent in  the aggregate zabti assessed area, 
the average zabti acreage increasing to 1012 bighas.
There were only a small number o f crops which were taxed in  k ind  and the 
aggregate quantity o f grain taken as revenue and the sale proceeds o f these was not 
very s ign ifican t (Fig.6.J.2 and Table 6.J.4). The chart showing the aggregate jin s i 
quantities exhibits w ide annual fluctuations which correspond to the pattern o f 
bajra production (Fig. 6.J.2). Bajra  was the m ajor jin s i assessed crop accounting 
fo r  more than 95 per cent o f the aggregate grain production (Table 6.J.2). A  small 
quantity o f moth was also produced, w h ile  the production o f paddy and sesame was 
very low. There was a sudden decrease in  the production o f bajra a fte r the 
maximum produce revenue recorded in  1756. This coincides w ith  the increase in  
the cu ltiva tion  o f vegetables noted above. Thus the massive expansion in  the 
cu ltiva tion  o f zabti crops from  the 1750s was perhaps to some extent due to 
substitution o f low er value crops like  m ille ts and moth, but the magnitude o f the 
expansion in  aggregate zabti acreage suggests that there was also an overall 
expansion in  cropped area.
Given the predominance o f cash assessment over k ind  in  the kh a rif harvest, we 
would expect the aggregate kh a rif revenue trends to closely fo llow  those o f the 
aggregate zabti area. The revenue returns, however, fluctuated more w idely from
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year to year and there is no apparent increase in  kh a rif revenues from  1750
corresponding to the phase o f expansion o f aggregate cropped area noted above.
On closer examination, we fin d  that t i l l  1756, the peaks in  the k h a rif revenue chart
can mostly be explained by the fluctuations in  the produce revenues (cf. Figs. 6.J.5
and 6.J.2). The extraordinary increase in  the revenue in  1756 is a ttribu tab le  in part
to the high grain revenue received that was sold at the fam ine-leve l prices in  that 
17year. The expansion in  the aggregate k h a rif zabti area that took place a fte r 1756 
is not reflected in  the kh a rif revenues due to the fa ll in  the average un it rate o f 
taxation caused by a sh ift towards the cu ltiva tion  o f garden produce which was 
taxed at a lower rate than maize, cotton, or sugarcane. The e ffec t o f the crop 
substitution that took place in  the 1750s thus had the e ffect o f under-representing 
the expansion in  acreage in  terms o f the aggregate revenue returns.
In  the rabi harvest, the m ajor crops cultivated were vegetables, barley and 
wheat w ith  a small amount o f poppy cu ltiva tion  fo r the production o f opium. O f 
these, vegetables and poppy were assessed in cash, the acreage thus taxed being 
dominated by vegetable production (Table 6.J.3). The trend in  the aggregate zabti 
area essentially fo llows that o f the kh a rif zabti area, namely a gradual expansion t i l l  
1750 after which there was a fu rth e r s ign ificant increase averaging tw ice that in 
the pre-1750 phase (Fig. 6.J.3). The rabi harvest was, however, dominated by the 
cu ltiva tion  o f the cereals wheat and barley that were assessed in  k ind  by the jin s i 
method (Table 6.J.1). The aggregate jin s i quantity chart showing the quantities o f 
barley and wheat revenues in  k ind  also indicates a gradual increase though in  short 
cyclical movements (Fig. 6.J.4). The expansion o f gross production coincided w ith  
a sh ift in  the cropping pattern. T i l l  1750, the relative proportion  o f barley and 
wheat production was approximately equal but thereafter wheat production
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expanded to be fou r times that o f barley (Table 6.J.3). In  real terms, however, 
there was no decline in  the quantity o f barley appropriated in  k ind  ind ica ting  that 
its acreage probably remained stable. There does not appear to have been a 
substitution o f barley fo r h igher value crops such as wheat or vegetables, but an 
overall expansion in  rabi cu ltiva tion  from  1750 equivalent to the increase in  the 
cu ltiva tion  o f wheat and vegetables.
The rabi revenues (Fig. 6.J.6) do not exactly correspond to the above trends in  
production although the overall increase in revenues is apparent. The 
dissim ilarities, especially o f a sudden increase in the aggregate rabi revenue in 
1755/6, can be explained in  terms o f the change in  prices. The predominance o f 
the jin s i form  o f assessment necessitated the sale o f the grain revenues at the 
prevailing price by the state. The total revenue received was then a function  o f 
both the actual production as well as the current price. W ith  the increase in  the 
production o f wheat, a high value crop, as well as the expansion in  vegetable 
cu ltiva tion , the revenues from  1750 onwards should have shown a substantial 
increase. The revenue curve, however, does not reflect the magnitude o f the 
expansion as there had been a fa ll in  prices from  about 1763 onwards which 
depressed revenue levels especially in  comparison w ith  the preceding decade which 
had witnessed very high prices.
Overall, there was an expansion in  production in  both the k h a r if and the rabi 
harvest accompanied by a sh ift in  crop composition through substitu tion as well as 
an increase in cropped acreage. This expansion was slow and fluc tua ting  at firs t 
but from  the early 1750s i t  was s ign ificant. The annual revenue returns also show 
an overall increase but the magnitude o f the expansion was smaller than that o f
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gross production (cf.Figs. 6.J.7 w ith  6.J.I., 6.J.3 and 6.J.4.). This was due to 
substitution o f crops liab le  to high rates o f taxation by the re la tive ly lig h tly  taxed 
category o f vegetables in  the kh a rif harvest and due to the fa ll in  grain prices that 
affected the returns on the expanding production o f wheat. The sudden rise in the 
annual revenue returns between 1755-57, fo llowed by an equally dramatic fa ll to a 
level slightly higher than the pre-1755 level was due to the sharp rise in  the prices 
during these fam ine years. Thus despite the apparent sluggishness o f revenue 
expansion, the other indicators show a trend o f consistently expanding production 
in  Jaipur.
The cropping pattern in  qasba Jaipur d iffe red  s ign ifican tly  from  the other 
qasbas studied both in  its c rop -m ix  as w ell as the long term trends in  production. 
The predominance o f market gardening and wheat cu ltiva tion  in  the qasba indicates 
that the urban market o f the po litica l and adm inistrative capital o f the region 
stimulated the production o f these crops. I t  is also possible that the relative 
po litica l security in  the immediate h in terland o f the capital in  the second ha lf o f 
the eighteenth century led to the m igration o f capital, skills and labour from  the 
outly ing parganas that were repeatedly ravaged by the Marathas in  this period. 
This would perhaps explain the continued expansion in  overall production  in  qasba 
Jaipur during a period when production in  the region as a whole declined 
s ign ificantly .
The trends that emerge from  the foregoing analysis o f the cropping pattern o f 
the six qasbas exh ib it a broad u n ifo rm ity  in  the phases o f expansion and decline, 
w ith  the notable exception o f qasba Jaipur. The phase o f expansion began from  
1720 and continued t i l l  about the m id-1740s although the magnitude o f the
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expansion in agricultural production in the qasbas varied. The expansion was
accompanied by an increase in  the cu ltiva tion  o f cotton and other cash crops in  the
kh a rif harvest and a concurrent expansion in  rabi production. The la tte r was due
to the increased cu ltiva tion  o f the hardier rabi crops -  barley and gram -  rather
than wheat. Contrary to the tw entie th century classification o f the region as a
kh a rif m ono-cropping region predom inantly producing secondary food grains, bajra
and moth, in  the eighteenth century in  all the qasbas analysed, the output o f the
18rabi harvest was at least as s ign ifican t as that o f the kh a rif harvest. The analysis
o f the cropping pattern in  the parganas o f which the qasbas studied were the
adm inistrative centres also shows that in  terms o f the revenue d is tribu tion  between
19the harvests, the rabi harvest was more im portant than the kh a rif. In  the sem i- 
arid  tropics, the cu ltiva tion  o f a second crop afte r the autumn harvest requires 
careful management o f water resources either through temporary storage o f 
rainwater in  tanks, or by tapping groundwater by l if t in g  devices, m ain ly temporary 
and permanent wells. The widespread and extensive cu ltiva tion  in  the rabi harvest 
therefore indicates that there was considerable investment o f capita l in  agriculture 
during the second quarter o f the eighteenth century..
The period from  the m id-1740s to about 1755/6 was a phase o f transition 
signalling the subsequent decline in  overall production. In  this period the decline 
was more marked in the case o f the k h a r if than the rabi harvest. A f te r  the severe 
drought and fam ine in  1755/6, however, agricu ltura l production fe ll sharply in  both 
harvests. In  this period there was also a relative sh ift to foodgrain production and 
revenue came to be increasingly collected in  kind. In  the two decades between 
1755 and 1775 (w hich marks the end o f our statistical series) agricu ltu ra l production
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in  the qasbas continued to stagnate at a level that was s ign ifican tly  low er than that 
in  the firs t ha lf o f the century.
Cropping Choices
The overview o f the short term variations in  cropping trends in  the qasbas 
clearly shows that agricu ltura l p roduction was sensitive to changes in  po litica l, 
environmental and economic conditions and that these played a v ita l role in  peasant 
production decisions. For the h istorian, however, the more fundamental questions 
which seek to understand the nature o f peasant decision-m aking and the ir response 
to the market remain problematic. In  the context o f a h igh ly monetised economy 
and the unequal d is tribu tion  o f economic resources, i t  would be pertinent to 
investigate i f  there was a systematic d ifference in  the cropping pattern o f various 
sections o f agriculturists and whether such differences were d irectly  associated w ith  
the ir d iffe re n tia l resource positions. Fortunately, our sources allow us a glimpse o f 
the variation in the cropping pattern o f ind iv idua l agriculturists.
I t  has been argued that the zamindars, revenue grantees revenue o ffic ia ls  and 
village headmen were endowed w ith  a greater command over resources that enabled 
them to produce commercial crops fo r  sale. The advantages that these 
agriculturists possessed were capital fo r  investment, access to the cred it and produce 
markets, and the ab ility  to undertake risks associated w ith  the production o f 
specialist crops. On the other hand, ’o rd inary ’ peasants (reza riaya) were unable to 
cultivate commercial crops because these ’’generally required a larger investment 
than an ord inary peasant could a ffo rd". The evidence o f a khasra, or record o f 
crop production and the associated taxation fo r each cu ltiva to r, o f a village in
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22pargana Chatsu, dated 1796 has been cited in  support o f this view. This khasra
o f the kh a rif harvest shows that one o f the three pateis in  the village was the
23largest single producer in  terms o f both num ber o f crops and volume o f output.
In  contrast, 16 o f the 36 cultivators in  the village produced only one foodcrop. 
However, a closer examination o f the khasra cited shows that these inferences need 
to be qualified. W hile there was undoubtedly a w ide d ifference between the gross 
production o f the largest producer and the m a jo rity  o f the small peasants, we fin d  
that at least fourteen o f the th ir ty  six cultivators in the village produced cotton, and 
all o f them were substantial peasants w ith  a larger and more d ive rs ified  production 
range than one o f the three pateis in  the v il la g e .^
Our evidence raises questions in  respect o f some o f the assumptions made in the 
hypothesis above. Our objections arise p rim a rily  from  the im p lied  equation o f the 
revenue classification o f agriculturists in to  khudkasht o r gharuhala and ra iya ti w ith  
un ifo rm  strategies o f production w ith in  each such category as well as the 
supposedly sharp d istinction between the two. The im plica tion  that command over 
resources would necessarily in fluence production decisions towards an 
in tensification in  agricu ltura l production , or the assumption that the m a jo rity  o f the 
peasants were too overtaxed and pauperised to cultivate cash crops needs to be 
examined.
Baker has suggested that production strategies in  sem iarid regions can be
2Sanalytically distinguished in to  two basic types -  the ’m in im a l’ and the ’intensive’ . 
M od ify ing  Bakers schema, we would suggest that three d istinct types o f cu ltiva ting  
’strategies’ can be envisaged :
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a) an extensive system o f food grain production associated w ith  large scale 
bhom ia/zam indar holdings cultivated p rim a rily  through bonded labourers (halis) and 
retainers (vasidars). The investment rationale o f the big zamindars/bhomias in  our 
region would perhaps be dictated by the ir attempt to enhance the ir po litica l 
au thority  and prestige through a greater control over men, larger retinues, religious 
and charitable donations, and conspicuous consumption rather than maxim ising
r y s
productiv ity . The production strategy o f such producers w ould be directed 
towards increasing the gross output o f food to feed dependants as well as used to 
maintain submission and subordination through occasional gestures o f ’benevolence’ 
in  the form  o f food doles."^
b) an ’intensive’ strategy adopted by p roprie to r-cu ltiva to rs  o f larger than 
average holdings and the best agricu ltu ra l lands. Such a strategy required the 
highest inputs o f capital and labour -  both animal and human. Capital was 
required fo r digging wells, buying seed and cattle, and procuring labour. 
Production was geared towards cu ltiva ting  marketable crops and returns were in  the 
form  o f h igher yields and more secure production. This strategy needed a 
considerable financia l outlay and a s ign ifican t command over the labour o f poorer 
cultivators w ith in  the village.
c) ’m in im a l’ strategy pursued by peasant fam ilies w ith  lit t le  or no capital in  
order to eke out a liv in g  barely ris ing above subsistence. Such peasants were 
p rim a rily  dependent upon ra in -fe d  cu ltiva tion  o f m illets in  the k h a r if harvest and a 
few leguminous crops that were saleable fo r lim ited  cash requirements.
Some o f the arguments above are substantiated by the analysis o f the khasra o f 
the rabi harvest o f a village fo r the year 1734. Khasras form  a part o f the body o f 
in form ation on the basis o f which the tax lia b ility  o f each tax payer was computed.
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The khasra that was analysed records the quantity o f grain in  maunds that was 
shared between the state and the peasant, the proportions at which the sharing was 
done, and the respective amount o f grain accruing to the state and the taxpayer. 
The number o f taxpayers recorded is 102 which indicates that the v illage was larger 
than an average sized village in Jaipur in  1901. I t  is possible that the number o f 
residents was in  fact h igher as those peasants who d id  not have the resources to
cultivate in  the rabi harvest would obviously not have figu red  in  the lis t o f
taxpayers fo r that harvest. The uniqueness o f the khasra lies in  that i t  records the 
fu ll names o f the cultivators enabling us to d iffe ren tia te  them by caste. However, 
about 20 o f these names remain un iden tified . A  complete lis t o f the taxpayers and 
the ir ind iv idua l liab ilitie s  are tabulated in  Append ix 8.3.
A n  analysis o f the cropping pattern accords w ith  the strategies as outlined above 
(Table.24). Four taxpayers out o f the 102, have been id e n tifie d  as the bhomias 
(category.1) and they accounted fo r  about 16 per cent o f the tota l grain production 
in the village. However, they only produced barley and low value m ixed grains. 
On the other hand, the 45 gharuhala cultivators ~ that is, Brahmans, Rajputs, 
Kayasthas, 8 pateis and a patwari (Cat.II to V II)  -  produced about ha lf o f the total
barley and low value grains and more than th ree -fou rth  o f the potentia lly
marketable high value wheat crop. T he ir contribu tion  to the revenue was v irtua lly  
in  the same proportion as the ir relative output. This appears to indicate that in  
village Naelo, the rates at which revenue was levied was not systematically biased in  
favour o f the gharuhalas -  w ith  the exception o f the bhomias. The 20 peasants o f 
the agricu ltu ris t castes (paltis) produced 8.5 per cent o f the total barley and 12.25 
per cent o f the wheat produced in  that year. The fact that the agricu ltu ra l castes
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Table 24 : Crop Distribution and Taxation : Mauza Naelo (1734)
Caste/ Nos Crop Taxable Asami State A v . Tax %Total
Status Produce Share Share Rate Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A: H igh Caste/Status:
I.Bhomias 4 Barley 1073.00 750.06 322.94 30.10 17.67
II. Raj puts 7 Barley 605.29 434.62 170.67 28.20 9.34
Wheat 184.66 127.66 57.00 30.87 12.18
II I .  Patels 8 Barley 969.63 637.02 332.61 34.30 18.20
Wheat 284.75 189.72 95.03 33.37 20.30
IV .Patwari 1 Barley 16.50 11.00 5.50 33.33 0.30
Wheat 6.00 4.00 2.00 33.33 0.43
V. Kayasthas 7 Barley 529.13 349.86 179.25 33.88 9.81
Wheat 181.00 117.22 63.78 35.24 13.63
VI.Brahmans 23 Barley 678.27 435.30 242.97 35.82 13.30
Wheat 333.75 203.40 130.35 39.06 27.85
V II. M uslim 1 Barley 108.00 80.32 27.68 25.63 1.51
Sub-total (A): 51 Barley 3979.82 2698.20 1281.62 32.20 70.14
Wheat 990.16 642.00 348.16 35.16 74.40
B: R a iva ti/N on-P riv ileged ;
V III.A g r ic u lt- 20 Barley 474.17 302.78 171.31 36.14 9.38
-urists Wheat 157.81 91.97 65.84 41.72 14.07
XI.M enia ls 11 Barley 8.06 5.35 2.71 33.62 0.15
X ll.C aste / 20 Barley 604.48 408.23 196.25 32.47 10.74
Status unknown Wheat 139.50 85.52 53.98 38.70 11.53
X III.  A w jan (7) Barley 506.75 331.52 175.23 34.58 9.59
Total 102 Barley
Wheat
5573.28
1287.47
3746.08
819.49
1827.20
467.98
32.79
36.35
100.00
100.00
Source : Khasra mauza Naelo dated Jeth Sudi 2 compiled fo r the rabi harvest o f V.S.1791/ 
A.D.1734. [Based on A ppend ix 8.3, Table 8.3.1]
Notes to Table 24: Col.2 gives the number o f taxpayers in  each category. The average rate 
o f taxation (col.7) indicates the proportion  o f revenue collection in  relation to the 
taxable produce fo r  each category o f asami (col.6 /co l.4). In  col.8,the con tribu tion  o f 
revenue by each category has been expressed as a percentage o f the total revenue received 
fo r each crop by the state.
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fo rm  such an ins ign ifican t proportion  o f the recorded taxpayers suggests that only a 
few had been in a position to cu ltivate the ir land in  the rabi harvest.
The analysis o f the khasra indicates that the cu ltiva tion  pattern o f the zamindars 
was quite d is tinct from  that o f the village elite. W hile the fo rm er controlled larger 
holdings, the ir cropping choices were not geared towards the production o f high 
value crops. The priv ileged sections, on the other hand, appear to have dominated 
village production and used the ir command over village resources to cultivate more 
extensively than the raiyati. However, we fin d  that o f the aggregate output o f the 
priv ileged sections, the valuable wheat crop comprised a quarter w ith  the remaining 
consisting o f barley and the m ixed crops. The ratio o f wheat output to the 
aggregate output o f the unpriv ileged cultivators was also the same. The crop 
composition therefore d id  not d if fe r  as dramatically between the two categories as 
the extent o f the acreage under the ir respective control.
I t  could be argued that perhaps this disproportion in  the extent o f cu ltiva tion
between the priv ileged sections and the ra iyati could, in  part, be a ttribu ted to the
fact that the crops o f the rabi harvest depended upon a r t if ic ia l irriga tion . I t  is
possible therefore that the lack o f resources to provide irr ig a tio n  was the prim e
reason fo r the low output o f the unprivileged sections. This hypothesis would then
lead to the fu rthe r proposition -  i f  irr iga tion  was the prim ary facto r in  explaining
the disparity in  production between the priv ileged and the nonprivileged sections o f
the village, then the d ifference ought not to be so great fo r the k h a rif season which
was p rim a rily  dependent upon ra in fa ll. U nfortunate ly we do not have a complete
29khasra o f the kh a rif harvest to examine this question w ith  comparable data.
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What we do have is an account o f the dues payable to the bhomia by the
I Q
agriculturists o f qasba Chatsu in the k h a rif season o f 1690. Bhom i was a cess 
calculated at 0.75 takas per bigha fo r  zabti crops and 0.75 seers per maund o f grain 
collected in  k ind  in  pargana Chatsu. The castes and sections exempt from  the 
payment o f this cess have been id en tified  and the details o f the various crops 
produced by them has been recorded. The agriculturists exempted from  taxation 
belonged to the Rajput, Bhat, Brahman, Deswali, Nagori and Sah castes and the 
revenue o ffic ia ls , the chaudhuri, qanungo and patel. These correspond to the 
privileged sections on the basis o f the ir social status and the exemption granted to 
them. The agriculturists on whom the cess was levied have not been d iffe ren tia ted  
by caste but sim ply placed under the collective term o f ra iyati. The relative crop 
d is tribu tion  w ith in  the categories o f p riv ileged and ra iyati have been presented in 
Table.25.
The unpriv ileged or ra iya ti category cultivated a larger percentage o f the total 
area under cash assessment and produced a larger quantity o f foodgrains than the 
privileged sections in  qasba Chatsu. Table 25 also shows that the ra iya ti grew a 
greater proportion o f cash crops than the priv ileged sections. Cotton cu ltiva tion , 
however was evenly d istributed between the two. In  a cattle census recorded fo r 
qasba Chatsu in  1666, the relative ratio  o f bu llock-owners belonging to the 
privileged category and the ra iyati was 4: 6, respectively. I f  this ratio is taken as 
a proxy fo r  the relative number o f these two sections in  qasba Chatsu, then the 
ra iyati were actually grow ing more specialised cash crops in the qasba than the 
priv ileged sections. This is particu la rly  apparent fo r the dye crops and vegetables 
while cotton acreage was proportionately greater under the category o f p riv ileged 
cultivators. On the other hand, the ra iya ti were producing a much smaller quantity
Table 25: Crop Distribution : Qasba Chatsu (1690)
A : Zabti Crons (area in  bighas)
Crops Total P riv ileged R aiya ti
A rea Area Area
Cotton 476.90 234.35 242.55
Indigo 58.95 0.00 58.95
Henna 54.55 16.10 38.35
Vegetables 192.35 13.90 178.35
Ralo (m ille t) 8.10 2.50 5.60
Kodon (-d o -) 70.00 25.80 44.20
V a rti ( -d o -) 0.90 0.00 0.90
Sunn-hemp 0.60 0.60 0.00
Total 862.25 293.25 569.00
Percentages 100.00 34.00 66.00
B: Jinsi Crops (in  maunds)
Crops Total P rivileged R aiya ti
Q uantity Quantity Q uantity
Baj ra 234.98 158.23 76.75
Juwar 54.88 18.50 36.38
M oth 908.38 377.23 531.10
Urad 26.10 16.48 9.62
Mung 13.45 12.38 1.07
Guwar 3.35 3.35 0.00
Sesame 23.10 14.15 8.95
Sali (rice) 50.25 0.00 50.25
Singhara 15.65 0.00 15.65
Total 1330.13 600.35 729.78
Percentages 100.00 45.13 54.87
Source: Jamabandhi Bhom i Pargana Chatsu Fasl K h a r if VS. 1747/ 1690 A D .
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o f grain than was ju s tif ie d  by the ir numbers. The observations that emerges from  
Table 25 would tend to corroborate our in it ia l hypothesis that the d iffe rence in  the 
crop composition as w ell as the extent o f cu ltiva tion  between the p riv ileged sections 
and the ra iya ti was not as disparate in  the kh a rif harvest as i t  appears to have been 
in  the rabi. However, as we had shown earlier in  the chapter, the cropping pattern 
in  the qasba was atypical o f the pargana as a whole due to its locational advantage 
over the villages and the fact that specialist cultivators, such as M alis, grow ing 
commercial crops like  vegetables and dye-plants tended to concentrate in  the 
h interland o f the qasba.
A lthough nothing conclusive can be said about the cropping pattern o f 
ind iv idua l agriculturists on the basis o f the data available, i t  is clear that this aspect 
needs to be examined in  greater detail. Our evidence questions the underlying 
assumptions on the basis o f which o ff ic ia l tax categories o r social groups have been 
iden tified  w ith  economic strata which in  tu rn  have been a ttribu ted  w ith  a d istinct 
pattern o f cu ltiva tion . In  an earlier chapter, our exam ination o f economic 
d iffe ren tia tion  w ith in  the peasantry based on bullock ownership showed an absence
o f extreme inequalities, w ith  the m a jo rity  o f the peasants o f each caste group
* V) *clustered in  the ’m iddle peasant’ category. Hence agricu lturists pursuing an
’intensive production strategy’ cannot be seen to be confined to one or the other o f
the tenuria l or social categories. The incentive fo r  agricu lturists to expand and
in tensify  production, such as witnessed in  the second quarter o f the eighteenth
century in  our region, involved a complex interaction between diverse factors such
as the ava ilab ility  o f cred it and resources, changes in  prices and the tax demands o f
the state, and the needs o f the cu ltiva ting  units. The available evidence so fa r
suggests that the sections o f rura l society that were in a position to respond most
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dynamically to the grow th o f com m odity production were the village elites and that 
thesesections were also invo lved in  the provis ion o f cred it to finance cu ltiva tion  and 
the m arketing o f crops. Our im perfect understanding o f the integra l links between 
production, cred it and m arketing make it  d if f ic u lt  at present to assess the role o f 
such ’agrarian managers’ in  regulating the cropping choices o f the dependent 
peasants.
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Notes to Chapter VIII: Cropping Patterns
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or Stimulus: The Town in  a P re-Industria l Economy", in  E .A .W rig ley and 
P h ilip  Abrams eds., Towns in  Societies, p.301.
2. See S.Nurul Hasan, K.N.Hasan and S.P.Gupta, "The Pattern o f A g ricu ltu ra l 
Production in the Territories o f A m ber (c.1650-1750)", P IH C . 1966, 
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Foodgrain Prices,
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associated w ith  using the revenue records.
6. See S.N.Hasan, K.N.Hasan and S.P.Gupta, "The Pattern o f A g ricu ltu ra l 
Production", pp.244-264 and D.Singh, "Revenue A dm in is tra tion  ", pp.92-145.
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dated VS 1767/AD  1710. Evidence fom the other qasbas also indicates that it  
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assessed under general categories like  "kyari", "seko" or "khatli".
8. For example, see Arhsatta . pargana Chatsu, VS 1774/AD  1717.
9- A rhsatta . pargana Chatsu, VS 1783/AD  1726.
10. See Section on U lw a r (A lw ar) by M a j. P.W.Powlett, Rajputana Gazetteer. 
vo l.III., 1880, pp.280, where "katli" has been iden tified  as the "dried up bed o f 
a seasonal r iv e r...f it to bear rabi crops by the aid o f peculiar manure." W ilson 
calls such land "kha tiri" and P latt defines "khatli" as manured land only. 
Wilson's Glossary, p.283. That kha tli denoted rive r irriga ted  land is confirm ed 
by the entry in  the Jamabandhi o f pargana Tonk, VS 1771/A D  1714, where 
"khatli nadi k i" is specified.
11. A rhsatta . pargana Malarna, VS 1786/AD  1729.
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13. In  the Taamina K ish tw ar Fasl U nha lu . pargana Phagi, dated VS 1770/AD  
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Dausa, VS 1801/AD  1744 and VS 1802/AD  1745. In  the la tte r reference, a 
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14. A rhsatta . qasba Sanganer, VS 1797/AD  1740.
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’average’ rate in  the context o f a system o f d iffe ren tia l taxation.
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and labourers as ’social loans.’ See idem . "Agrarian Change in  Punjab : 1880- 
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vilages in Jaipur d is tric t was about 386. A n  estimate o f the agricu ltura l 
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29. W hile the khasra analysed by S.P.Gupta is o f the kh a rif harvest, the caste o f 
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30. Jamabandhi Bhom i Fasl K h a r if . pargana Chatsu, VS 1747/AD  1690.
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Yaddadashti Hal B a il, pargana Chatsu, VS 1723/AD  1666. Th is document is a 
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number o f bullocks owned. In  deriv ing  the ratio o f p riv ileged to unpriv ileged 
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does not lis t poor peasants who d id  not possess bullocks, and consequently the 
ratio o f priv ileged section to small peasants is probably biased in  favour o f the 
former,
32. See Chapter I I I  on Agrarian Relations.
Chapter IX
CO NCLUSIO N
A  b rie f summary o f the trends in  the indices o f production allows us an 
overview o f the d istinct phases in  the h istory o f agricu ltu ra l p roduction in  eastern 
Rajasthan in  the eighteenth century. Fo llow ing a quarter century o f intense 
po litica l con flic t during the la tte r period o f the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
century, the main problem confron ting  the state was the resettlement o f peasants 
and the reoccupation o f abandoned land. The dramatic upswing in  foodgrain prices 
in  the second decade o f the eighteenth century, especially o f the staples bajra and 
moth, d id  not have an appreciable e ffect on production in the qasbas. D uring  this 
period foodgrain cu ltiva tion  dominated both seasons but no clear expansion in 
production is discernible. I t  appears probable that the frequency o f severe 
scarcities and famines in  the decade held back the vigorous expansion that soon 
followed. From the early 1720s, production began to expand gradually, the phase 
o f ’h igh ’ cu ltiva tion  becoming pronounced between 1730 to 1745 and coincided 
w ith  the years o f consistently high prices. D uring  this phase, the cu ltiva tion  of 
cash crops such as cotton, vegetables and sugarcane expanded in  the autumn 
harvest, particu la rly  in  qasbas Chatsu, Phagi, Lalsot and Malarna. The increase in 
the cu ltiva tion  o f the rabi staples -  barley and gram -  in  the same period can 
perhaps be seen as a compensatory adjustment fo r  the slight fa ll in  the cu ltiva tion  
o f the kh a rif foodgrains in  the qasbas. Thus, a fte r an in it ia l lag, the phase o f high 
prices also corresponded w ith  an expansion in  overall acreage as w ell as an increase 
in  the cu ltiva tion  o f cash crops.
- 3 3 3 -
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The sh ift in  the pattern o f production in  the next decade between 1745 to 1755 
also appears to fo llow  the general price trend. In  this phase, w h ile  the prices o f the 
rabi foodgrain remained high, those o f the kh a rif harvest showed a slight decline. 
C u ltiva tion  in  this period gradually receded, but the fa ll was disproportionately 
greater in  the case o f the high value crops cultivated in  the kh a rif harvest than in  
the rabi season which was dominated by grain production. The years fo llow ing  the 
succession o f scarcities and droughts that began in  1755 saw a sharp fa ll in  
production in  all the qasbas fo r a decade. The crisis in  production pushed up 
prices o f foodgrains to the ir highest level in  the century. In  the mid-1760s, 
however, prices abruptly collapsed by as much as ha lf the ir previous level. 
A g ricu ltu ra l production, however, continued to stagnate at a level s ign ifican tly  
lower than in  the whole o f the f irs t ha lf o f the century and was composed almost 
entire ly o f low  value foodcrops assessed in  k ind. The data fo r  this period is 
patchy, but the figures fo r  the available years indicates that there was a slight 
revival in  production in  qasbas Chatsu and Malarna after the worst effects o f the 
fam ine were over around 1765, but there was no abatement in  the spiral o f decline 
that had set in  in  qasbas Lalsot and Sanganer.
The coterminous changes in  the secular movements in  prices and cropping 
changes seem to clearly indicate that crop production in  the qasbas was responsive 
to price changes. But what does this te ll us o f peasant incomes and the ir response 
to the market? The expansion in  crop production in the f irs t ha lf o f the century, 
particu la rly  in  the cu ltiva tion  o f cash crops, when prices doubled underlines the 
"rationality" o f peasant economic behaviour. In  this phase o f expansion, when both 
production and prices rose together, incomes in  general must have also risen albeit 
d iffe ren tia lly . As we have seen, the tax demand on the cu ltiva tion  o f cash crops
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fe ll in  real terras in this period and hence not only d id  producers realise a higher 
price fo r the crop, they also retained a larger proportion o f it. Peasants who 
commanded the resources to invest in  the construction o f wells and the cu ltiva tion  
o f cash crops would have p ro fited  in  a period o f rising prices and an unchanging 
tax demand. Such cultivators would have certainly included the "agrarian managers" 
-  the village elite and rich agriculturists who provided the fac ilities  necessary fo r 
production such as credit, seed and cattle. The ava ilab ility  o f easier cred it in  a 
phase o f boom would have also made it  possible fo r more peasants to finance 
productive investment in  agriculture. The increased demand fo r  labour fo r 
agricultura l in tensifica tion  and expansion during this periodw ou ld also have 
provided poor and marginal peasants who lacked adequate resources to sustain 
independent production w ith  the means to supplement the ir meagre income.
S im ilarly i t  would be reasonable to argue that the decline in  prices in  the second 
ha lf o f the century w ithou t a compensatory downward revision in  revenue rates 
made the cu ltiva tion  o f fine  crops uneconomical. Hence, peasants fe ll back to 
protective strategies, reordering production to the needs o f se lf-su ffic iency . The 
fa ll in  prices, depopulation and the d isruption in  trade discouraged productive 
investment and contributed to the sharp fa ll in  production and an overall decline in  
all incomes derived from  agriculture. Such an unfavourable economic conjuncture 
must have impoverished the peasantry as a whole, but it  is doub tfu l i f  it  
s ign ifican tly  reduced the inequalities in  rura l society. The period o f recession and 
poor harvests saw an in tensifica tion  o f co n flic t in  the village over the collection and 
dis tribu tion  o f revenue. The rural elite added to the ir assets by foreclosing on 
mortgages o f land which had been im proved by the investment o f capital in 
irriga tion . A t  the same tim e, the depletion in  the resources o f the poor peasants led
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increasingly to a greater degree o f agrarian dependence in  the second ha lf o f the 
century.
The evidence o f sustained agricu ltu ra l expansion in  the early decades o f the 
eighteenth century testifies to the dynamic potentia l o f p re -co lon ia l agriculture and 
the ab ility  o f peasants to respond to market incentives. Peasants d id  not, however, 
simply respond as ind iv idua ls to the presence o f an abstract market. There were 
other equally crucia l determinants o f peasant response that were conditioned by a 
complex interaction between ecological constraints, peasant needs and state action. 
A  prim ary concern o f our study has been to locate the secular trends in  agricultura l 
production in  the eighteenth century w ith in  the context o f the interaction between 
the state and agrarian production system. In  exam ining the role o f the state in  the 
spheres o f rura l taxation, cred it and m arketing, the records o f the eighteenth 
century Jaipur state have proved pa rticu la rly  useful in  p rov id ing  a m icro -leve l view 
o f the changing interaction between the state and rura l society during a phase o f 
agricultura l expansion as well as one o f agrarian recession.
The c ritica l lim its  to the expansion in  production in  eighteenth century eastern 
Rajasthan were the ava ilab ility  o f water and the shortage o f labour. The frequency 
o f periodic droughts and poor yields occasioned by the inconstant monsoons and the 
absence o f perennial rivers underlined the inherent fra g ility  o f the agrarian 
landscape. The uncertainties associated w ith  sem i-arid agricu lture were fu rthe r 
accentuated by the f lu id ity  o f labour and capital in  the p re -co lon ia l period. Rural 
m igration and the en masse desertion o f villages form ed a v ita l part o f the peasants 
response to adversity. Wars, famines and excessive taxation were the o ft cited 
reasons fo r  the m igration o f peasants. A t  the same tim e, crises in  subsistence and
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the accompanying depopulation and fa ll in  demand discouraged productive 
investment and coincided w ith  the retreat o f ’h igh ’ farm ing. The constraints 
imposed by ecology and low population densities in  the sem i-arid  agrarian 
economies o f p re-co lon ia l Ind ia  defined and set lim its  to the share o f the social 
product that the state could claim. Raising agricultura l production and expanding 
the resource base required close attention to the rura l economy and the active 
implementation o f policies that sought to attract and retain labour and encourage 
productive investment in  land. These underly ing concerns were reflected in a range 
o f state actions and o ff ic ia l directives that sought to regulate rura l production and 
exchange as part o f a coherent and vigorously pursued agrarian policy.
The policies o f the Jaipur state towards agriculture fa ll in to  two broad 
categories: those that affected agricu ltu ra l production in  the long run and those that 
influenced the d is tribu tion  o f the product. The structure o f agricu ltu ra l taxation -  
both the level o f assessment and the modes o f collection -  were the princ ipa l 
mechanism fo r the d is tribu tion  o f the income generated in agricu lture. The 
fundamental aims o f the state required a system o f taxation w hich achieved a 
balance between the increased demand fo r  revenue by the state and the possib ility 
o f excessive explo ita tion o f the peasant resulting in  m igration and a steady 
demographic decline. In  the pursu it o f its objectives, the Ja ipur state drew from  
the repertoire o f Mughal practices and precedents but adapted them to local 
conditions. In  a dry fa rm ing region such as eastern Rajasthan, the spectre o f 
fam ine and its attendant devastation provided an equally com pelling rationale fo r  
the state to im plem ent policies that were flex ib le  enough to respond to short-term  
production crises w hile  at the same tim e incorporating incentives to stabilise and 
expand production.
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A  central feature o f the revenue po licy o f the state was to allow revenue levied 
on the production o f foodgrains to be paid in  grain through a system o f c rop - 
sharing thereby ensuring that the risks o f production shortfa lls were shared between 
the state and the peasant. As we have argued, the rationale fo r  the collection o f 
revenue in k ind  fo r foodgrains derived from  considerations o f peasant welfare and 
the agricu ltura l practice o f in tercropp ing prevalent in  dry fa rm ing  regions that 
made it  d if f ic u lt  to im pute a standard cash value to the state’s share o f the output. 
On the other hand, taxes on the production o f crops destined fo r  the market were 
paid in  cash at a fixed  rate per u n it o f land. These cash rates were graded to 
incorporate variations in the price o f the crop sown and the level o f productive 
investment o f labour and capital that such cu ltiva tion  entailed. The concept o f 
d iffe ren tia l rent b u ilt in to  the structure o f taxation ensured that cultivators who 
grew cash crops and risked greater investment were not penalised fo r  the ir efforts. 
A t  the same time, the risk o f a substantial loss in case the crop fa iled  was sought to 
be m inim ised by the remission o f revenue in such instances. The state also 
encouraged agriculturists to grow higher value crops by fund ing  the purchase o f 
seed or the sinking o f wells but these activ ities were generally le ft to private 
in itia tive . O ther forms o f d irect incentives, such as tax breaks or concessional tax 
rates, encouraged the expansion in  production and enabled the resettlement o f 
abandoned lands. Special concessionary tax codes fo r m igrant cultivators and the 
fact that in areas o f expanding agricu lture cultivators could negotiate the ir contracts 
underlines the essential bargaining strength o f the prim ary producers in  setting 
lim its  to the demands o f the state.
The effectiveness o f the form al tax codes in  stim ulating production depended to 
a large degree on the mechanism o f tax collection and the a b ility  o f the state to
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define and lim it  the power o f the social intermediaries who mediated in  the 
processes o f revenue extraction. I t  is generally accepted by historians that the 
implementation o f the revenue policies o f the pre-co lon ia l state was* delegated at 
the village level to structures dominated by the village elites. The aims o f a 
carefu lly structured system o f taxation, i t  is argued, were bound to be defeated as 
the practicalities o f revenue collection from  a m ultitude o f spatially dispersed 
producers meant that the ’dom inant5 elements were entrusted w ith  the responsibility 
o f allocating the aggregate revenue demand assessed on the village as a whole. Our 
evidence, however, indicates that the assessment o f lia b ility  by the state extended to 
ind iv idua l taxpayers and the detailed recording o f such assessments and arrears i f  
any must, at the very least, have lim ite d  the scope fo r m anipulation by the village 
headman. The evidence o f the khasra records therefore suggests that taxpayers 
liab ilities  were not arrived at in  an arb itra ry  manner but were drawn up in  
accordance w ith  the princip les o f taxation specified by the state and in  con fo rm ity  
w ith  local customs. A t the same time, the privileges o f the village elite and the 
socially dominant castes in the countryside were sought to be lim ite d  to preferentia l 
taxation and customary exemptions in  recognition o f the ir indispensable role in  
production and revenue collection. As much o f our analysis o f village con flic t 
indicates, the nom ination o f a member o f the num erically dom inant agricu ltu ris t 
caste in  the village as the village headman served to contain the power o f the 
socially dominant castes in  the village.
As the m ajor part o f the revenue o f the state was collected in  grain, an active 
strategy o f in tervention in  the market was one o f the key components o f the overall 
agrarian policy o f the state. The role o f the pre-co lon ia l state in  the regulation of 
the exchange economy has been understood to have operated at a very rudim entary
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level. The general view is that the state lim ited  itse lf to taxing traders or 
ins titu ting  monopolies over the sale o f certain high value commodities. The records 
o f the Jaipur state however shows that the state pursued an active policy o f 
in tervention in  the market in  order to realise the fu ll value o f its grain stocks w hile  
also protecting peasants from  the adverse movements o f prices. The control 
exercised by the state over the foodgrain market was effected through the 
continuous m onitoring o f current prices and a regulated mechanism o f sale that 
requisitioned the services o f the resident traders as the v irtu a l agents o f the state. 
The element o f coercion im p lic it in  the relationship between the state and the 
trader must however be seen w ith in  the context o f an essentially sym biotic 
interdependence in  which the state recognised that the services provided by the 
merchants were indispensable to the function ing  o f a centralised adm inistrative 
system.
A nother ac tiv ity  w h ich  frequently overlapped w ith  grain trad ing and w ith  
which i t  was closely linked  was the provision o f credit. The widespread 
dependence o f the peasants upon moneylenders fo r  the provis ion o f consumption 
loans was symptomatic o f a chronic d e fic it in the rural sector w hich was causally 
linked to the high level o f the revenue demand and the ins tab ility  o f production. 
Loans were p rim a rily  supplied at the commencement o f the production cycle to 
provide seed, to purchase draught animals and to feed the peasant fam ilies from  
one harvest to the next. The records o f the Jaipur state indicate that the state was 
aware that the advance o f money and grain at this stage in  the production cycle was 
c ritica l to sustain immediate production but, i f  unchecked, the terms imposed by 
the moneylenders could prove deleterious in  the long-run . However, i t  was 
infeasible fo r  the state to service a vast number o f petty borrowers and it
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recognised that this could be done more e ffective ly  by the professional 
moneylenders. In  order to prevent the subordination o f its claim  to the peasants’ 
produce to that o f the moneylenders, the state adopted a two pronged strategy: firs t, 
the state attempted to institu te  lim its  on the demands that the bohras could enforce 
on the borrowers such as the stipu la tion that loans should not be carried fo rw ard 
and thus compounded from  one harvest to the other; and second, in  situations when 
the moneylenders refused to provide short-term  loan fac ilities, the state intervened 
to o ffe r  an alternative source o f cred it in  the form  o f taccavi loans. In  times o f 
famines in  particu lar, state loans were c ritica l to recovery and served as a form  o f 
social subsidy to prevent large scale desertion by the peasantry.
The underlying theme in  our study has been that the agrarian po licy o f the state 
was a coherent and complex amalgam o f interrelated elements that aimed to achieve 
an acceptable balance between in te r-locked  and contradictory interests in  rura l 
society. The agrarian policy attempted to mediate between the revenue demands o f 
the state on the one hand and the social reproduction o f the p rim ary  producers on 
the other, along w ith  the need to reconcile these two prim ary interests w ith  the 
con flic ting  and often competing demands o f the traders, the moneylenders and the 
landed aristocracy. A  measure o f the effectiveness o f these policies was the 
sustained growth and agrarian prosperity during the reign o f Sawai Jai Singh when 
the active im plem entation o f the state’s agrarian policy coincided w ith  favourable 
economic trends and a phase o f re lative po litica l s tab ility . C lim atic  imbalances 
during this period resulted in  famines but the destructive impact o f such crises in 
production was contained by state in tervention  which aimed to restore incentives to 
stimulate production and which enabled a re latively rapid recovery.
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The in a b ility  o f the state to respond actively to widespread drought, on the 
other hand, had a domino e ffect on all in te rlinked sectors in the economy that 
resulted in  the drought rap id ly deteriorating in to  a severe fam ine fo llow ed by a 
prolonged period o f agrarian recession. The secular decline in  agrarian production 
in the region during the second ha lf o f the eighteenth century can be traced to the 
devastation caused by the irru p tio n  o f endemic warfare and the payment o f large 
indemnities to the Marathas, D u ring  this period o f intense fiscal pressure, the state 
was unable to deploy adequate resources to support a system o f state loans which 
was instrumental in  p rov id ing  re lie f aid. In  the wake o f the fam ine o f 1755/56, the 
state in it ia lly  attempted to encourage moneylenders to release funds by guaranteeing 
the return on capital. As a result the state was forced to subordinate its claim to 
the surplus to that o f the providers o f credit upon whom i t  came to depend 
increasingly. This arrangement coincided w ith  a sharp contraction in agricultura l 
production and meant that there was an increasing risk attached to the state’s 
revenue returns. Contemporary records o f the period ascribe the fa ll in  production 
to the depredations o f the Marathas and the depopulation a fte r the fam ine years. 
Our evidence also suggests that during  this period trade declined and there was a 
f lig h t o f capital from  the region. The negative effects o f p o litica l insecurity and 
famine on production were aggravated by the underlying dow nturn in  the economy 
reflected in  the secular decline in  prices. In  the changed context o f this period, the 
farm ing o f revenue through com petitive b idd ing became increasingly prevalent. 
The rationale fo r  the adoption o f revenue farm ing can perhaps be a ttribu ted to an 
attempt by the state to stem the long-te rm  decline in  revenue and to distance itse lf 
from  the element o f risk in  production in  return fo r a smaller but more secure cash 
income.
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I t  could reasonably be argued that we have ascribed to the state a degree o f 
cognitive action and control over the economy that i t  d id  not really possess. In  
part, this is a result o f the orientation o f our sources which l im it  themselves to the 
concerns o f the state in  the rura l economy. However, it  is the carefu l recording o f 
the m inutiae o f taxation that has enabled us to explore the linkages between the 
prim ary producers and the state. These linkages we have argued were operated 
through a set o f care fu lly  form ulated po licy measures which were responsive to the 
complex realities o f agricu ltura l production and the objectives o f the state.
This bias o f our sources must be balanced by the fact that they also reveal the 
m ajor lim ita tions o f state fia t in that the Jaipur state could never contro l or set 
boundaries to the power o f the interm ediary groups upon whom it  was dependent 
but whose interests conflic ted w ith  its own. Hence the state could not provide the 
po litica l and economic protection that was necessary except fo r  re la tive ly short 
periods and w ith in  the confines o f small, closely adm inistered domains. The 
tensions that orig inated in  the social sphere o f production had repercussions at all 
levels o f rura l l ife  and in  tu rn  impacted on economic activ ity . The states’ concern 
w ith  agricu ltura l production has to be evaluated w ith in  the context o f its fa ilu re  to 
address itse lf to two m ajor issues that together comprised the most im portant lim its  
to agricu ltura l grow th, namely, the provision o f adequate irr iga tion  and the 
establishment o f an e ffic ie n t grain d is tribu tion  network to combat the devastation 
o f famine.
Appendix 1 : Price Hierarchies
The five  tables below show the average d ifference in  the price levels o f five  
crops in  the six qasbas. As indicated in  the text, each table was constructed in  two 
stages. F irst, the common years fo r  w h ich prices were available fo r  any two qasbas 
were extracted and the mean obtained fo r each pa ir o f comparable observations. 
Thus we got a pa ir o f mean values fo r  common observations fo r  each o f the 
fo llow ing  relationships, viz.,
[The symbols used to id e n tify  the qasbas are C=Chatsu M =M alarna S=Sanganer 
J=Jaipur P=Phagi L=Lalsot. The same symbols are used in subsequent tables]
C : M M  ;: S S : J
C : S M  : J S : P
C : J M  ;: P S : L
C : P 
C : L
M  : L
In  the calculation o f each o f the fifteen  sets o f mean values fo r common years, 
where the number o f such observations was less than ten the sample was considered 
too small to be statistically relevant and was therefore ignored. As the common 
years as well as number o f observations in  each pa ir o f mean values was specific to 
the particu lar relationship being compared, the mean values were converted in to  
relative ratios. These were calculated by im puting a notional value o f 100 to the 
mean o f each qasba in  tu rn  in  each set o f relationships derived above. These 
relative ratios are given in  section A  o f the tables below. Section B gives the sum 
o f the relative ratios fo r  each qasba in  the m atrix  which, when d iv ided by the
- 3 4 4 -
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relevant number o f qasbas being compared, gives the figure  in  Section C. The 
la tte r represents the average d ifference in  the prices o f each foodgrain in  the qasbas 
and this value has been later used in  the estimation o f the missing prices. The last 
row o f ratios in  Section D  o f each table gives the values in  section C indexed to the 
average price ratio o f qasba Malarna as the base in  order to fac ilita te  comparison o f 
the price d iffe ren tia ls  fo r  the five  crops.
Table 1.1 : M a trix  o f Baira Prices
c
A:
M S J P L
C 100.00 94.46 112.20 123.37 88.13 114.63
M  105.86 100.00 122.46 150.77 105.76 117.02
S 89.13 81.66 100.00 105.27 83.12 96.56
J 81.06 66.33 94.99 100.00 72.76 84.54
P 113.47 94.55 120.31 137.32 100.00 127.85
L  87.24 85.46 103,56 118.29 78.22 100.00
B:(Sum) 576.57 522.46 653.52 734.74 527.99 640.60
C:(Sum/6) 96.10 87.08 108.92 122.46 88.00 106.77
D:(M=100) 110 100 125 141 101 123
Table 1.2 : M a trix  o f M oth Prices
A :
C M S J P L
C 100.00 92.91 156.26 135.51 91.60 101.69
M 107.63 100.00 159.18 161.07 101.74 104.29
S 63.99 62.82 100.00 83.29 55.61 65.09
J 73.80 62.09 120.06 100.00 70.04 60.01
P 109.18 98.29 179.83 142.77 100.00 108.83
iw 98,34 95.89 153.63 151.49 91.89 100.00
B:(Sum) 552.94 512.00 868.96 774.13 510.88 539.91
C:(Sum/6) 93.16 85,33 144.83 129.02 85.15 89.99
D:(M=100) 108 100 170 151 100 105
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The extremely high ratios o f moth prices in  qasba Sanganer are due to the 
inclusion o f an additional tax on the production o f all pulses (n irn i)  in the total 
proceeds from  the sale o f moth revenue in  grain. As the average harvest price has 
been determined by d iv id ing  the total proceeds by the total quantity  o f grain sold, 
the price calculated is h igher than the actual sale price. However, i t  was not 
possible to exclude the tax element in  our calculations as its amount has been 
separately mentioned only in  a few arhsattas. In  the computation o f the regional 
moth price, therefore, the prices o f qasba Sanganer have been excluded as these 
would tend to a rtif ic ia lly  in fla te  the average fo r  the region.
Table 1.3 : M a trix  o f Bariev Prices
A:
C M S J P
C 100.00 94.99 106.23 123.59 67.99
M 105.88 100.00 115.25 131.66 77.50
S 94.14 86.77 100.00 107.56 61.31
J 80.91 75.95 92.97 100.00 54.68
P 147.08 129.03 163.11 182.88 100.00
B:(Sum) 528.01 486.74 577.56 645.69 361.48
C:(Sum/5) 105.60 97.34 115.51 129.14 72.30
D:(M=100) 109 100 119 138 76
Note: In  the above m atrix , the values fo r  qasba Lalsot have been excluded as the 
number o f comparable observations w ith  other qasbas was always under ten. This 
was because barley was generally a zabti or cash assessed crop in  Lalsot. Therefore 
only in  the few years when barley was assessed in  k ind  are there any price figures 
recorded.
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Table 1.4 : Matrix of Wheat Prices
A:
M
M
100.00
S
111.52
J
136.44
P
101.21
S 89.67 100.00 115.38 82.84
J 73.29 86.67 100.00 72.22
P 98.80 120.72 138.47 100.00
B:(Sum) 361.76 418.91 490.29 356.27
C:(Sum/4) 90.44 104.73 122.57 89.07
D:(M=100) 100 119 136 98
Note: The ratios fo r  wheat prices o f qasbas Lalsot and Chatsu have been excluded 
as the number o f comparable observations were less than ten.(cf. Note fo r  barley 
above)
Table 1.5 : M a tr ix  o f Gram Prices
A:
C M P
C 100.00 93.51 85.18
M 106.95 100.00 105.10
P 117.40 95.15 100.00
B:(Sum) 324.35 288.66 290.28
C:(Sum/3) 108.12 96.22 96.76
D:(M=100) 112 100 101
Note: The ratios fo r  gram prices o f qasbas Lalsot, Jaipur and Sanganer were 
excluded as the number o f comparable observations were less than ten.
Appendix 2: Estimation of Prices for Years with Missing Data..
As discussed in  the text, the systematic hierarchy in  the prices o f the m ajor 
foodgrains across qasbas and the close correlation in  the ir long term  trends, made it  
feasible to estimate the missing values in  the price series. F irs t, we selected the 
m ajor foodcrops that were commonly cu ltivated in each o f the six qasbas and fo r 
which we had most complete price series. On this basis, two k h a r if crops, moth 
and bajra, and two rabi crops, wheat and barley, were chosen. Then fo r each crop, 
the average difference in  the relative price level between qasbas (Section C o f 
Tables 1.1 to 1.4 o f A ppend ix 1.) was used as a ratio to estimate the missing 
observations in  any one series fo r  w h ich  there was a corresponding price figu re  in 
the parallel series. When there were two or more corresponding values in  parallel 
series fo r any year, the missing value was estimated using the price from  the series 
that had the largest number o f non-m issing observations. This c rite rion  was 
adopted as the accuracy o f the price estimation depended upon the accuracy o f the 
price hierarchies previously calculated ( A ppend ix 1.). The la tte r w ould tend to be 
more accurate when the number o f tota l observations, and hence, the comparable 
observations between parallel series was high. As is evident from  the accompanying 
tables and figures, fo r  all the fo u r crops selected, the largest number o f 
observations as well as the maximum spread o f values w ith in  the period 1710 to 
1780 was fo r qasba Malarna. Systematic application o f th is c rite rion  has, 
therefore, in troduced an element o f bias in  the price estimations in  favour o f prices 
in  qasba Malarna. However, as the object o f our exercise is to analyse the long­
term trends which are broadly s im ila r in  all the qasbas studied, the bias is not 
thought to be o f such a magnitude as to v itia te  the conclusions.
- 3 4 8 -
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Using the method discussed above, an estimated price series was calculated fo r 
each crop and qasba. As indicated in  A ppend ix 1., the price  hierarchies and 
therefore the price estimates could not be calculated fo r certain crops where the 
number o f comparable observations in  the series were too few  fo r  average price 
ratios to be computed . Thus i t  was not possible to estimate the price o f wheat in  
qasbas Chatsu and Lalsot and barley in  Lalsot. Lastly, the price o f moth in  qasba 
Sanganer was excluded from  the calculations o f price estimations because in  
Sanganer moth prices were a rtif ic ia lly  in fla ted  which w ould a ffec t the later 
calculation and comparison o f regional prices.
The estimated price series fo r the fo u r crops, barring the above mentioned 
exclusions, are presented in  tables 2.1 to 2.4. alongside the actual prices recorded in  
our sources. In  order to ve rify  the va lid ity  o f the method, the estimated prices 
were then plotted w ith  the recorded prices in  order to compare the two. In  the 
figures that fo llow , the num bering sequence begins w ith  the id e n tify in g  in it ia l o f 
the qasba fo llow ed by d igits 1 to 4 where l= ba jra , 2=moth, 3=wheat and 4=barley. 
The graphs indicate a broad synchrony in  the actual and estimated prices. The 
close coincidence o f the two series, specially fo r qasbas Malarna, Chatsu and Phagi, 
indicated that i t  was possible to interpolate the estimated prices fo r the years fo r 
which we had missing values. Having derived a complete price series fo r  each crop 
and the qasba studied through in terpo lation, the parallel series fo r  each crop were 
arithm etica lly averaged to give a regional price fo r each o f the fo u r crops. The 
prices o f the fou r foodgrains in qasba Jaipur are included in  the regional index 
only from  1728 onwards as this was the firs t fiscal year a fte r the foundation o f the 
c ity  in  late November 1727. The average regional prices thus derived are presented 
in  Append ix 3. Table 3.1
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T A B L E  2 . 1 :  A C T U A L A N D  E S T I M A T E D P R I C E S o r  B A J R A
R a t e : A - a c t u a l p r i c e s £ « e s t i » a  t e d p r i c e s
H 8 L A 6 . H  * P H A C | C K A T S U s a f J C a M  e H . 3 7 \ i  p a * . L A L A O T
T E A R A E
t—--------------
A
■ ------  i
£
1
A E A £ A E A E
1 6 9 1 0 . 7 5 0 . 7 6 . . 0 . 8 3 0 . 9 6 . 0  . 9 2
1 6 9 7 . 0 . 8 6 0 . 8 7 . . 0 . 9 5 1 .  0 7 . 1 . 0 5
1 7  0 8 0 . 7 6 m 0 . 7 6 .  '■ 0 . 8 1 0 * 9 2 « a . 0  . 9 0
1 7 1 0 . 0 . 8 0 m 0  . 8 1 0 . 8 8 . 1 . 0 0 . 0 . 9 8
1 7 1 1 0 . 8 0 m 0 . 8 1 0 . 8 8 8 . 8 7 d 9 9 1 .  0 0 . 0 . 9 8
1 7 1 2 1 . 8 1 » 1 . 8 3 2 . 0 0 1 . 6 ( 1 1 . 5 8 2 .  2 7 a •. 1 5 9 2  . 2 2
1 7 1 3 2 . 7 1 2 . 5 1 2 . 7 6 . 2 . 9 9 3 . 1 6 3 .  3 9 . 2 7 5 3 . 3 3
1 7 1  <4 1 .  0 9 1 . 0 7 1 . 1 0 1 . 1 6 1 . 2 0 1 .  3 6 a 1 2 3 1 . 3 3
1 7 1 5 1 . 6 6 1 . 3 9 1 . 6 3 1 . 6 6 1 . 5 6 1 . 8 2 1 1 7 7 2 .  0 6 , 2 OS 2 . 0 2
1 7 1 6 1 .  3 5 1 . 0 7 1 *  21 1 . 3 6 1 . 1 8 1 . 6 9 1 . S I 1 .  6 8 a 1 8 5 1 . 6 5
1 7 1 7 2 . 6 6 2 . 6 6 2 . 4 2 2 . 6 7 2 . 6 9 2 . 9 1 3 .  3 0 a . 3 3 3 3 . 2 3
1 7 1 8 1 .  9 7 1 . 7 6 1 . 7 8 1 . 9 9 . 2 - 1 7 2 .  6 6 • 2 1 8 2 - 6 2
1 7 1 9 1 .  6 2 1 . 3 6 1 . 6 3 a 1 . 7 8 2 .  0 2 a 1 6 7 1 . 9 8
1 7  2 0 1 .  2 6 1 . 2 3 1 . 2 5 1 .  2 7 a 1 . 3 9 1 . 5 7 . 1 . 5 4
1 7 2 1 1 . 1 8 1 . 2 6 * 1 . 1 9 1 . 3 9 1 . 3 0 « 1 .  4 7 a 1 6 2 1 .  6 4
1 7 2 2 1 . 2 7 1 . 2 8 m 1 . 2 8 a 1 . 6 0 1 . 5 9 a • 1 5 7 1 . 5 6
1 7 2 3 1 . 1 5 1 . 3 1 1 . 5 9 1 . 1 7 1 .  & 6 1 . 2 7 1 .  6 6 . 1 . 4 2
1 7 2 * 1 . 0 . 8 7 0 . 8 8 0 . 9 6 1 . 6 2 1 1 6 1 1 . 0 9 • 1 . 3 7
1 7 2 5 1 .  2 1 0 . 9 8 0 .  9 9 1 . 2 2 . 1 . 3 3 1 . 5 1 . 1 . 4 8
1 7 2 6 1 . 6 S 1 . 5 2 l . S f c 1 . 6 6 . 1 . 6 0 1 .  8 1 . 1 . 7 7
1 7 2 7 0 . 7 9 0 . 9 6 0 .  9 7 0 . 8 0 a 0 . 8 7 0 .  9 8 a 0 . 9 6
1 7 2 8 0 . 7 3 1 . 0 6 1 .  0 7 0 . 7 6 a 0 . 8 1 l l 2 3 0 . 9 2 1 3 6 1 . 0 3 0  .  9 0
1 7 2 9 1 . 3 8 1 . 3  2 1 . 3 3 1 . 3 9 a 1 . 5 2 1 . 7 2 1 6 5 1 a 9 4 1 . 6 9
1 7 3 0 2 . 3 0 1 . 6 5 1 * 7 2 2 . 3 2 1 . 8 2 2 . 5 6 1 . 6 4 2 . 8 7 3 . 2 3 2 . 8 2
1 7 3 1 6 . 0 1 3 . 0 2 6 .  0 5 3 . 3 3 6 . 6 3 5 .  0 2 5 . 6 6 4 1 0 4  .  9 2
1 7 3 2 1 . 0 5 1 . 1 3 1 2 7 1 . 0 6 1 . 2 5 1 . 1 5 1 1 4 6 1 .  3 1 1 . 6 7 1 . 2 8
1 7 3 3 1 . 1 3 1 .  0 7 1 . 1 6 1 . 2 5 1 . 1 7 1 . 4 2 1 3 7 1 . 5 9 1 3 7 1 . 3 9
1 7 3 * i . 1 . 6 1 1 . 5 6 1 . 6 2 1 . 7 7 1 . 7 1 2 .  0 1 2 . 2 6 1 8 4 1 . 9 7
1 7 3 5 . 1 . 7 3 1 . 7 6 1 . 9 0 a 2 .  1 6 2 . 6 3 2 . 1 2
1 7 3 6 1 . 6 7 1 . 8 5 1 . 6 7 1 . 6 9 a 1 . 8 6 2 l l  2 2 .  0 9 2 0 2 2 . 3 5 2 . 0 5
1 7 3 7 1 . 7 7 2 . 0 6 * 1 . 7 9 2 . 2 5 1 . 9 6 2 . 4 8 2 .  2 2 2 6 6 2 . 4 9 2 3 2 2 . 1 7
1 7  3 B 1 . 6 2 1 . 8 6 1 . 6 3 2  . 0 3 1 . 7 8 2 .  0 2 2 .  2 7 1 . 9 8
1 7 3 9 . 1 . 6 3 m 1 . 6 5 . 1 . 5 8 1 ^ 7 9 1 . 4 7 1 6 6 2 . 0 1 1 . 7 6
1 7 4 0 . 0 . 9 6 0  . 9 9 1 . 0 8 1 . 0 7 1 . 2 2 1 .  2 3 1 . 3 8 1 . 2 0
1 7*11 . 1 . 2 1 1 . 0 7 1 . 2 2 1 . 3 3 1 . 1 7 1 .  5 1 1 2 3 1 . 7 0 1 . 4 8
1 7 6 2 . 1 . 5 8 1 2 7 1 . 5 9 1 . 7 6 1 . 3 9 1 . 9 6 1 .  9 7 2 0 4 2 . 2 2 1 . 9 3
1 7 6 3 0 . 8 9 1 . 0 6 1 .  0 9 0 . 9 0 1 . 1 6 0 . 9 B 1 . 5 6 1 . 1 1 1 5 9 1 . 2 5 1 . 0 9
1 7«»t t 1 . 1 2 1 . S I 1 .  3 3 1 . 1 3 1 . 6 7 1 . 2 6 1 . 4 0 1 7 9 1 . 5 6 1 . 3 7
1 7 0 S 0 . 7 7 0 . 8 8 1 . 0 5 0  .  7 8 0 . 9 7 0 . 8 5 1 1 2 3 0 .  9 7 1 1 9 1 . 0 9 0 , 9 5
1 7 6 6 1 .  2 2 1 . 6 0 1 . 6 2 1 . 2 3 , 1 . 3 6 1 . 8 3 1 . 5 2 1 7 3 1 .  7 1 1 5 7 1 . 6 9
1 7 6 7 1 . 0 2 1 . 2 0 1 . 0 3 , 1 . 1 2 1 . 5 0 1 . 2 7 1 4 3 1 . 6 3 1 2 1 1 . 2 5
1 7 6 8 1 .  0 9 1 . 3 1 * 1 . 1 0 1 . 6 6 1 . 2 1 1 . 5 9 1 . 3 7 1 . 5 6 1 . 3 4
1 7 6 9 8 . 9 7 1 . 0 5 1 . 2 7 0 . 9 6 1 . 1 5 1 . 0 7 1 . 2 1 1 . 3 6 1 . 1 9
1 7 5 0 1 . 1 2 0 . 9 2 1 . 1 3 1 . 2 3 1 . 0 0 1 .  6 0 1 2 5 1 . 5 7 1 , 3 7
1 7 5 1 1 . 0 9 1 . 2 9 1 . 4 4 1 . 1 1 1 . 6 3 1 . 2 1 1 .  3 7 1 . 5 4 1 . 3 6
1 7 5 2 1 . 0 2 1 . 0 3 1 . 1 3 a 1 .  2 8 1 . 4 6 1 . 2 5
1 7 5 3 ,  i 1 . 2 6 1 . 0 7 1 . 2 6 1 . 3 7 1 . 1 7 1 .  5 6 1 . 7 5 1 . 5 2
1 7 5 6 1 . 9 2 1 . 5 1 1 . 5 2 1 . 9 6 . 2 . 1  2 2 .  6 0 2 .  7 0 2 . 3 5
1 7 5 5 6 . 2 6 2 . 8 9 6 . 3 1 6 . 7 1 3 . 1 5 S .  3 3 4 6 6 6 . 0 0 5 . 2 3
1 7 5 6 2  I  8 8 3 . 1 9 2 . 9 1 a 3 . 1 7 3 .  6 0 4 6 8 4 .  0 4 3 3 9 3 . 5 3
1 7  5 7 1 . 3 1 1 . 7 8 2 . 0 9 1 . 3 2 1 . 9 6 1 . 4 6 1 . 6 3 4 2 3 1 . 8 6 1 . 6 0
1 7 5 8 1 . 6 5 1 . 3 6 1 . 6 7  “ 1 . 5 0 1 . 6 0 1 . 8 2 2 . 0 4 1 . 7 8
1 7 5 9 1 .  5 5 1 . 7 9 1 •  81 1 . 5 7 . 1 . 7 1 1 .  9 6 2 2 0 2 . 1 8 1 . 9 0
1 7 6 0 2 . 1 2 1 . 6 6 1 . 7 2 2 . 1 6 1 . 8  3 2 . 3 6 2 . 1 3 2 .  6 5 2 . 9 8 2 . 5 9
1 7 6 1 1 .  7 1 1 . 7 1 1 . 7 2 1 . 8 6 1 . 8 8 1 . 8 3 2 .  1 3 2 1 6 2 . 4 0 2 . 0 9
1 7 6 2 1 . 3 3 1 . 2 1 * 1 . 3 5 1 . 3 3 1 . 6 7 • 1 . 6 7 1 6 3 1 . 8 8 1 . 6 6
1 7 6 3 1 .  9 0 1 . 7 6 # 1 . 9 2 1 . 9 2 2 . 1 0 • 2 .  3 8 2 2 9 2 . 6 8 2 . 3 4
1 7  6 6 1 . 7 5 * 1 . 7 6 1 . 9 3 • 2 .  1 6 2 . 4 6 2 . 1 4
1 7 6 5 1 I f l 9 0 . 7 9 # 1 . 1 0 0  . 8 7 1 . 2 0 - 1 .  3 6 1 . 5 3 1 . 3 3
1 7 6 6 0  . 6 8 0 . 7 2 * 0 . 6 9 0 , 7 9 0 . 7 5 0 l 9 7 0 . 8 5 0 . 9 6 0 . 8 3
1 7 6 7 0 . 9 2 0 . 7 2 9 0 . 9 3 0 . 8 0 1 . 0 2 1 . 1 6 1 0 5 1 . 3 3 1 . 1 3
1 7 6 8 0 .  7 0 0 . 5 6 0 . 7 1 0 . 6 6 0 .  7 7 0 ^ 7 5 0 . 6 8 1 3 6 0 .  9 9 0  . 6 6
1 7 6 9 0 . 6 0 0 . 6 3 0 . 6 1 0  . 6 6 0 . 6 6 0 .  7 5 0 9 5 0 . 8 4 0  . 7 6
1 7 7 0 , 0 . 9 7 0 . 9 8 . 1 . 0 7 1 I  2 1 1 .  0 9 1 2 3 1 .  3 6 1 . 1 9
1 7 7 1 . 1 . C O 1 . 0 1 1 . 1 0 1 . 0 7 1 . 2 1 1 .  2 5 1 4 3 1 .  6 0 1 . 2 2
1 7 7 2 . 1 . 1 0 1 . 1 1 . 1 . 2 1 1 . 3 7 1 .  4 9 1 6 8 1 . 5 6 1 . 3 6
1 7 7 3 , 0 . 8 5 0 . 8 6 a 0 . 9 6 1 . 0 7 . 1 .  2 0 1 . 3 5
1 7 7 6 , . * , . a a . .
1 7 7 5 1 . 0 2 . 9 1 . 0 3 . 1 . 1 2 1 .  2 7 1 . 4 3 1 . 2 5
1 7 7 6 0 . 7 7 . m 0 . 7 8 . 0 . 8 5 0 .  9 6 1 . 0 8 0  . 9 6
1 7 7 7 1 . 2 8 . 1 . 2 9 . 1 . 4 1 1 . 6 0 1 . 8 0 1 . 5 7
1 7 7 8 1 .  3 3 1 . 2 5 1 .  2 7 1 . 3 6 . 1 . 4 6 1 .  6 6 1 . 6 6 1 . 6 3
1 7 7 9 1 . 1 0 . 1 . 1 2 a 1 . 2 2 1 .  3 8 1 . 5 5 1 . 3 5
1 7 8 2 1 . 1 2 . . 1 . 1 3 . 1 . 2 3 . 1 . 3 9 1 . 5 7 1 . 3 7
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TABLE 2 . 2 :  ACTUAL AND ESTIMATED PRICES Or HOTH 
Note:  A=ac t ua l  p r i c e s  E=es t imated pr i c e s
M A U A ft.H A P H A O I CHATS^ JAIPUR. t.Al_*OT
TEAR A E A E A E A E A E
1 691 . 0.56 0 .56 m • 0.61 . , a 0 . 591 697 . 0.96 0.96 . * 1 .04 a ■ a 1 a 021 708 . 0 .73 . 0.73 0.79 . . 0 .771710 . 0 . 81 . 0 .81 0.88 a a . 0 . 861711 0.85 • 0 .85 0.92 1 .47 a . 0 . 901712 . 1 .76 • 1 .76 1 .90 1 .44 1 . 78 1 a 861 713 2.45 2.41 2.44 • 2.64 a 2 . 54 2 . 581714 1.22 • 1.16 1 .22 1 .25 1 .32 1 .50 1 . 291 715 1.62 1 .45 1 .24 1.62 1 .57 1 .75 a 2. 05 1 . 711 716 1 . 34 0.82 1.19 1 .34 0.89 1 .45 . 1 .62 1 .421717 2.51 3.48 2 .48 2.51 3.76 2.72 ‘a . 3.05 2.651718 1 .95 2. 38 2.37 1 .95 . 2.11 , . 2.17 2.061 719 1 . 06 1.12 . 1 .06 • 1 .14 . 1.19 1.121 720 1 .29 1.15 1.15 1.28 . 1 .39 . . 1.40 1 . 361 721 1.20 1 . 26 . 1 .19 1 . 36 1 .29 a 1 . 50 1 . 261 722 1.10 1 .33 . 1.10 . 1 .1 9 . 1 .uo 1.161 7 23 1.24 1 .47 1 .65 1 .23 1 .58 1 .33 . . 1 . 301 724 . 0.74 . C . 74 0.80 1 .26 a . 0 . 781725 1.18 1.11 1.11 1.18 . 1 .28 . . 1 . 251 726 1.45 1 .78 1 .78 1 .44 * 1 .56 . . 1 .531 727 0. 76 0. 82 0.82 0 .76 . 0.83 . , . 0.811 728 0.65 0.91 . 0.65 . 0.70 1 37 0. 98 . 0.681 7 29 1.29 1 . 30 1 .30 1 .28 1 .39 1 29 1 . 94 . 1 .361 730 2.12 1 .51 1 .62 2.11 1.63 2.29 3. 20 - 1 .78 2 .231 731 4.85 4.11 4.09 4 .64 4.44 5.24 7. 34 4.10 5.121 732 1. 06 1 . 32 1 . 09 1 .05 1.43 1.14 1.60 . 1.111 733 m 1 . 03 1.12 1 .03 1.11 1 .22 1 46 1 . 56 1.09 1 . 081 734 1.16 1.15 1.15 1 .25 1 .24 1 .75 1 . 57 1 . 221 735 m 1 .37 . 1 .36 1.48 . 2- 07 . 1 .441 736 1.70 2.14 2.14 1 .70 1.84 2 34 2. 57 a 1 .791 737 1.66 1 .76 . 1 .65 1 .90 1 .79 2 62 2- 50 1 . 98 1 .751 738 1.64 1 .72 . 1.64 1 .86 1 .78 2. 49 . 1 .731 739 . 1 .52 . 1 .52 . 1 .64 1 94 2. 30 . 1 .601740 . 0. 86 . 0 .86 0.93 1 .51 1. 30 1 .07 0 . 911 741 0.99 0.99 0.99 1 .07 1 .07 1 03 1. 49 1.19 1 . 041742 1 .99 1 .75 1 .99 2.15 1 .89 1 94 3.01 . 2.101 743 1 .08 1 . 26 1 .39 1 .08 1 .36 1.16 1 84 1.63 . 1.141 744 1.14 1 . 37 1 .57 1 .14 1 .48 1 .23 1 52 1.73 . 1 .211 745 0.76 0.86 1 .06 0.76 0.93 0.82 1 1 3 1.15 0.87 0 .801 7 46 1 .22 1 .56 , 1 .22 . 1 .32 2 07 1.85 1 . S7 1 .291 747 1.10 1 .02 1.10 . 1.19 1 38 1 . 66 1.19 1.161 7 48 1.11 1 . 26 . ■ 1.11 1 .36 1.20 1. 68 1 . 25 1.171 749 0.99 1 .09 1.19 0.99 1.18 1 .07 1 . 50 . 1 . 051 750 1.15 0 .95 1 .15 1 .24 1 .03 1 24 1 . 74 . 1 . 211 751 0.89 1 . 07 1 . 25 0.89 1.15 0.96 1 . 35 . 0 . 941 752 . 0.93 . 0.93 1 .00 . 1.40 . 0.961753 , 1 . 20 1 .09 1 .20 1 .29 1.18 1.61 1.19 1 . 261 754 2. 02 1 .57 1 . S7 2.02 . 2.19 3. 06 1 . 48 2.131 7 55 . 4.49 4 4.48 4.85 3.52 5 31 6. 78 . 4 . 731 7 56 3.09 3. 44 3.08 4 3.34 5 2 0 4. 67 3.39 3. 261 7S7 1 .26 1 . 79 1 .94 1 .25 1 .93 1 .36 6 62 1 . 90 1 . 84 1 . 321 758 1 .52 1 . 50 , 1 i 52 1 .62 1 .64 2. 30 1 .62 1 . 601 759 1.68 1 .S9 1 .58 1 .68 . 1 .81 2 16 2. 54 1.40 1 .771 760 2. 29 1 . 95 1 .96 2 .28 2.11 2.47 3. 46 . 2.411 761 2. 11 1 .63 . 2.10 1 .76 2.28 1 91 3.19 1 .67 2 . 221 762 1 . 37 1.16 . 1 .36 1 .25 1 .48 1 69 2.37 1 . 29 1 .441 763 1.86 1 . 67 . 1 .86 1.81 2.01 2 30 2.81 1.72 1 . 961 764 . 1 .61 . 1 .61 1 .74 1 .70 2.43 1 .67 1 .701 765 0.88 1 . 00 . 0.88 1 .08 0.95 1.33 1.15 0.931 766 0.73 0. 70 , 0.73 0.76 0.79 1.11 0 . 771 767 0.72 0. 75 . e .71 0.81 0.77 1 1 4 1 . 08 0.76 0 . 751 768 0.62 0. 52 0.62 0. 56 0.67 0 96 0. 93 0.60 0.651 769 0.52 . 0.52 0.56 0.68 0 95 0. 78 a 0 . 551 770 , 0. 67 . 0.67 . 0.72 1 44 1. 01 1 .30 0 .701 771 . 1 . 03 . 1 .02 1.11 0.74 1 43 1. 55 , 1 .081 772 , 0.72 , 0.72 * 0.78 1 a 09 a 0 .761 773 . 0.83 . 0 .82 . 0.89 1 . 25 . 0 .871 774 . . , . . . . . .1 775 1 . 08 . . 1 .08 . 1.16 1.63 . 1.141 776 0.93 , . 0 .93 . 1 .00 1.40 . 0. 981 777 1 . 79 1 . 37 . 1 .78 . 1 .93 2. 70 1 . 44 1 .881 778 1 .51 1.14 1.13 1 .50 * 1 .63 2. 28 . 1 .591 779 1.28 . . 1 .08 . 1.17 1.63 a 1-141782 1.08 . . 1 .08 • 1.17 1.64 . 1 . 1 4
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TABLE 2 . 3 :  ACTUAL AND ESTIMATED PRICES OF WHEAT 
Note:  A=act ual  p r i c e s  E=es t i mat ed p r i c e s
MAtAA. H A PH AC. I CANC AK f t 3 *A i P o f t ,  ,
YEAR A E A E A E A E
1 691 0 . 7 8 0 77 a 0 .91 a
1697 . 1 .1<! 1 1 2 . 1 . 32 . ■
1708 . . . .
1710 1 . 1 7 1. 15 1 36 * .
1711 1 . 63 . 1 .61 1 . 89 .
1712 2.  70 2 . 66 3 1 2 . i . - •
1713 1 . S5 1. 53 1 80 . .
I71i* 1 .61 . 1 . 59 1 . 87 ■.
1 71 5 1 . 38 1 . <12 1 .36 1 66 1 . 59 .
1716 1 . 3 0 1 . 1 8 1 1 6 1 . 28 1 33 1 . 5 0 .
1717 . 2 . 8<i 2 80 . 3 . 2 9
1718 . . . . .
1719 . . » • .
1720 1 . 8 7 . 1 . 85 2 . 1 7 .
1721 . 2.01 1 98 • , 2 . 3 2 . *
1722 1 . 08 . 1 . 85 2 . 1 8 .
1723 1 . 66 2 . 00 1 97 1 .63 1 .92 . .
1 726 . . . . .
1725 1 . 36 1 . 18 1 1 6 1 . 32 1 . 56 .
1726 1 . 55 1 . 67 1 6<i 1 .53 1 .79 . .
1 727 1 . 26 1 .22 1 . 63 .
1728 1 . 65 1 . 35 1 . 62 1 57 1 . 68 1 . 96
1 729 1 . 83 1 . 75 1 72 1. 80 2 . 1 2 1 81 2 . 68
1730 1 . 90 1 . 72 1 69 1 . 87 1 66 2 . 20 2.  57
1731 3 . 09 3 0<t 3 . 83 6 51 3 . 57 6 . 1 8
1732 1 . 38 1 . 56 1 53 1 . 36 1 52 1 . 59 1 . 87
1733 . 1 . 70 1 67 . 1 . 97 2 . 30
1736 . 1 . 78 1 75 . 2 . 06 2 . 61
1735 . « . .
1 736 1 .8 3 2 . 10 2 06 1 . 80 2 33 2 . 1 2 <i 90 2 . 6 8
1737 2.<*8 2. 20 2 . 66 2 55 2 . 8 7 2 93 3.  36
1738 . 2 . 06 2. 02 2 38 2 . 0 3 2 38 2 . 79
1739 1 . 67 1 . 65 1 96 1 . 58 1 86 2 .  27
1760 1 . 30 1 . 28 1 51 1 . 36 1 59 1 . 76
1 761 1 . 26 1 2<i 1 . 67 1 73 1 . 66 1 79 1 . 71
17 62 . 1 . 79 1 76 1 . 96 2 29 2 . 0 7 2 61 2 . 6 2
1 763 1.3& 1 . 62 1 59 1 .32 2 06 1 . 55 1 97 1 . 8 2
1 766 1 . 3 7 1 • U9 1 47 1 . 35 1 79 1 . 58 1 89 1 . 8 5
1 765 1 .1 <i . 1 . 12 1 . 3 2 1 . 55
1 766 1 .< 1 6 1 . 60 1 57 1 . 66 1 79 1 . 69 1 89 1 . 98
1 767 a 1 . 67 1 . 65 1 96 1 .91 2 26 2 .  27
1 7U8 1 . 82 . 1 . 79 2 . 1 0 2.  66
1 749 1 .<13 1 . 38 1 36 1 .61 1 . 66 1 . 96
1 750 1 . 1 6 1 . 36 1 33 1. 12 1 . 32 1 79 1 . 55
1 751 1 . 1 2 1 . 32 1 30 1.11 1 . 30 1 . 52
1 7 52 . . . . .
1753 . 1 . 70 1 68 . 1 . 97 2. 31
1 756 2 . 6 5 2 . 6 9 2 65 2.61 3 . 0 7 3 . 60
1755 . 3. 20 3 1 S 3.  29 3 87 3 .71 6 31 6 . 3 6
1 756 2 • 3 <i 3 . 01 2.31 2 .71 a 07 3 . 1 8
1 757 1 .71 1 . 89 1 86 1 .68 1 . 98 2 27 2 . 31
1758 2 • 7 <i , 2 . 70 3 .'1 7 3 . 71
1759 2 . 5 2 2 . 26 2 23 2. 68 2.91 2 66 3. 61
1760 2 . 0 <i 1 . 93 1 90 2.01 1 90 2 . 3 6 2 . 7 7
1 761 . . . . .
1 762 1 .71 1 . 28 1. 68 1 . 98 1 73 2 . 32
1 763 1 . 90 1 . 68 1 . 87 1 96 2 .20 2 1 3 2.  57
1 766 . . . . .
1765 1 . 67 . 1 . 65 1 . 70 1 - 99
1 766 1 .3<l . 1 . 32 1 . 55 1 .81
1767 1 . 0 6 0 . 9 5 1 . 06 1 . 2 3  • 1 29 1 . 63
1 768 0 . 9 7 0 . 82 0 . 96 1 . 1 3 1 1 1 1 . 32
1 769 1 . 2 2 1. 10 1 .20 1 .61 1 69 1 . 66
1 770 1 . 32 1 .30 1 52 1 . 73 2 03 1 . 78
1 771 1 . 2 6 1 .22 1 66 1 . 36 1 57 1 . 68
1 772 . 1 . 16 1. 16 1 36 1 . 31 1 53 1 . S7
1 773 . . .
1 776 1 . 1 6 . 1. 16 1 . 36 1 . S7
1 775 1 . 2 5 . 1 .23 1 . 65 1 . 70
1776 1 . 1 8 1 . 16 1 . 36 1 . 60
1 777 2 . 1 0 , 2. 07 2 . 63 2 . 86
1 778 1 . 66 1 . HI 1 39 1 .63 1 . 92 2 . 2 5
1 779 . . . . m
1782 . . . . .
TABLE 2 . 4 :  ACTUAL AND ESTIMATED PRICES OF BARLEY
Hol e:  A=act ual  p r i c e s  E=es t imated p r i c e s  353
PrtAtl C-W ATS L) 4 A N ( .R M C  R. F f i l P w f ! .
YEAR A E A E A E A p A E
1 691 0 . 5 6 0 42 . . 0. 61 . 0 . 6 7
1697 , 0 . 7 4 0 56 . , • 0 . 81 . 0 . 8 9
1 708 . . . . • . .
1710 # 0 . 7 4 0 . 5 6 0.81 0. 91 O . 99 0 . 8 8
1711 1 . 2 9 1. 11 0 . 9 8 1 .21 1. 41 . 1 . 54
1 71 2 3 . 1 8 2. 41 3. 48 2 . 1 0 2 -30 3 . 8 0 ..
1713 0 . 9 9 0 . 7 5 • 1 . 0 9 1 . 1 9 . .
1714 1 . 0S '0.9 5 0 . 80 1 . 04 1 . 1 5 . 1 . 2 6 .,
1 71 S 0 . 9 4 0 . 9 7 0. 71 . 1 . 03 1 . 1 6 1 . 1 3 .
1716 0 . 97 1 . 1 5 0 61 0 . 7 3 1 .26 i . ee 0 . 89 1 . 1 6 .
1717 1 . 90 2 . 2 8 1 81 1 . 4 4 ‘ 2 . 50 2 . 08 . 2 . 2 8 .
1718 1 . 59 . 1 . 20 . 1 . 74 . 1 . 90 .
1719 0 . 8 8 . . 0 . 67 . 0 . 97 . 1 . 06 .
17 20 1 . 11 0 . 8 4 . 1 . 21 • 1 . 3 3
1721 1 . 29 1 09 0 . 9 8 1 .42 1 . 57 . 1 . 55 .
1722 1*12 0 . 8 5 . 1 . 23 . 1 . 34 _
1723 1 . 00 1 . 2 6 1 08 0 . 7 6 1 .38 1 . 0 9 . 1 . 1 9 .
17 24 . 0 . 81 0 . 6 2 0. 89 . . 0 . 9 7 .
172S 0 . 95 0 . 7 8 0 59 0.  72 . 1 . 04 . 1 . 1 4 .
1 726 1 . 20 1 . 2 8 0 97 0. 91 . 1 .31 . 1 . 4  3 .
17 27 0 . 7S 0 . 9 3 0 71 0.  57 . 0 . 83 . 0 . 90 .
1728 0 . 90 0 . 9 7 0 . 6 8 . 0 . 9 9 1 . 1 6 1 . 0 8 1 . 2 4
1729 1 . 38 1 . 2 9 0 98 1 . 04 . 1 . 51 . 1 . 6 5 1 41 1 .90
1730 1 . 4 8 1 . 5 2 0 92 1 . 1 2 1 . 67 1 . 62 1 . 26 1 . 77 2 . 0 4
1731 2 . 2 0 1 67 1 . 4 5 . 2 .41 2 . 2 8 2 . 63 3-03
1732 0 . 85 0 . 91 0 71 0 . 6 5 1 . 00 0 . 9 3 1 . 05 1 . 02 1 . 1 7
1733 0 . 9 6 0 83 0 . 7 3 1 .05 1 . 20 . 1 .1 S 1 .33
1734 1 . 2 6 0 98 0 . 9 5 1 .38 1 .41 • 1 .51 1 -74
1735 1 . 3 2 1 . 00 1 . 44 . . 1 . 5 7 1 .81
17 36 1 . 47 1 . 63 1 23 1. 11 . 1 . 60 1 . 79 1 . 7 5 2 91 2. 02
1737 1 . 9 0 1 - 62 1 . 4 4 1. 78 2 . 0 8 1 .91 2 . 2 7 2.61
1 738 1 . 35 1 . 03 1 . 48 1 . 6 7 1 . 83 1 . 6 2 1 63 1 . 86
1739 1 .1 2 0 . 8 5 . 1 . 23 1 . 34 1 . 1 0 1 27 1 . 55
1740 0 . 6 9 0 . 5 2 0 . 7S 0. 91 1 . 0 0 0 . 8 2 1 06 0 . 95
1741 0 . 8 7 0 64 0.  66 0. 95 0 . 92 1 . 1 7 1 .04 1 06 1 . 20
1742 * 1 . S 4 1 1 2 1 . 1 7 1 . 69 1 . 6 2 1 . 79 1 . 84 1 84 2-12
1743 0 . 9 3 0 . 9 6 0 79 0.71 1 .05 1 . 0 2 1 . 55 1 . 1 1 1 43 1 . 28
17 44 1 . 1 0 1 . 03 0 75 0 . 8 3 1. 13 1 . 20 i . 3e 1 . 3 1 1 36 1 .51
1745 0 . 71 0 . 9 2 0 . 5 4 . 0 . 78 i . i 0 0 . 8 5 0 . 98
1746 1 . 1 7 1 . 1 2 0 as 0 . 8 9 . 1 . 28 1 . 28 1 . 4 0 1 30 1.61
17 47 1 . 3 7 1 . 0 3 * 1 . S0 1 . 63 1 . 4 2 1 63 1 . 88
1748 1 . 4 2 1 . 2 6 1 . 08 1 . 37 1 . S5 1 . 69 1 . 70 1 . 96
1749 1 . 08 0 . 9 9 0 S3 0 . 8 2 1 .08 1 . 1 9 . 1 . 2 9 1 . 49
17S0 e . 82 0 . 9 9 0 78 0 . 6 2 1 .08 0 . 8 9 . 0 . 9 8 1 42 1 . 12
1751 0 . 9 6 0 . 8 5 0 73 0 . 7 2 0 . 92 1 . 0 5 . 1 . 1 4 1 . 32
1752 . 0 . 91 0 . 6 9 0 .99 . . 1 . 0 9 1 . 25
1753 1 . 2 6 0 83 0 .  95 1 . 38 1 - 21 . 1 . 51 1 .74
1754 2.  05 1 . 9 8 1 50 1 . 56 . 2 . 2 5 . 2 . 4 6 2. 83
1 755 . 2 . 2 5 1 60 1 . 70 2 . 46 2-31 3 . 1 3 2 . 6 9 3 28 3-10
17 56 2 . 2 8 2 . 2 2 1 . 73 2. 44 2 . 50 . 2 . 7 3 3 22 3-15
1757 1 . 08 1 . 2 8 0 84 0 .82 1 . 40 1 . 1 9 . 1 . 2 9 1 65 1 . 49
1758 2 . 0 0 1 . 5 3 - 1". 51 1 .67 2 . 1 9 2 . 3 9 2. 75
1759 1 . 6 3 1 . 48 1 1 2 1 . 24 . 1 . 79 . 1 - 9 5 1 92 2 .25
1760 1 . 2 5 0 84 0.  95 1 . 37 1.21 1 . 56 1 . 49 1 . 72
1 761 i . 1 . 2 0 0.  91 1 . 31 . . 1 . 43 1 . 65
1762 1 . 20 1 . 1 3 0. 91 1 .23 1 .31 . 1 . 4 3 1 1 4 1 -65
1763 1 . 4 7 1 . 2 2 1. 11 1 . 33 1 . 60 1 . 50 1 . 75 1 63 2. 02
1764 1 . 1 6 0 . 8 8 1 . 27 . . 1 . 3 9 1 .60
1765 0 . 79 0 . 9 0 0.  60 0 . 98 0 . 8 7 . 0 . 9 5 1 . 09
1766 0 . 8 6 0 . 6 7 0 . 6 5 0 . 74 0 . 9 5 . 1 . 0 3 • 1. 19
1767 C. 77 0 . 5 5 0 . 5 8 0.61 0 . 8 5 . 0 . 9 2 0 87 1 . 06
1768 0 . 64 0 . 5 9 0 . 4 9 0 . 65 0 . 7 0 . 0 . 7 7 0 82 0 .88
1769 0. 81 0 . 6 0 0. 61 0. 66 0 . 88 . 0 . 9 6 0 99 1.11
1 770 » 0 . 9 6 0 . 7 2 . 1 . 05 1 . 1 4 1 . 3 2 1 52 1 . 32
1771 „ 0 . 8  8 0.  67 0. 96 0 . 99 1 . 0 9 1 . 05 1 1 5 1 . 21
1 772 . 0 . 8 0 0. 61 . 0 . 8 8 P . 96 1 . 05 1 21 1.11
1 773 . . . . . . . .
1774 0 . 66 . 0.  50 . 0 . 7 2 . 0 .  79 0.91
1775 1 . 0 4 0 . 7 9 , 1 . 14 . 1 . 24 1. 43
1776 0.  91 . 0 . 6 9 . 0 . 9 9 . 1 . 0 8 1 . 25
1777 1 . 67 . 1 . 26 . 1 . 8 3 . 1 . 9 9 2.  30
1778 1 . 24 1 . 1 0 0 83 0 . 54 . 1 . 35 . 1 . 4 8 1 . 70
1779 . . . . . . ,
1782 . . . . . . . .
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Appendix 3. Regional Prices of Major Foodgrains and Agricultural
Price Index Eastern Rajasthan c.1710-1780
The average regional prices derived by the method described in  Append ix  2 fo r 
the fou r foodcrops selected are presented along w ith  the ir relative values indexed to 
the year 1716 in  Table 3.1. The agricultura l price index in  the last column o f the 
table is the geometric mean o f the relative indices fo r the fo u r crops. The year 
1716 was chosen as the base year fo r the regional prices fo r two reasons. F irst, the 
prices in this year were not unusual ind icating that i t  was a norm al or at least not 
an abnormal year. Second, it  was in  this year alone that the average regional price 
fo r each o f the crops selected was based upon actual prices recorded in  the arhsattas 
fo r each o f the qasbas (except qasba Jaipur whose price series begins only in  1728). 
Further, the price index calculated by this method can be readily compared to the 
weighted price index calculated by S.P. Gupta and Shireen M oosv ifo r the period 
1665-1750 indexed to 1716.
As we had indicated in  Append ix 2, there were nine years fo r  which we had 
no data fo r  wheat prices in the fou r qasbas, namely Malarna, Jaipur, Phagi and 
Sanganer, included in  the calculation o f the regional wheat price. In  order to 
estimate the regional wheat price in these years, we used the average pargana price 
fo r wheat given by S.Nurul Hasan et.al. fo r 1700-1750 and D ilbagh Singh fo r  1750- 
80. (see. S.Nurul Hasan and S.P.Gupta,"Prices o f Foodgrains", and D ilbagh 
Singh,"Revenue Adm in istra tion", Chap. IV .) The pargana averages are m arginally 
d iffe ren t from  the qasba prices fo r the same year as the tim ing  fo r the sale o f the 
crops in the entire pargana, including the qasba, was generally the same. Thus fo r 
two o f the missing years where the average price o f wheat in  pargana Malarna was 
cited in the above mentioned studies, these were taken to be the same as that
- 3 7 4 -
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prevailing in qasba Malarna (1718, 1719). Having obtained a price  value fo r qasba 
Malarna i t  was possible to estimate the wheat price in the other fo u r qasbas and, 
subsequently, calculate the average regional wheat price fo r that year by the method 
described in  A ppend ix  2. Average prices fo r six o f the nine years fo r  which we 
had missing data fo r wheat, however, were not available fo r pargana Malarna as 
well. These were therefore estimated using the pargana prices fo r  Chatsu. U n like  
qasba Chatsu where the wheat series is very incomplete as wheat was generally 
assessed in  cash in  the qasba, the average price series fo r pargana Chatsu is fa ir ly  
complete. Thus the comparable observations fo r common years fo r  the two series 
of wheat prices o f parganas Chatsu and Malarna were taken and the average ratio 
determined in  the same way as the price hierarchies had been calculated earlier.(see. 
Append ix 1.) These price ratios were then used to estimate the price in qasba 
Malarna, then the other qasbas and fin a lly  the regional average price fo r  the six 
years (1708,1724,1735,1761,1764,1773).
The regional prices fo r the fou r crops, bajra, moth, wheat and barley have been 
plotted on the same graph in F igure 3.1. F igure 3.2 is the graph o f the agricu ltura l 
price index fo r the period c.1710-1780.
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TABLE3 « 1 : AVERAGE PRICES Or MAJOR FOODGP.AINS AND 
INDEX OF AGRICULTURAL PRICES (1716*100)  
(E.RAJASTHAN c.1710 -  1700)
TEA R BAJRA
PRICE
BAJRA
IHDEX
MOTH
PRICE
MOTH
IHDEX
1691 0.86 59.26 0.S8 66.12
1697 0.96 67.69 1 .00 79.0 7
1706 0.82 57.98 0.75 59.8 0
1710 0.89 62.82 0.86 66.82
1711 0.89 62.68 0.68 69.90
171 2 1.76 126.62 1 .80 163.16
171 3 2.87 202.28 2.52 200.16
171 ft 1.19 63.96 1 .38 103.16
171 5 1.69 119.01 1 .62 128.66
171 6 1.62 100.00 1 .26 l eo .oo
171 7 2.88 202.87 2.95 236.68
171 6 2.11 169.01 2 . IS 170.96
171 9 1.76 122.99 1 .11 88 .25
1720 1.60 98.68 1.31 103.78
1721 1.37 96.62 1.31 106.33
1722 1.62 100.31 1.20 95.01
1723 1.61 99.62 1 .66 116.59
1726 1.08 76.17 0.77 60.8 0
1725 1.31 92.07 1 .21 9s»es
1726 1.63 115.18 1 .58 125.37
1727 0.91 66.53 0.80 63.91
1726 1.02 72.06 0.81 66.69
1729 1.51 166.82 1 .32 105.15
1730 2.2S 158.97 2.07 166.38
1731 6.36 307.39 6.96 396.65
1732 1.30 91 .66 1 .26 99.8 6
1733 1.27 6 9 . 3B 1.16 92.35
1736 1.86 129.79 1 .37 109.22
173S 2.01 161.9 B 1 .56 122.51
1736 1.93 135.89 1 .96 155.86
1737 • 2.21 155.91 1 .96 155.81
1736 1.92 135.72 1 .87 168.85
1739 1.61 113.59 1 .66 130.61
1760 1.16 80.66 1 .00 79.81
1761 1. 31 92.06 1 .05 83.55
17*2 1.75 123.36 1 .98 157.72
1763 1.22 86.22 1 .36 i e a . 0 9
1766 1.65 102.05 1 .38 109.90
17&S 1.03 72.66 0.96 76.93
1766 1.55 109.35 1 .68 117.66
1767 1.22 85.96 1.19 96.68
1768 1.35 95.27 1 .30 103.57
1769 1.19 86.1 6 1.18 93.80
1750 1.21 85.59 1 .16 92.15
17-SI 1.37 96.52 1.12 B8.80
1752 1.19 83.96 1 .05 83.22
1753 1.62 100.06 1.32 106.53
1756 2.17 152.98 2.06 163.98
175S 6 .  SI 318.32 6.77 379.16
1756 3.60 260.02 3.62 287.56
1757 S. 16 150.82 2.72 216.05
1758 1.68 118.26 1 .71 136*22
1759 1.85 130.76 1 .73 137.26
"1760 " 2.23 '157215 2.66 196.12
1761 1.90 133.90 1 .91 151 .75
176 2 1 .69 105.26 1 .39 110.69
176 3 2.13 169.96 1 .91 151.75
1766 ' 2.06 163.65 1 .81 163.95
1765 1.21 85.50 1.06 86.66
1766 0.82 57.83 0.82 65.35
1767 1.00 70.63 0.83 65 .91
1768 0.7B 55.28 0.67 53.31
1769 0.68 67.99 0*62 69.15
1770 1.11 78.16 0.96 76.21
1771 1.16 81 .89 1.13 90.1 6
177 2 1.30 91 .73 0.82 66 .81
1773 0.99 70.16 8.93 76.09
1776 • . .
177 5 • 1.18 83.56 1 .22 96.75
1776 6.90 63.22 1 .05 83.2 7
1777 1.69 166.99 1 .93 153.16
1778 1.53 108.1 6 1 .63 129 .28
1779 1.29 90.75 1 .22 96.93
1782 1.30 91 .72 1 .22 97.06
V HEAT WHEAT BARLEY BARLEY PRIC
PRICE IHOEX PRICE INDEX IKDE
0.B2 66.83 0.56 60 .66 57.2
1.20 96.6 £ 0 .75 80.56 79 .8
1 .56 122.05 . . »
1.23 96.97 0.77 83 .11 76.2
1.71 135.01 1 .26 136.93 9 6 . S
2.83 223.33 2 .86 305.02 186.6
1.63 128.7 5 1 .00 1 07.80 153.9
1 .69 133.57 1 .06 1 11 .61 106. S
1.66 115-25 0 .96 103.38 116.2
1 .27 100.60 0 .93 1 00 .00 100. C
2.98 235.36 2.12 228.IS 226.8
2.32 183.07 1.61 172.69 1 68 .6
1.67 131 .69 0 .89 96.13 108.2
1 .96 155.21 1.12 120.58 117.6
2.10 166.25 1 .36 163.56 126 .S
1.97 1SS .8 6 1 .13 .121 .76 115.9
1.85 -166.00 1.16 126.91 12O.0
0.75 59 .05 0 .82 88 .25 70. C
1 .35 107.00 0.93 99.93 98.5
1.66 131 .35 1.23 131 .66 1 25 .7
1 .29 102.30 0.80 85.65 77.5
1 .60 126.68 1 .00 107 .06 89 .C
1.87 167.89 1 .38 168.57 125.3
1.96 156.59 1 .68 158.52 1S9.0
3.73 292.77 2.32 268.96 306.6
1 .57 126.63 0.96 102.96 106.0
1.91 151.17 1 .06 116.36 109.:
2.00 157.8 2 1 .37 •167.35 136.7
1 .96 153.3 5 1 .63 153.67 162.2
2.7 8 219.79 1 .80 193.20 173.'.
2.60 205.36 1 .93 207.03 179 .:
2.21 176 .S9 1 .66 157.29 153. i
1 .78 160.31 1 .1 6 1 26.96 1 27 • (
1 .62 112-1 3 0.80 86.61 88.6
1 .51 119 . eo 0.96 10O.6 2 97. :
2.06 162.78 1 .60 171 .37 152. t
1.76 137.61 1.15 •123.70 112.2
1.63 128.61 1 .16 122.9 0 u s . :
1 .28 101 .52 0.82 68 .32 83.:
1.68 132 .S7 1.16 126.27 1 21
1.88 168.25 1..63 153.86 116.(
2.06 1 61 .57 1 .50 161.52 1 26 .i
1 .60 126.25 1 .16 126.22. 105. i
1 .60 110.62 1 .02 109.09 98.'.
1.31 103.70 1.01 108.96 99.2. 0.99 105.85 •
1 .91 151 .3 0 1 .36 166.25 1 22.2
2.99 236;e 2 2-22 238.27 193.'
3.66 287.36 2.56 273 .1 8 311 •:
2.86 226.05 2.68 266.67 253.:
1 .95 156.6 2 1 .26 1 36.83 161.:
3.08 263.32 2.07 221 .86 171
2.58 203.96 1 .68 180.75 160.:
■ 2.1 5 170.25 1.35 166.65 16S .1
1.96 155.29 1.30 139.79 166.;
1 .78 1 60 .66 1.18 126.88 119.:
1 .96 1S6.9S 1 .61 151 .33 151 .'
1 .79 161.33 1 .26 135.33 161 . .
1.65 1 30.76 0 .88 96.65 97.:
1 .50 118.80 0 .90 96.26 81 ..
1 .15 91 .21 0 .75 80 .62 76.1.06 82 .65 0.67 72.23 66.
1 .33 105.3 5 0.81 86.65 68 .
1 .56 • 121 .8 2 1 .00 115.72 95.
1 .37^ 108.23 0.95 101 .99 9 5 . f
1.29 102.33 0.B9 95.87 87.:
1 .35 107.03 . •
1.30 102.76 0 .72 76.95 •
1.61 11 1 .20 1.13 121 .12 102.
1 .32 106.66 0.98 10S.69 87.
2.36 186.6 0 1 .81 196.33 155.
1 .80 162.60 1 .32 161.87 1 29.
. • . • •
• . . . •
T A B U  1 . 2 :  P R IC E S  O f BAJRA,BARLEY AHO H IIE A t IH  QASBA J A IP U R , 1 7 2 8 -  1 8 0 0
A=Arhsatta Prices H-Prices fro* Dr.Hendleys tables 
Prices fro* both series indexed to 1762=100
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YEAR BAJRA BARLEY HHEAT BAJRA BARLEY HHEAT
A IHOEX A IHOEX A IHOEX H IHOEX H IHOEX H IHOEX
1728 1.3 8 85 1.24 109 1.9 6 113
1729 1.4 5 89 1.41 124 1.81 105
1730 3 .2 3 198 2 .0 4 179 2 .5 7 149
1731 5 .6 4 346 3 .0 3 266 4 .1 8 242
1732 1 .4 7 90 1.17 103 1.8 7 108
1733 1 .3 7 84 1.3 3 116 2 .3 0 133
1734 2 ,2 6 138 1.74 152 2 .4 1 139
1735 2 .4 3 149 1.81 159
1736 2 .0 2 124 2.9 1 255 4 .9 0 283
1737 2 .6 4 162 2.6 1 229 2 .9 3 169
1738 2 .2 7 139 1 ,6 3 143 2 .3 8 137
1739 1 .6 6 102 1.27 111 1.84 107
1740 1 .3 8 85 1.0 6 93 1 .5 9 92
1741 1 .2 3 75 1.06 93 1 .7 9 103
1742 2 .0 4 125 1.84 162 2.41 139
1743 1 .5 9 97 1.43 125 1.97 114
1744 1 .7 9 110 1.36 119 1.89 109
1745 1 .1 9 73 0 .9 8 86 1 .5 5 89
1746 1.7 3 106 1 .3 0 114 1.89 109
1747 1 .4 3 88 1.6 3 143 2.2 4 130
1748 1,54 94 1.9 6 172 2 .4 6 142
1749 1 .3 6 84 1.4 9 131 1.94 112
1750 1 .2 5 77 1.4 2 125 1,7 9 104
1751 1 .5 4 94 1:32 115 1.52 88
1752 1.4 4 88 1.2 5 n o
1753 1 .7 5 107 1.74 152 2 .3 1 133
1754 2 .7 0 166 2 .8 3 248 3 .6 0 208
1755 4 .6 6 286 3 .2 8 287 4.3 1 249
1756 4 .4 8 275 3 .2 2 285 4 .0 7 235
1757 4 .2 3 260 1:65 145 2 .2 7 131
1758 2 .0 4 125 2.7 5 242 3.7 1 214
1759 2 .2 0 135 1.9 2 168 2 .6 6 1S4
1760 2 .9 8 183 1.7 2 151 2 .7 7 160
1761 2 .1 6 132 1.65 145 2 .0 8 140 1 .7 4 135 2 .2 2 126
1762 1 .6 3 100 1.14 100 1 .7 3 100 1 .4 8 100 1 .2 9 100 1.7 6 100
1763 2 .2 9 140 1.63 143 2 .1 3 123 2 .1 3 144 1 .4 8 115 2 .0 0 114
1764 2 .4 6 151 1 .6 0 140
1765 1 .5 3 94 1.09 96 1.99 U S
1766 0 .9 6 59 1.19 104 1.81 105
1767 1.0 5 64 0 .8 7 76 1 .2 9 75
1768 1.04 64 0 .8 2 72 1.11 64 0 .8 5 57 1 .0 0 78 1.33 76
1769 0 .9 5 58 0 .9 9 87 1 .4 9 86 0 .7 3 49 0 .7 3 57 1 . 11 63
1770 1.2 3 75 1.52 133 2 .0 3 117 1 .2 6 85 1 .3 0 101 1.65 94
1771 1 .4 3 88 1.15 101 1.57 91 1.37 92 1 .6 0 124 2 .1 3 121
1772 1.6 8 103 1.21 106 I . S3 89 1.54 104 3 .0 2 234 1.8 0 102
1773 1 .2 0 74 1.25 84 1 .4 5 113 1.84 104
1774 0,9 1 80 1.57 91 1.54 104 1 .3 0 101 1.80 102
1775 1 .4 3 88 1.43 126 1.7 0 98
1776 1.0 8 66 1,2 5 110 1.6 0 92
1777 1.8 0 n o 2 .3 0 202 2.8 4 164 1.90 129 1 .1 0 86 1.5 8 90
1778 1.86 114 1.7 0 149 2 .2 5 130 2 .1 3 144 1 .4 7 114 1 .88 107
1779 1.5 5 95 2.2 2 150 1.6? l?9 2 .0 8 118
1780 1.38 93 1.3 7 106 1.9 0 108
1781 , 0 .9 7 66 1.0 5 82 1.67 95
1782 1.57 96 1.29 87 1 .3 0 101 1.74 99
1783 2 .6 2 177 1.3 9 108 1.74 99
1784 , 2 .3 9 161 2 .8 6 221 3 .4 0 193
1785 0 .9 5 64 1 .0 7 83 1.54 87
1786 0 .8 6 58 0 .6 9 53 1.0 8 61
1787 0 .9 8 66 1 .0 9 1.5 5
1788 1.0 0 68 1.4 2 110 1.37 78
1789 1.05 71 0 .8 8 68 1.15 65
1790 2.2 2 ISO 1.4 2 110 1.8 0 102
1791 2.0 3 137 2 .1 3 165 2 .5 4 144
1792 2 .0 3 137 2 .1 3 165 2.3 2 132
1793 1.08 73 2 .0 0 155 2 .6 2 149
1794 1.1 8 79 1 .2 5 97 1.76 100
1795 0 .8 0 54 1 .0 9 1.45
1796 0 .8 6 58 0 .8 8 68 1.3 3 76
1797 0 .6 3 42 0 .7 8 61 1.19 68
1798 0 .6 3 43 0 .6 7 52 1.00 57
1799 0 .7 3 49 0 .6 7 52 1 .00 57
1800 . 1.76 119 0.8 1 63 1.11 63
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Appendix 4: Price Relatives
- 3 8 0 -
TABLE 4.C: AHNUAL PRICE RELATIVES INDEX: BAJRA PRICE
QASBA CHATSU
YEAR BAJRA
PRICE
BAJRA
INDEX
MOTH HUNG • URAD TIL JUHAR BARLEY GRAM
1710 0.9 100 100 127 139 249 95 92 92
1711 0.9 100 105 141 129 379 89 138 130
1712 2.0 100 95 118 115 154 88 174 200
1714 1.2 100 106 179 172 223 86 88 114
1715 1.5 100 102 162 130 237 95
1716 1.2 100 76 139 110 231 4 107 76
1717 2.7 100 140 186 119 4 93
1721 1.4 100 98 127 110 183 94 102 117
1723 1.4 100 110 139 132 179 86 96 138
1724 1.0 100 83 130 112 224 98 92 99
1730 1.8 100 90 96 91 . 105 92 100
1731 3.3 100 133 120 4 100
1732 1.2 100 114 144 126 266 88 80 98
1733 1.3 100 89 110 93 160 84 84 98
1734 1.8 100 71 94 75 196 78 78 84
1735 1.9 100 77 91 81 , 92 76 75
1737 2.3 100 85 111 98 133 81 79 114
1738 2.0 100 92 120 110 140 90 73 94
1740 1.1 100 86 127 95 203 82 70 80
1741 1.3 100 80 125 92 . 79 72 87
1742 1.7 100 124 164 192 236 85 97 139
1743 1.1 100 119 175 146 188 84 92 130
1744 1.7 100 89 126 115 198 ' 77 68 86
1745 1.0 100 96 147 137 237 75 4 *
1748 1.4 100 94 106 103 213 103 95 125
1749 1.2 100 102 139 120 212 95 94 74
1750 1.2 100 101 109 103 . 118 88 %
1751 1.4 100 81 95 90 97 90 65 75
1752 1.1 100 89 109 90 231 101 88 101
1753 1.4 100 94 121 97 100 i l l
1755. 4.7 100 103 117 . 94 4 52 87
1757 2.0 100 99 108 118 175 ' 65 72 102
1758 1.5 100 108 148 152 195 111
1760 1.8 100 115 135 117 193 . 75 79
1761 1.9 100 93 101 98 181 70 101
1762 1.3 100 94 136 114 244 94 92 98
1763 1.9 100 94 120 122 244 99 69 95
1764 1.9 100 90 129 124 156 87 66 79
1765 0.9 100 125 184 230 96 113 144
1766 0.8 100 96 180 153 288 90 93 107
1767 0.8 100 102 152 128 294 88 76 78
1768 0.6 100 88 179 125 297 88 101 105
1769 0.4 100 127 280 352 * 89 149 155
1771 1.1 100 101 139 115 168 95 88 85
3 8 1
BAIJHARI
92
134
92
79
96 
94
85
89
79
76
89
73
76
97 
71
116
96
90 
68 
94
103
76
87
75
69
99
79
140
87
TABLE 4.M: ANNUAL PRICE RELATIVES IN0EX=8AJRA PRICE
QASBA MALARNA
YEAR BAJRA
PRICE
BAJRA
INDEX
MOTH URAD ‘ TIL JUWAR 8ARLEY WHEAT GRAM BAIJH
1713 2.7 100 90 99 137 95 . .
1714 1.1 100 112 138 191 94 97 148 145 99
1715 1.6 100 99 116 198 93 57 84 56 52
1716 1.3 100 100 100 202 72 96 73 72
1717 2.6 100 95 126 83 72 71
1718 2.0 100 99 153 91 81 t 83
1719 1.6 100 65 80 91 76 55
1720 1.3 100 102 147 89 88 149 103
1721 1.2 100 102 123 145 93 *
1722 1.3 100 87 103 180 90 88 148 , 88
1723 1.2 100 107 148 187 84 86 144 106 88
1725 1.2 100 98 99 249 100 79 i l l 74 ,
1726 1.4 100 100 109 217 83 83 107 84 83
1727 0.8 100 97 132 219 81 96 157 95 96
1728 0.7 100 88 125 221 83 123 197 123 123
1729 1.4 100 93 105 133 105 100 133 100 100
1730 2.3 100 92 94 141 98 65 83 63 65
1731 4.0 100 121 . 95
1732 1.0 100 101 117 329 84 82 132 113 84
1736 1.7 100 102 « 210 93 88 110 114 91
1737 1.8 100 93 100 135 85 107 140 142 114
1738 1.6 100 102 110 129 90 .
1743 0.9 100 122 193 211 73 105 151 131 113
1744 1.1 100 102 164 224 89 98 122 105
1745 0.8 100 99 135 204 74 92 148 102 96
1746 1.2 100 101 162 150 80 96 120 125 99
1747 1,0 100 108 146 159 110
1748 1.1 100 102 122 194 123 130 166 122 134
1749 1.0 100 102 107 185 77 112 148 123
1751 1.1 100 82 98 137 83 87 103 95 91
1754 1.9 100 105 121 130 96 107 138 117 115
1756 2.9 100 107 136 * 79 82 106
1757 1.3 100 96 135 179 92 83 131 126 84
1758 1.5 100 105 164 94 138 188
1759 1.6 100 108 100 150 90 105 162 121
1760 2.1 100 108 110 150 107 96 68 76
1761 1.7 100 124 108 172 96 ,
1762 1.3 100 102 115 228 85 90 128 105
1763 1.9 100 98 , 177 79 77 100 104 77
1765 l . l 100 81 121 144 64 73 135 88 65
1766 0.7 100 108 185 258 99 127 196 130 123
1767 0.9 100 77 102 200 92 84 115 65 77
1768 0.7 100 88 109 259 80 91 139 93 91
1769 0.6 100 220 , 135 204 149 136
1775 1.0 100 106 109 156 91 102 123 120
1776 0.8 100 121 146 169 108 118 153 131 120
1777 1.3 100 140 140 140 141 131 164 ♦
1778 1.3 100 114 113 144 112 93 125 95 .
1779 1.1 100 98 123 144 82
1782 1.1 100 97 116 166 78 ,
TABLE 4.P: ANKUAL PRICE RELATIVES : INDEX^BAJRA PRICE
YEAR BAJRA BAJRA MOTH
PRICE IHOEX
1691 0.8 100 74
1697 0.9 100 111
1715 1.4 100 86
1716 1.2 100 98
1717 2.4 100 102
1718 1.8 100 133
1720 1.2 100 92
1723 1.6 100 103
1725 1.0 100 113
1726 1.5 100 US
1727 1.0 100 85
1728 1.1 100 ,
1729 1.3 100 98
1730 1.7 100 94
1732 1.3 100 86
1733 1.1 100 105
1734 1.6 100 73
1736 1.9 100 114
1741 1.1 100 93
1742 1.3 100 138
1743 1.1 100 127
1744 1.3 100 118
1745 1.1 100 100
1746 1.6 100
1749 1.3 100 93
1750 0.9 100 103
1751 1.4 100 87
1753 1.1 100 102
1754 1.5 100 103
1755 2.9 100
1757 2.1 100 93
1759 1.8 100 88
1760 1.7 100 114
1778 1.3 100 90
QASBA PHAGI
TIL JUHAR. paody BARLEY
148 79 105 56
176 113 174 65
233 102 98
200 94 119 50
169 94 « 75
187 119 120
148 86 119
172 88 112 68
288 96 126 60
249 94 63
220 92 148 73
185 83 132
140 86 100 73
168 111 91 53
232 86 159 56
263 91 127 78
207 73 96 62
219 84 66
213 88 132 60
289 103 124 88
223 85 125 73
222 88 101 S7
202 71
176 94 53
168 89 163 66
85
128 89 51
205 96 111 78
167 84 99
148 103 55
86 40
156 78 62
163 103 117 49
167 94 139 66
3 8 3
IE AT GRAM GOJAI m m
102 35
130 120 •
96 62 65
115 129 •
123 113 97. 98
117 76 78
107 86 91
• 95 112 96
129 95 96
98 70 70
121 78 76
157 106 105
112 85 84
110 97
116 83 87 .
139 133 126
146 122 105 105
110 85 83 81
97 79
107 89 95 92
145 122 121 121
90 70 70 70
157 102 114 103
174 140 140 130
109 86
89 84 58 59
123 «
111 71 69 69
n o 100 97 92
TABLE 4.S: ANNUAL PRICE RELATIVES : INDEX=8AJRA PRICE
QASBA SANGANER
YEAR 8AJRA
PRICE
BAJRA
INDEX
MOTH URAD MUNG- 8ARLEY WHEAT GRAM GOJAI
1708 0.9 100 134 170 168 ,
1711 1.0 100 234 151 275 4 .
1712 1.6 100 143 140 145 197 190 172
1713 3.1 100 131 58 38 57 40 45
1715 1.8 100 183 149 146 65 93 60 70
1716 1.5 100 191 122 155 59 88 57 74
1724 1.6 100 123 154 . . .
1728 1.2 100 125 134 141 94 127 101 108
1730 1.6 100 142 165 146 77 101 81
1732 1.5 100 190 109 140 71 103 93 83
1736 2.1 100 148 200 180 84 110 112 93
1737 2.5 100 116 113 174 77 103 . .
1739 1.8 100 144 144 146 75 108 103 89
1740 1.2 100 194 202 183 82 124 92 .
1742 1.9 100 178 144 92 118 104
1743 1.5 100 148 216 101 133 135 116
1745 1.2 100 112 * 125 89 . .
1746 1.8 100 144 70 98 82
1747 1.5 100 115 137 . 109 129 .
1748 1.6 100 159 184 156 107 . 100
1760 2.1 100 93 101 99 73 89 78
1761 1.8 100 86 96 96 . .
1766 1.0 100 109 139 138 . . .
1766 0.8 100 97 178
1770 1.2 100 94 142 , 94 126 84 117
1771 1.2 100 96 119 126 90 119 86 98
1772 1.4 100 90 115 4 70 98 70 81
1773 1.1 100 131 156 . . .
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GQCHANI
74
90
120
117
99
84
BAIJHARI
57
97
80
93
86
117
113
111
76
93
87
72
TABLE 4.L: ANKUAL PRICE RELATIVES : INDEX-“MOTH PRICE
QASBA LAISOT 3 B 5
YEAR MOTH
PRICE
MOTH
INDEX
BAJRA URAD HUNG TIL 8ARLEY GRAM BAIJHARI
1712 1.8 100 90 111 111 187 *
1713 2.5 100 108 140 150 191 « «
1714 1.5 100 82 127 132 169 89 70
1715 2.1 100 100 121 127 193 . .
1716 1.6 100 114 n o 132 313 65 68
1717 3.0 100 109 109 125 150 71 109 .
1718 2.2 100 100 109 133 170 80 107 ,
1719 1.2 100 141 129 133 168 89 99 94
1720 1.4 100 119 131 178 91 115 99
1721 1.5 100 107 101 11L 188 104 111 104
1722 1.4 100 112 119 101 193 102 116 . 102
1730 l.B 100 . 100 101 . . . .
1731 4.1 100 100 101 181 . 80 ,
1733 1.1 100 126 125 133 • . . 100
1734 1.6 100 117 106 117 237 . 87 81
1737 2.0 100 118 129 159 205 91 135 104
1740 1.1 100 * * 147 . 75 83 79
1741 1.2 100 112 123 196 « 105 100
1745 0.9 100 157 • 246 102 120 .110
1746 1.6 100 100 125 145 147 .
1747 1.2 100 102 132 141 166 139
1748 1.3 100 125 132
1753 1.2 100 103 108
1754 1.5 100 113
1756 3.4 100 100 * 123 60
1757 1.8 100 146
1758 1.6 100 135 137
1759 1.4 100 131 142
1761 1.7 100 105
1762 1,3 100 124 155
1763 1.7 100 136 155
1764 1.7 100 133 132
1765 1.1 100 145 170
1767 0.8 100 152 208
1768 0.6 100 153 169 291
1770 1.3 100 117 142 102
1777 1.4 100 4 . •
TA8LE 4.J: ANNUAL PRICE RELATIVES : IN0EX-8AJRA PRICE
QAS8A JAIPUR
YEAR BAJRA
PRICE
BAJRA
INDEX
•MOTH BARLEY WHEAT GOJAI
1728 1.4 100 99 .
1729 1.4 100 89 98 125 110
1733 1.4 100 107 . ,
1736 2.0 100 116 144 243 106
1737 2.6 100 99 111 ,
1739 1.7 100 117 77 111 91
1741 . 1-2 100 84 86 145 107
1742 2.0 100 95 90 118 102
1743 1.6 100 116 90 124 106
1744 1.8 100 85 76 106
1745 1.2 100 92 . *
1746 1.7 100 120 75 109 92
1747 1.4 100 96 114 157 132
1750 1.3 100 99 114 143 126
1755 4.7 100 114 70 92 78
1756 4.5 100 116 72 91
1757 4.2 100 156 39 54 45
1759 2.2 100 98 87 121 100
1761 2.2 100 89 * 0
1762 1.6 100 103 70 106 84
1763 2.3 100 101 71 93 83
1767 1.0 100 109 83 . 123 101
1768 1.0 100 93 79 107 88
1769 1.0 100 100 104 157 125
1770 1.2 100 117 124 165 136
1771 1.4 100 100 81 110 131
1772 1.7 100 * 72 91 74
Appendix 5: Limitations of the Quantitative Data in the Arhsattas.
The statistical figures used in  the study have been extracted from  the revenue 
records or arhsattas compiled annually by the Jaipur state’s revenue authorities. As 
the revenue was calculated as a proportion o f the agricu ltu ra l p roduct i t  fluctuated 
seasonally and annually depending upon the quality o f the harvest and the type o f 
crop grown. The internal logic o f the tax system therefore necessitated a very 
precise form  o f statistical data collection and m onitoring o f ag ricu ltu ra l production. 
W hile the revenue records provide us w ith  a sensitive ind ica to r o f the pattern o f 
agricultura l production and changes in i t  during the course o f the eighteenth 
century, there are a number o f problems in the u tilisa tion  o f the quantita tive data 
that they record.
F irs tly , continuous annual series o f the arhsattas are not available fo r  any o f the 
six qasbas under study. The ava ilab ility  o f the most complete set o f records 
determined both the choice o f the qasbas to be analysed as w ell as the period o f 
study. O f the six qasbas chosen, reasonably continuous series are available from  
1710-70. W ith in  this period short gaps o f one to three years are common in  all the 
six qasbas under study. Longer gaps o f 11 years between 1717-27 in  the records o f 
qasba Sanganer, 1723-31 in the case o f qasba Lalsot and between 1761-70 fo r qasba 
Phagi are however more serious. In addition, fo r none o f the years in  the period do 
we have arhsattas fo r all six o f the qasbas.
The second and more serious methodological problem arises, however, from  the 
nature o f the statistical in form ation recorded. In con fo rm ity  w ith  the two d istinct 
forms o f taxation -  the crop-sharing or batai jin s i method and the cash or zabti 
m ethod- each arhsatta records two types o f figures:
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i) Where a physical d ivis ion o f the grain in a predeterm ined p roportion  was the 
method o f revenue appropriation, the revenue accounts p rovide us w ith  the 
aggregate quantity o f each crop taken in lieu o f tax from  the qasba as a whole, the 
date o f its sale, the sale price and the monetary value o f the revenue thus obtained 
from  each crop. This mode o f taxation was known as jin s i batai o r crop-sharing. 
As a rule, revenue on food grains was collected by the crop-sharing method.
i i)  On the other hand, high value crops or cash crops were inva riab ly  taxed on 
the basis o f a cash rate per un it o f land. In  the fo rm u la tion  o f the cash rates, the 
concept o f d iffe re n tia l taxation based on the relative value o f the crop, varying 
p roductiv ity  and level o f investment in capital and labour is clearly discernible. 
The revenue accounts fo r  crops assessed by the zabti method provide details o f the 
acreage o f each crop, the rate o f taxation per un it o f land, and the revenue so 
obtained fo r each cash assessed crop.
The statistics associated w ith  the zabti and jin s i forms o f assessment are
however not s tric tly  comparable. In the case o f the jin s i crops, we get no
in form ation on the area sown, yie ld, or the demand per un it o f area. On the other 
hand, fo r the zabti crops there are no figures fo r the gross produce, the current 
price o f the crop or the proportion o f the crop that the revenue rate represents. In  
short, the physical components o f the quantita tive data, i.e., the area statistics fo r 
the zabti crops and the quantity figures fo r the batai crops cannot be compared. 
However, in  theory, the cash rate per bigha and the proportion  o f the produce 
taken in k ind both represented the same share o f the gross produce. I t  should
therefore be feasible to use the revenue figures fo r each type o f assessment as a
proxy fo r the relative value o f output in order to make comparisons at d iffe re n t 
levels. However, the lag in the adjustment o f the cash rates o f revenue to the
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annual price variations continues to d istort the apparent approxim ation o f product 
value to the revenue derived.
The use o f the revenue figures therefore necessitates certain adjustments to take 
into account variations in its component elements. Varia tion  in  the annual revenue 
may arise from  changes in  the extent o f production, the com position o f the crops 
cultivated, the sale prices o f those assessed by the method o f crop sharing ( jin s i) or 
the rate o f taxation per bigha fo r crops assessed in  cash. Where such adjustments 
have been made to compute values, the method used has been explained below.
Method used fo r defla tion  o f revenue figures to determine comparative production. 
(Table 22 and Table 23) »
Table 22:
The table was constructed in three stages and by way o f illus tra tion  we have 
given below the calculations fo r  the year 1728.
i) In  the f irs t stage, the revenue figures fo r the qasba and the mean revenue 
values fo r  the eight neighbouring villages under the head o f ’average village’ were 
compared (col.1-3). These were then expressed in relative ratios w ith  the revenue 
fo r the average village being 100 fo r each category (cols. 4-5. Col. 4= c o l. l /  col.3 * 
100). The last two columns in  the calculations below give the re lative percentage 
d is tribu tion  o f revenue by harvest and method of appropria tion, that is zabti or 
cash and jin s i or in -k in d , the percentage d istribu tion  o f the average village being 
used as the base statistic (col.6= col.4 /  100 * Col.7).
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Qasba T o t.V ill A v .V il l Qasba A v .V il l Qasba A v .V ill
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
K h.Zabti 3739.21 1848.35 231.04 1618.42 100 384.70 23.77
Kh.Jinsi 288.97 1074.63 134.33 215.12 100 29.73 13.82
Rb.Zabti 846.38 14.16 1.77 47818.08 100 86.07 0.18
Rb.Jinsi 3467.22 4838.27 604.78 573.30 100 356.76 62.23
Totals 8341.78 7775.91 971.92 - - 857.26 100.00
While these p re lim inary  calculations give us the re lative revenue collection and 
hence an ind ication o f the d iffe rence in the cropped area o f the qasba and the 
average village, the d istortion in the revenue relatives due to the variation in the 
crop composition o f the two units s till remains.
ii)  In  the second stage the m u ltip lie rs  or the average rate o f taxation per 
bigha and the average price o f sale per maund o f grain were calculated fo r the 
qasba and the average village. These were then expressed in  relative ratios, the 
m ultip liers fo r the village being 100.
Qasba A v .V ill Qasba A v .V ill
K h.Zabti 1.54 1.02 150.98 100
Kh.Jinsi 1.24 1.31 94.66 100
Rb.Zabti 1.35 1.00 135.00 100
Rb.Jinsi 1.22 1.28 95.31 100
i i i )  Lastly, the relative revenues derived earlier (cols. 6 and 7 in  the firs t set 
o f figures) were adjusted to take in to  account the varia tion  in  crop composition 
expressed through the variation in the m u ltip lie rs  fo r  each un it. The qasba 
revenues fo r each category making up the total collections were deflated by the 
corresponding m u ltip lie r value (col.10) to obtain a notional revenue value (col.12). 
Thus such a notional relative index provides a measure o f the relative revenues o f 
the two units had the ir cropping pattern, rates o f taxation and price  at which grain 
was sold been identical. I t  thus gives us an index which can be used as a proxy 
fo r determ ining relative output or gross cropped area o f each un it ( (A ) below).
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Qasba A v .V ill.
K h .Zabti 254.80 23.77
Kh.Jinsi 31.41 13.82
Rb.Zabti 63.76 0.18
Rb.Jinsi 374.32 62.23
Total (A ) 724.29 100.00
Using the method above, s im ila r re lative notional indices were calculated fo r 
1747 and 1760 also w hich are indicated by (B) and (C) in  Section I,Table 22 fo r  the 
years 1747 and 1760 respectively. These three indices ind icate that the relative 
output o f qasba Sanganer was approxim ately seven to e ight and a ha lf times that o f 
an average village. The revenues fo r each crop grown in  the qasba were then 
scaled down by the relative notional index fo r the corresponding year to take in to  
account the d ifference in  the cropped area o f the qasba and the average village. 
For example, in  1728 cotton production in  the qasba yie lded a revenue o f 
Rs.2023.84 as compared w ith  Rs.137.71 in the average village. However, as the 
approximate d ifference in  the relative cropped area o f the qasba and the village, as 
given by the relative notional index, was a lit t le  over seven times, the qasba cotton 
revenue was scaled down by the same magnitude to give a fig u re  o f Rs.279.42. 
Cotton production in the qasba can therefore be said to have been tw ice that in  the 
average village.
Table 23:
Table 23 has been constructed on the same princ ip les as Table 22. In  
comparing the relative agricu ltura l production in the six qasbas, we were in it ia lly  
faced w ith  the problem that we d id  not have data fo r all o f the six qasbas fo r any 
year in the period 1710-70. To overcome this, one o f the six qasba’s series was
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chosen as the base and then the years fo r which we had data fo r  the base series and 
each o f the five  other qasbas in turn were selected. We then had values fo r  
common years in each pa ir o f parallel series w ith  one series in  each pa ir having 
been selected from  the base series. Each such set o f parallel series d iffe re d  from  
any other in  the number o f observations and the years selected due to the random 
nature o f the gaps in the data. The averages fo r each set o f figures being 
compared were calculated and expressed in  ratios relative to the base value. In  the 
calculations, qasba Chatsu was chosen as the base fo r the comparison. The choice o f 
qasba Chatsu as the base was because its revenue series was most complete.
Relative ratios were hence calculated fo r the area assessed in  cash (in  bighas) 
and the quantity o f in -k in d  revenue (in  maunds) fo r  each o f the six qasbas (Section 
I  and I I ,  Table 23). These were, however, inversely related and as the figures are 
not comparable, the revenue values fo r each type o f assessment were used to 
approximate relative production (Section I I I ,  Table 23 ). Due to the inter-qasba 
variation in  rates o f taxation and prices, relative m u ltip lie rs  were calculated in  the 
same way as in Table 22 above. These are given in Section IV , Table 23. These 
m u ltip lie rs  were then used to deflate the relative revenue figures (Section V , Table 
23), to give the relative values o f revenue that would have been obtained from  each 
qasba had the cropping pattern, prices and rates o f taxation been identica l to that 
in  qasba Chatsu. This index then takes in to account the figures fo r  the physical 
units, that is the relative area and quantity figures fo r each qasba and gives us a 
notional relative revenue value. In other words, the notional index provides a 
proxy fo r  the relative d ifference in the output or cropped area o f each qasba.
Appendix 6 : Tables and Figures Relating to Cropping Trends.
A  common set o f tables and figures have been compiled fo r  each qasba pre fixed  by 
the in it ia l o f that qasba in  each case. The in itia ls  ( [X ] ) used are J fo r Jaipur, P 
fo r qasba Phagi, S fo r  qasba Sanganer, M  fo r  qasba Malarna, L  fo r  qasba Lalsot and 
C fo r qasba Chatsu. The tables and figures are ordered in  the sequence Chatsu, 
Malarna, Phagi, Sanganer, Lalsot, and Jaipur.
Tables 6.[X].1 to 6.[X ].5
Table 6.[X ].1 shows the percentage d is tribu tion  o f the annual revenue by 
harvest and mode o f assessment. Table 6.[X ].2 shows the percentage d is tribu tion  o f 
acreage and quantity o f kh a rif crops. In  the table, the area o f each zabti crop has 
been calculated as a percentage o f the aggregate kh a rif cash cropped area fo r that 
year, w h ile  fo r the crops assessed by crop-sharing the quantity  o f each such crop as 
a percentage o f the aggregate produce quantity has been given. The selection o f 
m ajor crops was based on the c rite ria  o f continu ity  in production  and significance 
in  terms o f relative acreage, quantity and revenue derived. The m a jor crops thus 
selected account fo r  over 90 per cent o f the seasonal zabti area cropped and jin s i 
quantity produced as well as revenue obtained. Table 6 .[X j.3  provides sim ilar 
in fo rm ation  fo r the rabi crops. Tables 6.[X ].4 and 6.[X].5 show the revenue derived 
from  the m ajor kh a rif and rabi crops, respectively, as a percentage o f the total 
seasonal revenue.
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Figures 6.[X ].1 to 6.[X ].7
The bar charts arranged from  6.[X].1 to 6.[X j.7 fo r each qasba show the annual 
aggregate values fo r each o f the fo llow ing  statistic : F igure 6.[X].1 and 6.[X].2 show 
the aggregate values o f the zabti assessed area and jin s i quantity  in  the kha rif 
harvest, w h ile  Figures 6.[X ].3 and 6.[X ].4  are fo r respective aggregates in the rabi 
harvest. F igure 6.[X ].5 and 6.[X ].6 give the total revenue obtained in the kha rif 
and rabi harvests, respectively. Lastly, F igure 6.[X ].7 charts the total annual 
revenue derived in a fiscal year incorporating both the harvest seasons. In  the last 
chart, only those years have been retained where we had in fo rm ation  fo r both the 
kh a rif and rabi harvests.
YEAR
1710
1711
1712
1714
1715
1716
1717
1721
1723
1724
1726
1730
1731
1732
1733
1734
1735
1737
1738
1740
1741
1742
1743
1744
1745
1748
1749
1750
1751
1752
1753
1755
1756
1757
1758
1760
1761
1762
1763
1764
1765
1766
1767
1768
1769
1771
TABLE 6.C.1: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ANNUAL REVENUE
3 9 5
KHARIF HARVEST
UN CASH \IN KIND tKHARIF
15.46 84.54 52.52
34.02 65.98 40.14
30.13 69.87 27.58
46.57 53.43 49.94
37.26 62.74 100.00
56.95 43.05 30,77
57.11 42.89 22.37
23.45 76.55 57.93
39.90 60.10 64.78
29.30 70.70 38.91
97.02 2.98 12.65
73.07 26.93 20.57
92.76 7.24 28,54
74.09 25.91 26.41
65.46 34.54 34.06
66.27 33.73 38.35
57.56 42.44 26.66
73.21 26.79 39.76
52.88 47.12 32.03
56.04 43.96 26.98
65.76 34.24 26,67
84.27 15.73 19.05
52.38 47.62 22.24
54.74 45.26 18.09
44.79 55.21 21.52
56.31 43.69 34.40
62.90 37.10 24.50
53.20 46.80 28.62
31.23 68.77 23.57
52.77 47.23 26.22
84.53 15.47 36.59
82.90 17,10 33.54
100.00 0.00 15.78
86,79 13.21 9.43
61.37 38.63 39.07
23.40 76.60 42.57
49.13 50.87 30.07
57.34 42.66 24.63
61.48 38.52 24.59
66.08 33.92 19.98
57.95 42.05 19.82
41.71 ■ 58.29 25.47
44.91 55.09 22.72
35.23 64.77 16.93
61.43 38.57 25.43
39.88 60.12 27.45
QASBA CHATSU
RA8I'HARVEST
UN CASH UN KIND *RABI
72.94 27.06 47.48
52.80 47.20 59.86
90.24 9.76 72.42
87.69 12.31 50.06
68.39 31.61 69.23
98.82 1.18 77.63
90.81 9.19 42.07
97.51 2.49 35.22
81.64 18.36 61.09
100.00 0.00 87.35
94.86 5.14 79.43
100.00 0.00 71.46
93.36 6.64 73.59
97,94 2.06 65.94
97.23 2.77 61.65
88.86 11.14 73.34
99.35 0.65 60.24
99.09 0.91 67.97
96.67 3.33 73.02
96.70 3.30 73.33
99.50 0.50 80.95
96.25 3.75 77.76
91.09 8.91 81.91
100.00 0.00 78.48
97.45 2.55 65.60
95.65 4.35 75.50
95.85 4.15 71.38
93.13 6.87 76.43
96.34 3.66 73.78
93.84 6.16 63.41
99.59 0.41 66.46
90.88 9.12 84.22
94.41 5.59 90,57
98.96 1.04 60.93
89.77 10.23 57.43
96.73 3.27 69.93
96,79 3.21 75.37
97.77 2.23 75.41
98.64 1.36 80.02
99.04 0.96 80.18
89.76 10.24 74.53
94.39 5.61 77.28
96.38 3.62 83.07
89.36 10.64 74.57
88.43 11.57 72.55
ANNUAL REVENUE TOTAL RUPf
UN CASH UN KIND
42.75 57.25 3756.01
45.26 54.74 3289.30
73.66 26.34 10618.02
67.15 32.85 3822.82
37.26 62.74 1320.84
64.87 35.13 3880.40
89.49 10.51 1863.77
51.79 48.21 3853.87
60.19 39.81 4904.80
61.27 38.73 4880.96
99.62 0.38 6123.75
90.38 9.62 6617.88
97.93 2.07 5490,64
88.27 11.75 7164.00
86.88 13.12 6263.67
85.36 14.64 7182.28
80.52 19.48 7696.16
88.96 11.04 7359.37
84.29 15.71 7947.84
85.70 14.30 6178.55
88.45 11.55 4376.42
96.60 3.40 4225.99
86.49 13.51 5788.03
84.51 15.49 5410.06
88.12 11.88 5214.14
83.29 16.71 4898.84
87.63 12.37 5434.84
83.65 16.35 5329.10
78.54 21.46 5129.69
84.92 15.08 4830.39
90.43 9.57 5008.78
93.99 6.01 4478.76
92.32 7.68 2068.95
93.69 6.31 1676.98
84.28 15.72 2349.49
61.52 38.48 2771.31
82.42 17.58 2654.79
87.08 12.92 3211.90
88.84 11.16 2514.47
92.13 7.87 2963.48
90.89 9.11 2789.06
77.52 22.48 2823.97
83.15 16.85 3392.38
86.03 13.97 2709.08
82.25 17.75 3124.10
75.10 24.90 3700.82
Source: A rhsattas Pargana Chatsu
TABLE 6.C.2: PERCENTAGE AREA/QUANTITY OF MAJOR KHARIF CROPS
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ASSESSED IN CASH/KIND : QASBA CHATSU
° 1 o  F V A e n P *  1 O f o  S , O P r f - n i T f  C f t . o t > S 3
YEAR COTTON INDIGO GARDEN
PRODUCE
MAKKA KODON RALO MOTH MUNG 8AJRA JUHAR
1710 11.67 10.35 30.79 0.00 11.24 24.87 29.59 0.50 63.02 3.82
1711 27.54 21.01 21.88 2.07 12.81 11.12 14.45 0.31 79.77 4.65
1712 36.41 13.57 16.38 4.69 17.35 9.72 20.92 0.65 75.67 0.26
1714 9.91 16.02 24.17 9.36 23.08 15.15 35.00 1.03 56.06 1.52
1715 5.24 14.16 48.72 3.50 10.02 12.35 55.95 1.66 35.42 4,96
1716 21.77 12.99 26.68 5.33 24.66 6.72 33.89 0.60 58.54 0.00
1717 30.14 0.00 48.54 5.81 2.99 8.80 3.12 0.13 73.48 0.00
1721 22.10 7.81 24.88 9.61 9.11 18.86 30.51 1.75 58.93 1.71
1723 43.91 6.57 13.69 14.86 9.05 10.14 15.87 0.64 72.81 ‘ 8.83
1724 12.72 15.28 42.43 11.43 4.40 6.61 70.19 1.60 13.13 8.66
1726 59.84 1.80 23.67 9.16 1.31 3.83 29.73 1.93 5.11 14.88
1730 42.80 4.62 21.64 14.21 4.96 9.06 36.65 14.26 32.64 0.82
1731 67.70 0.00 10.64 15.47 0.34 0.00 4.98 0.06 9.36 10.75
1732 39.08 2.95 16.00 19.28 6.92 0.00 36.80 7.87 44.34 1.98
1733 32.83 6.28 22.76 12.43 9.03 11.50 54.87 23.00 4.11 0.15
1734 48.71 3.92 15.83 9.76 7.88 0.00 59.98 14.14 12.98 0.03
1735 34.77 6.02 22.52 12.27 5.30 7.02 66.99 10.70 6.82 0.25
1737 38.69 1.67 12.68 25.11 6.22 2.64 49.16 13.63 12,06 5.09
1738 12.04 2.70 15.72 27.34 9.27 7.10 34.54 8.61 30.84 3.33
1740 25.15 4.41 24.39 20.81 7.02 12.08 61.67 9.56 11.24 2.26
1741 37.58 1.98 24.42 22.30 5.08 6,62 33.04 8.56 47.23 1.64
1742 44.26 0,48 24.49 16.92 4.58 0.00 12.03 2.21 80.38 2.53
1743 11.00 0.00 31.82 30.40 3.63 16.38 ' 36.56 1.43 46.14 9.99
1744 13.92 0.00 42.31 18.34 5,28 15.10 42.80 2.79 20.01 15.28
1745 10.03 0.00 50.64 18.17 5.74 10.89 40.93 7.19 33.17 11.53
1748 34.50 0.00 24.41 23.83 3.85 0.00 25.08 6.09 42.93 4.74
1749 18.07 0.00 29.05 37.16 3.17 0.00 23.50 4.21 39.41 13.19
1750 32.84 0.00 25.80 29.95 1.70 0.00 27.97 5.B5 41.27 21.38
1751 28.22 0.00 44.73 12.03 2.23 0.00 50.94 . 10.15 12.66 0.25
1752' 32.60 0.00 34.70 21.47 3.69 7.04 44.04 6.75 17.57 0.85
1753 53.38 0.00 25.11 17.49 3.38 0.00 , 16.84 2.47 59.77 1.13
1755 37.32 4.07 9.34 33.93 4.40 10.00 14.76 3.30 62.32 0.00
1756 0.00 18.62 13.27 46.14 1.70 19.79 *
1757 0.00 23.76 10.53 45.11 1.68 0.00 59.39 1.66 17.03 12.89
1758 58.49 0.08 12.85 19.81 1.57 0.00 53.44 8.36 37.30 0,00
1760 28.25 1.78 22.37 7.59 1.47 0.00 17.38 4.04 72.37 0.00
1761 36.57 2.86 19.65 18.66 3.36 0.00 38.17 18.16 35.05 0.00
1762 56.97 4.25 12.13 14.42 0.64 0.00 47.45 6.21 33.94 0.08
1763 45.61 5.11 25.44 11.04 0.62 0.00 61.83 2.61 19.53 0.08
1764 56.76 4.20 18.88 8.07 0.S4 0.00 43.84 2.56 29.73 4.30
1765 41.05 3.14 23.50 23.90 1.85 6.15 25.61 1.03 54.01 3.33
1766 42.80 7.26 24.98 14.24 0.86 0.00 44.90 3.16 36.28 7.96
1767 43.92 5.40 26,96 19.91 0.00 0.00 49.95 4.90 16.78 16.04
1768 10.41 14.38 48.58 14.50 0.00 10.38 64.09 2.32 15.72 12.23
1769 61.61 4.54 24.16 6.57 0.27 0.00 36.36 0.56 26.38 31.89
1771 21.61 1.33 43.93 23 .S8 1.39 0.00 27.42 2.62 54.89 6.47
TABLE 6.C.3: PERCENTAGE AREA/QUANTITY OF MAJOR RABI CROPS
ASSESEO IN CASH/KIND
0(0 PrfLFft c  ZA&T\ CflJbPS}
YEAR CH0MII GARDEN
PRODUCE
TOBACCO
1710 86,29 12.61 1.11
1711 CO o> CO On 18.31 0.83
1712 92.25 7.32 0.40
1714 89.95 9.91 0.14
1716 88.10 11.66 0.12
1717 88.65 10.78 0.37
1721 85.40 13.91 0.69
1723 92.24 7.32 0.44
1724 91.61 7.75 0.64
1726 91.35 8.38 0.27
1730 87,75 11.82 0.35
1731 84.39 15.30 0.00
1732 89.41 9.92 0,64
1733 85.01 13.65 1.33
1734 85.60 13.47 0.94
1735 88.69 10.65 0.66
1737 89.57 10.19 0.25
1738 91.26 8.57 0.16
1740 81.93 17.49 0.58
1741 84.02 15.39 0.59
1742 86.89 12.80 0.30
1743 86.22 12.91 0.87
1744 86.03 13.56 0.41
1745 85.83 13.95 0.22
1748 86,13 13.26 0.62
1749 87.19 12.50 0.31
1750 86.01 13.15 0.84
1751 88.43 11.19 0.38
1752 92.18 7.65 0.16
1753 88.52 10.83 0.19
1755 89.19 10.72 0.08
1756 90.18 9.82 0.00
1757 93.41 6.59 0.00
1758 91.41 8.39 0.19
1760 91.77 8.23 0.00
1761 92.80 6.76 0.07
1762 93.32 6.53 0.14
1763 92.30 7.52 0.18
1764 94.24 5.76 0.00
1765 94.45 -5.34 0.21
1766 91.94 7.78 0.27
1767 92.51 7.32 0.17
1768. 93,12 6.87 0.01
1769 90.79 8.94 0.27
1771 91.13 8.04 0.83
3 9 7
QAS8A CHATSU
o(0 O.ubrtH'T'l G ^ iN S i C ftoPi)
BARLEY GRAM 8AIJHARI
48.25 41.86 9.73
30.03 62.48 7.39
55.54 44.37 0.00
46.47 35.62 16.71
27.25 59.61 11.54
100.00 0.00 0.00
22.93 76.98 0.00
96.42 3.58 0.00
50.62 35.30 14.08
39.03 22.32 38.39
28.28 66.16 5.57
47.75 34.65 16.86
51.87 40.82 6.00
36.12 54.98 8.56
29.16 32.14 38.70
56.68 29.83 13.49
55.61 44.22 0.00
63.19 18.15 18.59
40.02 40.32 19.66
81.99 18.01 0.00
66.44 14.76 18.74
38.65 40.84 20,48
71.61 10.75 17.50
61.48 27.84 10.59
33.89 45.27 20.39
41.76 50.06 7.10
55.49 29.81 14.50
38.03 48.09 13.82
49.84 30.44 19,70
97.94 2.06 0.00
96.12 o;oo 0.00
71.88 20.74 6.78
94.89 0.00 0.00
79.59 19.78 0.00
86.08 8.14 0.00
41.93 57.23 0.62
44.79 23.97 22.72
50.04 41.94 6.40
81.34 12.44 0.00
47.99 44.04 7.49
49.45 37.84 7.97
67.59 32.29 0,00
48.27 45.88 5.34
57.73 27.20 13.48
TABLE 6.C.4: REVENUE FROM MAJOR KHARIF CROPS AS A PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL KHARIF REVENUE : QASBA CHATSU
3 9 8
YEAR COTTON INDIGO GARDEN
PRODUCE
MAKKA KODON RALO MOTH MUNG - BAJRA JUHAR
1710 2.36 2.02 5.40 0.00 1.41 1.88 24.03 0.51 51.18 2.94
1711 9.75 7.07 6.61 0.54 2.79 1.46 9.82 0.28 51.82 2.70
1712 9.82 4.30 3.74 0.93 2.86 0.96 14.04 0.54 53.32 0.16
1714 5.25 9.70 10.38 2.40 7.14 2.91 18.62 0.92 28.06 0.66
1715 2.02 6.64 15.02 0.98 2.29 1.74 35.02 1.65 21.75 2.88
1716 13.13 7.62 13.44 2.44 9.34 1.54 11.74 0.38 26.84 0.00
1717 21.42 0.00 26.09 2.86 1.09 2.16 2.17 0.12 36.41 0.00
1721 6.70 2.85 6.41 2.14 1.74 2.21 22.71 1,69 44.99. 1.23
1723 18.25 2.92 4.74 4.48 2.36 1.62 10.37 0.53 43.30 4.50
1724 4.25 6.18 12.84 3.02 0.97 0.91 45.90 1.63 10.34 6.71
1726 65.01 2.20 20.29 6.73 0.80 1.41
1730 37.73 3.84 15.51 8.56 2.55 2.80 9.49 3.93 9.41 0.25
1731 69.98 0.00 8.60 10.56 0.19 0.00 0.66 0.01 0.93 1.07
1732 38.20 2.30 12.33 12.48 3.70 0.00 9.79 2.64 10.32 0.41
1733 27.98 4.74 15.59 7.29 4.47 3.43 16.67 8.68 1.40 0.04
1734 34.88 3.43 9.06 4.76 3.19 0,00 18.14 5.70 5.56 0.01
1735 21.80 4.48 11.48 5.36 1.97 1.57 27.19 5.12 3.57 0.12
1737 35.98 1.18 9.67 17.33 3.43 0.88 12.66 4.61 3.67 1.25
1738 9.72 2.89 10.40 15.73 4.55 2.10 14,59 4.74 14.18 1.37
1740 17.95 3.95 14.59 10.56 2.45 3.12 24.40 5,61 5,18 0.85
1741 29.69 1.35 15.74 12.33 2.34 1.80 9.52 3.85 17.00 0.47
1742 37.58 0.24 17.19 10.03 2.17 0.00 2.26 0.55 12.19 0.33
1743 8.56 0.00 19.56 15.72 1.54 3.91 19.07 1.10 20.29 3.70
1744 9.45 0.00 22.65 8.35 1.89 3.48 18.77 1.74 9.90 5.86
1745 6.25 0.00 24.60 7.44 2.35 2.03 20.64 5.57 17.43 4.55
1748 21.06 0.00 12.38 10.86 1.60 0.00 10.00 2.74 18.20 2.07
1749 12.24 0.00 15.48 19.06 1.42 0.00 7.98 1.94 13.06 4.14
1750 21.98 0.00 14.15 14.02 0.66 0.00 12.63 2.85 18.44 11.26
1751 10.93 0.00 14.06 3.24 0.48 0.00 32.20 7.56 9.92 0.16
1752 21.79 0.00 17.92 9,63 1.36 1.56 18.15 3.42 8.14 0.40
1753 43.21 0,00 27.06 8.76 2.44 0.00 . 2.35 0.44 8.86 0.16
1755 36.02 2.75 7.53 22.79 2.56 3.33 2.82 0.72 11.54 0.00
1756 0.00 21.56 16.22 47.46 1.44 10.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1757 0.00 32.36 9.82 33.77 1.14 0.00 7.88 0.24 2.29 1.13
1758 37.96 0.07 7.27 8.95 0.54 0.00 20.58 4.43 13.31 0.00
1760 7.18 0.33 4.81 1.41 0.22 0.00 14.74 4.01 53.28 0.00
1761 22.77 1.59 9.86 8.03 1.14 0.00 18.74 9.66 18.42 0.00
1762 38.48 1.93 6.72 6.84 0.23 0.00 19.19 3.64 14.65 0.03
1763 33.16 3.03 15.85 5.71 0.24 0.00 22.15 1.19 7.45 0.03
1764 28.61 2; 39 8.38 3.15 0.14 0.00 15.21 1.28 11.43 1.44
1765 27.83 2.12 13.40 11.95 0.70 1.49 10.38 0.62 17.57 1.04
1766 21.17 2.75 10.02 5.48 0.23 0.00 24.55 3.25 20.65 4.08
1767 22.26 3.03 11.20 7.43 0.00 0.00 26.43 3.87 8.72 7.36
1768 4.33 6.06 15.25 3.84 0.00 1.32 38.72 2.84 10.77 7.39
1769 37.60 2.90 12.55 3.07 0.18 0.00 16.04 0.54 9.16 9.83
1771 9.57 0.71 15.72 7.13 0.36 0.00 16.41 2.16 32.57 3.65
TABLE 6.0.5: REVENUE FROM MAJOR RABI CROPS AS A PERCENTAGE OF
3 9 9
TOTAL RABI REVENUE : QAS8A CHATSU
YEAR CHOMLI GARDEN
PRODUCE
TOBACCO' BARLEY GRAM BAIJHARI
1710 62.68 8.91 1.34 13.04 11.31 2.63
1711 43.01 9.07 0.72 14.73 28.90 3.52
1712 87.42 2.68 0.14 5,08 4.67 0.00
1714 79.12 8.37 0.21 5.13 5.07 1.92
1716 60.53 7.69 0,14 10.70 16.72 3.33
1717 87.84 10.28 0.60 1.18 0.00 0.00
1721 78.34 12.01 0.47 1.88 7.28 0.00
1723 89.72 7.08 0.71 2.37 0.13 0.00
1724 74.59 6.18 0.87 9.02 6.74 2.60
1726 96.46 3.35 0.19 .
1730 89.97 4.64 0.23 1.37 3.50 0.28
1731 93.39 6.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1732 89.32 3.62 0.41 2.90 2.59 1.08
1733 91.27 5.70 0.97 0.99 0.91 0.12
1734 90.85 5.69 0.69 0.96 1.57 0.23
1735 84.39 4.04 0.43 3.26 3.56 4.32
1737 94.71 4.45 0.18 0.32 0.24 0.09
1738 95.27 3.70 0.12 0.45 0.46 0.00
1740 87.92 8.26 0.48 2.03 0.67 0.63
1741 89.69 6.50 0.51 1.20 1.47 0.63
1742 93.78 5.46 0.26 0.38 0.12 0.00
1743 89.43 6.11 0.71 2.33 0.73 0.69
1744 84.63 6.14 0.32 3.07 4/12 1.72
1745 93.22 6.59 0.19 .
1748 89.80 7.07 0.58 1.41 0.84 0.30
1749 88.46 6.92 0.27 1.62 1.70 1.00
1750 90.08 5.06 0.71 1.65 2.15 0.29
1751 87.31 5.49 0.33 3.61 2.25 0.99
1752 92.35 3.85 0.14 1.29 1.87 0.50
1753 87.87 5.64 0.18 2.96 2.00 1.20
1755 94.32 5.21 0.05 0.39 0.01 0.00
1756 85.53 5.35 0.00 8.76 0.00 0.00
1757 90.76 3.65 0.00 3.68 1.51 0.37
1758 93.82 5.01 0.13 0.97 0.00 0.00
1760 85.27 4,50 0.00 8.05 2.11 0.00
1761 92.67 3.83 0.11 2.53 0.35 0.00
1762 92.99 3.67 0.13 1.30 1.88 0.02
1763 93,75 3.84 0.19 0.83 0.61 0.46
1764 95.39 3.24 0.00 0.63 0.63 0.08
1765 95.87 . 2.95 0.22 0.75 ' 0.15 0.00
1766 85.47 4.04 0.25 4.56 4.83 0.76
1767 90.23 4.01 0.16 2.65 2.09 0.44
1768 92.59 3.78 0.01 2.41 1.20 0.00
1769 84.65 4.47 0.24 5.04 4.98 0.52
1771 83.62 4.16 0.65 6.74 3.07 1.55
YEAR
1711
1713
1714
1715
1716
1717
1718
1719
1720
1721
1722
1723
1725
1726
1727
1728
1729
1730
1731
1732
1736
1737
1738
1743
1744
1745
1746
1747
1748
1749
1750
1751
1754
1756
1757
1758
1759
1760
1761
1762
1763
1765
1766
1767
1768
1769
1774
1775
1776
1777
1778
1779
1782
TA8LE 6.H.1: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ANNUAL REYENUE
QASBA MALARNA
4 0 0
KHARIF HARVEST RABI HARVEST ANNUAL REVENUE TOTAL RUPf
UN CASH UN KIND MHARIF UN CASH UN KINO %RABI UN CASH UN KIND
. 0.00 2.18 '97.82 100.00 2.18 97,82 1636.27
13.28 86.72 52.08 100.00 0.00 47.92 54.84 45.16 7326.64
41.69 58.31 10.57 2.49 97.51 89.43 6.63 93.37 3321.27
40.20 59.80 31.51 4.45 95.55 68.49 15.72 84.28 2842.50
36.41 63.59 48.39 3.52 96.48 51.61 19.43 80.57 2618.16
51.10 48.90 25.40 3.70 96.30 74.60 15.74 84.26 2913.37
21.79 78.21 61.16 5.92 94.08 38.84 15.63 84.37 3764.85
16.10 83.90 70.47 8.74 91.26 29.53 13.93 86.07 3838.59
13.69 86.31 68.83 5.58 94.42 31.17 11.16 88.84 4001.80
7.78 92.22 100.00 , , 7.78 92.22 3976.09
5.65 94.35 73.60 4.98 95.02 26.40 5.48 94.52 7058.81
3.78 96.22 79.59 5.50 94.50 20.41 4.13 95.87 7115.23
21.09 78.91 49.24 1.87 98.13 50.76 11.34 88.66 7359.73
37.23 62.77 36.57 2.35 97.65 63.43 15.10 84.90 5802.79
24.40 75.60 56.36 5.30 94.70 43.64 16.06 83.94 4754.36
25.48 74.52 56.60 0.88 99.12 43.40 14.80 85.20 4931.69
26.36 73.64 59,12 7.06 92.94 40.88 18.47 81.53 5379.90
36.02 63.98 43.78 4.53 95.47 56.22 18.31 81.69 5998.58
50.86 49.14 100.00 * , 50.86 49.14 1272.67
16.22 83.78 52.17 8.30 91.70 47.83 12.44 87.56 3090.95
43.09 56.91 38.56 7.00 93.00 61.44 20.92 79,08 2743.44
16,52 83.48 36.84 4.02 95.98 63.16 8.63 91.37 7149.25
6.84 93.16 95.86 100.00 0.00 4.14 10.69 89.31 3532.26
9.47 90.53 40.10 6.01 93.99 59.90 7.40 92,60 4514.93
17.90 82.10 24.35 2.15 97.85 75.65 5.98 94.02 6225.90
11.05 88.95 64.23 1.84 98.16 35.77 7.75 92.25 5387.17
28.09 71.91 46.14 3.17 96.83 53.86 14.67 85.33 4036.82
21.04 78.96 100.00 . 21.04 78.96 3087.81
21.28 78.72 29.23 0.89 99.11 70.77 6.85 93.15 6194.27
16.54 83.46 51.70 1.43 98.57 48.30 9.24 90.76 4741.89
100.00 0.00 13.59 0.81 99.19 86.41 14.29 85.71 2564.22
11.34 88.66 34,08 2.11 97.89 65.92 5.26 94.74 5555.98
35.00 65.00 29.77 0.67 99.33 70.23 10.89 89.11 7245.43
11.50 88.50 35.21 0,11 99.89 64.79 4.12 95.88 5623.98
16.59 83.41 29.59 0.71 99.29 70.41 5.41 94.59 2992.50
18.74 81.26 44.55 1.71 98.29 55.45 9.30 90.70 2626.17
15.47 84.53 60.46 2.03 97.97 39.54 10.16 89.84 3493.23
24.67 75.33 26,49 0.99 99.01 73.51 7.26 92.74 3891.62
23.97 76.03 100.00 , 23.97 76.03 1595.69
19.52 80.48 37.53 0.89 99.11 62.47 7.88 92.12 4655.63
17.62 82.38 40.09 1.64 98.36 59.91 8.05 91.95 3699.44
16.39 83.61 64.59 1.94 98.06 35.41 11.27 88.73 3046.28
15.84 84.16 50.44 , 100.00 49.56 7.99 92.01 4313.81
20.97 79.03 47.69 1.37 98.63 52.31 10.72 89.28 5395.35
17.99 82.01 63.22 2.00 98.00 36.78 12.10 87.90 3346.37
24.10 75.90 59.62 0.83 99.17 40.38 14.70 85.30 3212.76
. 4.54 95.46 100,00 4.54 95.46 775.68
13.28 86.72 44.51 2.08 97.92 55.49 7.07 92.93 3459.57
13.36 86.64 49.93 1.73 98.27 50.07 7.53 92.47 2996.49
12.33 87.67 79.56 6.34 93,66 20.44 11.10 88.90 2485.48
27.16 72.84 28.87 2.41 97.59 71.13 9.55 90.45 3526.14
10.45 89.55 100.00 « * 10.45 89.55 1561.49
14.03 85.97 100.00 , 14.03 85.97 1506.33
TABLE 6.H.2: PERCENTAGE AREA/QUANTITY OF MAJOR KHARIF CROPS
ASSESSED IN CASH/KIND : QASBA MALARNA 4 0 1
°/o CZPM2.T1 CG.0PS3 °1° ^ A 'N T I T I  C C R & p S j )
YEAR COTTON INDIGO GARDEN
PRODUCE
SUGAR­
CANE
. MAKKA TOBACCO MOTH TIL 8AJRA JUWAR
1713 1.56 0.00 3.14 78.49 0,00 0.00 15.63 5.53 72.98 5.46
1714 11.45 0.00 3.13 49.62 3.13 0.00 9.55 16.16 67.42 5.14
1715 19.28 3.02 1.66 68.72 0.00 0.00 71.36 8.40 9.01 7.81
1716 2.52 5.24 2.30 62.95 1.00 0.00 28.92 10.81 44.52 0.00
1717 34.13 0.00 1.45 60.88 0.00 0.00 10.10 6.12 66.07 17.26
1718 29.77 0.00 1.05 18.91 0.00 0.00 3.78 9.04 44.92 42.11
1719 1.74 0.00 2.49 39.65 1.13 0.00 27.78 16.35 18.87 36.50
1720 2.77 0.00 4.25 82,39 1.19 0.00 5.01 7.49 34.83 52.58
1721 2.89 0.00 2.48 87.80 0.00 0.00 15.06 4.66 52.45 27.44
1722 1.90 0.00 4.32 90.61 0.00 0.00 19.07 2.80 51.19 26.45
1723 8.93 0.00 5.86 78.89 0.00 0.00 17.34 5.79 45.93 30,53
1725 5.20 3.63 4.13 63.53 0.00 0.00 14.97 4.73 73.00 5.26
1726 9.19 5.46 3.67 72.20 0.38 0.00 5.37 0.40 16.63 77.13
1727 6.61 5.99 3.79 44.75 0.55 0.00 14 .IS 2.00 25.29 57.54
1728 21.86 2.71 8.69 24.66 3.11 5.07 21.23 14.11 29.55 33.06
1729 39.11 1.03 2.81 23.45 1.81 0.00 15.56 14.76 42.00 26.12
1730 14.47 0.00 3.09 44.58 1.35 0.00 24.43 9.85 58.73 2.43
1731 15.98 0.00 5.69 53.18 5.94 0.00 0.46 0.00 85.95 13.43
1732 13.62 1.96 5.38 16.04 14.68 0.00 9.22 0.44 44.88 44.68
1736 24.98 1.39 4.48 60.82 0.00 0.00 0.71 2.63 23.58 73.08
1737 11.51 6.33 6.97 45.49 4.70 0.00 10.89 4.66 21.41 62.44
1738 12,53 6.46 15.02 55.78 6.63 0.00 10.41 3.83 36.74 48.26
1743 4.62 12.87 17.31 52.57 2.42 0.00 2.35 1.27 30.34 65.95
1744 1.85 9.29 10.55 36.48 11.15 13.63 24.26 7.76 46,98 20.60
1745 7.73 5.31 25.50 35,54 2.06 4.77 7,86 5.70 35.50 50.34
1746 6.48 6.93 12.98 53.10 0.35 4.88 2.97 4.97 76.33 15.50
1747 10.47
V
7.07 13.19 49,26 0.00 9.03 11.68 5.73 60,39 21.57
1748 21.63 6.07 9.84 25.54 11.96 3.95 8.63 9.41 43.25 38.49
1749 8.28 4.00 11.70 13.61 8.92 5.48 6.35 5.18 32.43 55.36
1750 20.34 1.51 11.40 33.72 3,19 9.87 2.73 3.22 72.47 21.53
1751 11.34 3.93 23.79 24.82 4.08 14.08 15.29 17.22 26.34 40.02
1754 32.44 0.00 10.59 36.05 0.28 3.91 3.71 2.71 49.26 44.25
1756 5.32 0.00 28.15 0.00 21.70 5.99 1.42 4.28 94.22 0.00
1757 5.14 0.00 24.03 0.00 14.90 8.20 8.71 9.40 45.43 36.15
1758 44.61 0.00 18.81 0.00 13.88 4.90 3.75 1.70 56.23 38.32
1759 23.45 4.55 15.46 20.01 16.27 5.10 7.27 6.28 30.17 55.27
1760 2.58 9.08 21.86 26.83 25.14 6.63 16.58 9.16 64.00 3.10
1761 12.99 3.49 12.50 34,75 21.51 1.90 1.60 3.33 46.09 47.80
1762 22.24 0.00 12.36 28.50 27.18 3.87 8.11 3.36 41.53 45.45
1763 3.17 1.87 24.28 21.16 22.69 14.91 1.17 0.36 54.29 44.17
1765 4.06 5.32 22.31 43.22 13.46 6.34 2.06 3.23 30.13 64.44
1766 12.36 16.03 16.43 37.72 2.29 8.58 4.41 5.37 43.41 46.73
1767 7.53 20.34 13.51 42.44 3.87 4.55 15.99 20.57 48.75 12.11
1768 0.76 23,97 20.96 46.75 0.00 6.42 2.49 2.65 39.81 54.43
1769 21.92 14.31 15.60 35.62 0.40 6.95 0.00 11.85 88.15 0.00
1775 10.46 8.81 27.52 36.65 3.03 9.72 1.38 1.32 84.13 13.08
1776 5.19 9.50 34.17 39.07 0.00 10.53 8.54 4.94 64.08 21.53
1777 8.06 0.00 25.69 4S.64 5.19 8,14 11.86 8.88 55.89 18.22
1778 12.16 0.00 16.66 35.64 19.10 2.23 3.52 2.37 59.52 31.46
1779 0.00 0.00 25.16 33.28 2.14 8.23 2.31 10.73 24,90 61.26
1782 0,00 0.00 23,48 50.60 14.08 0.11 0.26 14.30 85.29
TABLE 6.M.3: PERCENTAGE AREA/QUANTITY OF MAJOR RABI CROPS 4 0 2
ASSESSED IN CASH/KIND : QASBA MALARNA
% AREA (Z-R&Tl c-£-°PS) <yo&j\jprt T^)T*Y CXiN&l CRoPS)
YEAR POPPY TOBACCO GARDEN
PRODUCE
ONIONS KHATLI BARLEY WHEAT GRAM
1711 14.51 8.55 38.97 21.47 0.00 41.51 6.41 2.60
1713 0.00 1.24 1.80 1.09 93.99 ,
1714 8.29 19.45 43.65 17.02 0.00 91.90 2.04 4.49
1715 1.85 44.07 31.34 13.49 0.00 63.93 3.95 22.84
1716 2.00 27.62 35.27 26.62 0.00 63.34 3.38 5.77
1717 2.36 24.90 40.85 20.37 0.00 87.52 0.00 12.48
1718 3.32 33,79 40.14 11.23 0.00 97.89 0.00 0.00
1719 0.00 43.18 31.64 8,00 0.00 100,00 0.00 0.00
1720 7.57 33.87 28.16 18.24 0.00 95.81 1.00 3.19
1722 0.00 32.76 34.83 16.47 0.00 95.53 1.89 0.00
1723 2.13 28.34 44.74 10.73 0.00 86.38 6.66 2.85
1725 2.85 16.76 44.36 26.62 0.00 54.41 28.74 15.40
1726 0.00 17.49 34.64 19.28 13.40 72.99 4.84 9.07
1727 0.00 24.01 35.90 19.51 14.86 75.83 4.38 6.52
1728 0.00 0.00 26.84 51.12 0.00 64.29 11.33 7.99
1729 0.00 24.22 34.81 12.83 19.80 66.58 0.76 2.57
1730 2.59 3.72 24.07 8.64 44.61 44.22 11.54 14.52
1732 9.03 12.43 40.97 9.44 21.16 82.67 7.02 1.72
1736 1.71 9.50 32.54 7.68 41.62 83.83 1.29 3.01
1737 0.50 7.77 33.18 4.19 44,00 75.64 5.96 11.42
1738 0.00 20,18 47.36 8.78 0.00 73.79 4.50 11.82
1743 0.00 24.48 51.81 9.64 6.17 77.18 17.56 0.41
1744 0.00 0.00 40.66 10.15 40.55 68.59 22.46 7.77
1745 2.31 0.00 53.71 23.56 0.00 72.89 13.29 6.71
1746 1.99 0.43 61.25 17.39 5.62 89.00 5.08 1.77
1748 0.00 0.00 31.15 11.60 22.57 71.16 20.03 4.73
1749 0.00 0.00 57.34 21.85 0.00 79.45 12.20 8.26
1750 0.00 0.00 17.96 46.11 0.00 41.70 42.92 10.88
1751 0.00 0.00 8.09 5.25 77.43 63.16 28.17 3.87
1754 0.00 0.00 15.75 3B.63 0.00 71.67 8.51 6.73
1756 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 98.89 0.77 0.28
1757 0.00 0.00 14.43 39.26 0.00 71.77 25.92 0.14
1758 0.00 0.00 20.63 39.16 0.00 85.70 12.73 0.00
1759 0.00 0.00 32.81 31.64 9.96 63.01 15.16 21.78
1760 0.00 0.00 6.62 28.92 39.02 0.00 23.19 32.29
1762 0.00 0.00 14.95 41.98 26.59 70.99 17.19 6.41
1763 0.00 0.00 39.67 41.46 0.00 86.54 6.31 1.25
1765 0.00 0.00 22.63 50.53 0.00 82.10 15.22 1.43
1766 . . < 45.34 40.75 7.21
1767 0.00 0.00 10.15 26.86 51.80 6.57 27.84 36.81
1768 0.00 0.00 7.06 70.32 0.00 30.35 47.59 0.96
1769 0.00 0.00 0.00 36.97 0.00 36.46 59.46 3.02
1774 2.50 0.00 13.11 22.53 43.59 63.56 17.52 17.85
1775 16.76 0.00 6.11 23.44 33.52 81.44 16.90 1.47
1776 0.00 3.07 31.70 36.61 0.00 44.34 32.60 13.31
1777 0.00 1.07 30.02 33.54 0.00 60.83 35.12 0.00
1778 0.75 0.00 22.62 7.79 39.78 49.41 20.57 23.29
TABLE 6.M.4: REVENUE FROM MAJOR KHARIF CROPS AS A PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL KHARIF REVENUE : QASBA MALARNA 4 0 3
YEAR COTTON INDIGO GARDEN
PRODUCE
SUGAR­
CANE
 ^ MAKKA TOBACCO MOTH TIL BAJRA JUHAR
1713 0.09 0.00 0.15 12.23 0.00 0.00 12.20 6.55 63.15 4.46
1714 2,61 0.00 0.89 31.04 0.62 0.00 5.38 15.48 33.83 2.42
1715 3.56 0.70 0.29 34.49 0.00 0.00 39.22 9.28 5.02 4.06
1716 0.45 1.28 0.41 30.09 0.16 0.00 16.42 12,43 25.33 0.00
1717 8.45 0.00 0.45 41.44 0.00 0.00 4.53 3.62 31.07 6.77
1718 4.79 0.00 0.21 8.37 0.00 0.00 2.89 10.65 34.68 29.47
1719 0.15 0.00 0.27 9.43 0.09 0.00 19.10 15.56 19.80 28.98
1720 0.16 0.00 0.30 12.73 0.06 0.00 4.53 9.72 30.77 41.20
1721 0.09 0.00 0.08 7.44 0.00 0.00 14.04 6.21 48.13 23.40
1722 0.04 0.00 0.12 5.44 0.00 0.00 16.07 4.90 49.83 23.06
1723 0.14 0.00 0.12 3.43 0.00 0.00 17.57 10.24 43.49 24.34
1725 0.55 0.47 0.43 17.59 0.00 0.00 10.84 8.72 53.97 3.89
1726 1.56 1.37 0.62 31.78 0.05 0.00 3.87 0.62 11.97 45.94
1727 0.92 1.34 0.53 16.18 0.06 0.00 11.36 3.62 20.88 38.67
1728 3.30 0.64 1.42 10.47 0.41 2.15 12.76 21.17 20.10 18.72
1729 6.84 0.22 0.52 11.19 0.27 0.00 10.15 13.76 29.35 19.18
1730 2.85 0.00 0.61 22.12 0.21 0.00 14.13 8.72 36.86 1.49
1731 4.36 0.00 1.55 37.50 1.30 0.00 0.28 0.00 42.41 6.30
1732 1.83 0.32 0.72 5.61 1.58 0.00 8.27 1.28 39.84 33.32
1736 5.20 0.43 1.14 34.79 0.00 0.00 0.43 3.22 13.77 39.49
1737 1.06 0.84 0.80 11.51 0.38 0.00 9.29 5.76 19,55 48,32
1738 0.37 0.30 0.63 5.19 0.23 0.00 10.25 4.76 35.53 41.79
1743 0.22 0.77 1.04 6,92 0.10 0.00 3.08 2.89 32.66 51.73
1744 0.18 1.17 1.25 9.47 0.92 3.51 18.80 13,21 35.69 13.93
1745 0.50 0.47 1.81 6.25 0.11 0.84 7.42 11.12 33.95 35.61
1746 0.89 1.15 2.23 20.09 0.04 1.85 2.15 5.40 55.10 8.99
1747 1.08 1.00 1.47 14.02 0.00 2.47 9.34 6.74 44.62 17.58
1748 3.04 1.26 1.73 9.87 1.47 1.53 5.87 12.20 28.89 31.57
1749 1.08 0.73 1.65 4.89 1.02 1.97 5.91 8.72 29.53 38,61
1750 11.62 1.29 7.81 52.20 1.60 15.51 v
1751 0.76 0.39 1.77 4,55 0.24 2.58 11.40 21.65 24.08 30.52
1754 6.72 0.00 2.54 20.52 O.OS 2.23 2.56 2.31 32.30 27.77
1756 0.61 0.00 3.46 0.00 2.17 1.67 1.33 5.07 82.03 0.00
1757 0.78 0.00 4.38 0.00 1.98 3.42 6.70 13.48 36.37 26.53
1758 7.81 0.00 3.99 0.00 2.13 2.36 3.22 2.29 46.14 29.62
1759 2.54 0.62 2.02 5.96 1.54 1.52 6.77 8.10 25.96 42.83
1760 0.39 1.89 4.16 11.07 3.36 2.78 12.62 9.69 45.11 2.35
1761 1.90 0.77 2.29 13.90 2.76 0.77 1.49 4.32 34.73 34.53
1762 2.80 0.00 1.94 9.85 2.99 1.34 6.83 6.30 34.12 31.72
1763 0.35 0.25 3.05 6.30 2.14 4.42 1.04 0.58 49.18 31.59
1765 0.35 0.61 2.20 10.27 1.03 1.52 1.79 4.98 32.26 44.40
1766 1.05 1.68 1.66 8.40 0.17 2.38 3.70 10.77 33.75 35.83
1767 0.84 2.84 1.81 12.96 0.38 1.39 8.44 27.98 33.23 7.55
1768 0.07 2.86 2.25 11.18 0.00 1.54 1.92 6.04 35.02 38.44
1769 2.78 2.82 2.42 12.80 0.05 2 . SI 0.00 17.30 58.60 0.00
1775 0.74 0.76 2.39 7.07 0.19 1.90 1.27 1.79 73.24 10.33
1776 0.35 0.96 2.78 7.21 0.00 1.96 8.32 6.74 51.72 18.79
1777 0.50 0.00 1.95 7.76 0.32 1.38 12.34 9.22 41.58 19.09
1778 2.00 0.00 3.38 16.17 2.76 1.01 2.75 2.34 41.02 24.28
1779 0.00 0.00 1.89 5.49 0.11 1.36 2.17 14.82 23.82 47.80
1782 0.00 0.00 1.81 9.23 . 2,35 0.12 0.46 15.15 70,20
YEAR
1711
1713
1714
1715
1716
1717
1718
1719
1720
1722
1723
1725
1726
1727
1728
1729
1730
1732
1736
1737
1738
1743
1744
1745
1746
1748
1749
1750
1751
1754
1756
1757
1758
1759
1760
1762
1763
1765
1767
1768
1769
1774
1775
1776
1777
1778
TA8LE 6.M.5: REVENUE FROM MAJOR RA8I CROPS AS A PERCENTAGE
Of TOTAL RABI REVENUE : QASBA MALARNA
OPIUM TOBACCO GARDEN , 
PRODUCE
ONIONS KHATLI BARLEY WHEAT
0.39 0.43 0.75 0.45 0.00 39.69 7.74
0.00 1.42 0.76 0.52 96,95 0.00 0.00
0.22 0.96 0.83 0.36 0.00 86.71 2.95
0.08 2.86 0.92 0.44 0.00 60.81 5.48
0.08 1.59 0.89 0.81 0.00 60.33 4.31
0.10 1.60 1.18 0.66 0.00 84.46 0.00
0.21 3.16 1.76 0.54 0.00 92.04 0.00
0.00 5.76 1.92 0.53 0.00 91.26 0.00
0.43 2.96 1.14 0.81 0.00 89.36 1.58
0.00 2.69 1.29 0.68 0.00 89.61 2.98
0.13 2.65 1.90 0.50 0.00 77.62 9.93
0.06 0.61 0.68 0.45 0.00 48.08 35.85
0.00 0.90 0.68 0.42 0,19 70.08 6.02
0.00 2.47 1.40 0.85 0.47 69.88 6.61
0.00 0,00 0.25 0.51 0.00 59.66 16.84
0.00 3.27 1.84 0.75 0.95 61.69 0.94
0.18 0.48 1.19 0.47 1.82 40.95 13.66
0.91 2.24 2.97 0.75 1.15 72.04 9.87
0.17 1.27 2.32 0.60 2.38 76.39 1.47
0.03 0.75 1.26 0.20 1.55 68.44 7.04
0.00 40.63 39.68 8.85 0.00
0.00 2.58 2.48 0.52 0.24 67.02 21.97
0.00 0.00 0.99 0.27 0.77 63.29 25.75
0.07 0,00 1.06 0.51 0.00 65.62 19.19
0.09 0.03 2.04 0.64 0.15 84.50 6.02
0.00 0.00 0.35 0.15 0.19 66.82 24.07
0.00 0.00 0.90 0.38 0.00 74.73 15.17
0.00 0.00 0.17 0.48 0.00 34.73 49.95
0.00 0.00 0.23 0.16 1.59 58.61 30.72
0.00 0.00 0.13 0.35 0.00 68.41 10.49
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 98.63 0.79
0.00 0.00 0.12 0,38 0.00 61.74 35.18
0.00 0.00 0.42 0.88 0.00 80.16 16.30
0.00 0.00 0.76 0.81 0.16 55.40 2 0 .5S
0.00 0.00 0.08 0.40 0.35 0.00 28.40
0.00 0.00 0.15 0.45 0.21 64.07 22.19
0.00 0.00 0.69 0.79 0.00 82.63 7.80
0.00 0.00 0.42 1.23 0.00 70.94 24.44
0.00 0.00 0.14. 0.51 0.63 6.25 36.28
0.00 0.00 0.15 1.62 0.00 23.66 56.47
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.00 27.63 68.20
0.20 0.00 0,58 1.36 1.91 51.61 24.90
0.50 0.00 0.14 0.59 0.62 76.91 19.21
0.00 0.09 0.53 0.82 0.00 38.76 37.00
0.00 0.12 1.98 2.96 0.00 52.06 37.80
0.04 0.00 0.58 0.33 1.02 44.27 24.72
YEAR
1691
1697
1715
1716
1717
1718
1720
1721
1723
1724
1725
1726
1727
1728
1729
1730
1731
1732
1733
1734
1736
1741
1742
1743
1744
1745
1746
1749
1750
1751
1753
1754
1755
1757
1759
1760
1778
TA8LE 6.P.1: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ANNUAL REVENUE
4 0 5
QASBA PHAGI
KHARIF HARVEST RABI HARVEST
UN CASH UN KINO HHARIF UN CASH UN KIND
58.08 41.92 45.75 1,28 98.72
21.93 78.07 59.72
OCO 91.90
31.56 68.44 100.00
78.30 21.70 28.28 2.81 97.19
37.18 62.82 44.18 9.80 90.20
22.41 77.59 100.00 * *
30.51 69.49 100.00 .
« 0.00 9,58 90.42
34.19 65.81 87.83 10.96 89.04
* 0.00 . 68.99 31.01
64.10 35.90 ■13.52 0.63 99.37
94.26 5.74 53.94 6.26 93.74
15.36 84.64 40.96 1.82 98.18
47.14 52.86 100.00 .
54.05 45.95 48.35 1.50 98.50
79.07 20.93 20.34 0.70 99.30
32.13 67.87 63.93 3.38 96.62
68.26 31.74 41.43 1.31 98.69
78.42 21.58 41.56 1.31 98.69
56.69 43.31 33.65 1.77 98.23
66.74 33.26 50.52 4.19 95.81
69.38 30.62 66.38 5.20 94.80
50.88 49.12 44.31 3.73 96.27
18.52 81.48 57.30 3.83 96.17
54.64 45.36 28.14 1.78 98.22
19.90 80,10 100.00 ,
89.54 10.46 29.19 11.45 8B.5S
68,05 31.95 28.92 7.08 92.92
73.05 26.95 29.87 10.04 89,96
34.95 65.05 21.49 4.40 95.60
61.85 38.15 36.98 3.54 96.46
28.12 71.88 30.99 2.92 97.08
47.16 52.84 21.58 14.07 85.93
77.51 22.49 11,53 8.79 91.21
57.32 42.68 69.36 7.37 92.63
48.55 51.45 29.07 4.49 95.51
29.39 70.61 33.29 2.22 97.78
ANNUAL REVENUE TOTAL RUPEES
*RABI UN CASH UN KIND
54.25 27.27 72.73 7305.07
40.28 16.36 83.64 2393.50
« 31.56 68,44 7119.68
71.72 24.16 75.84 9167.82
55.82 21.89 78.11 1869.55
22.41 77.59 8761.46
30.51 69.49 . 3953.19
100.00 9.5B 90.42 1467.52
12.17 31.37 .68.63 7589.08
100.00 68.99 31.01 138.98
86.48 9.21 90.79 14172.99
46.06 53.73 46.27 2252.00
59.04 7.37 92.63 13418.18
47.14 52.86 5595.22
51.65 26.91 73,09 13273.85
79,66 16.64 83.36 17101.85
36.07 21.76 78.24 4656.12
58.57 29.05 70.95 12692.03
58.44 33.35 66.65 8547.11
66.35 20.25 79.75 12291.80
49.48 35.79 64.21 3706.17
33.62 47.81 52.19 3379.81
55.69 24.62 75.38 4595.80
42.70 12.24 87.76 9610.38
71.86 16.66 83.34 8469.74
. 19.90 80.10 3135.71
70.81 34.24 65.76 693.94
71.08 24.71 75.29 3299.30
70.13 28.86 71.14 2320.61
78.51 ■ 10.96 89.04 4912.06
63.02 25.10 74.90 5415.33
69.01 10.73 89.27 7639.05
78.42 21,21 78.79 524.01
88.47 16.71 83.29 1814.94
30.64 42.02 57.98 2096.68
70.93 17.30 82.70 4126.13
66.71 11.27 88.73 7100,09
Source: Arhsa t t a s  Pargana Phaoi
406
T A B U  6.P.2: PERCENTAGE AREA/QUANTITY Of MAJOR KHARIF CROPS
ASSESSED IN CASH/KIND: QASBA PHAGI
ftfj= TV % &0ftt4riTV
c -----------——----------- -— ■---------- ^
YEAR COTTON INDIGO KODON HAKKA KAGANI MOTH TIL BAJRA JUHAR
1715 73.15 1.44 23.41 1.21 0.24 10.39 0.09 5.79 82,18
1716 54.56 2.08 38.83 2.02 0.92 46.61 21.43 7.74 8.12
1717 82.26 0.00 3.40 3.18 0.50 1.27 2.29 44.97 51.43
1718 47.68 1.61 39.66 3.46 0.00 2.06 2.17 11.83 83.68
1720 36.58 2.40 49.72 5.26 0.00 5.27 9.06 6.56 76.10
1723 57.47 1.50 31.93 3.29 4.27 3.68 4.33 5.97 85.48
1725 54.48 2.67 35.67 3.34 2.19 3.65 3.45 11.49 79.31
1726 94.56 2.49 0.00 1.94 0.12 15.94 1.06 3.82 79.18
1727 45.46 3.67 34.39 5.29 5.35 4.11 0.54 0.16 95.03
1728 63.18 2.80 29.74 0.86 2.10 4,21 1.93 3,40 89,84
1729 65.04 1.84 28.41 2.23 1,67 4.00 2.55 0.73 89.96
1730 47.88 1.54 44.19 3.36 2.03 32.45 4.08 54.67 4.06
1731 75.57 1.45 18.20 3.64 0.00 0.73 0.02 0.00 98.72
1732 48.23 0.52 43.58 4 . IS 2.45 4.89 0.16 4.95 88.49
1733 40.03 1.37 53.25 2.63 1.76 19.02 1.28 11.21 57.98
1734 41.03 2.50 50.62 2.44 0.00 11.78 0,49 0.43 85,46
1736 65.35 3.44 24.64 4.33 0.18 4.50 1.05 12.61 81.72
1741 50.06 6.64 36.38 3.60 2.48 21.65 5.00 8.89 60.53
1742 63.56 7.48 20.83 4.75 1.98 4.58 0.09 5.96 86.94
1743 22.97 4.24 45.32 9.49 15.30 1.27 0.09 3.31 95.28
1744 38.49 3.66 47.67 3.34 S .S3 6.94 0.32 1.63 90.41
1745 23.40 9.32 39.19 7.94 • 15.41 1.05 1.01 3,44 94,48
1746 34.35 23.13 21.04 6.46 8.76 0.00 5.20 84.57 10.23
1749 37.70 7.00 19:00 15.47 18.29 32.12 6.73 34.16 19.57
1750 44.09 5.77 26.40 11.40 9.87 17.98 2,57 12.38 65,07
1751 49.59 7.49 20.86 7.91 9.40 45.90 9.04 3.45 36.71
1753 44.72 1.71 42.87 5.65 . 3.85 26.77 4.16 7.37 54.43
1754 68.07 3.94 9.21 15.42 1.82 2.49 1.14 2.95 93.42
1755 ' 12.50 0.00 0.00 76.63 6.83 0.00 0.18 60.67 39.15
1757 30.76 2.29 28.63 12.27 20.60 14:43 0.00 69.45 15.31
1759 63.11 2.08 14.23 9.22 9.14 21.56 0.76 22.05 53.02
1760 36.34 S .10 22.32 11.40 19.64 42.75 8.59 18.46 22.28
1778 19.51 6.58 36.03 26.36 8.59 9.39 6.83 1.90 80.16
407
TABLE 6.P.3: PERCENTAGE AREA/QUANTITY OF MAJOR RABI CROPS
ASSESSED IN CASH/KIND: QASBA PHAGI
YEAR POPPY TOBACCO GARDEN
PRODUCE
KYARI
1716 7.08 3.42 '9.58 79.92
1717 0.14 0.68 14.58 84.59
1721 8.45 38.40 53.15 0.00
1723 14.03 41.86 44.12 0.00
1724 4.97 37.18 57.85 0.00
1725 31.29 4.05 64.66 0.00
1726 18.52 4.66 76.82 0.00
1727 16.93 29.94 53.13 0,00
1729 0.00 31.24 68.76 0.00
1730 4.65 17.21 78.14 0.00
1731 0.93 1.86 91.37 0.00
1732 5.13 33.60 61.28 0.00
1733 5.23 29.41 65.36 0.00
1734 0.00 12.89 21.82 65.29
1736 0.00 0.96 35.78 63.26
1741 0.00 0.00 24.15 55.27
1742 0.00 5.58 28.12 66.29
1743 0.00 8.00 20.36 71.64
1744 0.00 4.17 20.87 74.36
1746 0.00 0.00 30.86 69.14
1749 0.00 0.58 13.32 86.10
1750 0,00 7.03 13.79 7 9 .IB
1751 1.82 15.60 10.90 71.68
1753 0.00 1.06 16.24 82.69
1754 0.34 1.67 14.20 81.46
1755 0.00 0.00 17.22 82.78
1757 0.00 0.00 5,91 94.09
1759 0.00 4.54 40.98 45.29
1760 0.00 1,75 9.14 76.97
1778 0.00 4.03 20.42 75.55
%  &UAAJ1ITY £_3*in s i  C ftops)
BARLEY WHEAT GRAM GOJAI
16.61 16.05 65.55 0.00
98.27 0.94 0.80 0.00
77.18 4.11 16.71 0.00
63.52 0.55 15.13 16.35
18.51 17.43 63.59 0.00
9.89 5.37 83.47 0.00
83.36 10.93 0.39 4.91
16.18 0.00 79.43 1.45
24.25 7.05 66.69 0.00
15.72 6.48 69.37 0.00
99.88 0.12 0.00 0.00
22.00 2.15 69.65 0.00
29.37 2.16 65.10 0.00
20.92 10.35 64.22 0.00
84.02 1.69 12.18 2.01
75.08 1.38 18.89 4.28
78.17 1.95 15.02 4.75
48,71 3.77 43.25 2.82
31.32 5.20 56.31 1.42
94.54- 0.56 0,00 4.91
57.87 6.61 22.08 11.07
56.74 5.29 19.97 15.75
36,73 14.44 29.04 14.49
31.53 5.05 60.85 1.04
52.97 7.22 31.09 5.10
94.18 1.70 0.00 4.12
71.07 13.81 4.54 9.56
92.64 7.36 0.00 0.00
62.41 4.25 28.27 3.04
27.73 8.08 59.13 3.97
YEAR
1715
1716
1717
1718
1720
1723
1725
1726
1727
1728
1729
1730
1731
1732
1733
1734
1736
1741
1742
1743
1744
1745
1746
1749
1750
1751
1753
1754
1755
1757
1759
1760
1778
408
TABLE 6.P.4: REVENUE FROM MAJOR KHARIF CROPS AS A PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL KHARIF REVENUE: QASBA PHAGI
COTTON INDIGO KODON MAKKA KAGAKI MOTH TIL 8AJRA JUWAR
23.01 0.74 6.83 0.60 0.06 6.15 0.15 3.96 57.27
42.71 2.64 28.76 2.38 0.51 8.13 7.66 1.38 1.36
31.65 0.00 0,64 1.51 0.07 0.83 2.48 28.74 30.77
10.85 0.53 8.42 1.26 0.00 1.80 2.66 7.75 65.18
11.85 1.28 13.54 2.49 0.00 3.61 9.96 4.88 48.49
20.03 0,82 10.03 1.87 0.96 2.69 5.27 4.22 53.27
34.77 2.58 21.05 4.00 0.89 1.31 3.15 3.65 24.27
86.92 3.45 0.00 3.16 0.08 1.07 0.15 0.22 4.30
6.77 0.82 4.79 1.53 0.54 3.19 1.09 0.15 79.98
30.24 1.86 13.05 0.79 0.67 2.28 2.17 47.86
34.53 1.63 14,62 2.26 0.63 2.03 1.86 0.38 40.20
36.51 1.90 33.33 5.20 1.26 5.90 1.32 10.58 0.87
23.14 0.67 5.74 2.24 0.00 0.64 0.07 0.00 66.66
33.00 0.61 27.28 5.51 1.06 1.52 0.13 1.79 27.46
31.43 1.52 39.57 4.09 1.01 4.26 0.71 2.38 11.21
23.65 2.18 26.96 2.52 0.00 5.07 0.59 0.25 36.38
42.61 3.39 14.80 4.58 0.08 1.93 0.86 4.73 25.68
33.58 7.19 22.39 4.69 1.12 6.25 3.32 2.77 16.55
30.58 5.41 9.82 3.89 0.64 2.95 0.13 2.79 41.65
4.18 1.18 7.95 2.69 2.05 1.53 0.19 3.12 76.59
21.95 3.11 23 .S4 3.10 2.33 4.06 • 0.35 0.81 39.70
4.87 2.72 6.90 2.39 2.11 1.15 2.24 3.76 72.93
25.67 29.05 15.43 8.89 4.65 0.00 0.93 8.56 0.97
24.70 6.63 10.71 16.64 7.99 9.32 3.51 10.63 5.44
31.15 6.31 17.01 12.42 4.56 15.41 10.27
16.79 4.28 6.02 4.40 2.28 28.07 8.10 2.42 23.00
27.45 1.83 24.31 5.70 1.81 10.06 3.13 2.71 19.26
17.18 1.60 1.97 6.66 0.34 2.14 1.59 2.46 65.69
3.73 0.00 0.00 41.40 1.27 0.00 0.14 31.70 21.00
25.11 3.08 19.28 15.13 11.51 3.11 ' 0.00 16.10 3.06
36.43 1.60 7.14 7.70 3.59 9.32 0.58 10.88 20.30
17.72 3.70 9.69 7.94 7.18 22.01 6.34 8.36 10.43
4.96 2,67 8.90 10.60 1.68 5.98 8.11 1,35 53.16
YEAR
1716
1717
1721
1723
1724
1725
1726
1727
1729
1730
1731
1732
1733
1734
1736
1741
1742
1743
1744
1746
1749
1750
1751
1753
1754
1755
1757
1759
1760
1778
TABLE 6.P.5: REVENUE FROM MAJOR RABI CROPS AS A PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL RABI REVENUE: QASBA PHAGI
POPPY TOBACCO GARDEN
PRODUCE
KYARI BARLEY WHEAT GOJAI
0.56 0.36 0.44 1.44 15.58 21.69 0.00
0.05 0.31 2.69 6.75 88.31 0.97 0.00
0.89 5.59 3.10 0.00 66.67 4.84 0.00
1.41 6.68 2.87 0.00 52.94 0.62 14.58
3.87 39.57 25.54 0.00 . 0.00
0.26 0.05 0.32 0.00 9.90 7.94 0.00
1.63 0.58 4.05 0.00 75.28 12.58 4.83
0.34 0.84 0.64 0.00 13.76 14.15 1.42
0.00 0.77 0.73 0.00 23.71 9.11 0.00
0.04 0.22 0.43 0.00 15.48 8.81 0.00
0.05 0.15 3,07 0.00 96.45 0.16 0.00
0.08 0.69 0.54 0.00 20.88 3.28 0.00
0.08 0.63 0.60 0.00 28.26 3.13 0.00
0.00 0.72 0.46 0.59 19.53 13.00 0.00
0.00 0.14 1.92 2.13 90.91 2.30 2.39
0.00 0.00 1.93 2,05 69.46 1.87 4.34
0.00 0.65 1.22 1.86 73.23 2.15 4.75
0.00 0.88 0.92 2.02 41.20 4.81 2.59
0.00 0.21 0.54 1.00 27.92 6.76 1.40
0.00 0.00 3.99 7.46 8 3 .OS 0.68 4.82
0.00 0.16 1.46 5.46 52.15 7.29 10.89
0,00 2.11 1.90 6.03 48.97 5.82 14.44
0.13 1.89 0.50 1.88 33.04 17.30 13.50
0.00 0.15 0.93 2.46 29.97 7.24 1.08
0.01 0.17 0.63 2.08 49.10 8.86 5.04
0.00 0.00 3.99 10.08 79.65 2.13 4.15
0.00 0.00 0.90 7.89 57.56 18.55 8.42
0.00 0.97 3.87 2.10 82.84 9.79 0.00
0.00 0.31 0.69 3.10 56.26 6.52 2.92
0.00 0.31 0.64 1.27 24.49 8.92 3.87
TABLE 6.S.1: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ANNUAL REVENUE
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QASBA SANGANER
YEAR KHARIF HARVEST RABI HARVEST ANNUAL REVENUE TOTAL RUPEE
m  CASH UN KINO WHARIF UN CASH UN KIND %RABI UN CASH UN KIND
1708 59.44 40.56 100.00 , 0.00 59.44 40.56 3719.43
1710 0.00 23.82 76.18 100,00 23.82 76.18 3657.38
1711 70.35 29.65 100.00 . ■ 0.00 70.35 29.65 4234.87
1712 88.82 11.18 39.33 8.11 91.89 60.67 39.85 60.15 11897.85
1713 86.91 13.09 54.64 11.87 88.13 45.36 52.87 47.13 10297.12
1715 75.84 24.16 81.11 54.18 45.82 18.89 71.75 28.25 7902.91
1716 67.75 32.25 62.46 25.84 74.16 37.54 52.01 47.99 10201.88
1724 74.66 25.34 100.00 , 0.00 74.66 25.34 3500.94
1728 92.83 7.17 48.29 19.62 80.38 51.71 54.97 45.03 8341.78
1730 91.71 8.29 36.62 13.65 86.35 63.38 42.23 57.77 10021.53
1731 97.52 2.48 27.41 10.60 89.40 72.59 34.42 65.58 10606.80
1732 88.97 11.03 44.16 16.73 83.27 55.84 48.63 51.37 9138.93
1733 95.34 4.66 100.00 . « 95.34 4.66 3345,97
1736 96.39 3.61 46.94 14.91 85.09 53.06 53.16 46.84 9811.36
1737 81.00 19.00 44.28 15.87 84.13 55.72 44.71 55.29 11268.26
1738 , 0.00 13.84 86.16 100.00 13.84 86.16 5643.28
1739 94‘.46 5.54 37.38 15.35 84.65 62.62 44.92 55.08 11703.63
1740 94.24 5.76 43.02 26.99 73.01 56.98 55.92 44.08 9379.70
1741 97.03 2.97 45.45 24.14 75.86 54.55 57.27 42.73 10105.00
1742 96.39 3.61 44.34 25.11 74.89 55.66 56.71 43.29 10209.85
1743 93.05 6.95 28.79 22.02 77.98 71.21 42.46 57.54 11137.30
1744 99.23 0.77 17.72 18.18 81.82 82.28 32.55 67.45 11219.74
1745 95.93 4.07 49.78 40.75 59.25 50.22 68.22 31.78 6605.15
1746 95.00 5.00 49.71 26.48 73.52 50.29 60.54 39.46 7451.42
1747 92.93 7.07 52,66 38.24 61.76 47.34 67.04 32.96 8677.30
1748 94.26 5.74 32.76 22.14 77.86 67.24 45.77 54.23 8893.30
1755 95.94 4.06 33.32 14.60 85.40 66.68 41.70 58.30 8821.12
1756 100.00 0.00 100.00 p , • 100.00 0.00 814.20
1760 74.61 25.39 32.58 19.48 80.52 67.42 37.45 62.55 5464.28
1761 91.51 8.49 100.00 * t 91.51 8.49 1061.28
1763 ‘ 94.17 5.83 28.24 18.33 81.67 71.76 39.74 60.26 6347.40
1764 100.00 0.00 100.00 * 100.00 0.00 1281.64
1766 95.79 4.21 100.00 4 95.79 4.21 2199.84
1767 98.86 1.14 100.00 , 98.86 1.14 1859.58
1768 96.56 3.44 100.00 , 96.56 3.44 1990.45
1770 94.06 5.94 43.93 21.04 78.96 56.07 53.12 46.88 6444.24
1771 94.63 5.37 37.51 12.89 87.11 62.49 43.55 56.45 7414.30
1772 97,28 2.72 31.85 19,51 80.49 68.15 44.28 55.72 5882.93
1773 96.62 3.38 100,00 . 96.62 3.38 2287.82
Source; A rhsa t tas  Qasba Sanganer
TA8LE 6.S.2: PERCENTAGE AREA/QUANTITY OF HAJOR KHARIF CROPS
ASSESSEO IN CASH/KINO : QASBA SANGANER
4 1 1
AAeft C'Z-PrbYl CAt)PS^ <5(q ( S i . U P r t A ^ T ' i
YEAR COTTON MAKKA GARDEN
PRODUCE
SUGAR­
CANE
HADWA SHEET
POTATO
GUHAR HOTH URAD BAJRA
1708 37.55 17.14 27.09 1.89 10.05 5.98 0.00 1.17 0.23 90.31
1711 33.33 15.11 34.07 2.08 2.35 12.86 0.00 1.24 2.65 51.84
1712 44.01 18.81 5.73 11.37 6.01 14.06 0.00 42.83 1.87 40.33
1713 16.93 29.44 8.59 19.19 21.45 4.22 0.00 37.18 1.30 24.18
1715 38.55 13.02 10.71 21.90 11.05 4.77 0.00 35.18 10.81 28.96
1716 29.24 15.78 10.80 22.11 18.64 3.43 0.00 36.75 16.98 0.79
1724 27.60 24,52 14.45 5.34 23.30 4.78 0.00 22.19 19.45 23.29
1728 51.72 16.00 12.11 2.66 6.45 11.05 0.00 37.35 10.59 2.01
1730 39.48 16.93 8.53 3.09 18.57 13.40 0.00 51.73 13.15 0.06
1731 53.96 15.13 10.48 5.45 11.57 3.41 0,00 12.36 0.00 0.00
1732 29.12 25.46 11.68 0.90 29.93 2.90 0.00 30.70 19.55 23.91
1733 22.56 26.19 12.25 3.64 23.49 11.54 0.32 50.06 22.53 0.00
1736 32.98 25.50 12.47 13.34 12.56 2.99 0.16 57.01 6.42 0.66
1737 39.38 28,64 18.29 1.68 6.11 1.61 4.30 73.90 19.85 0.16
1739 33.66 27.00 19.92 1.79 14.60 1.14 1.90 77.53 12.02 1.29
1740 28.32 21.89 18.80 6.30 16.56 5.10 3.03 51.71 19.73 16.40
1741 32.54 21.44 15.01 12.12 8.68 4.72 5.48 93.00 2.85 0.00
1742 26.00 23.91 19.65 12.42 6.35 3.41 8.27 53.93 2.95 42.59
1743 7.35 33.29 25.90 0.99 18.02 3.46 10,97 76.70 6.46 16.84
1744 5.14 24.48 14.82 2.56 38.58 10.80 3.61 100.00 0.00 0.00
1745 11,96 24.16 16.04 4.97 23.17 10.82 8.89 80.92 0.00 17.77
1746 38.49 18.03 11.16 6.72 11.27 9.02 5.31 91.96 0.00 8.04
1747 36.77 16.04 14.91 0.99 15.00 7.93 8.36 81.85 7.77 10.21
1748 29.02 22.22 13.50 1.51 11.33 15.45 6.97 58.00 9.25 16.91
1755 14.26 39.07 12.07 8.50 14.06 4.54 7.50 100.00 0.00 0.00
1756 2.19 61.17 16.80 2.29 0.57 0.65 16.21 .
1760 22.98 10.71 27.15 3.35 14.60 2.29 15.61 69.84 13.53 9.83
1761 33.04 5.12 23.81 6.75 20.41 0.00 10.87 72.10 16.37 2.09
1763 44.65 10.19 22.72 0.34 6.42 0.00 6.59 66.78 33.22 0.00
1764 37.39' 4.19 25.27 2.18 4.53 0.91 , 7.53 100.00 0.00 0.00
1766 17.90 7,54 13.29 1.81 3.09 6.09 6.55 83.56 6.10 6.63
1767 11.62 11.76 19.75 7.83 3.85 14.01 7.64 83.66 15.68 0.00
1768 17.23 5.31 23.88 13.32 2.10 20.93 9.77 95.21 2.44 2,36
1770 35.50 6.17 13.56 16.79 3.47 15.38 8.33 44.71 15.52 39.76
1771 4,24 12.21 13.77 18.03 6.00 30.60 14.54 75.76 10.91 10.42
1772 2.28 10.09 16.23 20.77 13.51 23.03 10.77 67.71 27.30 4.99
1773 23.78 10.12 14.06 14.38 6.66 16.66 13.15 41.96 11.53 46.52
YEAR
1710
1712
1713
1715
1716
1728
1730
1731
1732
1736
1737
1738
1739
1740
1741
1742
1743
1744
1745
1746
1747
1748
1755
1760
1763
1770
1771
1772
TABLE 6.S.3: PERCENTAGE AREA/QUANTITY OF MAJOR RABI CROPS
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ASSESSED IN CASH/KIND : QASBA SANGANER
POPPY TOBACCO GARDEN HAKKA CONDIMENTS BARLEY WHEAT GRAM GOJAI baijhar;
27.90 0.00
PRODUCE
68.24 3.33 0.00 52.40 11.22 34.98 1.0*
2.33 0.10 ’ 93.52 4.06 0.00 58.68 32.52 0.43 8.37 O.OC
0.00 0.00 96.24 3.76 0.00 48.06 28.60 7.30 16.05 O.OC
4.53 0.24 93.03 2.19 0.00 78.19 20.19 0.80 0.82 O.OC
7.50 0.01 90.63 1.86 0.00 48.85 23.14 9.00 12.52 5.9E
13.90 0,87 82.69 2.55 0.00 63.14 5.31 13.19 11.73 6.63
3.63 0.48 85.95 6.51 3.23 66.39 4.50 13.41 0.00 15.70
0.99 0.58 94.96 0.00 3.14 93.28 1.39 0.00 4.28 1.05
2.48 0.83 94.52 2.17 0.00 70.62 5.71 13.06 10.49 O.OC
1.70 1.12 94.19 2.25 0.43 50.87 6.50 0.67 37. OS 4.91
0.84 0.97 94.21 2.29 1.29 88.58 3,29 0.31 7.25 O.OC
2.16 1.64 93.48 1.18 1.54 74.59 7.91 2.27 10.96 3.25
4.56 2.73 89.37 1.43 1.29 65.31 16.79 0.82 13.50 3.57
4.24 2.54 86.05 1.58 5.58 46.32 24.45 8.45 5.52 8.3E
4.24 2.92 88.41 1.94 2.49 38.16 18.46 5.41 14.24 16.79
0.00 2.41 94.69 1.97 0.93 72.60 15.94 0.00 ' 11.47 O.OC
1.26 3.71 93.08 1.14 0.82 69.07 19.55 0.35 10.52 0.5C
1.40 2.72 92.63 1.49 1.77 47.82 26.19 2.07 10.83 9.83
2.50 0.81 90.02 1.50 5.17 59.89 27.48 0.00 6.65 5.97
4.05 0.84 93.05 0.00 2.06 77.20 12.08 0.00 10,72 O.OC
4.31 3.36 84.63 5.85 1.82 70.67 29.33 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.74 1.51 83.66 6.19 4.90 58.51 0.00 0.00 8.44 2.47
0.13 0.31 90.09 7.35 1.94 66.05 11.85 0.00 22.10 O.OC
0.00 0.18 96.16 2.93 0.72 49.61 16.14 0.00 27.15 7.09
3.98 0.00 84.92 1.43 9.68 51.86 19.04 0.00 29.09 0.00
0.00 0.00 79.12 9.38 11.50 29.07 14.15 34.08 12.78 7.78
0.00 0.00 85.81 7.48 6.72 24.12 11.42 8.54 19.19 30.64
0.00 0.19 92.51 1.99 5.31 28.28 9.14 11.51 20.89 26.14
TABLE 6.S.4: REVENUE FROM MAJOR KHARIF CROPS AS A PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL KHARIF REVENUE : QASBA SANGANER
413
YEAR COTTON MAKKA GARDEN
PRODUCE
SUGAR­
CANE
MAOHA SHEET
POTATO
GUWAR MOTH URAD BAJRA
1708 26.46 1*1.22 10.45 3.54 4.60 2.82 0.00 0.36 0.09 20,40
1711 26.72 13,08 16.41 4.77 1.39 7,79 0.00 0.16 0.22 2.90
1712 32.69 15.85 3.06 25.36 3.56 8.30 0.00 2.68 0.11 1.77
1713 10.71 21.23 3.72 37.88 10.89 2.18 0.00 2.50 0.04 1.24
1715 20.48 7.92 4.06 36.55 4.74 2.09 0.00 3.58 0.90 1.61
1716 15.86 8.90 3.71 30.33 7.55 1.40 0.00 1.78 0.52 0.02
1724 21.95 19.95 7.39 8.90 13,62 2.84 0.00 1.19 1.31 1.02
1728 50.24 16,16 7.48 6.36 4.68 7,90 0,00 3,34 1.02 0.14
1730 38.86 16.74 5.31 8.33 13.05 9.41 0.00 5.11 1.51 0.00
1731 50.59 15.72 7.64 12.37 8.63 2.56 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.00
1732 27.60 26.32 8.22 2.37 22.29 2.16 0.00 3.61 1.32 1.48
1733 20.07 27.96 9,89 8.73 17.91 10.60 0.17 2.16 0.72 0.00
1736 27.53 21.84 7.88 29.54 7.71 1.83 0.05 2.25 0.34 0.02
1737 34.02 25.57 11.42 3.67 3.90 1.03 1.39 14.02 3.68 0.03
1739 34.95 28.14 14.39 4.25 11.14 0.87 0.73 4.35 0.68 0.05
1740 27.53 21.78 13.71 14.66 11.92 3.53 1.10 3.25 1.29 0.53
1741 28.95 19.72 10.93 26.89 5.74 3.01 1.80 2.86 0.05 0.00
1742 22.08 22.04 14.53 28,42 4.26 2.26 2.81 2.41 0.11 1.07
1743 7.40 37.58 23.08 3.16 14.56 2.82 4.43 5.47 0.67 0.81
1744 6.22 28.46 14.05 8.47 31.62 8.90 1.52 0.77 0.00 0.00
1745 13.00 25.76 13.83 14.12 17.67 8.35 3.22 3.35 0.00 0.66
1746 37.25 17.44 9.18 15.46 7.65 6.24 1.79 4.71 0.00 0.29
1747 39.00 17.14 13.37 2.73 11.41 6.11 3.16 5.77 0,65 0.63
1748 28.71 24.18 13.40 4.22 8.83 12.19 2.72 3.51 0.65 0.64
1755 13.00 36.62 9.91 21.50 9.48 2.95 2,49 4.06 0.00 0.00
1756 2.69 67.67 15.84 6.20 0.46 0.46 6.56 0.00 0.00 0.00
1760 19.03 10,04 20.00 7.01 9.74 1.64 5.37 17.30 3.66 2.63
1761 31.90 5.17 20.72 15.58 14.53 0.00 3.62 5.92 1.50 0.20
1763 46,77 10.75 20.45 1.31 4.68 0.00 2.31 3.83 2.00 0.00
1764 42.41 4.73 24.87 4.50 3.63 0.73 2.84 0.00 0.00 0.00
1766 18.85 8.94 15.56 4.50 2.62 5.04 2.77 2.27 0.21 0.17
1767 11.97 12.58 19.70 18.62 2.86 10.42 2.85 0.86 0.26 0.00
1768 18.65 4.88 21.28 27.80 1.36 13.50 3,21 3.21 0.15 0.08
1770 29.12 5.80 12.41 31.15 2.33 10.01 2.71 2.40 1.26 2.28
1771 3.90 11.05 12.27 37.34 4.16 20.55 4.90 3.91 0.70 0.56
1772 2.07 10.51 15.19 36.93 9.90 16.64 3.86 1.70 0.88 0.14
1773 22,30 9.95 13.38 29.13 4.68 11.73 4.58 1.56 0.51 1.31
TABLE 6.S.5: REVENUE FROM MAJOR RABI CROPS AS A PERCENTAGE
414
OF TOTAL RABI REVENUE : QAS8A SANGANER
YEAR POPPY TOBACCO GARDEN
PRODUCE
MAKKA CONDIMENTS BARLEY WHEAT GRAM GOJAI
1710 9.14 0.00 13.52 0.99 0.00 39.18 11.50 24.08 0.00
1712 0.29 0.03 7,34 0.45 0.00 47.55 35.81 0.46 8.07
1713 0.00 0.00 11.22 0.65 0.00 35.74 32.30 5.79 14.30
1715 4.24 0.56 47.39 1.98 0.00 33.04 12.09 0.31 0.37
1716 3.26 0.01 21.85 0.72 0.00 31.64 22.45 5.66 10.23
1728 3.97 0.54 14.45 0.65 0.00 48.44 5.50 10.88 10,31
1730 0.76 0.22 10.81 1.18 0.67 55.78 4.97 11.88 0.00
1731 0.16 0.22 9.72 0.00 0.45 82.16 2.42 0.00 3.77
1732 0.71 0.53 14.96 0.54 0,00 54.24 6.34 13.11 9.44
1736 0.41 0.61 13.25 0.48 0.10 40.62 6.78 0.71 32.65
1737 0.22 0.58 14.15 0.53 0.34 80.17 3.96 »
1738 0.47 0.80 12.00 0.22 0.34 61.07 8.42 2.39 10.20
1739 1.09 1.47 12.04 0.30 0.31 49.92 18.52 0.86 12.20
1740 1.71 2.40 19.96 0.58 2.34 32.29 25.72 6.63 .
1741 1.53 2.42 18.64 0,63 0.92 24.47 17.57 4.53 10.91
1742 0.00 2.23 21.79 0.71 0.38 51.35 14.43 0.00 9.11
1743 0.44 2.94 17.99 0.35 0.29 49.83 18.68 0.34 8.72
1744 0.41 1.81 15.07 0.38 0.51 35.28 25.00 1.82 8.95
1745 1.66 1.21 33.69 0.87 3.32 59.25 . 0.00 .
1746 1.68 0.78 23.17 0.00 0.85 53.27 11.62 0.00 8.63
1747 2.39 4.27 27.72 2.89 0.97 41.37 20.39 0.00 0.00
1748 1.21 1.10 16.48 1.76 1.58 44.10 0.00 0.00 5.95
1755 0.03 0.17 12.35 1.55 0.47 53,82 11.95 0.00 19.62
1760 0.00 0.15 18.15 0.93 0.26 37.76 15.03 0.00 22.12
1763 1.20 0.00 14.05 0.37 2.70 39.31 18.64 0.00 23.73
1770 0.00 0.00 14.91 2.55 3.58 21.97 14.27 22.87 12.05
1771 0.00 0.00 10.21 1.32 1.36 20.00 12.55 6.83 17.38
1772 0.00 0.11 17.24 0.55 1.61 21.04 9.51 8.55 17.91
8AIJHARI
0.84
0.00
0.00
0.00
3.77
5.2S
13.72
l.OS
0.00
4.32
0.00
2.98
3.14
8.37
12.20
0.00
0.41
7.76
0. 00
0.00
1.94
0.00
5.61
0.00
5.79
24.79
19.92
TA8LE 6.L.1: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ANNUAL REVENUE 415
QASBA LALSOT
YEAR KHARIF HARVEST RA8I HARVEST ANNUAL REVENUE TOTAL RUPEES
UN CASH UN KINO UHARIF UN CASH UN KINO *RA8I UN CASH UN KINO
1712 63.58 36.42 67.02 100.00 0,00 32.98 75.59 24.41 5399.73
1713 39.04 ' 60.96 57.45 100.00 0.00 42.55 64.98 35.02 7639.32
1714 74.93 25.07 54.36 99.51 0.49 45.64 86.15 13.85 5271,82
1715 74.14 25.86 100.00 • , 0.00 74.14 25.86 3256.24
1716 85.70 14.30 48.62 78.43 21.57 51.38 81.96 18.04 5890.49
1717 79.72 20.28 63.90 99.51 0.49 36.10 86.86 13.14 6089.98
1718 54.11 45.89 62.89 98.93 1.07 37.11 70.74 29,26 7434.36
1719 67.63 32.37 45.54 85.98 14.02 54.46 77.62 22.38 ■ 5426.45
1720 85.67 14.33 53.10 94.63 5.37 46.90 89.88 10.12 5426.03
1721 72.90 27.10 52.25 87.82 12.18 47.75 80.02 19,98 4963.97
1722 62.69 37.31 56.55 99.51 0.49 43.45 78.69 21.31 5946,36
1730 93.66 6.34 100.00 * • 93.66 6.34 3816,46
1731 78.49 21.51 51.67 99.93 0.07 48.33 88.85 11.15 8601.17
1733 91.00 9.00 45.66 98.30 1.70 54.34 94.97 5.03 7050.50
1734 87.85 12.15 40.74 88.96 11.04 59.26 88.51 11.49 8035.81
1737 82.04 17.96 46.74 98.82 1.18 53.26 90.98 9.02 9308.51
1739 89.64 10.36 40.75 99.58 0.42 59.25 95.53 4.47 9477,13
1740 96.20 3 . BO 38.33 99.03 0.97 61.67 97.95 2.05 9116.60
1741 94.81 5.19 49.04 98.62 1.38 50.96 96,75 3.25 8230.77
1742 92.30 7.70 100.00 « « 92.30 7.70 3518.60
1745 92.34 7.66 34.63 98,44 1.56 65.37 96.33 3.67 8388.74
1746 87.14 12.86 100.00 4 * 87.14 12.86 2566.57
1747 79.44 20.56 47.40 99.97 0.03 52.60 90.24 9.76 8106,80
1748 95.80 4.20 44.21 100.00 0.00 55.79 98.14 1.86 6821.79
1753 92.65 7.35 42.91 100.00 0.00 57.09 96.84 3.16 6536.32
1754 93.04 6.96 44,74 100.00 0.00 55.26 96.88 3.12 7148.33
1756 85.64 14.36 35.56 99.84 0.16 64.44 94.79 5.21 6765.15
1757 95.18 4.82 37.14 100.00 0.00 62.86 98.21 1.79 7121.14
1758 88.93 11.07 45.41 100.00 0.00 54.59 94.97 5.03 5812.69
1759 91.43 8.57 100,00 , 0,00 91.43 8.57 2963.34
1761 97.20 2.80 44.54 100.00 0.00 55.46 - 98.75 1.25 6187.51
1762 91.54 8.46 40.23 100.00 0.00 59.77 96.60 3.40 7415.52
1763 90.94 9.06 100.00 4 90.94 9.06 2445.38
1764 87.76 12.24 100.00 , 0.00 87.76 12.24 2515.91
1765 95.12 4.88 37.72 100.00 0.00 62.28 98.16 1.84 6577.29
1767 93.87 6.13 32.07 100.00 0.00 67.93 98.04 1.96 5327.94
1768 95.34 4.66 48.54 100.00 0.00 51.46 97.74 2.26 5201.64
1770 95.87 4.13 50.32 95.60 4.40 49.68 95.74 4.26 4208.53
1775 99.. 83 0.17 100.00 99.83 0.17 2242.10
1777 98,56 1.44 47,43 100.00 0.00 52.57 99,32 0.68 3512.27
Source: Arhs a t t a s  Pargana Lalsot
YEAR
1712
1713
1714
1715
1716
1717
1718
1719
1720
1721
1722
1730
1731
1733
1734
1737
1739
1740
1741
1742
1745
1746
1747
1748
1753
1754
1756
1757
1758
1759
1761
1762
1763
1764
1765
1767
1768
1770
1777
TABLE 6 . L . 2 :  PERCENTAGE AREA/QUANTITY OF MAJOR KHARIF CROPS 
ASSESSED BY CASH/KIND: 0AS8A LALSOT
°/b SkUPtMTlVy
% A*£A ( Z f l M l  CROPS} ( . 5 ^ * '  CROPS}
S0TT0M MAKKA GARDEN
PRODUCE
SUGAR­
CANE
CHOLA KAGANI GUHAR
— i
8AJRA
C ”'
MOTH
' ' i
BAJRA
64. 20 1 . 0 9 4 . 9 4 17 . 99 0 . 7 3 8 . 8 7 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 52 .68 37 . 76
29 .11 17 . 71 9 . 1 7 1 7 . 33 3 . 2 6 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 54 .63 3 2 . 3 3
5 1 . 97 1 . 2 4 6 . 4 7 15 . 28 8 . 6 4 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 33 . 15 5 4 . 77
65 . 90 0 . 0 0 4 . 1 4 1 7 , 4 0 1. 0 2 0 . 0 0 1. 35 0 . 0 0 47.17 41 . 17
61 . 12 0 . 1 6 3 . 3 2 19 . 23 5 . 9 7 4 , 7 2 2 . 0 3 0 . 0 0 77. 73 2 . 1 2
6 1 . 6 3 0 . 0 0 5 . 0 0 2 4 . 4 8 1 . 7 3 0 . 0 0 1 . 7 6 0. 00 79 .58 8 . 7 0
45 . 39 0 . 5 9 4 . 4 6 1 2 . 6 3 7 . 7 6 0 . 0 0 3 . 8 9 0. 0 0 54. 03 37 . 99
14 . 42 0 . 6 0 6 . 8 2 2 2 . 4 3 8 . 7 0 4 0 . 94 3 . 2 9 0 . 0 0 63. 38 • 2 2 . 86
5 1 . 4 7 0 . 1 6 1 . 9 1 1 7 . 4 3 4 . 8 5 5 . 1 2 1.86 15.47 82 . 23 0 . 0 0
5 3 , 52 0 . 0 0 4 . 0 0 19 . 74 4 . 1 2 1 0 . 63 3 . 5 4 0. 00 41. 00 3 9 . 7 9
46. 82 0 . 0 0 5 . 0 2 2 3 , 4 8 4 . 6 3 9 . 6 4 7 . 8 9 0 . 0 0 29. 55 5 4 . 03
5 0 . 62 0 . 2 5 4 . 6 8 2 0 . 9 7 3 . 8 1 4 . 1 8 3 . 8 5 9 . 4 0 87.61 0 . 0 0
61 . 41 0 . 2 9 3 . 2 9 2 0 . 7 3 1 . 0 9 5 . 8 6 4. 85 0 . 0 0 34 .07 6 5 . 4 7
6 1 . 97 0 . 2 2 4 . 9 0 14 . 7 9 2 . 8 6 5. 2 4 4 . 8 8 0 . 0 0 81. 72 7 . 0 2
5 3 . 3 5 0 . 6 6 3 . 3 3 2 0 . 8 3 3 . 7 9 6 . 4 7 6 . 0 8 0 . 0 0 92 . 48 3 . 3 0
5 6 . 18 9 . 5 0 3 . 1 7 13 . 17 3 . 3 6 5 . 5 2 5 . 8 3 0 . 0 0 93 . 73 0 . 14
56 . 07 1 2 . 33 4 . 4 2 6 . 2 8 4 . 1 6 0 . 0 0 11. 74 0 . 4 2
49 . 66 8 . 6 7 3 . 7 6 15 . 77 2 . 5 9 0 . 0 0 17 . 19 0 . 5 7 98 , 69 0 . 0 0
4 7 . 3 0 1 . 0 8 3 . 7 8 2 1 . 1 1 0 . 7 0 O . U 16 .11 7. 51 97 . 65 0 . 0 0
47. 66 6 . 3 7 6 . 1 1 2 0 . 8 7 0 . 4 6 0 . 3 1 13 . 43 3 . 6 2
3 3 . 8 2 0 . 2 9 4 . 3 4 1 2 . 18 0 . 0 0 2 . 0 7 10 .47 31. 58 93 , 07 0 . 0 0
61. 88 0 . 0 0 4 . 9 9 17 . 43 1 . 0 3 0 . 5 7 13. 01 0 . 0 0 72 .88 16.21
58. 84 3 . 4 0 3 . 8 0 14 . 56 1. 40 2 . 9 5 12.31 0 . 0 0 51. 97 45 . 77
2 8 . 03 8 . 2 9 2 . 5 6 7 . 7 4 1 . 7 6 2 . 2 3 3 . 34 44, 44 93 .94 0 . 0 0
5 2 . 8 0 8 . 91 3 . 1 3 11 . 62 2 . 8 9 1. 19 8. 41 9.91 96 .68 0 . 0 0
42 .52 7 . 24 3 . 8 3 1 3 . 2 3 4 . 6 0 1. 52 9 . 1 1 16.66 97 . 78 0 . 0 0
42 .64 16.31 5 .64 6 . 5 7 3 . 8 7 10 .49 9 , 3 8 0 , 0 0 73 .32 26 . 1 5
12. 40 8 . 4 7 3 . 3 1 4 . 3 8 1 . 6 7 8 . 0 3 5. 79 49.34 97 .43 0 . 0 0
43 . 15 3 . 0 5 2 . 5 4 5 . 8 6 2 . 8 7 1. 49 7. 04 31 . 03 78, 89 0 . 0 0
23 . 98 4. 54 3 . 3 5 9 . 8 1 8 . 2 5 3 . 4 5 10. 11 33 . 83 96. 21 0 . 0 0
38 .24 1. 24 4 . 2 8 9 . 7 1 3 . 9 5 0 . 0 0 ■10.51 25. 66 99. 27 0 . 0 0
43 .87 3 . 8 7 3 . 1 2 9 . 8 6 8 . 3 1 1 . 2 5 9 . 8 7 17.88 97 . 73 0 . 0 0
38 . 53 1. 65 4 . 5 9 8 . 8 6 9 . 2 5 1. 00 14 .40 18.27 93 .65 0 . 0 0
38 . 0 3 2 . 1 8 4. 91 8 . 7 6 9 , 5 0 1 . 3 5 13. 66 17. 33 9S.39 0 , 0 0
35. 71 3 . 6 3 3 . 7 8 10.31 6 . 2 0 0 . 8 2 13.77 19.74 84.57 0 . 0 0
33 . 93 0 . 0 0 5 . 4 5 16 .14 3 . 4 3 0 . 4 8 14 .08 15. 75 93. 17 0 . 0 0
2 6 . 2 8 0 . 7 3 4 . 5 6 12. 07 1 .56 0 . 2 0 13. 12 38 .32 98 .60 0 . 0 0
20 . 08 3.81 3 . 6 7 2 . 2 6 1 . 6 5 1.04 6. 91 54. 55 49 .50 0 . 0 0
48 . 63 1 .78 5 . 7 2 7 . 0 5 2 . 3 9 1 . 6 6 4 . 2 0 21 .72 100.00 0 . 0 0
TABLE 6.L.3: PERCENTAGE AREA/QUANTITY Of MAJOR RABI CROPS
ASSESSED IN CASH/KINO: QASBA LALSOT
%  ARE F\ CROPS)
y------------------------------------------------------------------------.------ j  r ---- .--------------------------------—---------------- ----------------------  I
YEAR POPPY GARDEN KYARI BARLEY GRAM BAIJHARI
1712 1.16
PRODUCE
2.86 94.75
1713 0.35 1.34 91.46 * .
1714 3.31 1.11 95.58 0.00 38.24 61.76
1716 3.46 1.61 92.41 0.00 41.96 57.64
1717 0.36 1.24 98.28 1.83 98.17 0.00
1718 2.40 1.69 95.90 5.80 94.20 0.00
1719 0.20 0.65 99.03 50.19 7.69 42.12
1720 1.33 1.51 97.00 8,11 67.53 24.37
1721 0.66 1.26 97.95 1.60 48.18 49.91
1722 0.86 1.67 97.44 17.79 55.47 26.73
1731 1.47 2.37 91.07 . 0.00 100.00 0.00
1733 3.92 1.62 94.13 0.00 0.00 100.00
1734 0.00 1.57 97.97 0.00 32.58 61.68
1737 0.20 2.41 96.76 38.12 26.55 33.32
1739 0.65 1.64 97.66 0.00 100.00 0.00
1740 0.70 1.29 97.88 39.46 34.60 25.94
1741 0.57 1.33 97.90 0.00 62.47 37.25
1745 1.20 1.24 97.56 3.09 25.83 18.17
1747 0.85 1.18 97.95 0.00 100.00 0.00
1748 1.49 1.65 90.55 m
1753 0.75 1.86 73.10
1754 0.41 2.43 78.22
1756 0.23 1.35 98.25 100.00 0.00 0.00
1757 0.04 1.14 88.11 ,
1758 0.34 1.62 97.11
1761 0,10 1.30 94.03
1762 0.06 1.26 87.00 ,
1765 0.31 1.96 97.66
1767 0.16 1.89 50.22
1768 0.43 2.15 85.05 *
1770 0.00 2.80 95.27 0.00 ioo.oo 0.00
1775 0.00 1.79 96.24 0.00 100.00 0.00
1777 0.13 1.97 38.65
4 1 7
YEAR
1712
1713
1714
1715
1716
1717
1718
1719
1720
1721
1722
1730
1731
1733
1734
1737
1739
1740
1741
1742
1745
1746
1747
1748
1753
1754
1756
1757
1758
1759
1761
1762
1763
1764
1765
1767
1768
1770
1777
TABLE 6.L.4: REVENUE FROM MAJOR KHARIF CROPS AS A PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL KHARIF REVENUE: QASBA LALSOT
COTTON MAKKA GARDEN
PRODUCE
SUGAR­
CANE
CHOLA KAGANI GUWAR BAJRA MOTH
3 2 . 4 5 0 , 8 2 3 . 3 2 2 0 . 9 7 0 . 2 6 3 . 7 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 19. 83
9 . 3 0 . 7 . 6 5 3 . 3 3 11. 53 0 . 6 6 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 32. 51
33 . 2 5 1 . 3 3 5. 09 2 0 . 92 3 . 8 9 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 9. 11
3 9 . 9 8 0 . 0 0 3.04 2 2 . 55 0 . 4 4 0 . 0 0 0 . 3 2 0 . 0 0 12.35
44 .91 0 . 1 9 2 . 8 0 28 . 19 2 . 5 2 2. 61 0 . 5 7 0 . 0 0 11.65
40. 22 0 . 0 0 3 . 6 2 31 . 58 0 . 7 8 0 . 0 0 0 . 4 5 0 . 0 0 16.05
2 2 . 7 7 0 . 4 1 2 . 7 8 13 . 53 2 . 6 3 0 . 0 0 0 . 7 1 0 . 0 0 24 .96
8 . 2 3 0 . 5 7 4 . 8 2 2 7 . 6 9 3 . 6 0 19. 90 0 . 6 3 0 . 0 0 18. 55
3 6 . 8 3 0 . 1 9 1.65 25 . 40 2 . 4 4 3 . 1 1 0 . 5 4 1 3 . 65 11.90
3 2 . 85 0 . 0 0 2 . 9 2 24 . 31 1 . 6 5 5 . 4 4 0 . 8 6 0 . 0 0 10. 93
2 4 . 8 0 0 . 0 0 3 . 4 2 2 4 . 3 9 1. 62 4 . 0 9 1 . 7 5 0 . 0 0 10.33
40. 11 0 . 2 2 3. 71 29 . 35 2 . 3 6 2 . 4 4 1 . 0 7 6 . 9 1 5. 53
41 . 99 0 . 2 4 2 . 4 0 25 . 52 0 . 4 9 3 . 0 8 1 . 1 9 0 . 0 0 7. 33
49. 59 0 . 2 3 4 . 23 21 . 99 1 . 5 0 3 . 2 5 1 . 4 1 0 . 0 0 7.11
3 9 . 83 0 . 5 2 2 . 6 8 28 .01 1,81 3 . 7 0 1 . 6 3 0 . 0 0 11.10
40 . 89 8 , 54 2 . 5 3 18.24 1. 63 3. 17 1 . 5 5 0 . 0 0 16 .42
47 . 8 0 13 . 66 4. 23 10. 04 2 . 4 3 0 . 0 0 3 . 7 4 0 , 3 0 10.36
4 3 . 7 2 10 . 53 3 . 5 4 2 5 . 3 7 1 . 49 0 . 0 0 5 . 3 9 0 . 4 7 3 . 72
3 9 . 68 1 . 3 0 3 . 38 32 . 58 0 . 3 9 0 . 0 7 4 . 8 6 6 . 1 0 5.04
3 9 . 21 6 . 2 9 5 . 4 2 32 . 47 0 . 2 5 0 . 2 0 3 , 9 8 3 . 0 5 7 . 70
30 . 41 0 . 3 6 4 . 1 5 2 0 . 5 8 0 . 0 0 1. 40 ■ 3 . 3 8 2 7 . 3 0 6 . 86
5 1 . 12 0 . 0 0 4 . 33 25 . 94 0 . 5 6 0 . 2 6 3 . 7 9 0 . 0 0 9 . 6 0
4 4 . 4 9 2 . 8 7 3. 11 20, 22 0 . 7 0 1.81 3 . 3 5 0 . 0 0 10.S3
30 . 11 8 . 2 3 2 . 7 8 8 . 6 7 1 . 07 1. 64 1 . 2 5 3 7 . 7 7 3. 88
4 6 , 4 6 8 . 4 1 3 . 18 17. 82 1. 77 0 . 7 5 2 . 8 6 8 . 2 0 7 . 10
37 . 99 7 . 3 7 4 . 03 21 . 50 2 . 8 7 0 . 9 5 3 . 2 9 13 . 5 5 6 .79
3 5 . 17 18 .22 5. 24 10 .67 2 . 1 4 7 . 0 6 2 . 8 8 0 . 0 0 10.54
12. 12 10. 02 3 . 4 8 7 .83 1 . 0 6 5. 74 2 . 0 1 4 5 . 2 2 4.64
38. 31 3. 34 2. 49 9. 41 1. 67 1.01 2 . 2 9 2 6 . 0 6 8. 93
2 1 . 27 4 . 9 0 3. 24 16. 35 4 . 8 0 2 . 4 3 ' 3 , 2 3 2 9 . 5 4 B.15
36. 49 1. 47 4 . 50 17.53 2 . 3 6 0 . 0 0 3 . 6 8 2 2 . 1 6 2.77
3 8 . 95 4 . 2 7 3. 04 16. 36 4 . 7 8 0 . 8 9 3 . 2 2 15. 29 8 . 1 9
3 6 . 65 1.85 4 . 70 15.39 5 . 5 0 0 . 7 3 4 . 9 2 16 .45 8 .60
33 . 58 2 . 7 4 4. 77 14.51 5. 44 0 . 9 6 4 . 4 5 15. 16 11.77
33 . 58 3 , 83 3 . 8 5 18.39 3 . 6 0 0 . 6 2 4 . 7 3 17. 34 4. 03
2 8 . 20 0 . 0 0 5 .20 24 . 79 1 .75 0. 31 4 . 4 6 1 1 . 98 5. 50
2 4 . 87 0 . 7 5 4. 63 20 .87 0 . 9 6 0 . 1 5 4 . 4 7 3 4 . 6 0 4. 56
2 0 . 82 4 . 46 4 . 0 0 3. 36 1 .09 0 . 8 2 2 . 9 6 4 8 . 3 9 2 . 3 0
44 . 72 2 . 0 0 6 . 00 11.51 1.44 1.19 1. 50 18 . 9 8 1.44
TABLE 6.L.5: REVENUE FROM MAJOR RA8I CROPS AS A PERCENTAGE 4 1 9
OF TOTAL RABI REVENUE: QASBA LALSOT
YEAR POPPY GARDEN
PRODUCE
KYARI 8ARLEY GRAM BAIJHARI
1712 1 . 3 6 2 . 9 8 9 4 . 9 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
1713 0 . 4 5 1.34 8 9 . 93 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
1714 4 . 2 8 1.09 9 4 . 1 3 0 . 0 0 0 . 2 2 0 . 2 7
1716 3 . 4 9 1.17 71 . 16 0 . 0 0 8 . 8 7 12 , 59
1717 0 . 5 1 1.31 97 . 51 0 . 0 1 0 . 4 9 0 . 0 0
1718 3 . 2 2 1. 67 9 4 . 02 0 . 0 5 1 . 0 3 0 . 0 0
1719 0 . 2 2 0 . 5 5 85 ,04 6 . 8 3 1. 17 6 . 0 3
1720 1 . 7 6 1. 52 9 1 . 09 0 . 3 6 3 . 8 2 1. 18
1721 0 . 8 2 1. 23 8 5 . 57 0 . 1 9 6 . 0 5 5 . 9 0
1722 1 . 2 8 1.81 9 6 . 3 9 0 . 0 8 0 . 2 9 0 . 1 2
1731 1 . 21 1.47 9 5 , 4 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 0
1733 2 . 7 6 0 . 9 7 9 4 . 33 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 1. 70
1734 0 . 0 0 0 . 8 3 87 . 84 0 . 0 0 3 . 7 5 6 . 6 0
1737 0 . 1 4 1.46 9 6 . 8 5 0 . 3 8 0 . 3 9 0 . 3 8
1739 0 . 5 3 1.00 98 . 01 0 . 0 0 0 . 4 2 0 . 0 0
1740 0 . 5 1 0 . 7 6 9 7 . 69 0 . 3 6 0 . 3 5 0 . 2 5
1741 0 . 4 5 0 . 7 8 9 7 . 3 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 8 8 0 . 5 0
1745 0 . 9 4 0 . 7 3 9 6 . 77 0 . 0 4 0 . 4 1 0 . 2 6
1747 0 . 6 0 0 . 7 4 9 8 . 6 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 0
1748 1 . 1 0 1.07 9 3 . 7 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
1753 0 . 6 3 1.27 8 2 . 86 0 . 0 0 o;oo 0 . 0 0
1754 0 . 3 6 1.60 8 7 . 3 8 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
1756 0 . 1 7 0. 83 98 . 73 0 . 1 6 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
1757 0 . 0 3 0 . 7 2 93 . 34 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
1758 0 . 2 4 0. 98 98 . 22 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
1761 0 . 0 9 0 . 8 3 9 7 . 4 8 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
1762 0 , 0 5 0. 8 0 93 . 74 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
1765 0 . 2 3 1.18 9 8 . 5 3 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
1767 0 . 1 6 1.60 71 . 57 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
1768 0 . 3 3 1.42 9 3 . 90 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
1770 0 . 0 0 1.64 93 . 32 0. 0 0 4. 40 0 . 0 0
1775 0 . 0 0 1.10 9 7 . 87 0 . 0 0 0 . 1 7 0 , 0 0
1777 0 . 1 4 1.78 59 . 28 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
TABLE 6.J.1: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ANNUAL REVENUE
4 2 0
QASBA JAIPUR
YEAR KHARIF HARVEST RABI HARVEST ANNUAL REVENUE TOTAL RUPEES
UN CASH UN KIND UHARIF UN CASH UN KINO tRABI UN CASH UN KIND
1728 30.33 69.67 62.89 100.00 0.00 37.11 56.19 43.81 213.89
1729 34.02 65.98 9.65 11.91 88.09 90.35 14.05 85.95 1293.26
1733 43.19 56.81 100.00 . 43.19 56.81 942.02
1736 54.16 45.84 54.18. 20.24 79.76 45.82 38.62 61.38 5507.24
1737 72.18 27.82 61.51 47.12 52.88 38,49 62.53 37.47 2994.52
1738 * 32.07 67.93 100.00 32.07 67.93 1370.64
1739 52.95 47.05 63.52 34.46 65.54 36.48 46.21 53.79 • 2679.64
1740 31.84 68.16 100,00 31.84 68.16 1361.85
1741 54.98 45.02 60.81 35.05 64.95 39,19 47.17 52.83 2998.14
1742 45.34 54.66 53.38 31.68 68.32 46.62 38.97 61.03 4348.84
1743 72.21 27.79 50.12 44.60 55.40 49.88 58.44 41.56 3211.66
1744 85.25 14.75 38.65 34.02 65.98 61.35 53.82 46.18 3382.72
1745 57.90 42.10 74.09 100,00 0.00 25.91 68.81 31.19 2685.53
1746 64.27 35.73 37.03 26.35 73.65 62.97 40.40 59.60 3765.50
1747 56.61 43.39 54.07 21.56 78.44 45.93 40.51 59.49 3140.91
1750 58.16 41.84 62.32 37.49 62.51 37.68 50.37 49.63' 4110.37
1755 62.17 37.83 32.92 17.26 82.74 67.08 32.04 67.96 9197.56
1756 24.11 75.89 52.42 20.42 79.58 47.58 22.35 77.65 10007.03
1757 61.30 38.70 36.81 32.89 67.11 63,19 43.35 56.65 5086.74
1759 75.88 24.12 37,43 29.27 70.73 62,57 46.71 53.29 4230.30
1761 84.81 15.19 100.00 ■ 84.81 15.19 1437.48
1762 92.53 7.47 36.57 47.31 52.69 63.43 63.85 36.15 2523.95
1763 93.37 6.63 29.46 26.09 73.91 70.54 45.91 54.09 4640.01
1767 93.09 6.91 45.55 30.24 69.76 54.45 58.87 41.13 4201.03
1768 92.40 7.60 47.84 38.49 61.51 52.16 64.28 35.72 4130.98
1769 78.56 21.44 41.79 42.95 57.05 58.21 57.83 42.17 4182.47
1770 80.11 19.89 38.84 29.68 70.32 61,16 49.26 50.74 4663.59
1771 88.52 11.48 36.52 23.72 76.28 63.48 47.39 52.61 5123.23
1772 93.73 6.27 29.81 25.62 74.38 70.19 45.93 54.07 4606.99
Source: Arhsattas Qasba Sawaii Jaipur
TABLE 6.J.2: PERCENTAGE AREA/QUANTITY OF MAJOR KHARIF CROPS
ASSESSED IN CASH/KIND: QASBA JAIPUR
°[o C"2-A<iT\ C ftiap £_ ) CUvNS \ CAoPS^
YEAR GARDEN MAKKA 
PRODUCE
1728 5 2 . 7 9 7 . 3 8
1729 1 1 . 7 8 5 . 2 4
1733. 1 6 . 98 7 . 1 1
1736 19 . 88 1 9 . 59
1737 2 1 . 5 8 2 5 . 9 3
1739 3 1 . 9 6 3 0 . 0 7
1741 3 1 . 5 1 2 2 . 6 9
1742 2 9 . 2 5 2 2 . 6 7
1743 3 0 . 3 1 3 0 . 9 7
1744 2 8 . 7 9 3 4 . 7 6
1745 2 9 . 7 4 2 7 . 6 5
1746 3 4 . 7 4 2 8 . 2 9
1747 2 6 . 9 7 3 4 . 1 8
1750 3 4 . 0 6 2 2 . 7 9
1755 - 3 5 . 2 6 3 8 . 6 0
1756 4 6 . 7 4 3 3 . 8 5
1757 4 3 . 7 0 3 7 . 9 3
1759 4 1 . 6 8 3 6 . 6 3
1761 4 4 . 0 6 2 6 . 6 2
1762 3 7 . 3 7 2 7 . 4 7
1763 44 . 21 3 0 , 5 5
1767 42 . 71 3 7 . 6 0
1768 48 . 24 3 6 . 2 4
1769 4 1 . 68 3 5 . 5 2
1770 4 2 . 20 4 1 . 74
1771 3 9 . 7 2 4 4 . 9 2
1772 3 7 . 7 6 4 6 . 1 5
SUGAR­ COTTON SWEET
CANE POTATO
0 . 0 0 27 . 54 0 . 0 0
3 . 4 0 41 . 6 2 1 . 0 5
5 . 8 1 11 . 10 2 . 1 2
39 . 43 5 . 7 8 3 . 0 7
28 . 31 2 . 3 0 2 . 0 0
12 .18 0 . 8 1 1. 67
15. 76 1. 7 0 1. 02
18 . 00 0 . 2 5 0 . 2 8
14 .19 0 . 2 1 0 . 3 6
9. 01 0 . 3 3 0 . 3 7
13 .52 0 . 1 1 0 , 3 6
6. 51 1.31 0 . 7 3
2 . 7 2 3 . 4 8 1.04
5. 48 1.91 3 . 5 8
11 .21 0 . 6 8 2. 3 4
1. 77 0 . 6 8 0. 11
1.54 0 . 0 0  - 0 . 4 2
2 . 5 0 5 . 4 5 1. 86
8 . 7 8 1. 89 3 . 4 3
4. 4 4 6 . 7 3 5 . 1 6
7. 91 1. 92 3 . 5 8
9 . 5 2 0 . 3 9 1. 77
10. 28 0 . 0 3 0 . 6 6
7. 14 4 . 6 2 1. 26
5. 84 1.74 2 . 7 1
4 . 60 0 . 4 8 4 . 0 6
3 . 5 0 0 . 3 6 4. 9 3
HADWA MOTH BAJRA
12 .30 3 . 2 5 84 , 0 8
14 .01 2 . 9 8 9 7 . 0 2
4 . 2 9 12. 64 8 7 . 1 0
1. 77 7 . 17 9 1 . 7 0
0 . 6 7 18.81 8 1 . 04
1 . 3 3 3 . 4 0 9 6 . 58
0 . 5 6 4. 5 0 9 5 . 49
1. 08 5 . 1 6 9 4 . 7 5
2 . 7 9 1. 89 98 . 11
13.51 2 . 4 3 84 . 6 8
7 . 6 2 11 . 25 8 8 . 1 7
10. 47 16 . 25 8 3 . 5 0
8 . 9 5 4 . 4 0 9 5 . 2 8
7 . 7 0 3 . 9 8 9 6 . 0 2
3 . 2 5 3 . 7 8 9 6 . 22
7 . 6 2 1.34 9 8 , 6 2
3 . 7 0 4 . 2 8 9 5 . 7 2
2 . 6 8 3 . 0 8 9 6 . 86
5 . 2 0 7 . 4 3 89 . 5 9
6 . 8 5 5 . 4 9 92 . 64
0 . 6 9 3 . 8 9 9 5 . 6 5
0 . 31 5 , 7 2 9 4 . 00
0 . 1 3 1. 64 98 . 36
0 . 3 5 3 . 4 7 9 6 . 2 3
0 . 6 9 0 . 4 5 9 9 . 5 5
1. 83 2 . 4 7 9 7 . 3 7
2 . 0 5 0 . 0 0 9 9 . 4 5
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TABLE 6 . J .3  : PERCENTAGE AREA/QUANTITY OF MAJOR RA8I CROPS 
ASSESSED IN CASH/KIND: QASBA JAIPUR
°f0 f*2-£A % s^o/y-Mi-vy
C iP r f in cRoPS}
YEAR POPPY GARDEN
PRODUCE
BARLEY WHEAT
1728 0.00 100.00 38.80 61.20
1729 0.00 100.00 54.47 33.43
1736 0.07 99.57 34.67 54.17
1737 0.00 100.00 54.61 45.39
1738 0.40 99.60 41.77 49.97
1739 0.00 100.00 33.75 58.32
1740 0.44 99.21 27.87 66.65
1741 0.13 99.40 30,63 69.04
1742 0.11 99.08 47.99 48.72
1743 0,58 98.75 55.32 41.31
1744 1.45 98.37 58.71 41.29
1745 1.07 98.31 59.37 38.82
1746 0.23 98.94 58.06 39.81
1747 0,66 99.34 42.66 54.56
1750 1.40 97.76 11.52 86.41
1755 0.10 98.24 8.19 88.57
1756 0.59 99.18 15.44 82.88
1757 2.41 97.48 20.18 68.61
1759 2.14 97.59 26.71 66.39
1762 2.55 96.71 42.80 52.29
1763 0.92 97.96 13.79 83.80
1767 2.75 96,74 15.71 78.00
1768 0.07 99.77 9.03 87.89
1769 0.79 98.49 14.71 76.38
1770 0.30 99.32 24.41 65.33
1771 0.05 97.79 34.72 54.56
1772 O.OS 98.93 29.91 54.77
YEAR
1728
1729
1733
1736
1737
1739
1741
1742
1743
1744
1745
1746
1747
1750
1755
1756
1757
1759
1761
1762
1763
1767
1768
1769
1770
1771
1772
TABLE 6 . J . 4 :  REVENUE FROM MAJOR KHARIF CROPS AS A PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL KHARIF REVENUE: QASBA JAIPUR
GARDEN MAKKA SUGAR­
PRODUCE CANE
1 5 . 69 3 . 3 5 0 . 0 0
3 . 8 5 3 . 2 0 3 . 13
7 . 4 3 4. 67 10 .17
4 . 6 8 6 . 0 1 38. 64
7 . 2 7 12 . 03 46 . 35
1 4 . 0 3 16. 81 14. 52
1 2 . 43 12. 30 23 . 03
8 . 6 6 9 . 8 4 22. 04
1 4 . 2 7 2 0 . 89 29 . 17
16. 17 2 6 . 8 6 2 8 . 38
1 0 . 7 7 13 . 49 26 .04
1 6 . 2 5 18. 87 16. 80
1 2 . 4 5 2 2 . 7 0 7 . 7 2
1 4 . 9 0 14 . 45 11. 66
13 . 32 20. 44 2 2 . 5 7
9 . 0 5 9 , 1 0 2. 51
2 1 . 8 7 26 . 91 5 .46
2 4 . 4 6 3 1 . 7 3 8 . 5 5
2 5 . 1 9 23 . 6 9 23 .94
2 4 . 3 4 2 7 . 74 18.07
2 3 . 8 2 27 . 9 3 30 .98
2 3 . 1 0 30 . 21 34 . 77
2 7 . 3 0 29 . 56 3 3 . 20
2 3 . 5 5 28 . 4 8 18. 70
2 3 . 7 9 3 3 , 60 16. 55
2 5 , 6 2 40 . 67 14. 08
2 6 . 5 6 45. 51 11.49
COTTON SWEET MAOHA
POTATO
7. 81 0 . 0 0 3 . 4 9
15 .82 0 . 3 0 5 . 3 6
5. 1 5 1.39 2 . 3 5
1.43 1. 46 0 . 4 0
0 . 7 8 1. 36 0 . 2 3
0 . 4 0 1. 2 9 0 . 5 8
0. 7 8 0 . 7 5 0 . 2 0
0. 09 0 . 1 2 0 . 2 4
0 . 1 2 0 . 34 1 . 3 7
0 . 1 8 0 . 4 0 8 . 9 3
0 . 0 5 0 . 2 6 3 . 0 1
0 . 7 3 0. 61 5 . 8 5
1.97 0 . 8 9 4 . 9 6
1 . 06 3 . 0 3 4 . 1 1
0 . 3 0 1. 73 1 . 4 3
0 . 1 6 0 . 0 4 1 . 7 9
0 . 0 0 0 , 4 4 2 . 3 4
3. 8 4 1. 9 6 1 . 9 5
1.21 3 . 4 9 3 . 6 3
5. 2 2 6 . 4 9 5 . 6 3
1.49 4. 41 0 . 5 2
0 . 2 7 1 . 93 0 . 2 2
0. 01 0. 71 0 . 1 0
3 . 1 0 1 . 3 5 0 . 2 3
1.15 2 . 8 3 0 . 4 9
0 . 38 4. 61 1. 3 7
0. 31 6 , 0 3* 1. 6 2
MOTH
2. 2 7
1. 75  
7 . 5 7
3 . 7 6  
5 . 1 9  
1.86
1.71  
2.68  
0. 61  
0 . 3 2  
4. 4 1
6 . 7 2  
1.84  
1 . 6 5  
1. 62  
1 . 1 8  
2 . 5 3  
0 . 7 3  
1.02 
0 . 4 2  
0 . 2 6  
0 . 4 3  
0.12 
0 . 7 4  
0.11 
0 . 2 8  
0.00
TABLE 6.J.5: REVENUE FROM MAJOR RABI CROPS AS A PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL RABI REVENUE: QASBA JAIPUR
YEAR POPPY GARDEN BARLEY WHEAT
1728 0 . 0 0
PRODUCE
100 . 00
1729 0 . 0 0 11. 91 43 .21 3 4 . 1 0
1736 0 . 0 2 2 0 . 1 6 2 0 . 6 3 5 4 . 2 5
1737 0 . 0 0 4 7 . 1 2 5 2 . 8 8
1738 0 . 2 3 3 1 . 8 4 2 2 . 8 3 3 9 . 7 2
1739 0 . 0 0 3 4 , 4 6 17.31 4 3 . 41
1740 0 . 2 3 31 . 4 7 14. 13 5 0 . 7 0
1741 0 . 0 7 3 4 . 7 9 13. 48 5 1 . 2 8
1742 0 . 0 6 31 . 31 2 8 . 4 3 3 7 . 6 8
1743 0 . 4 1 4 3 . 8 9 26 . 36 2 7 . 1 5
1744 0 . 8 5 33 . 11 3 3 . 3 8 3 2 . 6 0
1745 1.80 9 7 . 4 7 .
1746 0. 11 2 6 . 0 0 36 . 04 3 5 . 9 9
1747 0 . 2 5 21 . 31 27 . 71 4 8 . 6 4
1750 0 . 7 7 3 6 . 3 8 5 . 8 7 5 5 . 4 7
1755 0 . 0 3 16 . 98 5 . 2 8 7 5 . 1 3
1756 0 . 1 9 2 0 . 1 9 10 . 22 6 9 . 3 2
1757 1. 27 31 . 61 10 . 65 4 9 . 6 4
1759 0 . 9 9 2 8 . 2 2 14 . 92 5 1 . 4 0
1762 2 . 0 5 45 , 04 17 . 63 3 2 . 6 3
1763 0 . 3 3 2 5 . 6 0 8 . 0 9 6 4 . 1 8
1767 1.31 2 8 . 3 9 7 . 8 6 5 8 . 0 5
1768 0 . 0 3 38 . 24 4. 24 5 5 . 6 7
1769 0 . 5 2 4 1 . 8 0 6 . 0 0 46 . 71
1770 0 . 1 3 29 . 17 13 .95 4 9 . 8 9
1771 0 . 0 2 2 2 . 5 0 2 0 . 9 0 4 4 . 8 8
1772 0 . 0 2 2 5 . 0 6 19.34 4 4 . 8 5
4 2 4
FIGURE 6.C.1: ZA8TI ASSESSED AREA IN THE KHARIF HARVEST
4 2 5
QASBA CHATSU
TEAR
1710 ******** 398.05
1711 ********* 462.20
1712 *************** 772.50
1714 ******************** 977.60
1716 *************** 728.00
1717 ***** 272.85
1721 ************** 696.30
1723 *************************** 1356.00
1724 ************** 675.55
1726 *************** 758.75
1730 ********************** 1120.55
1731 ******************************* 1564,05
1732 ************************************ 1801.15
1733 ********************************** 1697.35
1734 **************************************** 1981.30
1735 ************************ 1222.25
1737 **************************************************** 2605,40
1738 *************************************** 1973.65
1740 *********************** 1143.75
1741 ****************** 877.10
1742 ************* 655.15
1743 ******************** 986.20
1744 ************ 608.00
1745 ************* 673.05
1748 *********************** 1142.85
1749 ******************** 1 0 0 1 . 0 0
1750 ******************* 974.75
1751 ********** 479.90
1752 ****************** 892.00
1753 ************************** 1318,40
1755 ***************************** 1473.10
1756 ********** 477.00
1757 *** 172.35
175S ' ************* 632.05
1760 ******* 351.10
1761 *********** 527.10
1762 *********** 570.40
1763 ********** 476.20
1764 ****** 316.70
1765 ******** 392.10
1766 ******* 371.75
1767 ******** 385.25
1768 *** 171.05
1769 ********** 494.45
1771 ********** 480.50
 +...........4-------- +........... +...............—
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FIGURE 6 .0 .2 :  JIMSI ASSESSED QUANTITY IN THE KHARIF HARVEST
QAS8 A CHATSU 4 2 6
YEAR
1710
1711
1712 
1714
1716
1717 
1721
1723
1724 
1726
1730
1731
1732
1733
1734
1735
1737
1738
1740
1741
1742
1743
1744
1745
1748
1749
1750
1751
1752
1753
1755
1756
1757
1758
1760
1761
1762
1763
1764
1765
1766
1767 
*1768 
1769 
1771
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FIGURE 6.C.3: ZABTI ASSESSED AREA IN THE RABI HARVEST
QASBA CHATSU
YEAR
1710 1440.30
1711 1149.40
1712 1845.80
1714 1902.35
1716 2122.25
1717 n m x x t t t t x m u x t s t m m * * * * * * * 1702.30
1721 t x t n t x t t n u t x t m x t m m x u * * * * 1699.40
1723 txxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1961.55
1724 txxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2828.25
1726 xxxxxtxxxxxxxxxtxttxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2534.80
1730 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxttxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2356.25
1731 xxxxxtxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1920.65
1732 txxxxxxxxtxtxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxttxtxtxxxxxxxxxxxx 2250.75
1733 xxxxxtxxxxxxtxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxx 1992.80
1734 xxttttxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxtxt 2162.45
1735 xxxxxxxxxtxxtxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxtxtxxt 2458.65
1737 xxxxxtxtxxtxtxxxxxxttxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxtxttxxt 2223.00
1738 txxtxtxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxtxxxxxtxtxxxxxxxxxtxxxtx 2689.55
1740 xxxxttxxxxxxxtxttxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxtxxxtxxxxtxxtxtt 2487.70
1741 xtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1821.35
1742 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxtxxxxxx 1970.70
1743 xxxtxxxxxxxxxxxttxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxx 2443.10
1744 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxttxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2285.00
1745 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxttxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxx 2386.30
1748 txxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxx 1997.70
1749 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxtxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxx 2644.33
1750 txtxxtxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxttxxx 2519.95
1751 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxt 2317.40
1752 ttxxtxxxtxxxxtxxttxxxxtxxxtxxtxxxxttxxxxxx 2097.00
1753 xxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxt 2031.05
1755 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxtxxxx 1947.05
1756 txtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxx 1111.35
1757 xttxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtx 978.30
1758 xxxxxxtxtxxxxxxxttxx 979.90
1760 txxtxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxt . . 994.00
1761 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1229.75
1762 txtxttxxtxxttxxxxxtxtxxxtxxxxxxt 1596.65
1763 xxtxxxxxxtxxxtxtxxxxxxtxxx 1299.40
1764 txxxxxxxxtxxxxxxtxxt*txxxxtxxttx 1607.25
1765 txxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxtxt 1499.50
1766 xttxxxxxxxxxxxttxxxxxxtxxx 1277.20
1767 xxxtxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxttxtxxtxxxxt 1683.35
1768 txxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtttxxx 1483.55
1769 xxxxxxxxttxxxxxxttxxxxttxxxxx 1464.45
1771 t txt txt t t txxxxtxxxxxtxxtxixt t t txt 1642.20
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FIGURE 6.C.4: JIMSI ASSESSED QUANTITY IN THE RABI HARVEST
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QASBA CHATSU
YEAR
1710 I************************************************************ 5 % 2 1
1711 jtxtxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxtxxttxxxxwtxxtxtttxxxtxxxxxxxtxxxxxttxxxxxxxxxxittxxtt 7 % 9 9
1712 jx w t t t t x x x tx x x t t t * * *  2 0 2 . 2 1
1714 203.46
1716 Jx xx ixx xx xx tx xx xx txx txM xxw txm xxxxxxx txxw xxtx tuxxxxxx txx tx txxxxxxxxxx t tx tm m j:  837,48
1717 j* 6.85
1721 j********* 93.89
1723 | * «  30.73
1724 j t x x t x x t t x t x x x t x t x x t t t t t t x t x t x j t x t x x t t t t x t x t t t x t t x x t x x t t t x x x t  5 9 7  9 9
1726 175.63
1730 ■ 1 5 2 , 7 1
1731 J 0 . 0 0
1732 \t ttxtxxxtttxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxtttxt  319.91
17 3 3  j xtxxxxt 7 4 . 9 6
1734 j txt t t t txx  8 5 . 2 6
1735 j x x x t x x x t t x x m x s t x x x x x x t n m m t t i m x m x x t  437.56
1737 1* 14.08
1738 !*** 29.40
1740 j m m m m m x m  192.21
1741 100.89
1742 !* 9.33
1743 { « « « « « « « *  1 4 9 . 6 8
1744 jxxxxxxxtxxxxxxtxtxttxxtxxttxxxt 312.89
1745 jm xxxxxxxx 105.89
1748 \txxxx 5 3 . 8 I
1 7 4 9  jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 181.09
1750 \txtxxxtxxtttxx 1 3 9 .13
1751 jtxtxtxxxxtxxxxxxxxxtttxxxxxx 275.83
1752 \txxxxxxxxxxt 121.82
1753 !txtxtxxxtxxxxx 136.81
1755 ! 4.85
1756 \ttxxxxx 65.18
1757 jxxxxxx 5 5 , 3 4
1758 !* 8.80
1760 jtxtxxxxxxxxt U 7 . 7 1
1761 !« * *  41.53
1762 j m x x x  60.81
1763 !«* 2 6 . 4 1
1764 | «  23.44
1765 J »  20.90
1766 jxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxx 271.37
1 7 6 7  jxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxx 231.61
1768 \txxxtxttxxtx 124,03
1 7 6 9  jtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxx 370.43
1 7 7 1  1xxtxttxttxttxxttt txtxxxtxtxtxxxxx 325.11
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FIGURE 6.C.5: KHARIF REVENUE
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QASBA CHATSU
YEAR
1710 xxxxxxtxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1972.68
1711 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1320.24
1712 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2928.29
1714 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1909.28
1716 xxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxt 1193.96
1717 xxxxxxxx 416.89
1721 xxxxxxxxxxxtxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2232.56
1723 xxxxtxxxxtxxxxxxxxtxttttxxtttxxxxxxtxxxxtxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 3177.39
1724 xtxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxtttxxxtxtxxxxxxxxxxxx 1899.17
1726 xxxxxxxxxxxtxxx 774.54
1730 xxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxtttttxtxxx 1361.56
1731 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxtxXX 1567.02
1732 txxxxxxxxttxtxxxxxxtttxxxxxxttxxxxxxxx 1892.12
1733 xxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxttxxxxx 2133.35
1734 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxttxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxtxxxxtxx 2754.05
1735 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2051.60
1737 xxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2925.74
1738 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxtxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2545.46
1740 xxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxtxtxxxxx 1667.13
1741 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 1167.13
1742 txxxxxtxxxxxtxtx 805.12
1743 xxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxttx 1287.45
1744 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 978.65
1745 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1122.08
1748 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxtttxxxxxxxttxx 1685.40
1749 xxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1331.78
1750 xxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxtxxxxtxtxtxx 1525.06
1751 xxxxxxxtxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxx 1209.24
1752 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1266.47
1753 xtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1832.50
1755 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1502.15
1756 xxxxxxx 326.48
1757 XXX 158.17
1758 xxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxx 917.85
1760 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 1179.61
1761 xxxxxxxxxxxxxtxx 798.31
1762 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 791.08
1763 xxxxxtxxxttx 618.41
1764 txxxxxtxtxxx 592.25
1765 txxxxxxxxxx 552.86
1766 xxxxxxxxxxxxxx 719.26
1767 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 770.68
1768 xtxxxxxxx 458.61
1769 xxxxxxxxxxtxtxxx 794.60
1771 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1015.71
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FIGURE 6.C.6: RABI REVENUE
QASBA CHATSU 430
YEAR
1710 xtxxxxxxxtxxxxtxxx 1783.33
1711 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1969.06
1712 xxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxtxxxxxtxtxxxxxxtxtxxxxxxtxttttttxxxxxtxxxtxxtxxxt 7689.73
1714 t x t xx t t t t t t t t t t t t t x 1913.54
1716 t t txxt t t txtxttxxtxxxxxtxxtt 2686.44
1717 txxxtxxxxxxxxx 1446,88
1721 t txt txxxt t txtxt t 1621.31
1723 tttxxttxtxxtxxxxx 1727.41
1724 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxttx 2981.79
1726 t t txt txtxt txtxxt t t xtxtxt t t t t t x i t t t t t t t xxxxt txtxxtxt tx 5349.21
1730 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxtttxxxutxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtx 5256.32
1731 xtxxxxtxxxtxtxxxxxxxxtxtxtxxtxxxtxtxttx 3923.62
1732 txxtxxxxxxxtxxxxxxtxxtxxxtxtxxxxxttxxtxxxxxxxtxxxtxxx 5271.88
1733 t t t t t t t t t t t x t t t t t t t x t x t x t t xxx t t t t x t t x t t x t 4130.32
1734 xttxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxttttxxixxxtxxxxxx 4428.23
1735 txxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 5644.56
1737 xxtttxtxxxxxtxxxxtxxxxxxxttxtxxxxxxxxxtxxxxx 4433.63
1738 txxxxxttxtxttxxtttxxxxxxttttttt ttxxtxxttxxxxxxttxxxxxx 5402.38
1740 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 4511.42
1741 t t txttxxxtttxxxxxxxtxxxxtxtxtxti 3209.29
1742 xxxxxxxttxtttxxtxxtxxxxxxtttttxxxx 3420.87
1743 txtt txtxtxxtxtxtxtxtxxxtxtttxxxtxtttxxtxxxxxx 4500.58
1744 xxxxxtxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxtttxtxxxxxtx 4431.41
1745 xxxtttxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxtxttttxxxxxtttxxtxt 4092.06
1748 txtxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxittxx 3213.44
1749 txxtxttxxttxt txt txxxtxttt txxxxtxxttxxtxtx 4103.06
1750 xttxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxtxtttxtxxtxxxttx 3804.04
1751 txxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxtxtxxx 3920.45
1752 xtxxxxxxxtxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxtttttt 3563.92
1753 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxttxxxtt 3176.28
1755 txxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2976,61
1756 xxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxx 1742.47
1757 xxxxxxxxtxxxtxx 1518.81
1758 xxxxxxxxxxxtxx 1431.64
1760 xxxxxxtxtxxxxxxx 1591.70
1761 ttxxxxxxxtxxxxxtxxx 1856.48
1762 xxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxx 2420.82
1763 txxxxxxxxxtxxttxxxx 1896.06
1764 xxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxt 2371.23
1765 txxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxx 2236.20
1766 XXXXXXXXXXXXXIXXXXXXX 2104.71
1767 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2621.70
1768 txtxxxxxxxxtxxxtxxtxtxt 2250.47
1769 txxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2329.50
1771 xxtxtxxttxxxxxtt t t t txtxtxtt 2685.11
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FIGURE 6.C.7: ANNUAL REVENUE
QASBA CHATSU
4 3 1
* * * t  * t  * * t  * t  * * 1 1  * * * * 3756.01
t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 3289.30
X X X X X X t X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 10618.02
t x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x t x 3822.82
x x x x x x t x t x x x x t x x x x x 3880.40
t x x i t t t x t 1863.77
t x x t x x x x x x x x t t x x x x x 3853.87
x x x x t t x x x t x t t t x x x t x x x x x x x 4904.80
x x x x x t x x t x x t x x x x x t x t x x x x 4880.96
x x x x t x x x x t t x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x 6123.75
x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 6617.88
t x t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t x t t t t t t t t t 5490.64
t t x t t t t x x t t x x t t x x x x t t x t x t t x x x t x t t t t t 7164.00
x t x x x x x x x t x x x x x t x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x 6263.67
x t t x t x x x x x t x x x t t x x x x t t t x x x x x x x x x x x x x 7182.28
t t x x t t t x t x t x t t x t x t t t x x x x x t t t t t t t x t x t x t 7696.16
x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x t x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x t x 7359.37
x t x x x x x x x x x x t x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 7947.84
xtxxxxxxtxxxtttxtxxtxttxxxxxxtx 6178.55
t t t t t t t t t t t x t t t t t t t t x t 4376.42
t x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x t 4225.99
x t x x t x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x t t 5788.03
t x x t t t t t t t t t t t t x t t t t t t t x t t t 5410.06
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t x t 5214.14
t x t t t t t t t x t t t t t t t t t t x t t t 4898.84
t t t t t x t t x t t x x t t t x t x t x t t x x x t 5434.84
x t t x x t x x t x x x x x x t x x x x x t t t x t x 5329,10
xxtxxxxxtttxxxxxxxxxxtxxxx 5129.69
t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x t x t x 4830.39
t x x x x x t x t x t x x x t x x x x t x x x t x 5008,78
x x x x t t x x t x x x x x t x x t x t x t 4478.76
x t x x t x x t x x 2068,95
t t t x x x t t 1676.98
t x t x x x x t x t x x 2349.49
t x x x x t t t t x x x x x 2771.31
x x x x x t x x t x x x x 2654.79
t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t 3211.90
x x x x x x x x x x x t t 2514.47
x x x t x x x t x x x x x x x 2963.48
t t x x x t x x x x x x x t 2789.06
t x x x x x x x x t x x x x 2823.97
x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x 3392.38
x t t t x x t t x x x t t x 2709.08
x t x x x t t x x x x x t x x x 3124.10
t x x x x t x x x x x x  X xxxxxx 3700.82
+ + + + +
2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
RUPEES
FIGURE 6.M.1: ZftfiTI ASSESSED AREA IN THE KHARIF HARVEST
432
QASBA HALARNA
YEAR
1 7 1 3  j x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x  1 8 2 . 9 0
1 7 1 4  [ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  7 9 . 9 0
1 7 1 5  j x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x i x x x x x x x x x x x x  1 6 5 . 4 5
1 7 1 6  j x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  2 2 4 . 1 5
1 7 1 7  [ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x i x t x x x x x x x x x x x t x  1 8 3 . 1 5
1 7 1 8  j x x x x x x x x x i x x x x t x t x x x x x x t x i x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t t x x i x i i x x x x x x t t x t t x x x x x x  3 7 0 . 7 0
1 7 1 9  j x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  2 3 5 . 2 0
1 7 2 0  j x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x m n x x x x x x  1 5 5 . 3 0
1 7 2 2  J x x x x x x i x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x t  1 1 3 . 4 0
1 7 2 3  j x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x  8 9 . 5 5 '
1 7 2 5  J x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x i x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x i i x t t t x x x x x x x t x  3 3 7 . 5 5
1 7 2 6  J x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x m t t t x  2 8 7 . 4 0
1 7 2 7  IXXXXXXXXXXXXXXlXIXXXXXXXXXXXTXtXXXXXXXXXXXXXtXXXXXXXXXXXIXXX 2 9 9 . 7 5
1 7 2 8  J x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x t t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t i t x t t t t t i x x t t t x x x x x  3 6 4 . 8 0
1 7 2 9  jXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXtXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXtXXIXlXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXl  4 7 1 . 4 5
1 7 3 0  [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 4 1 4 , 1 0
1 7 3 2  J t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  1 7 3 . 6 5
1 7 3 6  { x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x i x i x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  2 2 0 . 0 0
1 7 3 7  j x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  2 4 2 . 3 5
1 7 3 8  J i x x x x x x x x x x x x i x x x x x x x x x  1 1 4 . 5 5
1 7 4 3  j x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x  8 6 < 6 5
1 7 4 4  j x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  ^ 3  IQ
1 7 4 5  [ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  2 2 1 . 1 5
1 7 4 6  j x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  2 5 6  2 0
1 7 4 8  j x x x x x x i x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  2 5 4 . 5 0
1 7 4 9  J x x x x x x x x i x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  3 2 0 . 1 0
1 7 5 8  j t x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  1 9 9 . 1 5
1 7 5 1  ' x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  j 2 6  1 0
1 7 5 4  J x x r x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x i t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x i x x i t x x t x t x i x x x x x x x t x x x x x t x x x x i x x x x x x x x  4 4 6 . 4 5
1 7 5 6  [ x x x x x x x x x x x x x i i i x x x u x x x x x x i x x x x x x m x x x x x x x x  2 2 6  3 0
1 7 5 7  J x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x t  1 3 4  2 0
1758  | XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 2 0 4  9 0
1759 |ttXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 228 60
1 7 6 0  j t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x t x x x x x t x  1 5 5  9 Q
1 7 6 2  [ t x r x x x t x x t x x t x x t t t x x x n t t x t x u x t x t x x x x x x x x x x  2 1 9  6 5
1 7 6 3  J t x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x t x x x t x x x x x x x x x x  1 6 0 . 6 5
1 7 6 5  J t x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x t t x x x t x x x t x x x t  1 7 1  2 0
1 7 6 7  j x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x i x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t  2 8 5 . 7 0
1 7 6 8  [ X t x x x x x x x x t x t x t x t t t t t t  t x x x i x i i t x m x x  1 8 4 . 6 0
1 7 6 9  j t t x x x x x x x x x x x x t x t x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x  2 5 1 . 6 5
1 7 7 5  j t i x i t x i x x x x x x x x t x t x i x i  1 0 9  q q
1 7 7 6  [ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  1 0 1 . 1 0
1 7 7 7  j t x x t t x t x t x t t x x x x t x x i i i x x  1 2 2  2 5
1 7 7 8  [ t x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  1 6 7 . 8 0
  + + + +  + + + +  + + ..............
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YEAR
1713 i t i t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t i t t t t t t t t t t t t i t i t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t 1211.65
1714 t t 45.25
1715 t t 45.95
1716 t t 30.05
1717 t  t t 50.80
1718 t t t 51.20
1719 t t t 55.00
1720 t t 40.30
1722 t t t 55.55
1723 t t 49.40
1725 t t 45.65
1726 t t t 58.60
1727 t t t 65.60
1728 t 15.65
1729 t t t t t 93.95
1730 t t t t t t t 133.15
1732 t t t t 85.30
1736 t t t t t 96.35
1737 t t t t t t t t 158.85
1738 t t t t t 107.05
1743 t t t t t 103.75
1744 t t t t t 92.10
1745 t t 30.35
1746 t t t 57.80
1748 t t 39.65
1749 t 28.60
1750 t 16.70
1751 t t t t 82.85
1754 t t 33.65
1756
1757 t
6.70
14.90
1758 t 23.75
1759 t 25.60
1760 t 28.70
1762 t 22.75
1763 t t 30.75
1765 t 19.00
1767 t t 38.90
1768 t 20.55
1769 t 11.90
1775 t t 35.20
1776 t 24.45
1777 t t 32.65
1778 t t t t  • 73.15
■ — 4 ........................ 4 .........................+ ......................- + ......................... + ..........................t -
200.00 400.00 600.00 800.00 1000.00 1200.00
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FIGURE 6 . f t .4: JIKSI ASSESSED QUAHTITY IN THE RABI HARVEST 
QASBA MALARNA
YEAR
1713 0 . 0 0
1714 2660.59
1715 tt************************************* 1961.67
1716 t t x x t t x x x x x x x x x t t t t t t t t t x x x 1328.84
1717 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x 1101.06
1718 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 8 6 6 . 2 1
1719 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 1169.31
1720 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 1048.63
1722 x x x x x t t x x x x x x t x t t x t x x x x t t x t x x x * 1560.45
1723 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 1307.43
1725 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x 3466.18
1726 x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t t t x x x x x x x x 2953.25
1727 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x t x x x 2534.37
1728 .. x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 2198.43
1729 t x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x t x 1479.88
1730 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x 2104.49
1732 x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 1510.34
1736 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 1048.26
1737 x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x t x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x 2153.79
1738 t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 2292.91
1743 x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x t x x x x x x x x x x z x x x t x t x t x x x x x x x i x x x t x x t 2522.86
1744 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x t x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x 3954.78
1745 x x x t x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x t x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t t 2436.20
1746 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t 1766,46
1748 x x x x t t x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x t x t x t x x x x x x x x x t x x t x t x t 2898.30
1749 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x t x x x x x 1989.02
1750 t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x t 2260.35
1751 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x t x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x 3556.41
1754 x x x t t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 2363.91
1756 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x 1590.64
1757 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 1673.94
1758 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 681.18
1759 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 743.79
1760 x x x t x t x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x 1716.04
1762 x x x x t x t x x x t x x x x t x x x x x t x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x t x t x 2195.11
1763 x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x 1444.01
1765 x t t x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x 1177.92
1767 x x x x x t x t x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x t x x x x x x x x t x t x x x x x x t x x x 3475.56
1768 x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 1498.45
1769 x x x x x x t x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x 1218.06
1775 t x x x t x x x t x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x 1743.96
1776 x t t x x x x t t t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x t x 1445,84
1777 x x x x x 260.71
1778 x x t t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 1817.47
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YEAR
i
i
1713 3815.39
1714 J * » «  351.02
1715 \ t t t t txxt txxx  8 9 5 5 9
1716 j t t i t t t t t t t t t t t t t *  1267.04
1717 { m m t t t t  7 3 9 . 9 7
1718 [ t m t m t t t t t t t x t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t  2302.59
1719 [ m m t t m t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t i t *  2705.15
1720 ^txxtxtxxxtxxxxxt t txxxt t t t t t t t t t t t txt t  2754.26
1722 [ t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t i t t t t t t t t t x t t t t t t t t t t t x t t t t t t t t  5195,02
1723 Jt txt t txxxt txxxxxtt txtxtxxttxxtxxxtxxtxxttxxtxtxtt t t txxxxxxxttxt t t txtxxxxttxt  5662.94
1725 I************************************************ 3623.97
1726 { m t t i t t t t t X t t t m t t t t t t t t t t  2121.82
1727 j t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t x t t t t x t t t  2679.74
1728 [ t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t ? ?  2791.38
1729 j t t t m t t t x t t t t t t t t t t x t t t t t t t x t t i i t x i t t x t t t  3180.53
1730 [ t * * * t * * t * * * * * t * * t t t t x t * t t t t t t t t t t t t  2626.18
1732 j t t t t t x t t t t t t t t x t t x t x t t  1612.62
1736 1057.76
1737 \ t t t t txxxxxt t txxt t t txt txt t txtxtxxtxx  2634.03
1738 \ t t i txxxxxxxxt t txtxxxtxt t txt t t t t t t txxxtxtxxxt t  3386.10
1743 [ * t t t t t x t i t t t t t t t x * t t t t t t  1810.28
1 7 4 4  J t t t t t t t t i t t t i t t x t t x t  9 9
1 7 4 5  | m m t t t x t t t t * t t t t t x t t t t t m t t t t m x t m t t t t t  3 4 ^q 3 1
1746 | t t t m t t t t t t t t t t t t m x m  1 2 ^ 2  4 1
1748 j x x m m m t m x t t t t t m  1 8 1 0  5 2
1 7 4 9  j t x x x t t m x x t t x t t t t t t m m m t x t t  2451 56
1750 { « « *  348^50
1751 [ t t i i t t t t t t x t t x t x t m t x t t x  1 8 9 3  2 5
I 7 5 4  [ t x i t t t t t t x x t t x xxxt t t x t x t t t t t t  2156 98
1756 J t x x x t t t t t t t t x t t x t x x t t t t x t x  I 9 7 9  9 4
17 5 7  [ t t t t x t t t t t t t  885.53
1758 J t t tx tx txx xx xx tx t  1169.98
1 7 5 9  j t x t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t  2 1 1 1  92
1760 [ t t t x t t t x t t t t x t  1030.73
1 7 6 2  j m x x t t t x t x t t t x t t t t t t t t  I 7 4 7  3 4
1 7 6 3  j m i x t t t t t t t t t x t t i t t  1483.27
1765 J t t t i t t t t t t i t t t x t t t t t t x t t t t  ^9 ^ 7  5 2
1767 [ m t t m t t t x t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t x x x x  2573.27
1768 J t t x t t t t t x t t t t t t x t x t t t t t t t m  2 1 1 5  4 4
1769 j t t t t t t t t t t t t t x t t t t t t t t t x t x  1 9 1 5  5 2
1 7 7 5  j t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t  1 5 3 9  9 8
1 7 7 6  [ t x t t x t x x t t t t t x m x t t  1496.25
17 7 7  | t m t t t t t m t t t t t t t x t t t t t t  1 9 7 7  ^g
1778 J t m m m t m  1018.00
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FIGURE 6.M.6: RABI REVENUE
QASBA MAIARNA
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YEAR
i
i
1713 [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 3511.25
1 7 1 4  jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxx 2970.25
1 7 1 5  [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1946.91
1 7 1 6  jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1351.12
1 7 1 7  «xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2173,40
1 7 1 8  jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1462.26
1 7 ig jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1133.44
1720 [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1247.54
1722 J************************* 1863.79
1723 jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1452.29
1 7 2 5  j xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 3 7 3 5   ^7 5
1726 [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 3680,97
1 7 2 7  jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2074.62
1728 [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2140.31
1 7 2 9  [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2199.37
1 7 3 0  *xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 3372.40
1732 1478.33
1 7 3 6  [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1685.68
1 7 3 7  j xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxttxttxttxxtx 4515.22
1738 . ! «  146,16
1 7 4 3  jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2704.65
1 7 4 4  jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 4709.91
1 7 4 5  [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1926.86
1 7 4 6  [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2174.41
1 7 4 8  jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxixxxxtxxtx 4383.75
1 7 4 9  [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2290.33
1 7 5 0  jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2215.72
1751 J XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 3662.73
1 7 5 4  [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 5088.45
1756 [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 3644.04
1 7 5 7  ■ jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2106.97
1758 Jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1456.19
1 7 5 9  jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1381.31
1760 [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2860.89
1762 [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2908.29
1 7 6 3  j xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2216.17
1765 [xxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1078.76
1 7 6 7  jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxtx 2822.08
1768 |xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1230 9 3
1 7 6 9  jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1297.24
1 7 7 5  [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1919.59
1776 [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1500.24
1777' [xxxxxxx 508.00
1778 j xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2508.14
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FIGURE 6.H.7: ANNUAL REVENUE
QASBA HALARNA
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FIGURE 6.P.1: ZABTI ASSESSED AREA IN THE KHARIF HARVEST 4 3 9
QASBA PHAGI
YEAR
1691 2588.05
1697 t t t t t t t t 565.70
1716 t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t 2789.85
1717 t t t t 292.30
1723 t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t 3333.00
1725 t t t t t t t i t t t t t t t t t t t t t 1603.65
1726 t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t 1431.95
1727 t t t t t t t t t t t t t t 1064.35
1729 t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t 4691.55
1730 t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t i 3790.80
1731 t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t 1323.70
1732 t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t x t t t t t t t t x t t t t z t 5036.25
1733 t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t x t t t t t t t t t t t t t z t t t t t t x t t t t t t t t x 3759.00
1734 t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t x t t t t t t t t t t x t t t x t t t t x t x t x x 3146.20
1736 t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t x 1571.15
1741 t t t t t t x t t t t t t t t t x t t t x t t t x t t t 2110.90
1742 t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t 1416.45
1743 t t t t t t t t x t t t t t t t t t t t t 1566.35
1744 t t x t t t t t t t t t x t t t t t t t t t t t t t t 2021.25
1746 t t t 243.80
1749 t t t t t t t t t t t t 905.45
1750 t t t t t t t t t t 782.10
1751 t t t x t t t 562.25
1753 t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t x x t t t 1887.30
1754 t t t t t t t t t t t t 899.10
1755 t 52.00
1757 t t t 224.95
1759 t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t 1176.80
1760 t t t t t t t t t t t 851.45
1778 t t t t t t t t t t t t 894.35
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IFIGURE 6.P.2: JIHSI ASSESSED QUANTITY IN THE KHARIF HARVEST
QASBA PHAGI
440
YEAR
i■
1691 2220.82
1697 j t t m m m t *  970.13
1716 { « * «  381.78
1717 ! « *  217.74
1723 ' t t t t t t t t t t z t t t t t t t t t t t t t t x t t t t t t t t t t t t t  2957.23
1725 ! « « « «  615.61
1726 J* 45.78 •
1727 5204.59
1729 2500.69
1730 | « « *  391.34
1731 J*******;** 640.67
1732 j m m t m m m t m  1498.96
1733 j m m m  707.99
1734 { m m m m m m m  1551.85
1736 J « « *  375.06
1 7 4 1  \ t x t t t t t t t  655.57
1 7 4 2  \ t i t t t t t t t t  74 9 .8 8
1743 4772,00
1744 j m m * * * * * *  888.03
1746 ! 12.68
1749 J « *  233.58
1750 \ n x t t t t t  625.51
1751 ; m » «  514 . 4 3
1753 ! t t t t t t t t t  691.03
17 5 4  ; m m m t t m m  1303.78
1755 J 20.46
1757 | 23.17
1759 , ' « * «  396.97
1760 | « «  315.71
1778 j t m m m m m x *  1325.00
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FIGURE 6.P.3: ZA8TI ASSESSED AREA IK THE RABI HARVEST
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QASBA PHAGI
xxxxxxxxxxxxx 32.10
mxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxt 115.75
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 206.20
*«xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx*xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 139.55
t t t t u t t t t t t t t t t t t  44.20
t t u t t t t t t t t t x t t  40.75
xxxxxxxtxxxxxx* 36.45
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 63.80
xtxxxtt txxtt txtxxxt  48.50
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxx 50.55
xxxxxxxxxxxxxtx 37.65
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 43.90
t t txxxt txtxt  30.60
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxtxtx 129.95
xxxxxxttxxxxxxxxtxxtxxxxxttttxx 78.25
txt txxttxt txxxtxt txxxtxxt  63.15
xxxxxxxxxxxxtitxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 97.60
txxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 151.25
XXXXXXXXXXXttXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXtXXX 109.00
xxtxxxxxtxtxxttxxxttx 52.50
txxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxtxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 190.65
txxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxttxtxttxxxxtxxxxxxx 162.85
xtxxxxxxxttxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxtxxx 137.20
t txxt t t t t t t t t t t t txxtxt txxxtxxxxxxxtxxxxt txt t t t t t i t t xt t t  136.35
xxxxxxxxxxitxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxtxxxx 176.40
xxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 70.85
txxxt t t txtxt t txt t txxt txtxtxxxxxxtxt txxxtxxxt t t txt t t t t t t t t t txxxxtxxtxxtx  177.75
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 44.05
txxtxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxtttxxtxxxxtxxxxxxx 159.80
txxxtxxxxxxtxxttxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxx 1 1 0 . 4 5
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FIGURE 6.-P.4: JIHSI ASSESSED QUANTITY IN THE RABI HARVEST
QASBA PHAGI
YEAR
ii
1 6 9 1  jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 10076.42
1697 ; « « «  1166.47
1716 [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 7635.77
1717 ! «  387.57
1723 ! * «  534.23
1725 !xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxx 15637.84
1726 | « «  727.41
1727 jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 7132.79
1 7 2 9  [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 5151.73
1730 jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 10943.64
1731 | « «  729.82
1732 jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxx 7409.05
1733 [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 4326.85
1734 jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 5856.76
1736 j « » «  1209.18
1741 J « « x x  1241.30
1742 [xxxxxxxx 1606.96
1743 [Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 3286.08
1 7 4 4  jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 5392.40
1746 | «  380.41
1 7 4 9  jtxxxxxxxxx 1904.48
1750 [xxxxxxx 1342.84
1 7 5 1  [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 3549.74
1753 [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2916.86
1754 [xxxxxxxxxxxx 2456.30
1755 J* 162.90
1757 1159,30
1759 ! «  383.76
1760 [xtxxxxxxxxxx 2363.05
1 7 7 8  [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 3763.47
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FIGURE 6,P.5: KHARIf REVENUE
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QASBA PHAGI
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FIGURE 6.P.6: RA8I REVENUE
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QASBA PHAGI
YEAR
1691 t t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 3963.21
1697 t t t t t 964.11
1716 t x x x t x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 6575.07
1717 x x x x x 1043.57
1723 x t x x x 923.95
1725 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x 12256.93
1726 x x x x x 1037.19
1727 t t x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 7921.57
1729 x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x X X X 6855,57
1730 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x t x x x x 13624.13
1731 t t x t t x x x 1679.35
1732 t t x x x x x x x x x t t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 7433.80
1733 x x x x t x x x x t x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x 4995.26
1734 t x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x t x x x x x x t x x x x x t t 8155.89
1736 t x x t x x X X X 1833.95
1741 x x x x x x 1136.17
1742 t x x x x x t x x x x t t 2559.45
1743 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 4103.76
1744 x x x x x t x t x t x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 6085.98
1746 XX 491.37
1749 t x x x x t x x x x x x 2345.26
1750 t x x x t x x x 1627.36
1751 t x t x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x 3856.46
1753 t x x x t x t x x x t x x x x x x 3412.61
1754 t x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x t t x x x x x x x x x 5306.10
1755 X X 410.94
1757 u x x x x x t 1605.66
1759 t x t 642.32
1760 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 2926.53
1778 t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t t x x x t x 4736.58
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FIGURE 6.P.7: ANNUAL REVENUE
QASBA PHAGI
445
YEAR
i
i
1691 [ t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t i t t  7 3 0 5 .0 7
I 6 9 7  j m m m t t *  2393.50
1716 . 9167.82
1717 j m m m  1869.55
1723 7589.08
1725 \ t t t z t z t t t t z t t t t t t t z t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t i t t t t t t t t x t t t x t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t x x t t t t x t  14172.99
1726 2252.00
1727 ' txxxtxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxtxt t t txxtxt txxt txxxt txt t t t t txt t i t t t t txt txt t  13418,18
1 7 2 9  >txtxxxt txxxxxxxxtxxxxxxt t t t t t txxt t t t t txt t txt t txxt t t t t t t t t txtxtxt tx ' 13273.85
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FIGURE 6 .S .1 :  ZABTI ASSESSED AREA IN THE KHARIF HARVEST 
QASBA SANGANER
YEAR
1712 2386.85
1713 2448.45
1715 236S.6S
1716 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x t x x t x x x x x x x x 2092.00
1728 x x x x t x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x t x x t x x x x x t x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x t x 2430.05
1730 x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 2170.55
1731 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 1747.30
1732 x x x x x x x t x x x x x x t x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 2406.15
1736 t t t t t t x x x x x x x t t t x x t t t x t t t x x x t t x t t t t t t x x t x t t t x 2261.30
1737 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x 2579.65
1739 x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 2698.30
1740 x x x x x x x x t x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x t x t x x x x x x x x t x x 2341.35
1741 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 2462.60
1742 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x t t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 2459.30
1743 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x 2091.30
1744 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 1334.75
1745 x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x t x x x x x 2153.00
1746 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 2084.00
1747 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 2849.25
1748 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 1853,75
1755 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x 1597.35
1760 t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 1027.05
1763 t x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 1133.25
1770 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 1520.20
1771 t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x t x 1547.90
1772 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t 1115.60
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FIGURE 6.S.2: JINSI ASSESSED QUANTITY IN THE KHARIF HARVEST
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QASBA SANGANER
YEAR
ii
1712 J************************** 129,26
1713 'xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 92.28
1715 [XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 201.34
1 7 1 6  jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx |06 64
1728 jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtx 233.03
1730 jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 155.38
1731 !« * * *  24.88
1 7 3 2  jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 168.38
1736 { m m m m  5 0 0 8
1 7 3 7  328,46
1 7 3 9  jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 95,08
1740 jew****************** 107 0 4
1 7 4 1  jxxxxxxxxxx 48.42
1 7 4 2  'xxxxxxxxxxxx 5 B - 8 0
1 7 4 3  jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 9 9  9 ^
1744 1* 5.29
1745 jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 99,07
1746 jxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 71.87
1 7 4 7  [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1 3 6  5 9
1 7 4 8  jxxxxxxxxxxxtxx 69.85
1755 ; « «  2L56
1760 | xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 223 24
1763 jxxxxxxxxxxx 5 3  0 i
1770 jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1 3 3  3 2
1 7 7 1  * xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1 2 3  7 4
1 7 7 2  jxxxxxxxx 38 > ' 4 7
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FIGURE 6 . S .3: ZA8 TI ASSESSED AREA IN THE RA8 I HARVEST 
QASBA SANGANER
XMXXXtttXXXXtXttXiSXS* 453.70
466.95
x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x t x x t x x x x x x t x x x 770.95
x x x x t x x x x x t x x t x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x t x x t x x 850.70
x x x x x x t x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x 628.95
x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x 660.35
x x x x x x x x x x x t t x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x 636.55
x x t t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 725.45
x x x x x x x x t x t x t x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x t x x x 630.15
x x x x t x x t x x x t x x x x x x t x t t x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 828.75
x t x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x t x x x x x t t x t x x 877.00
x x x x x t x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x t x t x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x t t t x x 1120.35
x x t t x x x x x t x x x x t x x x x x x t x x x x x t x t x t x t x x x x x x t t t x x t t x t x t 1013.90
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x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x t t t x x t x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x t t t x x x x t t t x x x t x x x x t x x x x x 1362.30
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t t x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x t t x x x x 1101.80
x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x t t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 775.20
x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x t t x x x 1158.05
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x t x x t t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 970.80
x x x x x x x x t x x x x x t x x x x x t x x t x x x x x t x x x x x 709.10
x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x t x x x x t t x x x x 662.20
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x 729.00
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x 583.80
x x x x t x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x 468.20
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FIGURE 6,S.4: JINSI ASSESSED QUANTITY IN THE RA8I HARVEST 449
QASBA SANGANER
YEAR
1712 2545.52
1713 2930.01
1715 544,88
1716 2786.20
172B xxtxxtttxxxxxxxxtxttxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxx 2848.91
1730 XXttXXXXXtXXXXtXXXXXXXXXXXXtXXXXXXXXXXttttXXttXXttttXitx 4220.59
1731 tXXXXXtXXXXXXXXtXXXXtXXXXXXXXXXXXXXtXtXX 2973.34
1732 txtxxxxxxxxxxttxxxtxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxtxxtxtxxxx 3730.66
1736 ttXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXtXXtXtX 2327.78
1737 XXXXtXtXXXXXXXXtXXXXXXXXtXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 2970.96
1739 ttxxxxxtxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxtttxxxtxxxxxxtxxxtxxxtxxxxxxxt 4172.50
1740 xxttxtxtxxxtxtxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxtxxxxtxxxxxxxxxtx 3732.90
1741 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxtttxxtxxxxxtxxxxtxxt 3030.43
1742 txtxxxttttxttxxxxxxxttxxxxxxxt 2251.21
1743 txtt txtttxxtxxxtxttxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxttxttxxxxxtttt 3681.43
1744 xxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxttttxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxttxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxtttttxttt 4933.62
1745 txttttxtxxxtxttttxxxxxxxxxxxxtxtxxxxxxxt 2983.07
1746 txtxxxxxxxxxtxxtxxxxxxxtxtx 2019.19
1747 tt txxttxxxxxxxtxtxtx 1472.94
1748 txxxxxtxxxxxtxxtxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxx 2663.83
1755 xxxttxtttxtxtxxxxxxx 1531.02
1760 txxxxttxtxtxxxxtxtxxxxxx 1800.44
1763 txttxxttxxxxtxxxtxxxxxttxxtxxxx 2298.19
1770 ttxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxttxxxxxxxtxxxx 2390.90
1771 xxtttxxxttxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxtxtx 3539.62
1772 txxtxxxxxtttxxxxxxxxxxxtxtxtxxxxxxxxxxxxx 3106.24
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FIGURE 6.S.5: KHARIF REVENUE
QASBA SANGANER
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  4 6 7 8 . 9 7
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x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  4 0 2 8 . 1 8
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  3 6 6 9 . 6 6
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  2 9 0 7 . 5 7
x x x x x x x t x t x x x t x t x x x t x t x t x x t t x t x x t x x t t x x x t x t x t x x x x x x t t t  4 0 3 5 . 4 9
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x t t x t t x t t  4 6 0 5 . 8 4
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x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  4 3 7 4 . 5 0
x x x t x x x t x x x x t x x x x x x t x t x t x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x  4 0 3 4 . 7 4
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  4 5 9 2 . 6 1
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  4 5 2 7 , 0 6
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x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  2 9 3 9 . 0 0
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x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  2830 96
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FIGURE 6.S.6: RABI REVENUE
QASBA SANGANER
YEAR
1 7 1 2
i
i
• x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x XXXXXXXXXt XXXXXXXXXXXXt XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 7 2 1 8 , 8 8
1 7 1 3
1 7 1 5
• x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
j x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 4 6 7 0 , 8 5
1 4 9 2 . 7 8
1 7 1 6 |  x x x x x x x  x x x  x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 3 8 3 0 . 0 2
1 7 2 8 j x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX! 4 3 1 3 . 6 0
1 7 3 0 j x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 6 3 5 1 . 8 7
1 7 3 1 J x x x x x t x x t x t t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x 7 6 9 9 . 2 3
1 7 3 2 J x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x X X X X X X X X X X X ! X X X X X X X X X ! x x x x x x x x x 5 1 0 3 . 4 4
1 7 3 6 • x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 5 2 0 5 . 5 2
1 7 3 7 • x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 6 2 7 8 . 2 0
1 7 3 9 • X X X X t X X X X t X i X X X X X X X x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x t x x t x x x 7 3 2 9 . 1 3
1 7 4 0 • x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 5 3 4 4 . 9 6
1 7 4 1 • x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 5 5 1 2 . 3 9
1 7 4 2 Jx x x x x x x x x x t X X X X X X X X XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 5 6 8 2 . 7 9
1 7 4 3 ‘ XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX! t x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x 7 9 3 1 . 1 4
1 7 4 4 ' x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x XXXXXXXXXXXX!XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX!XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX!x x x x x 9 2 3 1 . 2 0
1 7 4 5 ' x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x XXXXXIXXXXXX 3 3 1 6 . 8 9
1 7 4 6 • x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x XI XXXXXXXXXXXXXX 3 7 4 7 . 3 0
1 7 4 7 • x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX!! 4 1 0 7 . 9 4
1 7 4 8 * x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 5 9 7 9 . 5 6
1 7 5 5 ] t x x t x x t x x x x x x t i x x x t XXXCXIXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 5 8 8 2 . 1 2
1 7 6 0 ' XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX t x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x 3 6 8 3 . 7 6
1 7 6 3 ' t s x x x x t x x x x t t x t x x X x XXXXXXXI XXXXXXXXXXXXXX! ! ! 4 5 5 5 . 2 0
1 7 7 0 ‘ XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX! XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 3 6 1 3 . 2 8
1 7 7 1 JXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX! x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x 4 6 3 3 . 0 2
1 7 7 2 I XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX! x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x X 4 0 0 9 . 0 0
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FIGURE 6.S.7: ANNUAL REVENUE
QASBA SANGANER
YEAR
1712 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 1 1 8 9 7 . 8 5
1713 t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 1 0 2 9 7 . 1 2
1715 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 7 9 0 2 . 9 1
1716 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 10201.88
1728 t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 8 3 4 1 . 7 8
1730 x x x t x t x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x t 1 0 0 2 1 . 5 3
1731 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 1 0 6 0 6 . 8 0
1732 x x x t x x t t t x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x t t x x x x t t x x x t 9 1 3 8 . 9 3
1736 x x x x x t t x x t x x x x x x x x x x t x x x t x t x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x 9 8 1 1 . 3 6
1737 x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x t x t t x t t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x 1 1 2 6 8 . 2 6
1739 x t t x t t t t t t x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x t x x x x x t x x x x x x x t x t x x t t t x x t x x x 1 1 7 0 3 . 6 3
1740 t x x x t x x x t x x x x x x t t x t t x x x x x t x x x t x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x 9 3 7 9 . 7 0
1741 t t x x x x x t x x x x t t x x x x x x t t x x x x t t x x x x x x x x x t t x x x x x x x x t t x x 1 0 1 0 5 . 0 0
1742 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 1 0 2 0 9 . 8 5
1743 x x x x x x t x x t x x x x t x t x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x t t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x 1 1 1 3 7 . 3 0
1744 x t t t x x x x x x x t x x x x t x x x x x t x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x t x t x x t x 1 1 2 1 9 . 7 4
1745 x t t t x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 6 6 0 5 . 1 5
1746 t t x x t x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 7 4 5 1 . 4 2
1747 x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 8 6 7 7 . 3 0
1748 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x 8 8 9 3 . 3 0
1755 x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 8 8 2 1 . 1 2
1760 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 5 4 6 4 . 2 8
1763 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 6 3 4 7 . 4 0
1770 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 6 4 4 4 . 2 4
1771 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x 7 4 1 4 . 3 0
1772 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 5 8 8 2 . 9 3
 +  +  +  + —
2 0 0 0  4000 60 00  8000 10000
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RUPEES
FIGURE 6 . I . I :  ZA8 TI ASSESSED AREA IN THE KHARIF HARVEST 
0AS8A LALSOT
453
YEAR
1 7 1 2 xxxxxxxxtxxxtxtttxtxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2 2 2 7 . 2 0
1 7 1 3 xxxxxxxxttttxttxxtxxxxxxxxtxxx 1 5 0 5 . 2 5
1 7 1 4 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtttxtxxxtxtxtxtxtxxxxxxttx 2 0 4 8 . 7 0
1 7 1 6 xxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxttxxxx 2 1 5 5 . 8 5
1 7 1 7 txttxxtxxxttxtxxxxxxxttxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxtxtttxxt 2 6 5 4 . 4 5
1 7 1 8 txxttxtxxxxxxtxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxttxxxxxxxxxxxxxxt 2 6 0 8 . 7 0
1 7 1 9 xxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxtxtxxxxxxxxxtx 1 5 8 0 . 2 5
1 7 2 0 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxtxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2 2 4 0 . 5 5
1 7 2 1 xxxxxxxtxtxxxttxtxtxxtxxxxxxxttxxx 1 6 8 1 . 4 5
1 7 2 2 xxxtxxxxtxxttxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxx 2 0 4 7 . 3 5
1 7 3 1 xxxxxxtxxxxtxtxttttxxxxxxtxxxxtxxxxxxtttxxtxxxtxxxtxxxxtxx 2 8 9 9 . 8 5
1 7 3 3 xxxxxxxxxxxxxtxtttxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxtxtxx 2 4 7 2 . 4 0
1 7 3 4 xxxxxxxxtxtxxxxtxxxtttxtxxtxxxxtttxxxxxxxttxttt 2 3 4 1 . 4 0
1 7 3 7 xxtttxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxttxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxtxtxxxxttttxt 3 0 8 2 . 4 0
1 7 3 9 txxxxxttttttxttxxxtxtxxttxtxxtxxtxttxxxxxtxxtxxxtttxxxxxtxxxxxxxxx 3 2 8 2 . 7 5
1 7 4 0 txxxttxxxtxxtxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxtttxtxtxxxtxxxxxttx 2 9 1 9 . 2 0
1 7 4 1 txxxxxxtxtxxxtxxxxxxxxxxtttxxxxxttxttxtxxxxxxxxttxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxx 3 2 4 4 . 8 5
1 7 4 5 xxxxxtxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxx 2 5 1 7 . 9 5
1 7 4 7 xxxxxxttxttxxxtxxxxtxttttxxxxxxxtxtxtxxtxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2 8 7 9 . 4 5
1 7 4 8 xxtxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxtxxxx 3 1 1 2 . 2 5
1 7 5 3 xxxxxxtttxxtxxxxtxttxxtxtttxxxxxxxxtxxxxttxxxttttttt 2 5 9 4 . 2 0
1 7 5 4 xxxxxtxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxtxttxxtxtxxxxxtxx 2 9 6 6 , 4 0
1 7 5 6 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtttxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2 0 2 8 . 8 5
1 7 5 7 X X X X x X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X xxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxtxxxxxx 2 5 3 5 . 7 0
1 7 5 8 txxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2 3 3 7 . 9 0
1 7 6 1 xtxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxttxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2 6 1 8 . 8 5
1 7 6 2 txxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxttxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2 6 5 3 . 2 0
1 7 6 4 txxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2 2 1 7 . 9 5
1 7 6 5 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxttxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 2 3 1 9 . 9 5
1 7 6 7 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxtxxxtxx 1 4 6 4 . 9 5
1 7 6 8 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxttxxxxxxxxtxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxttx 2 3 1 0 . 7 0
1 7 7 0 txxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxx 2 4 8 0 . 0 0
1 7 7 7 txxxtxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1 5 9 6 . 9 0
.............. +...............+.............. +.............. 4...............+...............t ..............4“
4 0 0 . 0 0  8 0 0 . 0 0  1 2 0 0 . 0 0  1 6 0 0 . 0 0  2 0 0 0 . 0 0  2 4 0 0 . 0 0  2 8 0 0 . 0 0  3 2 0 0 . 0 0
8IGHAS
FIGURE 6.L.2: JINSI ASSESSED QUANTITY IN THE KHARIF HARVEST 4 5 4
QAS8 A LALSOT
YEAR
i
i
1712 j m m m t m m m m t m m m m m  766.23
1 7 1 3  j m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m  1028.30
1 7 1 4  j m m m m m m m m t *  524.47
1 7 1 5  j m t m m m  265,64
1 7 1 7  j m t m m m  257.65
1718 994.23
1719 j m m m m m m m t m m m  610.18
1720 j m m m m m  297.03
1721 J t m m m t t i m t t t t m *  459.63
1722 J m m m m t m m m m t m m m t m m  839.50
1731 j m m m m  232.90
1 7 3 3  j m t m m m  257.20
1 7 3 4  j m t m m m  250.54
1 7 3 7  j m t m m m m m  385.88
1739 J 0.00
1740 ! « « «  123.56
1741 j m m m  175.79
1745 j m m m m  246.78
1 7 4 7  [ m m m m m m m m m m m  656.65
1748 J » « *  99.38
1753 j m m m  173,72
1754 \ t t t t t t t  149.89
1756 { « * «  102.12
1757 | m  68.53
1758 j m m m  184.82
1761 !** 46.21
1762 j t m m m  1 9 4 . 6 3
1764 [ t t t u t t t t  186.21
1765 ! « * «  102.94
1767 J t m m  132.49
1768 J t m m m  195.76
1770 J t m  75.46
1777 J*  16.65
 + + + + + -
200.00 400.00 600.00 800.00 1000.00
MAUNDS
FIGURE 6.L.3: ZA8TI ASSESSED AREA IN THE RA8I HARVEST
4 5 5
QAS8A LAISOT
YEAR
1712 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x 1770.25
1713 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 3078.90
1714 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t t x x x x x x x x x x x 2275.50
1716 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X t 2176.10
1717 t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x 2064.20
1718 t x t x x x x x x x x t x x x x x t t t t x x t t x x x t x t x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x 2515.30
1719 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x 2324.65
1720 t x x t x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x t t x 2285.25
1721 t x x x x x x x x t x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 2057.45
1722 t x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t t t x x x x x x x 2546.55
1731 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x t x x x x t t x x 2313.55
1733 t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 2052.45
1734 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X t X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 2239.25
1737 x x x x t x t x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x t x x x x 2591.70
1739 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x t x x x x t x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x t 3039,15
1740 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t t x x x x x x x x x x x x x t 2918.00
1741 t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x t x x x x x x t x x x x x t 2191.95
1745 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x t x x x x t x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x 2897.25
1747 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x t x t t t x 2380.35
1748 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x t x t 2194.40
1753 t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x 2374.75
1754 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x t x x x t x x 2366.00
1756 t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x t t t x 2367.35
1757 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x t 2544.40
1758 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x 1715.00
1761 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1956.55
1762 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x 2496.55
1764 0.00
1765 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 2215.35
1767 t x x  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x t x x x x x x x t x t t x x t t t x t t t t t 2745.65
1768 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1569.90
1770 t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 1141.25
1777 x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 1507.78
400.00 800.00 1200.00 1600.00 2000.00 2400.00 2800.00
8IGHAS
FIGURE 6.L.4: JINSI ASSESSED QUANTITY IN THE RA8I HARVEST
QASBA LALSOT
YEAR
i
1712 ! O.OO.
1713 ! 0.00
1714 I* 10.20
1716 [ ********************************************************************************* 605.96
1717 J 3.28
1718 12.94
1719 j *************************************************** 380.61
1720 j ************ 89,11
1721 j************************ ' 178.51
1722 !* 8.22
1731 | 0.88
1733 | ******** 59.70
1734 J ***************************************************** 401.03
1737 !« * *  27.34
1739 J** 18.21
1740 <********* 64.71
1741 { m m  47.48
1745 J*********** 83.28
1747 | 0.66
1748 | 0.00
1753 ; 0.00
1754 j 0.00
1756 J 3.38
1757 J 0.00
1758 J 0.00
1761 | 0.00
1762 ! ' 0.00
1764 1 0.00
1765 ! 0.00
1767 [ 0.00
1768 J 0.00
1770 \ t t t txxxxx 68.92
1777 ! 0.00
.................. i .................+................ +................+................+................+............... + - - ............+ .................+.................i -
60.00 120.00 180,00 240.00 300.00 360.00 420.00 480.00 540.00 600.00
HAUNDS
YEAR
1712
1713
1714
1716
1717
1718
1719
1720
1721
1722
1731
1733
1734
1737
1739
1740
1741
1745
1747
1748
1753
1754
1756
1757
1758
1761
1762
1764
1765
1767
1768
1770
1777
457
FIGURE 6.1.5: KHARIF REVENUE
QASBA LAISOT
x x x x t t t x x t x x x X X X X i t t t x x t x z x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x t t x z t x x z z x x t t t
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x t t x t x x x t x t x t x x x x t x t t x x t t x x x x t t x x x x x t x t x i t t t x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t X t x x t t x t x t x x t x x x x x t x x x x x t x t x t x x t t x t
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t t t t x x t t t t t t x x t z t t t x x x t x t x t t t x t x x x x x t x t x x x t x t i x x t t t x t t x x t
x x x x x x x x x x x x x X X X x t t x t t t x t t x t x x t x t x t x t x x x x x x x t x t x t x x x x x x t x t x x x x x x x x x x t t x x t x t x t t x t t x t t t t x x
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x t x x x t t x x t x t x t t x t x t x t t t t x x t
x x x x x x x x x x x x x X X X z z x t x x x t t x t i t x x x x t t t x t x i x x x x x t x i x x x x
t x x x x x x x t x x x x x x t x x x t t t t t x t x t x x x t x x t x x x x x x t x t t x
x x x x x x x x x x x x x X X X x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x t x t x x x x x x x x x x t t t x t x
x t x x x x x x x x x x t x t x x t x x x t x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x t x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x t x x t t x x x x x x x x t x x x x t
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x t t x x x x x x t x t x x x z x x x x t t t x t x x t x x x x x x x t t t x x t x
x x x x x x x x x x x x x X X X x t x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t t x x t t x x x x x x t t t t x t x x x x x t
x x x t x x x x x x x x t i t t x x t x x t t t t t x x x x x x x t t t x x x x x t x x x x x x t x x x t t x i x x t t x x t t x x x x t x t x x x t x x t x x x
x x x x x x x x x x x x x X X X x x x t x x x t x t x x t x x t t t x t x x x x t x t x t x x x x x x t x x x t x x x t x x t t x t x x t x x
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RUPEES
FIGURE 6.L.6: RA8I REVENUE
QAS8A LALSOT 458
YEAR
1712 x x x x x x x x x t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t 1780.82
1713 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 3250.66
1714 t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x 2405.93
1716 x t x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 3026.53
1717 t X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 2198.29
1718 i x x x t x x t x x x x x x x x t x x x t t x x t x x x x x x x x t x x x 2758.53
1719 t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 2955.02
1720 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x t t t x 2544.88
1721 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x t x x x x x 2370.47
1722 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 2583.76
1731 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x t x x x x x x x t x t x x x x t x t t x x x x x x t t t x x x t x 4156.85
1733 t t x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x t x t x x x x x x x x t x x t 3831.22
1734 t x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x t x t x x x t x t x x x x x x x 4762.01
1737 t x x x x x x x x t x t t x x x x x x x x x x x t x t x x x x t x x t x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x t 4957.72
1739 x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x t x x x x t t x x x x x t x x x t x t t x t t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 5615.60
1740 t x x x x t x t x t x x x x x t t x x x x x x x t x x t x x t x t x x x x x x x x x x x t t t x x t x t x t x x x x x x x x x x t t x x x x x x x x x 5622.53
1741 t t x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x t x x t t t t t t t t t x t 4194.31
1745 x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 5483.54
1747 x x x x . x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x t t t t x x x x x t x x x x t x t x t x x x t t x t t x 4264.10
1748 x x x x x x x x t t x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x t x t t t x x x t 3805.97
1753 x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 3731.89
1754 t x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x 3950.07
1756 t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x 4359.31
1757 t t x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x 4476.10
1758 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x t x t x x x x x x x x x 3172.90
1761 x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t t x x x XXXXXXXXXXX 3431.29
1762 t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x t x t x x x x x x x x x t t x x x x x x t x t x x x x t x x x x t x t x x 4431.94
1764 0 . 0 0
1765 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x t x x x x 4096.63
1767 t t x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x t x t t x x x x x x x x x x t x 3619.43
1768 x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x t x t x t x 2676.63
1770 t x t x x x t t x t x x x t x x x x x x x x x x t t x x 2090.66
1777 t x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x t x 1846.44
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FIGURE 6.1,7: ANNUAL REVENUE
4 5 9
QASBA LALSQT
YEAR
II
1712 ' x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x t x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x 5399-730
1713 j x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t t x x t x x 7639.320
1714 j x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 5271.820
1716 j x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x 5890.490
1717 [ x x x x x t x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 6089.980
1718 j x x i x t t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x 7434.360
1719 j x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 5426.450
1720 j x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 5426.030
1721 j x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 4963.970
1722 J x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 5946.360
1731 J x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x 8601.170
1733 j i x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 7050.500
1734 j x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x 8035.810
1737 | X x l X l X i X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 9308.510
1739 J X X X I X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ! 9477.130
1740 [ X X X X X I X X I X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X I X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 9116.600
1741 j X t X I l l X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X t X X X X X X x x x x x x x 8230.770
1745 j x x x t x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 8388.740
1747 [ X X X Z X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X x x x x x x 8106.800
1748 j X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X I X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 6821.790
1753 j x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 6536.320
1754 jxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 7148.330
1756 J X X X X I X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 6765.150
1757 j X X x X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X t X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 7121.140
1758 J t X X X X X X X X X X X X X X l X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 5812.690
1761 [ X X X X X X t X X t X X X X t X l X t X X t X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X t X X X t X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 6187.510
1762 j X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X t X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X I X X X X X 7415.520
1764 J x t t i x x x x x t x x x t t x x x x t x x t x x 2515.910
1765 j X x l X X X T X X X X X X X X X X X X t X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 6577.290
1767 j X X X X X X X I t x t x X X X X X X X X X X l X X X X X X X X X t l X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 5327.940
1768 ; t x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x t x t x x x x t x t x x x x x x x x x x x 5201.640
1770 | X X t x x X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ! 4208.530
1777 J X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 3512.270
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FIGURE 6.J.1: ZABTI ASSESSED AREA IK THE KHARIF HARVEST
QASBA JAIPUR
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FIGURE 6.J.2: JINSI ASSESSED QUANTITY IN THE KHARIF HARVEST
QASBA JAIPUR
YEAR
1728 * * * * * * * 68 .43
1729 * * * * * * 57.13
1736 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 668.85
1737 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 194.23
1739 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 480.70
1741 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 672.67
1742 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 623.29
1743 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 281.00
1744 * * * * * * * * * * * 111.91
1745 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 709.53
1746 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 278.19
1747 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 515.20
1750 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 857.66
1755 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 244.27
1756 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 886.07
1757 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 167.16
1759 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 173.79
1762 * * * * 42.23
1763 * * * * 39.46
1767 * * * * * * * * * * * * * 125.13
1768 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 144.82
1769 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 391.39
1770 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 292.91
1771 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 150.32
1772 * * * * * 51.30
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FIGURE 6 . J .3 :  ZA8TI ASSESSED AREA IN THE RABI HARVEST 
QASBA JAIPUR
YEAR
1728 70.30
1729 x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x 164.60
1736 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t t t x t x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x 417.70
1737 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x t 473.25
1739 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x 277.50
1741 t x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 318.20
1742 t x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 558.85
1743 t t t t t t t t t t t x t t t t t t t t x t t x t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t 570.45
1744 t t x t x x t x x x t t x x t x x t x x x t t t x x x x x t t t t x t x t t t x t x t t t x x x t x x t x x x x t x t t x t x 629.35
1745 t t i t t t t t x t t t x x x x x x x x x x t x t x t x t t x x t t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 622.75
1746 x x x x x x x x t x x x t x x t t x x x x x x x t x x t x x t t t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t t t x x x 577.45
1747 ' x x x x x x t x x x x x t x x x t t x x x t x x t x x 274.15
1750 x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x t t x t x t t x x t x x t t x x x x x x x x x x x x x 424.55
1755 t x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x t t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t t t t x x x x t x t x x x x t x x x x x x x x t t t x x x x x x x t x x x x t x t x t x x 931.00
1756 t x x t x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x t x x x t x x x x x x x t x x t x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x 759.15
1757 x x x x x t x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x t x x x x x x x t x x x t x x x x x x x t x x x x t x x x t t t t x x x x x x x t x t t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 883.55
1759 x x x x x x x x t t x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x t x x x t t x x x x x x x t x 710.40
1762 x t x t x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x t t x t x x t x x x x t x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x i x x x x x x t x x x t 769.98
1763 t t x x x x x x x x x x x x t t x x x t x x x x x x x x x t t t x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x t t x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x 884.40
1767 x t x x x x x x t x x x x x x t x x x x t t t x x x t x x x x t x t x x x t x t x t t t x x x x x x t x x x x x t x x x x x x 630.90
1768 t x x x x x x x x x x t x t x x x x x x x t x t x x t t x t t x x x t x x t x t x t x x x x x x t x x x x x t x x t t x x x x x x x x x x x x 714.30
1769 x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x t x t t t x x x x x x x t t x x x x t x x x x x x t x x t x x x t t x x x x x x x 870.70
1770 x x x x x x t t x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x t x x x t x x x x x x t t x t x x x t t x t t x t t t t x x x x t t x x x x x t 725.85
1771 t x x t x x x x t t x x x x x x x t x x x x x t x t x x t x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t t t t x x x x x x x x x x x t x t 659.50
1772 t x x x t x t t x x x t x x x x x t x x x x x x x t x x x t x x t x x x x x x t x t t x x t x x x t x x t x x t x t t x t x x x x x t t x x x x x x x 746.30
— + ......................................................  + ....................+ ..............................+ ............................. + ...........................' + .............................. + — .........................i —
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FIGURE 6.J.4: JINSI ASSESSED QUANTITY IN THE RABI HARVEST
QASBA JAIPUR
YEAR
1728 i 10.46
1729 txxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtx 657.01
1736 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 516.20
1737 txxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtx 458.70
1739 ttxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxx 394.75
1741 txxxxxxxxxtxxxxttxxxxxxx 488.78
1742 txxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 651.61
1743 xxxxxxxxtxtxxxxxtxxxttxxxxt 534.24
1744 txxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxtxtxtxxx 867.38
1745 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 834.01
1746 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxtxtxxxtttxttxxxxxxxttx 1133.31
1747 xxxxxxtxxtxtxxxxxtxtxxtzxxxxx 573.88
1750 xxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxx 555.02
1755 xxxxxxtxtxxxxxxxtxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxttxxxtxxttxxxxxxxxxxttxxttxxx 1213,57
1756 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxttxxttxxttxxxxtxxxxttt 977.89
1757 xxxxxttxxxxxxxxxxttxxxxxxxxxtxxxttxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxx 102S.57
1759 ttxxxxxxxxxxtxttxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxtxtttxx 769.51
1762 xxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxttxxxxxxxx 576.84
1763 txxxtxxtttxxxtxtxxxxtxxxxxxxxttxttxtxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxx 1175.58
1767 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1319.45
1768 ttxxtxtxxxtxtxxxtxtxxxxxxxxttttxttttxtxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxt 1230.78
1769 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxttxxxxtxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxx 997.93
1770 xxxxxxxxttxxxxtxxxttxxxxxxxxtxtxxtttxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxtx 1073.58
1771 txxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 1700.62
1772 txxxtxxxxxxxxtxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxtttxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxx 1726.28
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FIGURE 6.J.S: KHARIF REVENUE
QASBA JAIPUR
464
YEAR
1728 ** 134.51
1729 x x 124.83
1736 x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x 2983.90
1737 t i x x x x t x x x t x x x x x x x x t x x x x t 1841.95
1739 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 1702.14
1741 x x x x x x t x t t x t t t x t x x t t x t x t 1823.05
1742 t t t t x t t x t t x x t x t t t t t x x x t x x x x t t t t 2321.62
1743 t t t x x x x x x t x x x x t t t t x x x 1609.77
1744 t x t t t x x x t x t x x x x t x 1307.37
1745 t t t t t t x t x t t x t t x x t t x x t t t x x x x 1989.59
1746 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 1394.54
1747 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 1698.38
1750 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 2561.73
1755 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 3027.55
1756 x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x t x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x t x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 5245.31
1757 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x t x x t x 1872.39
1759 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 1583.32
1762 x x x x x x x x x x x x 922.99
1763 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 1366.77
1767 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 1913.63
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FIGURE 6.J.6: RABI REVENUE
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Appendix 7: Khasra of Mauza Naelo: Rabi Harvest. 1734.
The khasras were an essential part o f the body o f in fo rm ation  w hich provided 
the basis fo r  the com pilation o f the revenue lia b ility  o f ind iv idua l taxpayers. The 
com pilation o f khasra papers seems to have been a regular part o f the M ughal 
revenue adm inistrative practice.^ The com pilation o f the khasra was the f irs t step 
towards ascertaining the ind iv idua l lia b ility  o f each revenue payer. They were 
prepared separately fo r each prim ary fiscal un it -  the village or qasba -  and record 
the crop areas sown or quantity o f each crop produced by each assessee. The 
arhsatta figures were abstracts drawn from  the khasras fo r  each fiscal un it which 
record only the gross totals fo r  each crop w ithou t reference to the taxpayer. The 
value o f the khasras lie  in  that they provide us w ith  an insight in to  the cropping 
pattern o f ind iv idua l agriculturists in  the village. U nfo rtuna te ly , there are few 
khasras that have been found fo r  the eighteenth century and the m a jo rity  o f these 
are incomplete.
A  khasra was prepared separately fo r  each agricu ltura l season and gave the 
exact date o f com pilation along w ith  the likh tang or deed o f agreement signed by 
the patel and patwari o f the village, ve rify in g  the details o f the measurement as 
well as accepting responsibility fo r  any subsequent shortfalls. In  accordance w ith  
the two d istinct modes o f revenue assessment, batai jin s i and zabti, two sets o f 
figures under these heads were recorded in  the khasra.
The form at fo r crops assessed according to the zabti system is un ifo rm . The 
length, breadth, and area o f each p lo t is given along w ith  the name o f the assessee 
and the crop grown. Occasionally, the area o f plots affected by crop fa ilu re  were
- 4 6 7 -
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also entered under the head o f "nabud". In  the khasras examined, in  no case was 
there a un ifo rm  proportional deduction made fo r each p lo t ind ica ting  that nabud 
was the actual or estimated area o f crop destroyed in  the affected p lo t rather than a 
proxy fo r the condition o f the harvest. The area figures are expressed in  bighas 
measured by a ja r ib  or dori (measuring chain or rope) o f 20 ganthas o r knots. One
bigha was equal to 400 sq. ganthas but the dimensions o f the dori d iffe re d  in
* 2various parganas. O ften, there are tw o or more entries fo r  an ind iv idua l fo r  a 
single crop suggesting that the khasra was a p lo t survey rather than a record o f the 
aggregated area under each crop cu ltiva ted by the ind iv idua l. I t  also suggests the 
possib ility o f dispersed holdings.
The crop-sharing or batai jin s i account appears to be organised in  two distinct 
ways. In  the m a jo rity  o f khasras seen, each jin s i crop was subdivided in to  the 
varying schedule o f tax rates applicable -  i.e., a half-share, a th ird , a fou rth  or 
tw o -f if th s  share. Then fo r each such divis ion, the khasra records: the name o f the 
taxpayer, the total amount o f crop produced by him , the amount accruing to the 
state and the amount le ft  w ith  the agricu ltu ris t in  accordance w ith  a specified tax 
rate, the additional grain amount, o r "seri", charged as a percentage o f the state 
share, and lastly, the total grain amount due to the state -  i.e. basic revenue plus 
seri. This exercise was repeated in  tu rn  fo r  each crop assessed according to the 
crop-sharing method. Im mediately below the name o f the taxpayer one or more 
figures (generally three and never more than three) are listed w hich add up to the 
figure  under the head o f total quantity produced by the assessee. Invariab ly, the 
firs t o f these figures is the largest. This fact, along w ith  the observation that there 
were never more than three figures in  any case, lead us to suggest that they were 
the amounts o f harvested grain weighed at three d iffe re n t dates during the harvest
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period. I t  is un like ly  that the figures bear any relationship to the three revenue 
instalments or qists as the date o f com pilation o f the khasras examined so fa r is 
before that o f the firs t instalment date.^ A lte rna tive ly , the figures could re fe r to 
grain heaps on the threshing f lo o r as was the standard practice in  the second 
method o f recording jin s i values in  the khasra. The form at fo r  the crop-sharing 
khasra discussed above has been described as "khusha batai" o r where the 
unthreshed grain sheaves were weighed and d iv ided between the state and the 
peasant.
The second form  o f batai khasra was very d iffe re n t and probably represents a 
d iffe re n t procedure fo r  crop-sharing. In  this, the number o f grain heaps or 
"dheris1' were recorded against the name o f each assessee fo r each crop. Next, the 
quantity o f grain in  each dheri was given and this m u ltip lied  w ith  the number o f 
dheris gave the amount o f crop taken in  revenue. F ina lly , a small charge under the 
head o f "thanpo" -  lite ra lly  a mud or dung mark a ffixed  on the grain heap on the 
threshing floo r to safeguard against the ft -  was added on to give the total revenue 
amount demanded. Hence, the gross amount produced or the respective shares o f 
the peasant and the state in accordance w ith  a specified p roportion  was not stated. 
The number o f heaps varied and in  some cases more than a hundred heaps o f a 
single crop have been recorded fo r one assessee. The heaps were o f un ifo rm  weight 
fo r each entry made in  the khasra and may perhaps be the quantity  measured by a 
earthen measuring pot. The weight o f the dheri varied fo r  each tax payer 
ind ica ting  that i t  was not a standardised measure institu ted by the revenue 
authorities but fluctuated w ith  the size o f the pot provided by the assessee. In  the 
khasra examined, the w eight o f a dheri varied w ide ly ranging from  two maunds to 
as lit t le  as two and a quarter sers w ith  the average being approxim ately one and a
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quarter maunds (or f i f t y  sers) fo r  ba jra  and five  sers fo r  the pulses moth, mung, 
and urad. This fo rm  o f khasra papers indicate that crop-sharing was based on 
actual physical d ivision o f the threshed grain described as "ghalla batai" or "ghalla 
bakshi".
In  the khasras, the name o f the ind iv idua l has been recorded under the general 
heading o f asami. This term should, in  this context be understood to mean 
taxpayer rather than cu ltiva to r, although the two may coincide in  the m a jo rity  o f 
cases. This d istinction is especially applicable to the zamindar or bhom ia account in  
the khasra o f village Naelo analysed below. In  this, when the land was not tilled  
under the personal supervision o f the bhomia, e ither by vasidars or bonded 
labourers, halis or agricu ltura l labourers or in  gharuhala, the name o f the actual 
cu ltiva to r was exp lic itly  stated. W hile this feature is very clear in  the case o f the 
bhomias, we cannot assume that i t  does not apply to the other agriculturists. The 
entries fo r  the patels, fo r instance, may include the obligation to rem it revenue on 
land cultivated by seasonal m igrant peasants or pahis w ith in  his ju risd ic tion . 
Secondly, there are an inexplicab ly large number o f entries where no name has 
been recorded. These have been entered under "awjan" w hich has been translated 
to mean un iden tified  by S.P. Gupta.^ I t  occurs in  all khasras fo r  every crop but 
there is no systematic pattern in  its occurrence. Where the records have been 
prepared in  such detail, this lack o f precision appears illog ica l. I t  may perhaps mean 
’d itto ’ as in  one instance the entry fo llow ing  Roop Brahman is awjan Roop and in  
the bhomia account o f the khasra o f v illage Naelo, awjan gharu fo llows Bahu 
Jodhpuri’s account. However, u n til we obtain corroborative evidence and can be 
reasonably certain o f its correct meaning, awjan entries have been separately 
catalogued in the table appended.
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The khasra examined in detail is o f village Naelo fo r  the rabi harvest o f 1734. 
The larger adm inistrative un it o f w hich the village was a part -  a tappa or pargana 
-  has not been mentioned. The total number o f asami’s recorded are 102 or 91 i f  
we exclude the kamins. W ith  an ins ign ifican t area assessed under zabti (3.75 
bighas), devoted entire ly to small vegetable plots cu ltivated by M alis, this khasra 
provides details o f the foodgrains -  barley, wheat, and m ixed grains -  on which 
revenue was levied by crop-sharing. O f the foodgrains, wheat has been accounted 
fo r separately while all the other grains have been included in  a general 
und iffe ren tia ted  category. These two categories are then broken down in to  the 
various dasturs or customary proportions in  which the gross produce was shared 
between the state and the assessee. Interesting ly, we notice that a taxpayer may be 
assessed at more than one rate fo r  the same crop as well as occasionally there are 
several entries under one name fo r a single tax category.
There are a number o f entries where two names have been recorded. Both 
taxpayers in  these cases were invariab ly o f the priv ileged strata in  terms o f social 
status belonging either to the higher castes or the patels o f the village. This seems 
to indicate jo in t lia b ility  or perhaps an arrangement fo r cu ltiva tion  in  partnership. 
We are at present unclear as to the nature o f or reason fo r  these partnerships. As 
the parties are o f a d iffe re n t caste in  some cases, we cannot explain it  in  terms o f 
fam ily  members cu ltiva ting  in d iv id u a lly  and in  partnership. These entries d if fe r  
from  those in  the big zamindars or bhomia account discussed below where the 
names o f the tenants are iden tified  by the p re fix  o f "jota" o r "jo t" meaning 
’cultivated by ’ .
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The account o f the big zamindars, or bhomias (SI.Nos. 1-4 in  Table 7.1), is 
interesting in  that although they are the largest producers, they produced only 
barley and not the higher value wheat crop. Further, only when they cultivated 
the ir land in  gharuhala w ith  the help o f halis, were they taxed at the rate o f a 
quarter o f the taxable produce. However, they leased out a large portion  o f the ir 
land to tenants which was taxed at the rate o f a th ird . The produce from  the 
leased out portion  o f the two highest revenue payers in  the village -  Bahu Jodhpuri 
and Bahu T avri -  was over three-quarters o f the ir total taxable produce. The 
tenants were e ither the patels or agriculturists w ith  a substantial tax lia b ility  o f 
the ir own. The leasing in  o f land by substantial cultivators suggests that the terms 
offe red by the landlord must have been m utually advantageous to attract these ’ r ich ’ 
peasants.
The kam in account comprising six barbers, a carpenter, ironsm ith , potter and 
two menials, was taxed at a concessional rate o f a th ird  o f the produce. In  each 
case the amount recorded against the ir name was very small -  ranging from  as lit t le  
as three sers to th ir ty  sers. This feature along w ith  the element o f regular gradation 
in the amounts recorded fo r each kam in suggests that the tax was levied on the 
customary share o f grain received by the kamins.^
In  accordance w ith  the p rinc ip le  stated in  the dastur amals, or schedule o f 
revenue rates, we would have expected that the patels, Brahmans and members o f 
the higher castes were taxed at rates lower than those applicable to the general 
agricu ltu rist castes, i.e. the M a li’s, Gujars, Jats, and A h irs . However, we note no 
such caste based d is tinction  in  the rate o f taxation. From the table appended, i t  
can be seen that fo r the highest proportions o f tw o - f if th s  (40%) and a th ird
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(33.33%) o f the produce being levied as revenue, the m a jo rity  o f the entries are fo r
patels, Brahmans and Pancholis (kayasthas).
References:
1. Irfa n  Habib, Agrarian System, p.213; N .A .S idd iq i, Land Revenue System under 
the Mughals 1700-1750. pp50-54; Chhatar M ai, D iw an-i-P asand. trans. 
L. Dacosta, pp.9-10.
2. The ja r ib  was always d iv ided in to  20 ganthas and the standard ja r ib  was equal 
to 60 gaz. A lthough the ja r ib  in  use in  eastern Rajasthan was also d iv ided in to  
20 ganthas, the length o f the ja r ib , and hence the area o f the bigha, varied 
from  one pargana to another (see discussion in  note o f Chapter V I)
3. C h itti dt. Vaisakh sudi 9 VS 1783/ A D  1726 [No. 362], The le tte r quotes the 
dates fo r three kh a rif instalments or qists as m id-N ovem ber, m id-Decem ber, 
and early Februaury. The rabi season had two qists; one in  m id-June and the 
second in  July. These dates d if fe r  s lightly from  the dates o f revenue 
instalments fo r  Punjab quoted in  Indu Banga, Agrarian  System o f the Sikhs, 
p.95.
4 S P Gupta, "Khasra Documents in  Rajasthan", Medieval In d ia -A  M iscellany, 
vol. IV , pp. 168-176.
5 Also see discussion on the status and tax liab ilities  o f agricu ltu ris t and non- 
agricu ltu ris t kamins in  Chapter I I I  on Agrarian Relations.
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Notes to Table 7.1
The figures under Total revenue (col.3) include the basic land revenue (col.2) as 
well as an additional levy termed seri that was charged over and above the basic
revenue. The rate at which seri was levied varies slightly between d iffe re n t asami
accounts and is about 4.40 per cent o f the basic revenue. Seri appears to be a levy 
under jih a t or collection charges.
Asam i’s Share in  col.4 has been derived by subtracting Tota l Revenue (col.3)
from  Taxable Produce (col. 5). This is the only derived figu re  in  the table. The
figures in  the other columns have been entered as given in  the khasra. The Asam i’s 
Share gives the amount o f grain le ft w ith  the cu ltiva to r a fte r the land revenue had 
been deducted.
W ith  the exception o f entries numbered 1 to 4, the figures listed against barley 
include the m ixed crops ba ijha ri and gojara. No d istinction  has been made in the 
khasras w ith  regard to these lower value crops. Wheat, on the other hand has been 
entered separately in  the khasra fo r  each producer. Entries 1 to 4 fo rm  a sub­
section in  the khasra recording the revenues from  the Rau or substantial zam indar- 
bhomias cu ltiva ting  land w ith  the help o f the ir vasidars and halis or agricu ltura l 
labourers. In  this sub-section i t  is stated that the figures entered under barley are 
fo r that crop alone.
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Table 7.1
Foodgrain Production in village Naelo : Rabi harvest 1734 A.D.
SI. Name o f Asami Crop Rate Basic Total Asamis Taxable
No. Revenue Revenue Share Produce
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Bahu Jodhpuri Barley 1/4 14,38 15.25 42.25 57.50
[Isar Narnaul] 1 /4 16.00 17.00 47.00 64.00
[Dalpati Brahman] 1/3 29.00 30.25 56.75 87.00
[C hitar Patel] _ll_ 1/3 41.00 42.75 80.25 123.00
2. Bahu Tavri Barley 1 /4 28.75 30.50 84.50 115.00
[Lalo Patel] 1/3 29.00 30.25 56.75 87.00
[H iro ] —n— 1/3 39.00 40.70 76.30 117.00
[Pemu Patel] 1/3.5 45.00 47.00 110.50 157.50
3. Bai ka Barley 1/4 7.50 7.56 22.44 30.00
4. Km  K ilyan  Singh Barley 1/4 51.50 54.00 152.00 206.00
1 /4 5.50 5.83 16.17 22.00
[Gharu] 1 1/4 1.75 1.85 5.15 7.00
5. Bhojra j Kachhawa Barley 1/4 5.00 5.06 14.94 20.00
6. Bhanu Chauhan Barley 1 /4 1.25 1.33 3.67 5.00
__!!__ Wheat 1 /4 3.25 3.45 9.55 13.00
7. Mayaram Chauhan Barley 1/4 10.63 11.28 31.22 42.50
1/4 12.00 12.50 35.50 48.00
__H_ 1/4 2.25 2.38 5.62 8.00
&  Pemu Patel 1/3 19.00 19.80 37.20 57.00
Gangaram Ptl Wheat 1/3 2.00 2.09 3.91 6.00
— . 1/3 7.00 7.22 13.78 21.00
8. N ir  Singh Chauhan Barley 2/5 17.00 17.75 24.75 42.50
_!!_ _ll_ 1/3 8.42 8.80 16.45 25.25
__II Wheat 1/3 16.00 16.70 31.30 48.00
9. Sadaram Kachhawa Barley 1/3 3.60 3.80 6.95 10.75
_ll_ 1/4 9.06 9.46 26.79 36.25
Wheat 1/3 2.50 2.61 4.89 7.50
10. Surat Singh Rathor Barley 1/4 45.00 47.00 133.00 180.00
Wheat 1/4 15.00 15.50 44.50 60.00
11. Parasram Rawat Barley 1/4 22.13 23.13 65.37 88.50
II 1/4 17.51 18.28 51.76 70.04
— n — Wheat 1/4 2.04 2.13 6.03 8.16
_ll_ II 1/3 8.00 8.35 15.65 24.00
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continued Table 7.1 
12. B ino Patel
13. C hitar Patel  II _
&  Dedo Patel 
&  Dedo Patel
14. Dedo Patel
&  C h itar Patel 
&  C hitar Patel
15. Gangaram Patel
&  Kheto B ’man 
&  M y ’ram Ch’han
16. Jagrnp Patel
17. Lalo Patel
18. M alu Patel
19.Pemu Patel
&  M y ’ ram Ch’han
20. Patwari
21. Bakso Pancholi
22. Kanu Pancholi
&  Kheto B ’man
Barley 1/3
Wheat 2 /5
__t l __ 1/3
Barley 2/5
_ n _ 2/5
1/3
- J T_ 1/3
Wheat 1/3
Barley 2 /5
1/3
1/3
_ l l _ 1/4
Wheat 1/4
Barley 2/5
1/3
_ 1/3
Wheat 2 /5
— 1l — 1/3
— u — 1/3
Barley 2/5
2/5
1/4
Wheat 1/3
Barley 2/5
1/3
Wheat 1/3
Barley 2/5
^1 1 1/3
Barley 1/3
1/3
1/3
Wheat 1/3
Barley 1/3
Wheat 1/3
Barley 2/5
Barley 2/5
2/5
1/3
Wheat 2/5
9.50 9.93
6.50 6.80
8.50 8.88
18.00 18.80
32.50 33.95
70.00 73.13
34.00 35.50
17.00 17.75
2.00 2.09
70.00 73.13
34.00 35.50
24.25 25.30
17.00 17.75
19.50 20.38
6.50 6.78
1.88 1.96
4.00 4.18
24.00 25.00
2.00 2.09
5.50 5.75
16.00 16.70
27.50 28.73
10.50 10.98
14.25 15.15
15.50 16.20
10.00 10.45
3.00 3.13
6.50 6.80
0.50 0.53
7.00 7.40
19.00 19.80
4.50 4.70
5.50 5.50
2.00 2.00
9.50 9.93
5.50 5.75
8.00 8.35
20.00 20.88
4.00 4.18
18.57 28.50
9.45 16.25
16.62 25.50
26.20 45.00
47.30 81.25
136.87 210.00
66.50 102.00
33.25 51.00
2.91 5.00
136.87 210.00
66.50 102.00
71.70 97.00
50.25 68.00
28.37 48.75
12.72 19.50
3.67 5.63
5.82 10.00
47.00 72.00
3.91 6.00
8.00 13.75
31.30 48.00
81.27 110.00
20.52 31.50
21.10 36.25
30.30 46.50
19.55 30.00
4.37 7.50
12.70 19.50
0.97 1.50
13.60 21.00
37.20 57.00
8.80 13.50
11.00 16.50
4.00 6.00
13.82 23.75
8.00 13.75
11.65 20.00
39.12 60.00
5.82 10.00
continued Table 7.1
23. Lakho Pancholi Barley 2/5 8.50 8.88 12.37 21.25
—Ir_ It 1/3 43.00 44.88 84.12 129.00
_ll_ _,f~ 1/3.5 5.00 5.23 12.27 17.50
Wheat 1/3 19.00 19.85 37.15 57.00
24. M adhur Pancholi Barley 2/5 7.00 7.30 10.20 17.50
II II 1/3.5 30.40 31.63 74.37 106.00
_JI_ Wheat 1/3 22.50 23.50 44.00 67.50
25. Ravdo Pancholi Wheat 1/3 6.25 6.50 12.25 18.75
26. Khetsi Kayastha Barley 2/5 1.00 1.05 1.45 2.50
1/3 8.50 8.88 16.62 25.50
- " -  &  Gordhan B ’man - " - 1/3 1.75 1.83 3.42 5.25
-d o - Wheat 1/3 9.25 9.75 18.00 27.75
27. Mohan Kayastha Barley 1/3.5 28.5 29.75 70.00 99.75
28. Chatro Brahman Barley 2/5 2.25 2.36 3.27 5.63
1 2/5 4.50 4.73 6.52 11.25_1!_ Wheat 2/5 10.00 10.45 14.55 25.00
29. Dolo Brahman Wheat 2 /5 27.00 28.13 39.37 67.50
30. Dalpati Brahman Barley 1/3 2.00 2.09 3.91 6.00
_1l_ Wheat 2/5 7.00 - 7.30 10.20 17.50
__ll_ 1/3 29.00 30.28 56.72 87.00
31. Dhanu Brahman Wheat 2 /5 9.60 10.05 13.95 24.00
32. Dungo Brahman Barley 2/5 5.50 5.75 8.00 13.75
33. Gordhan Brahman Barley 2/5 1.25 1.30 1.83 3.13
- " -  &  Kheto B ’man 2/5 10.50 10.98 15.27 26.25
- " -  &  Khetsi K y ’stha _n_ 1/3 1.75 1.83 3.42 5.25
34. Govindo Brahman Barley 2/5 0.50 0.53 0.72 1.25
35. Hardo Brahman Barley 2 /5 2.25 2.35 3.28 5.63
- " -  &  Kuslo B ’man _lt_ 1/3 1.50 1.56 2.94 4.50
36. H a r ji Joshi Barley 2/5 4.00 4.18 5.82 10.00_1!_ 1/3 23.35 24.35 45.65 70.00
37. Kheto Brahman Barley 1/4 25.00 26.10 73.90 100.00
- " -  &  Gordhan B ’man — 2/5 10.50 10.98 15.27 26.25
- " -  &  Kanu Pancholi _H_ 2/5 8.00 8.35 11.65 20.00
&  G’gram Ptl Wheat 1/3 24.00 25.00 47.00 72.00
continued Table 7.1
38. Kuslo Pande 
• &  Harda
&  Prahakaro 
&  Prahakaro
Barley
_ t t _
_ l l _
1/3
1/3
1/3
2/5
39. Nathu Pande Barley 1/3
40. Nando Pande
_ l l _
Barley
Wheat
2/5
2/5
41. Mohan Pande Barley 2/5
42. Mado Pande Barley 2/5
43. Prahakaro Pradhan
&  Kuslo Pande
_ i r _
&  Kuslo Pande
Barley
_ l l _
_ ! ! _
2/5
2/5
1/3
1/3
44. Ramchand Brahman Barley 2 /5
45. Roop Brahman Barley 2/5
46. Ramdas Pande
__ H __
Barley
t l
Wheat
1/3
1/3
1/3
47. Revad Brahman Barley 1/3
48. Ramsingh Joshi Wheat 2/5
49. Swami Ramkisan Barley 1/4
50. Uday Joshi
_ l f _
Barley
_ t f _
2/5
1/3
51. Lai Khan M iya Barley 1/4
52. Fakira M a li Barley 1/3
53. Ramsingh M a li Barley 2/5
54. Samlo M a li Barley 
— n —
2/5
1/3
55. Lakho M a li Barley 2/5
56. Manohar M a li Barley 2/5
57. Mohan M a li Barley 1/3
5.50
1.50 
21.50
5.50
5.75 
1.56
22.45
5.75
10.75
2.94
42.05
8.00
16.50 
4.50
64.50 
13.75
11.00 11.50 21.50 33.00
6.00
5.50
6.28
5.75
8.72
8.00
15.00
13.75
2.50 2.61 3.64 6.25
8.50 8.88 12.37 21.25
7.50
5.50 
14.18 
21.50
7.83
5.75
14.78
22.45
11.92
8.00
27.72
42.05
19.75
13.75
42.50
64.50
13.50 14.03 19.72 33.75
9.00 9.40 13.10 22.50
1.85
2.60
2.00
1.93
2.73
2.09
3.57
5.11
3.91
5.50
7.84
6.00
10.00 10.45 19.55 30.00
22.80 23.80 33.20 57.00
1.13 1.18 3.45 4.63
7.00
18.00
7.23
18.80
10.27
35.20
17.50
54.00
27.00 27.68 80.32 108.00
1.00 1.04 1.96 3.00
6.50 6.78 9.47 16.25
2.00
9.20
2.09
9.63
2.91
18.87
5.00
28.50
4.00 4.18 5.82 10.00
3.10 3.23 5.52 7.75
55.00 57.40 107.60 165.00
continued Table 7.1
58. Palado M a li
59. Dhormu G ujar
60. Mehwalo Meena
_ 1 1 _
_ i r _
61. Narayan Meena
—. n _
62. Ramsingh Meena
63. Tulsi Meena
64. Hariyo Jat
65. Hemraj R a jo ri
 !1_
66. Keso R a jo ri
67. Sukho R a jo ri
68. Aso Vedhlo
69. Dhan Vedhlo
70. H ira  Vedhlo
71. Harram Vedhlo
72. Govindo
73. Govindo Vav
74. Bhansingh Vav
75. Bharmal Vav
76. Abharam Ch.
77. Banila Kuslo
78. Ghasiram
79. Hattiram  k i Vasir
Wheat 2/5 2.00
Barley 2/5 2.50
Wheat 2/5 9.00
Barley 2/5 1.70_1!_ 1/3 1.50
Wheat 2/5 4.00
Barley 1/3 19.75
Wheat 2/5 8.75
Wheat 2/5 7.50
Wheat 2 /5 5.50
-J 1 — 2/5 3.26
Barley 1/3 0.67
Barley 2/5 5.25
Wheat 2/5 4.50
Barley 2/5 0.35
Barley 2/5 10.00
Barley 1/3 1.38
Barley 1/3 37.50
Wheat 2/5 8.50
Barley 2 /5 2.71
Wheat 2 /5 10.00
Barley 1/3 16.00
Wheat 1/3 2.25
Barley 2/5 12.00
Barley 2/5 3.00
Barley 1/3 26.50
Barley 1/3 11.50
Barley 1/4 19.40
Wheat 1/3 13.00
2.09 2.91 5.00
2.61
9.43
3.64
13.07
6.25
22.50
1.78
1.56
4.18
2.47
2.94
5.82
4.25
4.50
10.00
20.63
9.15
38.62
13.73
59.25
22.88
7.83 10.92 18.75
5.75
3.40
7.26
4.77
13.01
8.17
0.72 1.28 2.00
5.48
4.68
7.65
6.57
13.13
11.25
0.38 0.50 0.88
10.43 14.57 25.00
1.44 2.69 4.13
39.18 73.32 112.50
8.88 12.37 21.25
2.83
10.45
3.95
14.55
6.78
25.00
16.70 31.30 48.00
2.36 4.39 6.75
12.55 17.45 30.00
3.13 4.37 7.50
27.68 51.82 79.50
12.00 22.50 34.50
20.28 57.35 77.63
13.81 25.19 39.00
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80. Isar Narnaul 
—T —
Barley
II
Wheat
2/5
2/5
1/3
1/3
13.00
1.00
1.00
6.50
13.58
1.04
1.04 
6.80
18.92
1.46
1.96
12.70
32.50 
2.50 
3.00
19.50
81. Jodho Bagri
_II_ BarleyWheat
2/5
2/5
1.00
14.33
1.05
14.93
1.45
20.82
2.50
35.75
82. Jasram (ka vasi?) Barley 1 /4 27.50 28.73 81.27 110.00
83. Jairamu Wheat 2/5 3.50 3.65 5.10 8.75
84. Kanjodo 
—
Barley
Wheat
2/5
2 /5
4.30
3.00
4.50
3.13
6.25
4.37
10.75
7.50
85. Keso Barley 1/4 3.81 3.45 9.80 13.25
86. Kesoramso Barley
II
2/5
1/3
7.00
24.35
7.30
25.43
10.20
47.57
17.50
73.00
87. Karm u Dekati Barley 1/3 1.50 1.56 2.94 4.50
88. L ikhm u Wheat 2 /5 8.90 9.30 12.95 22.25
89. Sitaram Sede Barley 1/3 2.87 3.00 5.60 8.60
90. Sahibram Barley 1/4 11.25 11.73 33.27 45.00
91. Sahjuk Vasir Barley 1/3 1.42 1.50 2.75 4.25
92. Dayaram Nai Barley 1/3 0.13 0.13 0.25 0.38
93. Thakro Nai Barley 1/3 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.75
94. Godho Nai Barley 1/3 0.13 0.13 0.25 0.38
95. Ganglo Nai Barley 1/3 0.13 0.13 0.25 0.38
96. Revado Nai Barley 1/3 0.13 0.13 0.25 0.38
97. Harram Nai Barley 1/3 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.08
98. Chando K ha ti Barley 1/3 0.08 0.08 0.15 0.23
99. Deepo Kum har Barley 1/3 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.75
100. Luhar Barley 1/3 0.08 0.08 0.15 0.23
101. Kuslo Chamar Barley 1/3 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.75
102. Balahi Barley 1/3 1.25 1.25 2.50 3.75
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continued Table 7.1
A w ja n  (7 entries) Barley 2 /5  41.50 43.35 60.40
1/3 100.35 104.81 196.19 301.00
1 /4  25.50 27.07 74.93 102.00
103.75
Source: Khasra mauza Naelo fo r  the rabi harvest o f 1734 A .D ./  1791 V.S. dated Jeth. 
Sudi 2
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Aal
Abadi
Aghori
A jw a in  
A ls i 
Ambar 
A m i I
Asam i 
A s antiwar
A sli
Bahai 
Bai jhari
Bajra
Balahi 
Banjar
Baqaya
Baqi
Barani
B a rti/V a rti
Batai
GLOSSARY
the dried roots o f this biannual fie ld  crop were used to produce 
a red dye; Morinda tinctoria
settlement; village site; population
lit .  ha lf a hide; hast I aghori was a cess levied on the leather 
workers in  a qasba
lovage or bishops weed; Caryota copticum  
linseed; Linium usitalissium
storehouse; granary; khasa ambar was the royal granary
the head o f adm inistration at the pargana level whose prim ary 
function  was the collection o f revenue
taxpayer, cu ltiva to r
according to name; account showing the revenue payable by 
each taxpayer
prim ary, orig inal; asli mauza was the o rig ina l village as opposed 
to a later settlement or dakhili (q.v.) village
gross cropped land
mixed crop o f wheat, barley and gram sown in  the w in te r or 
rabi harvest
bulrush, spiked or cumboo m ille t grown in  the autumn harvest; 
Pennisetnm typhoideum
H indu  caste o f leather-workers
cultivable waste; land that was potentia lly  cultivable but 
required considerable e ffo rt to clear as it  had la in  fa llow  fo r a 
long period or had never been tilled
revenue arrears
remainder; balance o f account
un irrigated or ra in -fe d  land
a low value, early ripening kh a rif m ille t consumed ch ie fly  by 
the poor; Patti cum crus gal li
crop-sharing; the d iv is ion o f the grain heap between the 
agricu ltu ris t and the revenue appropria tor
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Batta
Bechiragi
Bhadvadh/  
Bhadvar
BJiakho/Bhakhi
Bhara
Bhent
Bhomia
Bhomi
Bigha
Bighori
B ij-k h a j/  -kh ad
Bisondh
Bor
Buzurg
Chahi
Chhaili rasi 
Charas 
Chari 
Chaudhuri
d ifference or rate o f exchange; a charge imposed to make up 
fo r any probable defic iency in  the value o f non-standard or 
short-w e ight coin
lit .  w ithou t ligh t; used to denote deserted village as in  bechiragi 
gaon.
land prepared fo r the p lanting o f sugarcane; or land repeatedly 
ploughed during the kh a rif harvest and allowed to lie  fa llow  
before sowing in  the rabi season
a person who kept count; a counter; a revenue functionary who 
assisted in  the process o f crop-sharing or batai
carriage hire; cost o f conveyance; rent.
o ffe rings presented to the revenue o ffic ia ls ; generally commuted 
in to  a fixed  cash levy per village
zam indar; landholder
cess paid to the bhomia (q.v.) in  recognition o f the zam indari 
r igh t
measure o f land w hich varied from  a square o f 75 cubits or 
haths (q.v.) to 95 cubits in  eastern Rajasthan. Most common 
was the bigha o f 75 cubits which was equivalent to the standard 
M ughal b ig h a -i-d a fta ri or approximately tw o - f if th s  o f an acre
fixed  cash levy per un it o f land irrespective o f produce
advance o f seed and food to cultivators; consumption loan
lit .  f ive  per cent; renumeration paid to patel
a term used in  the tax records to denote un irriga ted land 
producing w in te r wheat, barley or gram
s u ffix  fo llow ing  the name o f a village that denoted a parent or 
older village and distinguished i t  from  a s im ila rly  named o f f ­
shoot village (c f ,khurd)
w e ll- irr ig a te d  land
cess on sheep and goats
leather bucket fo r draw ing water from  a well 
green fodder
holder o f superior hereditary rights to land who was also a 
pargana  (q.v.) level revenue o ffic ia l; also a headman o f a 
profession or trade
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Chhadami
Chino
Chitti
Chomli
Chola
Dakhili mauza 
Dam
Dangro bigha 
Das tar
Daul
Dehnimi
Desawar
Dhani
Dhenkali
Dher
Diwan
six dams (q.v.); cess levied at that rate per rupee o f revenue 
paid
common m ille t; Panicum miliaceum  
le tte r
tax category in  pargana Chatsu which re ferred to irriga ted land 
sown w ith  wheat or barley that was taxed at the standard cash 
rate per un it o f land irrespective o f which o f the two crops was 
grown
cowpea or lobhia; the green pods o f this k h a r if legume could be 
consumed as vegetable or the ripe seeds used as a pulse; 
Dolichos sinensis
a village whose revenue returns were included in  the returns o f 
an asli (q.v.)village; an o ff-shoo t o f a parent village which was 
not recognised as an independent revenue un it in  the 
adm inistrative records
fractional piece o f a taka (q.v.) or copper coin; f i f t y  dams made 
one taka and twenty five  dams one paisa  (q.v.). The taka and 
dam  in  the H indu  scale o f copper currency were not the same 
as the Mughal dam  which was also a copper coin
land located on a h ills ide or the bank o f a rive r; from  dang: a 
h ill or precipice
custom; in  revenue usage denoted customary rates o f taxation; 
the dastur amal or dastur-nl-am al recorded the o ff ic ia l tax 
schedules
a pre-harvest estimated assessement o f revenue by the qanungo; 
daulnama was a extract from  the general particulars o f the 
statement fo r  the in fo rm ation  o f each taxpayer
lit .  f ive  per cent; the share o f the village headman o f the 
revenue collected (c f.bisondh)
outside the desk or te rrito ry  w ith in  the adm in istra tive bounds o f 
the Jaipur state
a cluster o f homesteads or a hamlet w ith in  the bounds o f the 
village but at a distance from  the main habitational site.
a shallow p it-w e ll
an unlined, earthen or kuccha well
tit le  o f the ch ie f c iv il adm inistrator and head o f the revenue 
and finance departments; the highest rank in  the state 
bureaucracy
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D ofasli
Dori
Doriya 
Ek harfi
Gaoit 
Gar i wan 
Gau shumari 
Ghani teli 
Gharuhala
Ghi
Ghughari
Gochani
G o jara /G o ja i
Goshwar
Gundgari
Gur
Guwar
Habubati 
H akikat nawis 
H aljota
double-cropped land
lit .  rope; in  revenue usage, a hempen rope used to measure land
and also called saan dori or sina dori
a member o f the o ff ic ia l land measuring party
lit .  changing, a ltering, or turn ing; arhsatta ek harfi was the term
used fo r the provisional annual revenue statement
village
professional carterer, d rive r o f a cart 
a tax on livestock
tax levied per wooden oil-press or ghani {ci.khali ghani)
a priv ileged tenure extended to proprietors belonging to the 
upper castes and the hereditary village o ffic ia ls  which entitled 
them to concessionary rates o f land revenue taxation and 
various exemptions
c la rified  butter
lit .  grain boiled in  the husk; cess imposed in  lieu  o f the grain 
trad itiona lly  presented to the sehna (q.v.) on the ripening o f the 
crop
m ixed crop o f wheat and gram grown in  the rabi harvest
m ixed crop o f wheat and barley grown in  the rabi harvest
a concise statement o f income and expenditure under each 
accounting head; a m onthly com pilation o f accounts; also 
referred to as goswaro
ground fu ll o f hollows; a soil abounding in  moisture, 
unrefined sugar
cluster-bean; a hardy kh a rif crop cu ltivated as a vegetable, a 
pulse or green cattle fodder. Cyamopsis psoralio ides
imposts in  addition to the land revenue levied on the revenue 
un it as a whole; denoted exactions in  k ind  o f articles o f use but 
the dues were collected in  cash a fte r commutation
newswriter; a state appointed o ff ic ia l responsible fo r  reporting 
on events in  the parganas independently o f the regular o ff ic ia l 
dispatches sent by the pargana adm inistrator o r am il (q.v.)
cu ltiva to r or agricu ltu ris t as opposed to kamin (q.v.)
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Har ka bigha
Hath
H im ayati
H o li
Ijaradar
Inam
Incch tarkari 
Jagir
Jari
Jinsi
Jot
Juwar
Kachra
Kaguni
Kamin
Kankar
Kasumbho
Kasur batta 
Katla
land at a distance from  the village site and extending to its 
boundary
lit .  hand; a cub it measure o f approxim ately tw enty-one inches 
in  eastern Rajasthan
patron, protector, defender or guardian
popular H indu  festiva l to celebrate the onset o f spring
revenue farmer; a person who took over the management and 
collection o f the revenue and contracted to pay an agreed cash 
sum to the state
grant o f revenue-free land fo r service (cf.udik)
a tax in  addition to the basic land revenue levied on the 
cu ltiva tion  o f vegetables
the assignment o f the land revenue o f specified areas as 
remuneration fo r  m ilita ry  or c iv il service; a ja g ird a r  was the 
recip ient o f such a prebendal tenure
the produce o f the second or th ird  cu tting  o f the indigo plant 
(cf. nyoti)
derived from  jin s  o r grain; mode o f revenue collection in  k ind  
cu ltiva tion
Ind ian m ille t; m a jo r kh a rif crop in  sem i-a rid  regions o f Ind ia  
and an im portant food crop. Sorghum vulgare
a vegetable very like  cucumber except larger and m ottled yellow 
and green
Ita lian or fo x ta il m ille t; also called kagani, kangni and kanguni; 
the straw -ye llow  varie ty o f Panicum italicum  (cf. raid)
generic term fo r  the service castes such as the village artisans 
and menials
gravel
safflow er or bastard saffron; the flowers o f this rabi crop are 
used to produce a red dye and the seeds yie ld  valuable oil; 
Carthamus tinctorius
discount on the payment o f revenue in  coin other than the 
standard currency
wholesale market
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Kha.ee
Khali
Khalisa
Khari kliaklo
K harif
Khasa
Khasra
Khata
Khatli
Kholri
Khurak
Khurd
Khush kharid  
Khudkasht
Kodon
Kos
Kothi kua 
Kotri
grain p it
o il cake; khali ghani was the tax levied per o il press (ci.ghani 
teli)
te rritories that were d irectly  administered by the state, o r the 
crown lands; in  fiscal accounts the term was used to denote the 
sum that was deposited d irectly  in  the state treasury and which 
had not been either assigned in  ja g ir  or alienated in  revenue- 
free grants
hay, dry fodder; the straw and cha ff o f barley and wheat 
the autumn harvest
g ra in -p its  in  which the state’s share o f the revenue collected in -  
k ind  was stored (c f .khaee, khata)
a document compiled by the qanungo and the village headman 
and accountant w h ich recorded the area cu ltivated and the crops 
produced by each taxpayer in  the village during  the current 
agricu ltura l season
g ra in -p it, possibly bigger than a khaee
a crop raised on the dried sandy bed o f a r ive r made productive 
by the application o f manure or khat
hearth tax on artisans and occupational castes resident in  the 
qasba; also called jhupri
a fixed  daily allowance o f food; rations provided by the village 
to the revenue o ffic ia ls  during the ir stay in  the village
small, litt le ; a s u ff ix  used to designate an o ff-shoo t village 
which had the same name as an older kalan or buzurg (q.v.) 
village
spot sales o f grain by the state to traders (c f .satta)
l i t .  se lf-cu ltiva ted; a khudkashta cu ltiva to r was a resident 
peasant p roprie to r cu ltiva ting  his own land
sm all-gra in  m ille t grown in  the k h a rif harvest; Paspalum  
scrobiculatum
a measure o f distance a lit t le  over two and a quarter miles (2.27 
miles)
a b r ic k - lin e d  w ell
a mud fo rt, the residence o f the local zam indar or bhomia
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K u ri
Kyari
Lalharo 
Langar 
Lawazim a  
Laik zarrati 
Lih
Machil
Mahajan
M akka
Malba
M ali
M aljihat
Mandwa 
Maund (man)
a coarse grain m ille t generally eaten by the poor; also grown as 
one o f the best green fodders fo r horses and cattle; Patti cum 
hetopus
in  general the term refers to small plots o f land that have been 
carefu lly prepared in  order to obtain a f irm , retentive soil; in  
the revenue records, the term is sometimes used synonymously 
w ith  seko (q.v.)
rabi crop cu ltivated in  parganas Malarna and H indaun; possibly 
a type o f gourd or melon
a kitchen fo r the d is tribu tion  o f cooked meals to the poor; an 
almshouse maintained by pub lic  revenue
a surcharge imposed in  addition to the standard cash or zabti 
levy to defray the costs o f assessment
the total cu ltivab le land which included the land cultivated, the 
current fa llow  and the lea (c f .banjar)
land that was annually flooded
irriga ted land; specific term used in qasba Sanganer to 
d iffe ren tia te  between irriga ted land planted w ith  a new 
sugarcane crop and land that produced a ratoon crop which was 
also watered (c f ,peri)
a generic term fo r  a merchant, trader or dealer. Mahajan was 
also a specific caste whose members were priv ileged 
agriculturists
Ind ian corn or maize; cultivated as a k h a rif and a rabi crop and
can be consumed as a green vegetable or the ripe grains are
ground to produce a flou r; Zea mays
village fiscal pool to which the peasants contribu ted in  order to
pay taxes levied on the village as a whole and to meet 
communal expenses
H indu  caste o f specialist market gardeners
the basic land revenue (mat) and the other charges on 
agricu ltura l production levied to defray expenses o f assessment 
and collection (ci.sa ir jih a t)
finge r m ille t; also called ragi in  west and south Ind ia  where i t  is 
cultivated extensively ; Eleusine coracana
a u n it o f weight w ith  varying values in  our region and period 
ranging from  about 52 lbs. to the standard m att-i-Shahjahani or 
pukka man o f about 73.76 lbs.; in  modern usage, more 
commonly refered to as maund
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Mauza
M oth
Mung
Nadar
Nankar
Nalvat
Nirakh
Nirni
Nyoti
Padat
Pahi
Palti
Panchayat
Panchotreh
Pargana
Paimali
Paisa
Parna
Parwana
Patel
village
brown gram; a leguminous kh a rif crop exceptionally suited to 
ra in -fe d  cu ltiva tion  on poor quality soil; a popular and w idely 
consumed le n til in  Rajasthan; occasionally also grown as green 
fodder; Phaseolus aconitifolius
green gram; Phaseolus radiatus
impoverished
allowance paid to the zamindar fo r assistance in  the collection 
o f revenue
rent payable on the use o f a well to the p roprie to r
price, rate; nirakh bazar was the current market price
fodder; a cash levy imposed on the cu ltiva tion  o f lentils  in  lieu 
o f the dry fodder retained by the peasant
the firs t cu tting  from  the indigo plant
fa llow  land; current fa llow  and lea (ci.bahat)
a m igrant or non-resident cu ltiva to r
a cu ltiva to r who was not entitled to a p riv ileged tenure, and 
generally belonged to the agricu lurist castes
a court o f a rb itra tion ; each caste group had its own panchayat 
which exercised a general supervisory func tion  over the 
behaviour o f its members
tax levied at five  per cent (cf. dehnimi, bisondh)
the e ffective  un it o f revenue adm inistration; a subordinate un it 
h ierarchically linked  to the w ider adm in istra tive area such as 
the d is tric t (sarkar) and province (suba)
destruction o f crops caused by warfare
small coin; s ixty fo u r paisas made a s ilve r rupaiya (q.v.) o r 
rupee
the contractual sale o f grain by the state to the traders 
a royal order 
village headman
Patwari village accountant
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Pauni
Pedi
Phutkar
Piwal
Potadar
Pukka
Qanungo
Qasba
Rabi
Rahat
Raiyat
Raiyati
R aj
Ralo
Rama ka bigha
Reh
Rozina
Rupee (rupaiya)
collective name fo r  the low castes or menials 
the ratoon crop o f sugarcane
sundry, separated, or incurred at d iffe re n t places (as debts); 
fu tkar asam i: miscellaneous persons
irriga ted  land; good quality irriga ted cotton land was termed 
p iw a l paheli w h ile  poorer land situated at a distance from  the 
village was classed as p iw a l pacheli
treasurer; pargana level o ff ic ia l treasurer and moneychanger
sturdy or long-lasting as in  pukka kua o r b r ic k - lin e d  well; 
standard as in  pukka man or the o ff ic ia l maund weight; fixed  as 
in  pakk i zabti or crops invariab ly assessed in  cash
pargana  level o ff ic ia l who p rim a rily  m aintained records relating 
to revenue assessment and oversaw the w ork ing  o f the village 
accountant or patw ari; member o f the hereditary rura l elite
adm inistrative centre o f the pargana o r the subordinate part o f 
a pargana , the tappa ; country town
w in te r harvest
Persian wheel
cu ltivator; in  its widest sense the term included all revenue 
payers but most often used interchangeably w ith  p a lti to denote 
unpriv ileged resident peasant
perta in ing to the raiyat', raiyati dastur was the standard rate o f 
taxation, as opposed to the riyayati or concessional tax schedule; 
raiyati bigha , or land cultivated by the raiyat
kingdom
m ille t; reddish varie ty o f Kaguni; Panicum italicum
annually flooded land or land situated along the rive r
barren land u n fit  fo r cu ltiva tion , (ci.usar)
daily wage; rozindar was a w orker paid a fixe d  da ily wage
silver coin equivalent to sixteen annas or s ix ty fo u r paisas in  the 
trad itiona l Ind ian scale o f silver currency
Sahukar banker, dealer in  money, merchant in  general
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S air-jih a t
Sakarkandi 
Sakim i (shikmi) 
Sali 
Sanad
Sandhya Gayatri 
Mantra
Sanjha
Sarda
sa rf-i-s icca
S arikat/sh rikat
Sarson
Satta
Sawai Jamabandhi
Sawanu
Sehna
Seko
Ser (seer)
a variety o f regular cesses which were imposed on the prim ary 
revenue un it, the village or qasba in  add ition to the land 
revenue
sweet potato; Ipomoea batatas 
a dependent, a subordinate cu ltiva to r 
rice; O ryza sativa
grant; an o ff ic ia l document containing the particu lars o f the 
emoluments, titles and privileges to which the grantee was 
entitled
the inaudib le recitation o f the Gayatri m antra , 
verse from  the Vedas o f particu lar sanctity, during the 
prescribed periods o f daily religious worship by the Brahmans, 
namely, sunrise, noon and sunset, o f which the evening service 
was specially im portant
share-cropping
the finest variety o f melon; Cucumis melo
a cess to make up fo r  any loss that may occur between the 
value o f the coins in  w hich revenue was paid and the standard 
currency (c f kasur batta)
partnership; co-parcenary or jo in t occupancy
rapeseed; a plant o f the same genus as mustard grown in  the 
rabi harvest fo r its seeds which y ie ld  an o il used fo r  cooking 
and ligh ting , and the oilcake a valuable cattle fodder; Brassica 
campestris
a contractual arrangement between the state and the traders fo r  
the sale o f grain that had been collected as revenue in k ind
a sub-category in  the annual statement o f revenue accounts 
which included all non-agricu ltu ra l taxes; taxes on commerce 
and the transit o f goods form ed more than e ighty per cent o f 
the proceeds under this head
relating to the period o f the monsoon
village watchman appointed to prevent the p ilferage o f the 
standing crop or the threshed grain and to supervise the d ivision 
o f the grain heap between the cu ltiva to r and the state
wheat or barley fie lds watered by wells
un it o f weight one -fo rtie th  o f a man (q.v.); the weight o f the 
ser varied locally
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Siyalu
Singhara
Suji
Syaha
Tag at
Taka
Tappa
Tappadar
Taqmina
Tarbuz
Tehsil
Tehvil potadar
Teniya
Thirma
T il
Tisala
Tola
Udik
Ujar
Unhalu
the local term fo r the autumn or kharif harvest
water chestnut; Trapa bispinosa
a grainy flo u r made from  hard wheat
corruption  o f shahi or royal, relating to the k ing
advances o f money made by the state to the cultivators
copper coin equal to f i f t y  dams or two paisas  (q.v.)
an adm inistrative sub-d iv is ion  o f a pargana ; each such cluster 
contained one or more villages and a qasba\ the qasba which 
was the adm inistrative centre o f the whole pargana  was always 
located in  tappa haveli
subordinate o f the am il responsible fo r  the fiscal and revenue 
management o f the tappa
a statement g iv ing a detailed estimate o f the revenue obtainable 
in  the current harvest based on a survey o f crops grown and 
estimated yields
watermelon
collection, revenue collected; in  modern usage a sub-d is tric t 
revenue divis ion
cash in  the keeping o f a person appointed to take care o f it; 
pargana treasury
a member o f the o ff ic ia l land measuring party 
a type o f cloth o f superior quality
sesame; generally sown as an autumn crop fo r  its seeds which 
y ie ld  o il w h ile  the o il-cake is used as fodder and manure; 
Sesamum indicum
the th ird  cu tting  from  the tri-annua l ind igo p lant
a standard tola was equal to the weight o f a s ilver rupee o f 
179.66 troy grains and eighty tolas made one standard seer 
(q.v.). The weight o f the tola> and hence that o f the seer and 
maund, varied locally.
grant o f revenue free land fo r charitable and relig ious purposes 
deserted, uncultivated or uninhabited; opposite o f abad  (q.v.) 
w in te r or rabi harvest
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Urad black gram; Phaseolus mungo
Usar land rendered u n f it  fo r cu ltiva tion  due to the effloresence o f
alkaline carbonates
Vas dw elling, habitation
Viran deserted, uninhabited
Virotra l i t .  two per cent; charge in qasba Phagi to renumerate the patel
Vyapari trader, dealer; also called vyopari, beopari
Waqaia Nawis news w rite r, recorder o f events, collector o f o ff ic ia l intelligence
Yaddashti memorandum
Zabti land revenue assessment in  money per u n it o f land
Z aid  rabi summer crop o f melons, gourds and vegetables sown a fte r the
rabi harvest
SELECTED B IB L IO G R A P H Y
I.P rim a ry  Sources
A : Fiscal Records
Arhsattas and Jamabandhis: Data A v a ila b ility  Chart : c.1710 -  1780.
V S /A D C P J S L M V S /A D C P J S L
1748/1691 - A - - - - 1801/1744 A A A A -
1754/1697 - A - - - - 1802/1745 A K A A A
1765/1708 - - - A - - 1803/1746 - A A A A
1767/1710 A _ - R - - 1804/1747 - - A A A
1768/1711 A _ - K - R 1806/1748 A - - A A
1769/1712 A - - A A - 1806/1749 A A - - -
1770/1713 - _ - A A A 1807/1750 A A A - _
1771/1714 A - _ - A A 1808/1751 A A - - -
1772/1715 K K - A K A 1809/1752 A
1773/1716 A A - A A A 1810/1753 A A - - A
1774/1717 A A - - A A 1811/1754 _ A - - A
1775/1718 - K - - A A 1812/1755 A A A A -
1776/1719 - - - - A A 1813/1756 A - A K A
1777/1720 - A - - A A 1814/1757 A A A - A
1778/1721 A R - - A K 1815/1758 A - - - A
1779/1722 - - - - A A 1816/1759 - A A - K
1780/1723 A A - - - A 1817/1760 A A - A -
1781/1724 A R - K - - 1818/1761 A - K K A
1782/1725 - A - - - A 1819/1762 A - A - A
1783/1726 A A - - - A 1820/1763 A - A A A
1784/1727 - A - - - A 1821/1764 A - - K K
1785/1728 - K A A - A 1822/1765 A - - - A
1786/1729 - A A - - A 1823/1766 A - - K -
1787/1730 A A - A K A 1824/1767 A - A K A
1788/1731 A A - A A K 1825/1768 A - A K A
1789/1732 A A - A - A 1826/1769 A - A - -
1790/1733 A A K K A - 1827/1770 - - A A A
1791/1734 A A - - A - 1828/1771 A - A A -
1792/1735 A - - _ _ - 1829/1772 - - A A -
1793/1736 - A A A - A 1830/1773 - - - K -
1794/1737 A - A A A A 1831/1774
1795/1738 A - R R - A 1832/1775 - - - - R
1796/1739 - - A A A - 1833/1776
1797/1740 A - R A A - 1834/1777 - - - - A
1798/1741 A A A A A - 1835/1778 - A - - -
1799/1742 A A A A A - 1836/1779 - - - - -
1800/1743 A A A A - A 1839/1782 - - - _ -
The table above shows the revenue records consulted fo r each o f the six qasbas 
studied -  Chatsu (C), Phagi (P), Sawaii Ja ipur (J), Sanganer (S), Lalsot (L ), and 
Malarna (M ). Symbols A ,K ,a n d  R indicate whether the complete annual series is 
available (A ) or only the record o f the k h a rif (K ) or rabi (R) harvest. In  the o rig ina l
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documents the fiscal year expressed in  V ik ra m i Samvat (VS) began in  m id-September 
and hence straddled two calendar years. In  the table we have only indicated the 
Christian year corresponding to the beginning o f the fiscal year.
Other Fiscal Records
Roznamcha Pargana Phagi, VS 1782/AD  1725.
Roznamcha Pargana Oasba Sanganer, VS 1781/AD  1725; VS 1782/A D  1725. 
Roznamcha Chabutra K o tw a li. Qasba A m beri, VS 1753/AD  1696.
Roznamcha Chabutra K o tw a li. Qasba Tonk, VS 1750/AD  1693.
Svaha Satti, Pargana Jalalpur and Bhadkol, VS 1721/AD  1664.
Svaha Satti. Pargana Dausa and Saneri, VS 1723/AD  1666.
N irakh  Bazar. Pargana Phagi, VS 1782/AD  1725.
Khasra. Mauza Naelo, VS 1791/AD  1734.
Taam ina. Pargana Lalsot, VS 1788/AD  1731.
Goshwara. Qasba SAnganer, VS 1817/A D  1760.
B: Taxation Schedules
Dastur A m a l. Pargana Amarsar, VS 1783/AD  1726.
Dastur A m a l. Pargana Antela, n.d. (A D  1727?).
Dastur A m al M a liih a ti wa S a iriiha ti. Fasli K h a r if wa Rabi. Pargana Chatsu, VS 
1769/AD  1712.
Dastur A m a l. Pargana Harsana, n.d.
Dastur A m a l. Pargana M au jpu r, n.d.
Dastur A m al wa A m al Dastur. Pargana Phagi, n.d. (A D  1679?).
Dastur Am ah Qasba Sanganer, VS 1660/A D  1603.
Dastur A m a l. Pargana Sonkhar Sonkheri, VS 1773/AD  1716.
Dastur A m a l. Pargana U dehi, n.d. (A D  1714?).
Dastur A m a l. Pargana Jhak, n.d. (A D  1712?).
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C: Censuses and Surveys
Yaddashti H a l. Pargana Chala Kalyan, VS 1722/AD  1665.
Yaddashti Hal B a il. Pargana Chatsu, VS 1723/AD  1666.
Yaddashti Hal B a il. Pargana Chatsu, VS 1723/AD  1666.
Yaddashti Asami wa B a il. Pargana Malarna, VS 1723/AD  1666.
H akika ti Raqba Bigha wa Asami wa B a il. Pargana Mauzabad, VS 1721/A D  1664.
Yaddashti Padat D h a rti. Pargana Mauzabad, VS 1722/AD  1665.
Hazari Asami wa B a il. Pargana Mauzabad, VS 1723/AD  1666.
Yaddashti Haaiqati Vavat Baai Tagai wa Baqava. Pargana Mauzabad, VS 1722/AD  
1665.
Yaddashti H aa iqa ti. Paragana M alpura, VS 1772/AD  1715.
Yaddashti Hal B a il. Pargana N iw a i, VS 1767/AD  1710.
Yaddashti V ic h o ti. Pargana Bhangarh wa A jabgarh , VS 1774/AD  1717.
D: O ffic ia l Reports and Correspondence
C hittis  from  collection in Muwazana K hu rd  and Muwazana JKala, D a fta r D iwan 
H azuri. RSAB.
Sanads and C h ittis  catalogued under D a fta r Sanad Nawis.
C hittis  under Nuskha Punva.
Am ber Records. VS 1721-1724/AD  1664-1666, VS 1757-1790/AD  1700-1733.
Arzdashts. VS 1687-1724/AD  1630-1667, VS 1740-1743/AD  1683-1686, VS 1757- 
1781/AD  1700-1724.
II. Gazetteers and Reports.
Raiputana Gazetteer. Calcutta, 1878-1880, V o l.II: A jm e r, by J.Digges La Touche. 
V o l.I ll:  S irohi and M ount A b u , by M a j. C .A.Bavlav.Ja ipu r, by 
M a j. C .A.Baylay. V o l.IV : U lw a r. by P.W.Powlett.
Im peria l Gazetter o f India: P rovincia l Series. Raiputana. Com piled by 
K .D .Erskine. Calcutta 1908.
Rajasthan D is tr ic t Gazetteer: A lw a r. Jaipur 1968.
Rajasthan D is tr ic t Gazetteer: Jhalawar. Jaipur,1964.
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Ind ian Crop Calendar. 4th.edition. Revised and Enlarged. 
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